STUDIA CROATICA

Año X – Enero - Diciembre 1969- Vol. 32-35

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF "STUDIA CROATICA"

With this volume, STUDIA CROATICA celebrates its tenth anniversary. We extend our gratitude to all its collaborators who have supported it intellectually, morally, or materially.

THE GENOCIDE OF THE CROATIAN PEOPLE

DOMINIK MANDIĆ - THE PERSONALITY AND HIS CULTURAL WORK

Dr. ANTE TRUMBIĆ

THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE CROATIAN BISHOP JOSE J. STROSSMAYER IN THE FIRST VATICAN COUNCIL (1869-1870)

"PRAXIS", SOCIALIST BUREAUCRACY AND ALIENATION

THE CENTENARY OF THE HUNGARIAN-CROATIAN COMPROMISE (1868-1968)

COMMENTS

"HEARING THE BELLS"

STANKO M. VUJICA: UNPUNISHED CRIME OF BELGRADE'S COMMUNIST AGENTS IN MUNICH, WEST GERMANY

DOCUMENTS

ROGER BOŠKOVIC WAS CROATIAN

A SERIAN NEWSPAPER ON RELATIONS CROATIAN-SERVIAN

DONATION ACT MADE IN 1069 BY THE CROATIAN KING KREŠIMIR IV IN NIN TO THE CONVENT OF SAINT CHRYSOGONO

BOOK REVIEWS

Victor E. Meier: Neuer Nationalismus in Südosteuropa (New Nationalism in Southeastern Europe).

Veceslav Holjevac: Hrvati izvan Domovine (Croats Living Abroad).

George Prpić: The South Slavs, University of Kentucky Press, 1967, pp. 173-203.

Félix Germain: Yugoslavia, Casa Arthaud edition, "Les Beaux Pays" collection, Grenoble 1968

BIBLE - THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS, Stvarnost Publishing House, Zagreb 1968.

CHRONICLES AND NEWS

IN MEMORIAM OF THE REVEREND FATHER CARLOS KAMBER

IN MEMORIAM OF DOCTOR MATEO JELICIC

CULTURAL MICRO-NEWSLETTER

FIFTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE "CROATIAN ACADEMY OF AMERICA"

300 YEARS OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN CROATIA

THE GENOCIDE OF THE CROATIAN PEOPLE

Croatia does not have its Pitt

FRANJO NEVISTIĆ

"Having or not having is a constitutive element that determines our access to problems, our general vision, and our dispositions. Without this fact, what we call character, firm will, or serenity of judgment—that is, our better will and knowledge—can hardly be achieved. Because having or not having—this must somehow be linked to the atoms of our being, influencing the quantity of their mass, the nature of their tension, the direction of their movement, and the tendency of their association, thereby acting upon our consciousness to determine its practical attitude toward reality." (Krešimir Brant: The Current Moment of the Economy, in "Kritika", Zagreb, No. 6/69).

In the last volume of Studia Croatica—Vol. 28-31/1968—we demonstrated that the State of Yugoslavia, formed in 1918, has been an illegitimate state from its inception and remains so to this day. For our reasoning and demonstration, we have relied on legal and political theory and values. We have also sought to elucidate, in this way, the ultimate causes of the tragedy that befell the peoples of that multinational state during the last great war.

This time, our purpose is not to resort to ideal values for the same objective. While we delve into the problem of whether values are subjective appraisals, or whether they possess elements susceptible to more concrete measurement, thus ensuring objective knowledge, we wish, in the following lines, to turn our gaze in another direction.

It is commonly said that empiricism is the essential characteristic of English thought. At the beginning there would be Francis Bacon, and at the end, if there is indeed an end, Alexander Toynbee. Currently, however, this characteristic is no longer exclusively English. In our age of positive science, technology, and economics, we are all, in a certain sense, empiricists. We would not wish to suggest that higher ideals and values have been banished. No. In the free world, the custom and the necessity of seeking and finding those values embodied in facts still prevail. But what is needed first are the facts: their enumeration, their description, their analysis, and only at the end, the exiological position and the practical attitude.

Consequently, wishing to continue elucidating the "Yugoslav phenomenon," which so troubles many, especially the Croatian people, we will try here to focus our attention on the economic facts of that political community, hoping to shed more light from them—the light necessary for understanding the starkly opposing and fatal relations between the peoples of multinational Yugoslavia. That is why we have quoted the words of a Croatian Marxist, considering them a very opportune starting point for what we wish to say. "To have or not to have" determines our access to problems. It influences our subconscious tensions, forging our practical consciousness "in the face of reality."

However much this formulation may seem borrowed from the materialist ideological-philosophical arsenal, no one can deny the accuracy of its content, if it is limited to the strictly scientific-empiricist field in the sense, for example, of Teilhard de Chardin's conceptions, when he focuses on the "phenomenon of man," trying to decipher it down to its ultimate unknowns through scientific-empirical data. Brant delves into that famous law of recurrence-complexity of Chardin. He does so, perhaps unintentionally and unknowingly, but with this method he better envisions the path to follow. Whatever worldview we adopt, matter and economics have their decisive and legitimate value in human life. What, then, can we say about the economic "situation" of the Croatian people in Yugoslavia? From 1918 to the present day, instead of absolute growth, we have seen a decline and a relative and constant deterioration. This deterioration and decline are increasingly manifested in a tendency toward "not having." Let us examine the facts.

In 1918, Croatia and the other non-Serbian regions contributed 75% of the population to the community with Serbia; the value of agricultural production at that time represented 83% in Croatia and the non-Serbian regions, compared to 17% in Serbia; forestry wealth 90% versus 10%; mining 60% versus 40%; handicrafts 77% versus 23%; trade 82% versus 18%; industry 80% versus 20%; and finance 72% versus 28%. This was understood to be always in favor of Croatia and the non-Serbian regions, united with Serbia in 1918.[1]

The railway infrastructure contributed to the community represented 14 billion compared to 3 billion in favor of Croatia and the aforementioned regions. Croatia gave the new community 4,048 public buildings, while Serbia only contributed 1,561; Croatia incorporated its 8,600 hectares of arable land, while Serbia contributed only 1,900; the proportion of public roads was 20,087 compared to 11,206 in favor of Croatia; revenues from forestry in Croatia were more than seven times those of Serbia.[2]

Serbia was then a poor agrarian country with persistent foreign debt. By the time the Yugoslav Commonwealth was formed in 1918, Serbian debt accounted for 73% of the total debt of all the other nations in the Commonwealth. Commenting on the case, Bićanić says: "On the contrary, Serbia's active participation in the community was minimal. This active role fell to Croatia and the other non-Serbian regions... Furthermore, the influx of money sent by emigrants must be emphasized. From 1919 to 1938, it reached an enormous sum of 12 billion dinars, while in the same period, foreign trade liabilities amounted to 3.5 billion. Of that figure, 60% was sent by Croatian emigrants, according to specialists' calculations, which means that Croatians had remitted 7.2 billion dinars, thus covering 200% of the total foreign trade debt over 19 years. Tourism presented the same picture. Of the total income from this sector, between 350 and 500 million dinars per year, 182 million They came from the maritime regions, which are entirely Croatian, and another 100 million were collected in other non-Serbian regions. That is, the contribution from Croatian tourism reached 80%, and the rest, almost entirely, came from the non-Serbian regions [3].

Regarding debts, each Serbian citizen entered the community with a debt of 4,700 dinars, while Croats had only 185 dinars per capita. "These debts were later settled from the common fund." Of the 7,935 million total owed by the new community, 4,114 million were paid as Serbian debts, and 3,440 million as "common" debts, while only 381 million were paid as non-Serbian debts. Based on this data, Bićanić concludes: "Therefore, we can say that the new state's resources were used to pay 15 times more for Serbian debts than for those inherited from Austria-Hungary." And to make matters worse, Serbia, by introducing its new currency—the dinar—first devalued the Croatian krona by 20% and then paid the Croats 1 dinar for 4 kronas, even though both currencies were at par on the international market [4].

Analyzing the tax system, Bićanić states that during the period 1918–1938, Croatia and the non-Serbian regions contributed 8.292 billion dinars, while Serbia, including Montenegro, contributed only 1.820 billion. If the same formula had been applied in Croatia as in Serbia, Croatia would have only had to pay 3.21 billion, which "means that Croatia and the non-Servian regions had contributed the enormous sum of 5.11 billion more than they owed, or rather, they have actually paid 260% more than what was collected in Serbia."[5]

The investment policy presents the following picture: in the first 10 years, 2.771 billion was invested from the state budget. Croatia received only 250 million, and Serbia 1.753 billion, or 63% of the total. In addition, 1.125 billion was invested in Belgrade and 1.1 billion dinars for military buildings. "More was spent on the city of Belgrade than on the rest of the country's regions." Under King Alexander's dictatorship, another 1 billion dinars were invested in Belgrade without the city contributing a single dinar. Only 59 million dinars were spent on 69 large and 300 small ports in the Croatian Adriatic, while 110 million dinars were disbursed for the construction of the Sava pier in Belgrade. "Therefore," writes Bićanić, "it can be said that Croatian ports, under Belgrade's rule, became the most backward in Europe."[6]En cuanto a las inversiones en la construcción de ferrocarriles, Belgrado invirtió del total de 3.377 millones, 2.852 en Servia y sólo 525 en otras regiones.

The banking system was a separate problem. Here, Serbian hegemony over Croatia was most evident. While Croatian industry flourished, finances accumulated in Belgrade. The National Bank was organized on the basis of private interests. Of 60,000 shares, 20,000 were distributed among small landowners who had no interest in the institution's operations. Of the remaining 40,000, 35,000 were held by Serbs.

But of these, distributed in Belgrade, 25,866 were in the hands of only nine men. Dividends were allocated in such a way that the profits ended up in the pockets of private individuals. The bank's lending policy also favored Serbia, allocating 1 billion to Serbia and only 250 million to Croatia during the period 1932-1937. This is why Croatian industry had to pay interest rates of 13-20%, while Serbian industry paid only 6%. The case of the Mortgage Bank was similar. Croatia had received 412 million less than it was entitled to. Of the bank's nine directors, seven were Serbian; of the fourteen senior executives, eleven were Serbian; of the nine directors of its subsidiaries, seven were Serbian; and of its total employees—some 700-800—90% were Serbian.

The Postal Savings Bank followed the same pattern. Before the centralization of this credit in Belgrade, this bank, in Zagreb, granted 77 million within its jurisdiction in 1926, while in 1938, of the credit centralized in Belgrade, which reached 1.535 billion, Croatia had received only 15 million, or less than 1%. The Privileged Agricultural Bank, which held 25% Croatian capital, granted loans to 72,000 Serbian peasants, while only 10,000 Croatian peasants benefited. "To have or not to have" is the decisive factor, we might repeat... It is logical to ask: How was such discrimination against Croatia possible? The police apparatus and the army constituted the backbone of Great Serbian hegemony. According to Bićanić's research, of 10,000 officers in 1938, only 1,000 were Croatian, or 10%, even though the latter made up a third of the total population of the state. Pre-war Serbia had 3 million inhabitants and only 3 generals. In 1938, Yugoslavia had 15 million inhabitants and 165 active generals, plus about 100 retirees.

Of those still active, there were two Croatians and one Slovene. In the police, gendarmerie, and border troops, 90% of the positions were held by Serbs. In 35 governments, there were 656 ministers, and only 4% were Croats. Of the 350,000 public employees in 1938, for whom 5 billion was budgeted, the majority, and the most important and best-paid positions, were held by Serbs. Thus, for example, in that same year, 1938, 1,058 Serbs and only 152 Croats were admitted to the judicial service—that is, those who received a law degree (future judges).

To avoid endless enumerations, we will reproduce this final paragraph from Bićanić: "The balance sheet is for us Croats more than shocking. Of the resources collected in Savska Banovina—the Banat of Sava (Croatia in the narrowest sense, because at that time, in 1938, there was also the Maritime Banat—Primorska Banovina—as another part of Croatia), 46% was spent outside Croatia. We can state without exaggeration that, during these 20 years, we have paid the central government (in Belgrade) an enormous tribute of 30 billion dinars, which were neither spent nor invested in Croatia and for its needs. While today we are paying an amount two and a half times greater than before the First World War, our main sectors of the administration have at their disposal half the resources they had 25 years ago."[7]

Here we interrupt the enumeration of data concerning Belgrade's economic policy with respect to the Croats under the monarchical regime. Has the situation changed in communist Yugoslavia? To find the answer, we must once again turn to the facts.

The first thing we must clarify is: Who holds power in that communist society? This question has always been of paramount importance in every type of society. Political science and sociology consider it one of the firm conclusions of their research that, in all societies and at all times, there has been and is a group, a class, an elite of individuals whose will is decisive for the life of the community; there is a point toward which the concentration of power gravitates and from which this power radiates to the entire society, shaping its economic, social, cultural, and other relations. This phenomenon is inevitable even in the most democratic societies (R. Michels, V. Pareto, or C. Mosca).

Who, then, are the owners of Yugoslav communist society? The question is almost unnecessary. The dictatorship of the proletariat admits no other decisive factors in the life of the communist community than the Communist Party itself. It cannot be otherwise in Yugoslavia. But here, too, it is necessary to make distinctions, and often very subtle ones. Especially when dealing with a multinational communist state, a dictatorship of the proletariat composed of different nationalities.

A member of that proletariat reasons in this regard: "The working class is an integral part of a nation's being; in itself, in a special way, it embodies the history of its nation, its motives, its successes and tragedies, its symbols and directives... In the ceaseless struggle to eliminate its position as a wage earner, the working class draws on the historical experience of its nation and, in its struggle to destroy the groups of domination and their structures within its own nation, diligently safeguards the integrity of its national being, its individuality, its sovereignty, and its historical perspective. For this reason, and because the interests of the working class are supranational, national interests are, at the same time, and perhaps even more so. To assert the contrary would be to deny the social being of the working class, its inner richness, and its creative capacity." Therefore, he laments that the necessary attention was not paid to the aforementioned problem of "the national structure of the ruling team, the main cause of major distortions, which can have far-reaching consequences, and already do, in the production process, distribution, and the entire structure of society" [8].

This same author then analyzes the national composition of the central bodies of the Federation in Belgrade. The data were taken from Ekonomska Politika (Economic Policy), the official Belgrade publication. According to these data, the composition of the central state bodies is as follows: Serbs 4,334, Montenegrins 424, and, if these are considered as services or pro-services, the number of Serbian officials in the central bodies is 4,758, while that of Croats is only 504, Slovenes 187, and Macedonians 135. We extract only these partial data, necessary for our objective: national disproportion to the detriment of the Croats and the consequent discontent and national antagonisms.

More interesting than these data is the national composition of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, that is, of the Party itself in its capacity as the sole factor of power. The author we cite provides us with data relating only to the republics of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia has 4,159,696 inhabitants. Of this total, 80.3% are Croats, 15% Serbs, and the remainder Yugoslavs and others. This natural proportion changes considerably in the League of Communists of Croatia: the number of Croats decreases to 65.9%, the number of Serbs rises to 27.4%, and the number of Yugoslavs to 3.1%.

In the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the picture is as follows:

Total population: 3,277,935. Of this total, 42.9% are Serbs; 25.7% Muslims; 21.7% Croats; and 8.4% Yugoslavs. These national natural forces were distributed within the Communist League of that republic as follows: Serbs rose to 57.1%, Muslims to 26.3%, while Yugoslavs fell to 1.7% and Croats to 12.4%. Further commentary is superfluous. But to provide a complete picture, we will quote an official publication from Belgrade, which gives us the following data: "All Yugoslav nationalities were represented (at the Eighth Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia): Serbs 655; Croats 278; Slovenes 126; Macedonians 98; Montenegrins 103; Szekipers 44; Hungarians 32; etc. [9].

That is to say: Serbs and Montenegrins 758 and everyone else 675. From all that has been said, it is easy to conclude that the ruling power is in the hands of the Serbs.

With the removal of the infamous A. Ranković, who, with his Serbian police apparatus, constituted the "state within a state," as the famous Sixth Party Congress also described it, the situation changed formally, but not substantially. Economic reform in the direction of self-management and direct socialist democracy remained a dead letter. "We live in a society of self-management and decentralization, but the centralization of the net product remains extremely high, because 13 central banks (in Belgrade, federal banks—our note) control three-quarters of all financial resources. Despite the decentralization of administration and public services, the amount of the central budget does not decrease. On the contrary, it increases." Thus, for example, in 1968, 59.9% of Croatia's total budget revenue went to the federal budget in Belgrade.[10]

From this position of power, then, the entire economic, cultural, and political life of the country is planned and directed. To form an opinion on this matter, it is necessary to examine how each of the republics contributes to the formation of the community's net product and, subsequently, how they obtain the resources from that product for their investments. "According to the data for 1967, if we take 100 as the coefficient for Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed 1.4%; Montenegro 1.5%; Croatia 27.5%; Macedonia 4.9%; Slovenia 17.3%; and Serbia 37.4% (including Vojvodina at 10.2% and Kosovo at 1.5%). But if we look at the amounts invested in each republic, we get a different picture: Bosnia and Herzegovina received 12.1%; Montenegro 2.5%; Croatia 22.1%; Macedonia 8.8%; Slovenia 13%; and Serbia 41.5%" [11].

Taken from the Statistical Bulletin of Yugoslavia, Year IX/1969, No. 2, p. 51, 58, 69 and 64, the Serbian central power has managed the net product of the Yugoslav community as follows[12]: 

	APORTE AL PRESUPUESTO FEDERAL		INVERSIONES				REGRESO DEL PRES. FED.
	En millones	%	bancaria	%	Federal	%		%
Bosnia y Herzegovina	1.114	9,59	952	8,03	668	30,90	44,8	7,50
Montenegro	167	1,44	255	2,15	200	9,26	13,5	2,26
Croacia	3.156	27,20	2.800	23,62	30	1,42	59	9,88
Macedonia	575	4,96	1.177	9,93	381	17,64	67	11,21
Eslovenia	2.226	19,19	1.684	14,20	12	0,56	35,9	6,01
Servia	4.362	37,64	4.987	42,07	869	40,23	377,1	63,14

One of the specialists on the subject says the following: "The main criticism of the vertical distribution of Yugoslavia's budget revenues is that it is always carried out from top to bottom, meaning that the Federation retains the largest and most secure portions; the Republics take the remainder for themselves, and the communes take what is left over. But the decentralization of the general administration and the transfer of many public services to the communes are carried out without providing them with the budgetary resources allocated for this purpose" [13].

V. Veselica adds: "A very interesting process has taken place during the period of socio-economic reform, namely, the statism of the socio-political units was transferred to the banks, but in such a way that these became de facto owners of enormous means of production and, from this base, expropriated the self-managing workers as the main bearers of the socio-economic system, who should be deciding on the net product or available capital." For further illustration, we cite the fact that the investment assets of the Yugoslav Investment Bank totaled 2.245 trillion (old) dinars on December 31, 1967. Furthermore, the fact that the other banks are in a state of absolute subordination to the Investment Bank is demonstrated by the fact that its commissions amount to 1.472 trillion (old) dinars, meaning that the other banks only perform technical and banking services for the Investment Bank.

What particularly highlights the problem of state capital—which is enormous, exceeding 2.15 trillion (old) dinars—deposited in federal banks is the fact that this capital, through banking practices, becomes territorialized. (The term "territorialize" is a euphemism for "servitize," the appropriation of foreign capital from Belgrade, primarily to the detriment of the Croatian people. — Editor's Note). It would not be difficult to prove that most of the capital of the Yugoslav Investment Bank and the other former federal banks is being territorialized, and that this is in direct conflict with the fundamental principles of the Constitution, which states that Yugoslavia is a community of freely united and equal peoples and nationalities.

“Thus, for example, was the situation of Croatia in relation to the total of that capital: while the Croatian economy contributes 27% to the creation of the net national product, the total capital of Croatian banks within the total of Yugoslav banks is only 12%. And, to make matters worse, the share of Croatian banks in the distribution of investment loans is only 10%. Consequently, this is a disastrous economic and financial situation, which places not only Croatian banks but the entire Croatian economy at a disadvantage, because this is how the redistribution of accumulated capital is carried out in the hands of factors outside of production. This fact also involves a political dimension because, along with the expropriation of the main factors of production (the producers themselves), a very complex problem arises: the relations between nations and republics” [14].

The consequences are logical. Industrial growth in that country, compared to that of 1939 and taking 100 as the base, is as follows: Yugoslav average 692, while in each republic, taken individually, the table is as follows: Montenegro 3,658; Macedonia 1,473; Bosnia and Herzegovina 824; Serbia 731, Slovenia 595 and Croatia 592 [15]

Two things are evident: Croatia is relegated to the last place, and the favoritism towards the undeveloped republics is in vogue. The Croatian side objects to this policy in the terms that we reproduce verbatim: "But that there were many irrational expenditures in the undeveloped regions is demonstrated by the fact that these regions, having received 43% of the investments throughout the postwar period, contributed only 21% to the net product, while the developed regions had received only 30% in investments, and their contribution to the net product of the community reached 79%. Thus, investments in Croatia and Slovenia tend towards a constant decline: Croatia invested within its sphere in 1956 of the net product of its companies 45.81%, while in 1967 this investment fell to 39.22% and, in the first six months of this year (1969), reached 31.95% [16].

"In a multinational state, where the formation of each of its peoples developed separately, as is the case in Yugoslavia, the interests of the working class are not identical, but rather differentiated by their specific national characteristics and features, manifesting themselves daily in the production and distribution process and, especially, in the distribution of the net product or, more specifically, in the distribution of investments. Since the value of this product is greater and more centralized at the federal level, the influence of local producers will be less on its distribution, naturally causing the growth of national antagonisms..." [17].

To offer a brief illustration of how this policy is reflected in the field of public education and culture in general, we reproduce the following table: In 1967, there were 26,558 applicants for secondary school teaching positions in Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina had 6,752; Macedonia, 1,141; Slovenia with 1,676, Serbia with 15,076, and Croatia with 420. Politika, from Belgrade, on August 20, 1969, emphasizes that elementary school students in Serbia will soon receive free textbooks, while in Croatia, according to a newspaper from that republic, students must pay for enrollment and contribute to school construction. The number of illiterate people is increasing in Croatia, which was once considered the most cultured and progressive republic.

The same books published in Zagreb in Latin characters cost 700 dinars (poems by M. Lalić), and in Belgrade 300, because Serbian writers and publishers receive subsidies. The following case is particularly interesting: In the Croatian city of Bjelovar, there is a collection called Barešić, which includes various weapons from the 16th to the 19th centuries. This collection has great historical value. The municipal authorities tried to secure a suitable space for it. But the owner offered it for sale to the Military Museum of Belgrade.

Since the museum has money, it immediately offered 1,200,000 dinars, while the Bjelovar Municipality, which does not, could only offer 60,000… This is what Vera Jurić said at a public meeting, when Mirko Božić, in 1956, had said: “The strange thing is that, when we can’t publish something in Croatia, we take it to Belgrade and it gets published there. They have funding for newspapers there, while we don’t. For example, this year (1956), Belgrade allocated 30 million for this purpose [18]. That’s why in 1968, 37,321 books were printed in Serbia, while in Croatia only 14,000.” (Statistical Calendar of Yugoslavia, 1969, p. 458).

In order to publicly warn of what this policy means for the future of the Croatian people, Bruno Bušić quotes Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber: "Education, development, and the exploitation of intelligence are the only source of progress and well-being."

Referring once again to the distribution of investments, Bruno Bušić observes the following: "According to the United Nations Statistical Office, investments can be defined as the set of goods produced in a given period and destined for future production. This means that the amount of resources allocated to investment reflects a nation's effort to achieve its desired rate of economic growth through temporary sacrifices—that is, by lowering and limiting its current standard of living—further develop its material and intellectual potential and thus assert its individuality and positive presence in the contemporary world. This intention and these sacrifices bear fruit only if those who created these values and investments decide on them... We all know that national equality does not consist of formal equality before the law, but, above all, in the possibility of independence for each nation, so that it can create, through its labor, the basis for integration into the international division of labor on equal terms and thus enable the struggle for a higher degree of culture and civilization" [19].

But the most catastrophic consequence of this policy is the phenomenon of mass emigration from Croatia. Although we published statistics on this matter in the latest issue of Studia Croatica, vol. 28-31, we reproduce here the recent table on emigration and population growth in all the Yugoslav republics, prepared by the same author, the Croatian communist Zvonimir Komarica.:

REPUBLICAS YUGOESLAVAS	Crecimiento natural	%	Emigración	%	Saldo de crecimiento año 1968 (por mil)
Bosnia y Herzegovina	63.074	16,6	13.964	3,1	49.110	12,9
Montenegro	7.507	14,0	165	0,3	7.332	13,7
Croacia	23.028	5,3	24.088	5,5	-1.060	-0,2
Macedonia	27.970	17,8	3.642	2,3	24.328	15,5
Eslovenia	11.561	6,9	2.114	1,2	9.447	5,7
Servia	76.317	9,1	7.467	0,9	69.850	8,0

Z. Komarica added the laconic comment to his table: "Croatia is the only one among the Yugoslav republics that had a negative population growth rate in 1968 of less than 0.2 per thousand, or a loss of 1,060 people. Whether this is 'fatal' or 'the lowest in the world,' considering the data for a single year, I leave to others to judge" [20].

With such a population decline, "Croatia will have about 400,000 fewer young people aged 0 to 19 in 1980 than it does today. And, if the floods of 'export of technical intelligence' continue, with 40% of all graduates going abroad, then Croatia is losing its vital resources, thus falling far behind the other Yugoslav regions" [21].

Šime Djodan, in his radio conversation with Veselica, says: “If we, for 20 years, lose in factor density, if we lose in fixed funds, if our share of the national product decreases, if our share of the population decreases, this means that we are losing in all vital areas. When one shrinks, the others grow; this is the law of the relationship between the part and the whole” [22].

Having or not having, says K. Brant, determines atomic combinations and tensions of our very being. Not to mention justice, law, or morality. He who works, who creates, sacrifices, produces, and accumulates, and yet has little because he is deprived of what he has created, becomes a field of tensions precisely oriented toward discontent. It doesn't matter whether we proclaim all this as justice or not, law or not. The facts inevitably provoke tensions. Stronger than our character, our will, or our serene and disinterested thinking. If this were not the case, also in the Croatian case, we would be denying that people their human nature and the ethical principles of self-improvement inherent to it.

It is not mere coincidence, therefore, that María Pilar Comín, in a series of articles published in La Vanguardia Española in May 1969, when recounting her impressions of Yugoslavia, noted some peculiarities in Croatia that she did not find in other Yugoslav republics: discontent, even with Tito himself, and poverty. María Pilar Comín was part of a group of foreign journalists, invited by the Yugoslav Tourist Federation. They had seen Belgrade and Ljubljana quite well during a brief visit, but they barely touched Zagreb for a morning, passing through on their way to Ljubljana.

Nevertheless, in front of the cathedral, where the remains of Cardinal Stepinac rest, they saw beggars. They also saw a group of Croatian students, and one of them told the journalist: "I don't know what I'm doing or what my purpose in life is. The regime may know, but I don't." María P. Comín comments: "Some Croatians criticize the Serbs, saying they have a domineering streak and try to impose their will on everything, keeping 60% of Croatian tourism revenue, which goes to Belgrade to equip Southern Serbia. In short: a diversity of opinions."

We believe that, based on what has been presented in this article, this is not, and cannot be, a mere "diversity of opinions," but rather very concrete realities, injustices committed and being committed against the vital interests of the Croatian people. That is why we find the opinion of, for example, the journalist V. Meier, incomprehensible. He advises that Croatians and Slovenes continue paying taxes to the Federation because it guarantees their political security [23]. Does Mr. Meier understand economic, cultural, and biological genocide as political protection?

Let us invoke the American case to better understand the case of Croatia. The North American colonies rebelled in 1776 against England over the Stamp Act, which deprived them of certain commercial advantages. There, says A. Maurois, the War of Independence began. Against the severity of the English sanctions, Pitt raised his voice in favor of the colonies: "The Americans have not always acted prudently, but they were driven to madness by injustice. Would you punish them for a madness whose authors you are?" [24].

The Croatian rebellion of 1941—preceded by unparalleled economic exploitation by Serbia—was punished in what is known as the Bleiburg Tragedy. A tremendous punishment, a true genocide for the "madness of rebellion," whose authors were the Serbs and their policies. And what about the current situation?

Currently, over 180,000 Croatian workers are employed as slaves of "Yugoslav socialism" in West Germany. Their protests against the tyrannical regime in Belgrade are drowned out by propaganda against Croatian "terror," which endangers the lives of German diplomats and citizens by calling for the prohibition of political and national activity among this mass of people, deprived of freedom, well-being, and their own homes. Anyone who resists this propaganda or advises Croatian workers against sending their savings to Yugoslav banks is condemned to death by the secret agents of that communist country, because a few hundred million dollars is not a negligible sum, despite its bourgeois origin. The Yugoslav socialist economy, accustomed to feeding on American aid, has come of age, when it should be living off its own production, but reality runs counter to bureaucratic wishes and plans.

This Belgrade regime, which in the course of a single year has liquidated some ten of the most prominent and active Croats within the Croatian political and economic émigré community in West Germany, inadvertently pronounces its own condemnation when one of its ideologues and historians justifies the violent death of Franz Ferdinand in 1914 in Sarajevo, even resorting to the arguments of Catholic philosophers, despite the fact that disinterested history can demonstrate that the Habsburg "tyranny" was not even a shadow of that of Belgrade [25].

Plainly and simply put. Were the two Yugoslavias—the monarchical and, especially, the communist—not imposed, and wasn't the former maintained, and isn't the latter maintained, by the most inhuman terror?

Croatian independence is also a logical proposition from an economic standpoint. The painful situation in which Croatia finds itself due to Serbian hegemony—to have or not to have is the decisive factor—grants it every right to independence, in accordance with the principles falsely invoked by Dedijer, and which fully support the Croatian people in their struggle against Serbian tyranny. The words of John XXIII shine with extraordinary accuracy also regarding the situation of the Croatian people:

"The people of all countries are either citizens of an autonomous and independent state or are destined to be so. No one likes to feel subject to political powers originating from outside their own community" (Pacem in Terris). It is evident that the good Pontiff did not mean to speak of "preferences," but of very painful realities. To overcome them, the right to overthrow tyrannies remains firmly in place. Croatia—it is not presumptuous to say civilization—is still waiting for its Pitt to offer support against the madness being perpetrated by Serbian hegemony.

Buenos Aires, 1969. 

DOMINIK MANDIĆ - THE PERSONALITY AND HIS CULTURAL WORK

DUŠAN ŽANKO

"The present in the light of a sound and scientific past."

Dr. CARLOS BALIC

Three Creative Phases

It is not easy to encompass the creative impulses of Dr. Dominik Mandić (who has just turned 80) and who, from the first decade of this century to the present day, has continued to surprise both the Franciscan Order, to which he belongs, and Croatian intellectual circles, as well as international scientific and academic institutions.

Among the most distinctive traits of this exceptional personality, two stand out: that of the humble Franciscan with his profound spiritual vocation and that of the historian in the intellectual-humanistic sense.

Indeed, Mandić is the quintessential Franciscan and a born historian, or rather, a Franciscan historian (a researcher of the earliest sources of his Order and the most competent historian of his Order in Croatia, especially with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina). and national historian (that is to say, an upright and humble researcher and champion of historical truth concerning those two regions where that truth has been distorted and misrepresented throughout the centuries). Several of Mandić's biographers highlight his character and mentality, similar to those of his native province, Herzegovina.[26]

Dr. Mandić's multifaceted activity in the literary, cultural, social, pedagogical, religious, artistic, administrative-economic, political, and rigorously scientific fields can be divided, according to the different periods of his life, into three phases: the Herzegovina, the Rome, and the Americas. We will try to trace his trajectory as far as possible, taking into account the time that has passed and the distance that separates us. Mostar, Rome, and Chicago will be the three characteristic milestones of his fruitful life and his great work.

Mostar

The first and longest phase of his life in Herzegovina (until his 50th birthday) was marked by a series of restless tendencies and inclinations, brimming with youthful energy and acquired talents, and attuned to the many spiritual and cultural needs of his province. This phase was dedicated with fervor and selflessness to the pressing economic and cultural problems of his region. Among his accomplishments were the Croatian peasant schools, the Tobacco Growers' Association, and the founding of the weekly newspaper Narodna Sloga (National Concord). He also had to draft the first program of the Croatian People's Party, establish the Mostar Printing Press (which he would even manage for several years), and build a school for the day students attending the classical high school in Siroki Brijeg.[27]

Alongside numerous cultural and social activities, a political moment stands out in the life of Dr. Mandić.[28]

While it may seem that Mandić was still searching for the fertile ground for his exceptional creative force, the first signs of a true historian were already emerging, signs that would gradually restrict his current activities and confine him to the library.

Having earned his doctorate in theological studies, specializing in history, in Fribourg, Switzerland, in 1921, he published his first scholarly work in Mostar in 1923, followed by others[29] related to the earliest sources of the Franciscan Order.

During the period 1932–1939, or rather, during the second part of his time in Mostar, Mandić wrote extensively on the history of the Franciscans of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the history of the Church in general. He had finally found his true vocation as a humanist historian. He retired to Siroki Brijeg as director of the Franciscan high school (1934-1939), and there, in his modest cell, he began to classify the documentary material, publishing two or three works each year as contributions to the history of churches, convents, schools, dioceses (especially that of Duvno, from the 14th to the 18th centuries), and Franciscans, as well as numerous biographies of meritorious Franciscans.[30]

In 1939, during the Congress of Franciscan Generals in Assisi, he was elected General Advisor (Definitor) of the Order in Rome, having to leave his fruitful work and numerous projects begun in his beloved province.

Rome

Here begins the Roman phase of this dynamic, intelligent, and popular Franciscan from Herzegovina. A dramatic internal struggle was surely raging within him, for, aside from sentimental and human reasons, an accomplished historian must relinquish his documents and research, devoting himself to other pursuits (1939-1952). The Franciscan universalist spirit temporarily prevailed over his patriotic and scholarly aspirations. He had to renounce his vocation as a historical researcher and devote all his energies to another field of action: the humble and obedient service of his Order. Mandić himself will bear witness to this internal struggle:

"When, on Pentecost Sunday in 1939, I was elected at the general meeting of the provincial superiors in Assisi as the representative of the Slavic provinces in the Supreme Government of the Franciscan Order, it represented a great sacrifice for me to leave Herzegovina and interrupt my previous religious, cultural, and social work. Arriving in Rome at the end of June of that same year, I tried to persuade General Leonardo M. Bello to accept my resignation and allow me to resume my activities in Herzegovina. He refused to even discuss it, assuring me that in Rome I would be more useful to the Church, the Franciscan Order, and the Croatian nation. I resigned myself and accepted the election of the general chapter and the decision of the successor of Saint Francis as a manifestation of divine will. At the beginning of July, the Superior Council entrusted me with the management of the affairs of the general curia and the Order."

This abrupt transition might have been fatal for someone else, but for Mandić's strong and tireless spirit, the Roman phase meant transferring all his energies and moral and intellectual strength to a different field: the economic, organizational, artistic, humanitarian, and charitable sphere.

His first task would be of an economic nature: he was appointed general bursar of the order, finance minister of one of the world's largest religious families with an 800-year tradition. His program was as follows: 1) To build the new headquarters of the Order (general curia); 2) To find space to expand the Antonian University and concentrate the scientific institutions on Via Merulana in Rome; 3) To organize a robust publishing house for the University, to support the work and study of all the central Franciscan institutions and the apostolate of the press. And as if that weren't enough, to build a large lecture hall and library for the Athenaeum of Saint Anthony, and then to purchase and organize the Franciscan Order's printing press.

Just as in Mostar, here his great talent as a founder, organizer, initiator and above all as a researcher is revealed.

We must not forget that we are in the middle of the Second World War and that in these circumstances the strongest spirit would be daunted. Mandić, however, fears nothing and overcomes all obstacles in the realization of his plans. First he built the new curia in Gelsomino, near the Vatican, one of the most beautiful buildings in Rome, composed of a temple, a new artistic jewel in the Eternal City that has more than 300 churches, and all this at the time when, due to the war, almost all construction ceased. They say that he found the box almost empty to maintain the College of San Antonio, which also included the University and the curia itself, for only one month.

After two years of studying plans and acquiring materials, construction began on May 31, 1942, which would end on October 29, 1947; The cornerstone of said church was laid in 1945 and all the works, including the artistic ones, were carried out in five years.

It is worth listening to what Mandić, who gathered around him like a Renaissance patron, an entire legion of plastic artists, says about this. "I entrusted the plans of the church to the refined Giovanni Muzio, then, without a doubt, the most prominent Italian architect in the construction of temples. As for the artistic works, in addition to the brilliant Ivan Meštrović and the sculptor Manzo from Milan, I turned to several young and talented plastic artists... 27 artists collaborated on that decoration, including 2 Croatians, one Slovenian, one Hungarian and 22 Italians...

I personally sketched the general lines of the temple decoration. I controlled each work in the respective workshops and during its placement and execution in the church. I gave advice, made observations and criticism. No artistic work, except the San Francisco, by Ivan Meštrović, was finished without prior modifications and refinements.. . The main ornament, repeated with different variants, which frames and unites all the artistic tasks (labors) and gives the whole a peculiar appearance is the Croatian troplet... On the façade of the church where a large mosaic of the Mediatrix Mother of God, by Filocamo, who wears the Croatian national blouse of Šestine and, under her feet, is the tapestry with motifs of the national costumes of Rama, Duvno and Vrlika... In the middle of the dome a tender mosaic stands out with the effigy of the Virgin and, on her head, the crown of King Zvonimir with the three-strand necklace of pearls in red, white and blue..." [31].

During twelve years spent in Rome, Mandić did not publish anything. His muse, Clío, was silenced by the busy treasurer and patron, builder and inspirer of great architectural and artistic works. You had to see him climbing high ladders under the dome, directing, controlling and modifying details of the sculptors and masters and even Meštrović[32]. We had to accompany him through the workshops where he examined cartoons and sketches and enjoyed the realization of artistic beauty, participating in every detail as the inspired inspiration. One day he showed me a series of cardboard that he had discarded because of a few lines that disagreed with his idea.

"And artists don't protest against so much verification?" —I asked him—. "No, rather they are happy when someone with a sure vision of an idea is at their side," he answered, smiling; and at that time he was convinced that the artists felt the great authority and original talent of Mandić, who during the construction and execution of mosaics, statues, reliefs and ornamental motifs was a confident and firm leader. Even Meštrović and Kljaković recognize this. "Professor Nagni," writes Mandić, creator of the highly beautiful sculptural group on the altar of the Mediating Mother of God, modified his first plans 14 times before receiving the order to execute the work. With my behavior and influence, the artists lost some of their originality and spontaneity, but the architectural-sculptural ensemble gained unity, and the artists had to strive and perfect their works.

Who could forget our meeting in Rome in 1945, after Mostar in 1924! We were both burdened by the memory of Široki Brijeg, now burned and abandoned, he as its director and I as a student. That fact facilitated our mutual understanding and trust. Father Dominik was a Roman dignitary and I was a lost and miserable refugee, representative of the concentration camp in Fermo, where there were more than two thousand people, including women and children, lacking everything.

Here I remember that, on one occasion, the parish priest of St. Mark's in Zagreb, Svetozar Rittig, confided to me that at a time of religious crisis, Meštrovic had told him that he was seriously thinking of joining the Franciscan Order.

At that moment, Mandić came to the aid of so many in need, opening the treasury of his Order, a treasure he had accumulated himself, and thus the ragged were clothed, the hungry were fed, and the sick were cared for. He also established makeshift hospitals and schools in the Fermo concentration camp, and in Grottaferrata, he settled a group of Croatian female students. He helped wherever he could, encouraged and inspired spirits, and intervened with Anglo-American ecclesiastical, civil, and military authorities. He saved many by paying their travel expenses to overseas countries.

When one day, without warning, he appeared at the Fermo camp, he overshadowed Cardinal Rufini of Palermo, who that same day had visited the Croatian refugees along with the Archbishop of Fermo. Dominik Mandić, vigorous and upright, in the presence of the British commander and the Italian prelates, resembled Moses leading his people.

This is only a part of Mandić's organizational and charitable work during those years. He transferred the Congregation of the Sisters of St. Francis of Maribor to Rome; established the Daughters of St. Vincent de Paul in Rome; founded the novitiate for nuns; and in Grottamare, on the Adriatic, founded the school and convent for seminarians.

In addition, Mandić reformed, renovated, and improved numerous monasteries and churches, schools, and charitable institutions in Rome and throughout Italy.[33]

The Roman phase also came to an end. Mandić fulfilled his assigned mission better than expected. His work in Rome was completed and indelible. "Roman artists and engineers, in close circles, refer to it as 'Father Mandić's Curia,'" as Basilio Pandžić notes in his masterful description of "The New Church of the Franciscan General Curia in Rome."

The new course taken by the lives of Croatian refugees also influenced Mandić, who would write his account, De re economica Curiae Generalis ab anno 1939-1951, in the Acta Capituli generalis O.F.M. Assisi A.D. 1951. He had to say goodbye to Rome, distance himself even further from his Croatia, and journey to the New World, where, in North America, a significant nucleus of the Franciscan family from Herzegovina had settled.

Chicago

In contact with his brothers from Herzegovina, Mandić would return to the problems of Croatia in general, and of Herzegovina in particular.

He would serve as guardian for three years, filling Hrvatski Kalendar (The Croatian Calendar) with his articles on popular illustrations created by the Franciscans, on Blessed Nicholas Tavelić, and on the Croatian priests murdered between 1941 and 1945. He would also find time to write Molitvenik za Hrvatski narod u Americi (Prayer Book for the Croatian Community in North America). Furthermore, he founded the series Hrvatske knjige (Croatian Book) titled Croatia, which he edited from 1954 to 1955, as well as the cycle Croatia, American Series, Vols. I-II, 1954-1955.

Most importantly, however, his muse, Clio, would now take center stage in his creative activity. Mandić retreated to his library and devoted himself entirely to the study of history. That year will be memorable for Croatian historiography, for after 30 years, having already turned 66, Mandić will dedicate himself fully to his true vocation. This priest of exceptional vigor is only now beginning his masterpiece by publishing a long series of historical-scientific works that reveal great erudition and a profound sense of responsibility to rectify numerous opinions and theories of Croatian and Serbian historians.[34]

Rački and Sišić, the two most prominent historians in Croatian historiography, would be his main adversaries, so his corrections have a double meaning: the end of a debate that dates back to the time of F. Rački, that is, 100 years ago, and the beginning of a new era in the study of the Croatian High Middle Ages and the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When, in my essay "Bosnia and Herzegovina in Mandić's Trilogy," I expressed my surprise at Mandić's long "wait" as a genuine historical researcher and when I congratulated him on his having taken refuge in Chicago, finally allowing "his true calling" to prevail, I received a letter from him, which I am including here, as it explains this long "wait" and the phenomenon of his "calling." Moreover, this valuable document, by outlining the method and conditions of his work, explains his third creative phase, the American one.

"He finds it strange that I was able to occupy myself with other matters for so many years, despite my vocation as a historian. He must bear in mind that neither the University of Zagreb nor the Academy of Sciences and Arts gave me any position or facilitated my exclusive dedication to historical study. I am the son of peasants. For my education, my parents could only afford to buy me books and my first habit. Everything else, both during my secondary and university studies, was the responsibility of the Franciscan province of Herzegovina. At that time, personnel were scarce, and I had to fulfill the tasks entrusted to me by my superiors.

Alongside my official duties, I always engaged in historical research, which could not be intensive or current, since I was taught at the university that one could not write about certain problems, and especially about debatable problems, until one had gathered sufficient documents and supporting evidence, which I was unable to do in Mostar, whose Franciscan library is quite poor. I always trusted that the Lord would give me the time and opportunity to dedicate myself exclusively to historical research with the purpose of refuting..." "All the errors concerning the history of Croatia, particularly those concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to write a systematic history of those two provinces and of Croatia in general.

God gave me this through His special Providence when I arrived here, and for the past 12 years I have worked exclusively on the historical research of Croatia. Now, having gathered all the documents published to date concerning that history, and especially that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and having discovered new documentary sources, it is not difficult for me to write historical works and engage in debates about the incorrect positions of certain Croatian and other historians" (Chicago, December 14, 1967). We make no comment on the reproduced letter, since it clearly explains the secret and the adventures of Mandić in his three creative phases: Mostar, Rome, and Chicago.

II — The Scholarly Work

Dr. Mandić's scholarly work encompasses two defined fields: the history of the Franciscan Order and Croatian history. In the first phase, the Mostar phase, Mandić published his research on the earliest documents, statutes, and regulations of the Franciscan Order. In the third phase, the North American phase, he published works on the founding of the Croatian Province and the first Franciscan convents in Croatia, and later on the establishment of the first Bosnian Franciscan vicariate, thus completing the history of the Franciscan Order in Bosnia. Throughout his life, he collected documents and materials relating to churches, schools, parishes, and dioceses, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and published his findings in both major and minor works.

Mandić devoted particular attention to documents concerning the martyrdom of Blessed Nicholas Tavelić and to Franciscans of all nations in relation to the Bogomilis (Paterenes) in Bosnia.

In the field of Croatian history up to the end of the 11th century and of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the beginning of the Croat migration to the present day, Mandić's studies constitute sensational corrections that no serious historian can ignore. From the time he began publishing his work in 1955 until today, Mandić astonishes us both by his age and by the number of studies he has written, and above all by the new theses—or rather, the questions that were left unanswered or misrepresented.

We will try to summarize their works in the form of a bibliographic review, following this plan:

A. Rectification of Croatian history

1.- Dalmatia, a classic Roman territory or Roman and Croatian Dalmatia as an integral part of the West. 2.- The lost key to the first Croatian historical sources was found. 3.- Regnum Dalmatiae et Croatiae (7th-11th century), a) the arrival of the Croats and the first Croatian territory; b) the Christianization of the Croats; c) the Croatian assembly at the Duvno field in 753; d) the Croatia Rubra; g) Dubrovnik.

B. The Franciscans

1) In the sources; 2) The founding of the Franciscan province of Croatia; 3) The formation of the Franciscan vicariate in Bosnia; 4) Blessed Nicalás Tavelić, Franciscan martyr.

C. Bosnia and Herzegovina

1) The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (7th-20th century): a) the Catholics; b) the Patarenes; c) Muslims.

2) The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A. Corrections of Croatian history

Those who are somewhat familiar with the development of Croatian historiography from Kukuljević and Rački to Sakač, from Klaić and then Sišić, Barada, Guberina, Katić, Karaman, Truhelka and G. Novak, until today, will understand the importance and scope of a historian of stature and stature in Mandić. All this development over a century is nothing more than a series of continuous corrections, revisions and slow progress. Sisic rectified Klaić, Barada rectified Sisic, Mandić rectified Barada, but not only Barada but Sišić and Klaić, Rački and Novaković, Perojević and Ćorović. Finally, after so many efforts and so many lives dedicated to history, we are in the presence of a definitive review and vision of Croatian history (D. Zanko, "Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Mandić Trilogy", Hrvatska Revija, No. 12(1-2), 1962, p. 75).

This statement prevailed when I read the first volume of that great trilogy (1960) which dealt with the "State and religious belonging of medieval Bosnia and Herzegovina." Croatian historiography urgently needed a deep rectification after so many contradictions, illogical conclusions, misinterpreted documents, ambiguities, gaps and, what is worse, suspicious insinuations coming from anti-Croatian political sources and the Yugoslav myth.

We share the opinion of the French medievalist Marc Bloch "that the knowledge of history is something in constant progress, transforming and perfecting", but all previous attempts to expound history during the Croatian national dynasty, from Rački to Barada, seem to us too labile, inconstant, always threatened by new points of view, accompanied by numerous and changing hypotheses and new falsifications.

Even the historian who publishes a new falsification of some document of the Croatian dynasty is declared an idol of scholarship. Even leading authors (such as Sisic, Barada) change their previous statements on the basis of new knowledge and contributions from archaeology, philology and other subsidiary disciplines. We should not be surprised, since a similar process also governs the historiography of all civilized peoples.

On the other hand, each town has debatable historical moments and certain myths, supported more by certain ideologies and nationalisms than by science. Thus, for example, the French still today continue to argue bitterly about the Gallic or Roman sources of their national character without mentioning Napoleon, the subject of more contradictory comments precisely this year.

The Spanish have not yet put an end to the controversy surrounding Américo Castro's thesis, which maintains that it is a gross error to consider the aborigines of the Iberian Peninsula as Spanish and to declare Seneca, Trajan and Theodosius as Spanish; In other words, they disagree about the origins of the Spanish way of life. Who in Croatia does not remember the myth woven around Gregory of Nin, the death of King Zvonimir, the tragic conflicts between Latinity and Croaticity in the first centuries of Croatian state life, myths sustained and nourished by a typically anti-Latin mentality, which judged the 11th and 12th centuries from the point of view of the Slavic romanticism of the 19th century, omitting to mention Bosnia and Herzegovina? [35].

Taking all this into account, the appearance of Dr. Mandić in the field of Croatian historiography amounts to an exit from the dark tunnel, to a phenomenal overcoming of all justified weaknesses and unjustified "budgets". In other words, scholarship is not opposed to the essential objectives of historical activity. Mandić places facts and events in a logical course of historical events, provides external and internal arguments. Create an extremely useful work to better understand the present and prepare for the future, becoming interested in the truth of our past.

Free from official programs and administrative directives, the author meditates in complete freedom and in Franciscan solitude on the history of his people, using the most rigorous methods of historical inquiry, knowing the smallest details and answers the questions raised regarding the first centuries of Croatian history, from the 7th to the 11th, because, as Henri-Irénée Marrou expresses: "History is the answer to the question asked, derived from the depths of the soul of the researcher." And what is deepest in the soul of Mandić, a born historian? He himself will tell us: "Establish the authentic historical truth of our past and rectify as many incorrect statements as I found, especially in works written in other languages" [36].

Elsewhere he will tell us with precision and frankness what worried him most and which deserved an adequate response, namely: "establishing the historical truth. Lucić, with his scientific works, was useful to the Croatian cause, since, through his critical works, the West learned about the ancient and glorious history of that people. But, unintentionally, he harmed Croatia because Western authors, following him, will not consider Bosnia, Zahumlje, Medieval Duklja and the Republic of Dubrovnik, nor will they treat the history of those regions as an integral part of general Croatian history[37].

Dr. Francisco Rački, to attract the Serbs to the Yugoslav idea, Serbs who claimed Bosnia and all the southern provinces, Rački as one of the main standard-bearers of the Yugoslav idea, adopted Lucić's thesis and left to the Serbs all the regions that Constantine Porfirogenetos had given them in the 10th century. In numerous and valuable works Rački It deals only with the history of the Croats between Cetina and Rascia, that is, the former White Croatia. What is found south of the Cetina and Neretva and east of the Vrbas is omitted by Rački because it is not considered Croatian national territory. From then until today the problems of Croatian history are in the shadow of F. Rački, the most prominent historian.

Even Ferdo Sišić, renowned scientist and senior professor of Croatian history at the University of Zagreb, does not deviate from the theses of Lucić and Rački... It is understandable that this position suited Serbian historians who, without serious objections, extended the limits of the Serbian national historical territory from the Cetina River in Dalmatia, to Livno in western Bosnia (see Vl. Ćorović: History of Bosnia, Belgrade, 1940).

"This abandonment of Bosnia and the southern regions by the best Croatian historians stimulated us to study in depth the national problem of these regions according to the norms of current historical criticism... We have found the clear and unequivocal testimony of the documents that, with the authority of numerous and true sources, attest that the Croats, upon arriving in the Adriatic, populated all the regions between Istria and Albania and between the Adriatic and the river Drava to the north and the Drina River to the east"[38].

The problem is serious. As we see, it is the main axis of Croatian historiography: Lucić-Rački-Sisic which, due to Lucić's deficient perspective, motivated by the political circumstances of the 17th century and abused by the Yugoslav Rački-Sisic line, will become a deviation that is still officially supported today in the history chair in Zagreb[39].

Dr. Mandić was aware from the outset of this monumental undertaking, which, based on meticulous detail, would yield a comprehensive work of rectification. But since it concerned the central axis, spanning the 17th to the 20th centuries, it was necessary to encompass all documents and sources, forming a continuous whole and explaining the logic of historical events, for, as Vialetaux says, "history has its own way of revealing the order of dependence, the genesis, and the meaning of the events it narrates." The logic of Mandić's medieval Croatian history, like "the national question," being "fundamental" in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina "and in the present reality," inherently conditions its value.

Beyond this logic, we find in Mandić a humanist dimension that, with a mysterious affinity, situates the historical object and subject within the same racial, linguistic, religious, cultural, political, and emotional framework. Mandić understands the late medieval Croatian period, for as a Franciscan and one of the leading researchers of the Franciscan Order's sources, he possesses the mentality and religious vision of the Western world. This vision, this personal experience, this existential, or rather insistential, reasoning, which Xenopol would define as "of historical reference," helps the author when describing and investigating the conditions of state and religious life, so interdependent at that time, to write objectively and without "presuppositions" [40].

1. — Dalmatia — a classical Roman territory or Roman and Croatian Dalmatia integrated into the West

"F. Sisic attempted to corroborate Diehl's thesis, arguing that from 732 to 925 Dalmatia was ecclesiastically subordinate to the Patriarchate of Byzantium and, consequently, in state matters, dependent on it and its nearest prefecture, Eastern Illyricum. But this thesis is erroneous" [41].

"Barada agreed with Sisic, maintaining that the (archi)diocese of Spalatense, from its foundation around 760/70 until 923, was subordinate to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. N. Klaić also supports the same unfounded thesis" [42]17.

" Mandić repeatedly proved that the Byzantine Patriarchate, until the Schism, never encompassed or claimed territories west of the Drina River and Budva, since these regions had belonged since ancient times to the Italian Prefecture and the Western Roman Empire. Thus, Byzantium considered these territories to be under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Rome.

He first addressed this issue in the first volume of his trilogy, Bosnia and Herzegovina (pp. 365-373), irrefutably clarifying that the Roman liturgy had been used in these regions since Roman times and that their bishops were always dependent on the Roman Patriarchate. Even the State of Bosnia and the "Bosniak Christians" (Patarenes) celebrated their feasts according to the Roman liturgy (pp. 361-458). For the second time, three years later, in his extensive study Dalmatia in the Exarchate of Ravenna from the mid-sixth to the mid-eighth century [43], he rejected the theses of Diehl, L. M. Hartmann, and Sisic concerning the subordination of Dalmatia to Eastern Illyricum and Byzantium.

Since Emperor Diocletian made the definitive division of Illyricum ("Provincia Dalmatia" from Rascia to the Drina River; "Provincia Praevalitana, Praevalis" from the Drina River to the Ibar River and the Šar Mountains), these formations of Western Illyricum (including Dalmatia) under the Prefecture of Italy, and of Eastern Illyricum (also including Praevalis) under the Prefecture of the East—through various decrees of Constantine the Great and Gratian, until the final decision of Theodosius the Great—the border between Dalmatia and Praevalis along the Drina River became the dividing line between East and West, between the Western and Eastern cultural worlds, until the Ottoman invasion in the 15th century [44].

When Justinian I (555), upon dismantling the Gothic kingdom, obtained Western Illyricum and Italy, he established the Prefecture of Italy in Ravenna, later called the Exarchate. What then became of Dalmatia? Was it integrated into the Prefecture of Italy or annexed to the Prefecture of Eastern Illyricum? Although there is no valid document in favor of either theory, Charles Diehl nevertheless excluded Dalmatia from the Exarchate of Ravenna, and L. M. Hartmann tried to prove that Dalmatia belonged to Eastern Illyricum (555-751), a theory shared by Sisic. Mandić, however, found several pieces of indirect evidence and documents that allowed him to conclude that Dalmatia belonged to the Prefecture of Italy in Ravenna and was an integral part of it.

These arguments (Mandić lists eight) would be: the nature of ecclesiastical and civil administration from Constantine to Justinian, which aligned the boundaries of metropolises with the boundaries of state provinces; then, the valuable collection of letters from Gregory I, 32 of which were addressed to Dalmatian bishops and others, without any allusion to or mention of the Dalmatian metropolis in Salona being subordinate to the papal vicariate of Thessaloniki. On the contrary, Gregory I expressly states that the Roman patriarchs had entrusted the election of the Salonitan bishops from the earliest times. From Gregory I's conflict with the Salonitan bishop Maximus, Mandić concludes "certainly and unequivocally" that Dalmatia, at that time, was subordinate to the exarchate, meaning that neither in ecclesiastical nor civil matters did it belong to Eastern Illyricum or Byzantium.

Furthermore, Porphyrogenitus recorded that Emperor Heraclius I (610–641) demanded that Rome establish the ecclesiastical hierarchy in Dalmatia and send missionaries to evangelize the Croats. Archdeacon Thomas noted that the first archbishop of the restored Salonitan metropolis in Split (Spalato) was John of Ravenna. “Dalmatia is the province that belongs to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Italy,” Porphyrogenitus wrote. Dalmatians were elected popes (John IV) and archbishop of Ravenna.

When Leo III the Isaurian (717–741) clashed with the Roman popes, he confiscated all the property of the Roman church in the Illyrian prefecture in 723. Mandić emphasizes that, after thoroughly examining all the documents,[45] none mention that Dalmatia was taken from papal jurisdiction. In contrast, all sources and documents are limited to the emperor's interference in the countries east of the Drina River and Budva.

Furthermore, the Byzantine Patriarchate, until the definitive schism of 1054, never exercised judicial power in the territory of the former Roman province of Dalmatia, and therefore in the entire territory of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nor did it aspire to annex these regions, as they indisputably belonged to the Roman Patriarchate, which, from the beginnings of Christianity until the schism, exclusively exercised ecclesiastical judicial power.

We have emphasized Mandić's first and significant correction, which places the demarcation and dividing line already in the early Roman civil and ecclesiastical conflicts between East and West at the Drina River and Budva. Official historiography resolved these problems in a nebulous and incorrect manner, preventing a present-day understanding of the "internal European opposition between the men of Western Europe and the men of Eastern Europe" (F. Heer). This opposition cannot be properly understood without considering that the Danubian and Balkan peoples were, for many centuries, the target of struggles for spiritual, religious, and political dominance between the Latin and Byzantine hemispheres.

Furthermore, as the Austrian historian Friedrich Heer aptly observes, we are on the threshold of the formation of two mentalities, the Greek and the Latin: "Eastern and Western Churches each shaped, within their respective spheres, not only individual religiosity but also total spirituality, culture, and social life. Each created a closed hemisphere in which the specific post-Christian processes of secularization of Western and Eastern Christianity clashed" [46]. At the dawn of Croatian history, Mandić correctly perceives the background of all our problems and clarifies it in all its variations and orientations.

Every people possesses its own cultural sphere, in which its source and constitution, its tradition and continuity are found, so that without knowing the fundamental aspects of the past, nothing is understood. Therefore, Mandić's rectification of a problem as distant and delicate as that of two Roman Illyrians, the eastern and the western, the problem of two patriarchates, the eastern and the western, which established the centuries-old dividing line of Drina-Budva, is by no means a sterile display of erudition, but the indispensable basis for grasping the historical meaning of two cultural spheres, formed through two different medieval mentalities, and the place of the Croats in one of those spheres.[47]

2. The Lost Key to Understanding the Earliest Croatian Sources Was Found

Undoubtedly, one of Mandić's main and fundamental themes is his correction of the great debate surrounding the authenticity, date of origin, and name of the oldest chronicles. He emphasized this fundamental issue because, thanks to this correction, Mandić was able to clarify and substantiate many other topics, namely:

The arrival of the Croats in the Adriatic;

The Croatian assembly at the Duvno field;

Medieval Croatia Rubra and Duklia, and others.

There are two chronicles that constitute the earliest source of Croatian history: one written in the Chakavski dialect, the so-called Croatian Chronicle, and the other written in Latin and called the Chronicle of the Priest Duklianin (Ljetopis Popa Dukljanina).

There is an interesting connection between these two chronicles, specifically the first 23 chapters of the Chronicle. The Croatian texts are translated verbatim into Latin in the Chronicle of the Priest Duklianin. Furthermore, the Croatian Chronicle contains 15 chapters (pp. 24-28) that are missing from the other, which, in turn, has 34 new chapters not found in the Croatian Chronicle.

Given the evident relationship, the question arises: Which came first? Was there one author or several? Where, when, and who wrote each? [48]

F. Sisic attempted to elucidate these interesting questions twice: first in his work The Croatian History (1925) and, three years later, in the critical edition of the Chronicle of the Priest Duklianin (published in 1928 by the Royal Serbian Academy in Belgrade). In both cases, Sisic maintains that Ljetopis predates the Chronicle, but he had previously stated that Ljetopis was written in Latin and later translated into "Croatian," by the same author. The Chronicle, he claims, is a translation of Ljetopis and dates back "to the 14th century when an unknown author from the area around Split, a priest, translated from the original Latin only the part of Ljetopis that he considered to contain the history of Croatia..."

Mandić responds with seriousness and certainty: "Sisic's theses are unfounded and therefore unacceptable."

But since Mandić usually establishes his concise corrections at the beginning of his studies and then documents them in a thorough and detailed analysis, the reader will find 26 scholarly pages in one place [49] and 21 in another [50], a total of 47 pages of a scientific and logical exposition that will provide the answer to all the questions at hand.

1. The priest of Dioclea (Lucić calls him Presbyter Diocleas) could not have been a Slav (Servian) but rather a Latin from Dalmatia or Dioclea, a Catholic priest from Bar in Dioclea, since there were no Serbs there until the end of the 12th century, and because the priest himself noted that from the mid-7th century until his time, only Croats and Romans (Latins) lived from present-day Rijeka to Wallona in Albania. Therefore, this priest could also have been a Croat, but Mandić proves that he was a Latin and that he knew Croatian, which is why he translated the treatise on Croatian history from that language into Latin.

2. The Croatian Chronicle is written in the čakavski dialect by a priest who supported the use of the national language in the liturgy.

3. The chronicle of the priest of Dioclea was written between 1149 and 1153. Mandić provides irrefutable evidence.

4. The Croatian Chronicle predates that of the priest of Dioclea, a fact confirmed in the prologue of the latter, where its author states that he "translated into Latin the treatise on the Goths, which in Latin is called Regnum Sclavorum." The Chronicle lacks this prologue in the discovered transcription. Why? Because the priest of Dioclea wrote it while translating Regnum Sclavorum, that is, after the work known as the Croatian Chronicle. Furthermore, the Chronicle omits the passage concerning the dioceses of Dioclea in Chapter 9. Why? It is obvious that at the time it was written, these dioceses, as can be inferred from the papal bulls concerning their foundation, did not yet exist. Furthermore, if, in Sisic's opinion, the Croatian Chronicle is a later version of the Chronicle of the Presbyter of Dioclea, one might ask, why were only the first 23 chapters translated and not all of them?

5. The original title of the Croatian Chronicle, according to Mandić, was The Kingdom of the Croats. The Romans called it Libellus Gothorum, ironically referring to the Croats as Goths, but the priest of Diocleia translated the true title into Latin as Regnum Sclavorum, and it must surely have been Regnum Croatorum, since the old Croatian Chronicle did not use the names "Slavs" or "Serbs," only "Croats." It mentions the Croatian name, language, and land 23 times and never uses the Slavic name, thus deducing that the Croats descended not from the Slavs but from the Goths. Why then did the priest of Diocleia write Regnum Sclavorum? Because the inhabitants of Italy and the Romans in Dalmatia and Dioclea called all their Slavic neighbors "Sclavi," that author interpreted the Croatian chronicler's title as Regnum Sclavorum (Kingdom of Slaves).

6. Where and when was Regnum Croatorum written? Most likely in Dioclea, which for its author is the center of the Croatian kingdom, since he speaks of the first king and the other kings, without mentioning the monarchs of White Croatia. It would be logical for the work to have been written in Red Croatia, that is, in Dioclea. Moreover, Chapter IX mentions the state and ecclesiastical assembly held in Duvno, which divided the Croatian state not only into two political parts, White Croatia and Red Croatia, but also into two ecclesiastical jurisdictions: the Archdiocese of Salona and the Archdiocese of Dioclea. The Croatian Kingdom was unaware of the Archdiocese of Bar (1089), and therefore, the chronicle was written before 1089. Mandić particularly emphasizes the political conditions prevailing during the reign of Michael, the first king of Southern Croatia or Rubra (1074-1081), and the situation that prevailed in Croatia, suggesting that the Croatian Chronicle was written with a view to Michael's political interests and during his reign, even under his inspiration, since at the beginning of the 11th century, convincing the Croats that Dioclea was supposedly an ancient kingdom and the initial center of the entire Croatian state was an argument that only suited Michael. This text recognized the sovereignty of the common Croatian king, Peter Krešimir IV (circa 1056–1073), but after his death, it appears that it refused to recognize either Slavac or Zvonimir, and even declared its independence and assumed the royal crown in 1077.

If Mandić's hypothesis regarding the hidden bias in the Croatian Chronicle (or Regnum Croatorum) is accepted, then it can be concluded, in addition to other evidence, that it dates back to the period between 1074 and 1081.

7. Mandić considers the main value of the Regnum Croatorum chronicle to be its preservation of the memory and comprehensive summary of the oldest Croatian administrative work, the Methodos, which contained laws and regulations adopted at the famous assembly of Duvno and which were still in force in Dioclea in the 11th century. Mandić's merit lies in having clarified the secret of the Regnum Croatorum, for "despite its flawed foundation and other weaknesses, this chronicle possesses great historical value due to its antiquity (the oldest of all Slavic chronicles), because it contains fragments and passages from even older Croatian documents, which were lost in subsequent centuries," and because it has found the lost key to the earliest sources of Croatian history.

8. Most important are the geopolitical assertions in the oldest Croatian chronicles that Dalmatia was divided into Upper and Lower Dalmatia, which were identified with White Croatia and Rubra Croatia. From the numerous sources cited by Mandić, it is clear that this division of Dalmatia and its identification with White Croatia and Rubra Croatia was not invented by the Croatian chronicles, but was a known and acknowledged reality. This fact contributes to the veracity and authenticity of both chronicles and compels us to accept their identification of Upper Dalmatia with Red Croatia and Lower Dalmatia with White Croatia [51].

3. The Kingdom of Dalmatia and Croatia (7th-11th centuries)

a) The Arrival of the Croats and Their First Territory

There are very few issues in Croatian history that have been addressed and studied by as many authors as the arrival of the Croats to the Adriatic. They also grappled with the mystery of their previous homeland and various migrations of anonymous Slavic multitudes, as well as those of the Serbs, the problems of name, language, time, and the colonization of the territory. Worse still, they presented conflicting and contradictory viewpoints—confusing, fanciful, and, in most cases, adapted to Yugoslav ideology. Interpretations of the text of Emperor Porphyrogeny were relied upon exclusively, as if no other documents existed. Thus, Ferdo Sisic, in the chapter "Theories on the Arrival of the Croats and Serbs" of his celebrated work Croatian History (1925), lists some thirty authors of such theories.

First, instead of speaking clearly and transparently about the Croats, the term "Slavs" is used, always presented in conjunction with the Serbs as if they were twins. And when the discussion turned to the colonized territory and the first signs of state life, the debate was brought to a close by two theses, along with Dümmler, Rački, and Jagić:

-that the Serbs and Croats, during the 7th century, as part of "an enormous Slavic mass... without any thought of founding organized states" (Sisic), were lost in that anonymous Slavic sea and passed "through a historical void for two centuries, the 7th and 8th" (Sisic).

-that only in the 9th century did two national nuclei begin to form: the Croat in Dalmatia, solely between the Cetina and Krka rivers, and the Serbian in Rašcia, nuclei that would evolve into two states: Croatia and Rašcia.

-that only in the 9th century did two national nuclei begin to form: the Croat in Dalmatia, solely between the Cetina and Krka rivers, and the Serb in Rašcia, nuclei that would evolve into two states: Croatia and Rašcia. Mandić dispels this fog and, based on thorough research, establishes:

—that there were two migrations of South Slavs: the first from the end of the 4th century to the beginning of the 7th, with the Croats arriving first, followed by the Serbs, and finally the Bulgarians as organized peoples, not as anonymous tribes;

—that the Croats arrived in the Adriatic with their own name, their specific social order, their ruler, and their army.

Mandić also establishes that this arrival occurred in 626 based on a detailed analysis "of the oldest information about that event, which dates back to 727," referring to the Chronica Maiora of the Sevillian bishop Saint Isidore (See Studia Croatica, Nos. 24-27, 1966, pp. 64-69). In the second edition of his Chronicle, Saint Isidore of Seville noted, in 727, that during the 16th year of Heraclius's reign, the Slavs seized Greece, and by Greece he meant Dalmatia, as he explains in his work Etymologiae: "Greece has seven provinces, and the first is Dalmatia..." These Slavs were the Croats who, as agreed, appropriated the conquered lands, and therefore, Mandić argues, "Isidore of Seville rightly noted that the Croatian Slavs seized the provinces of Greece from the Romans, that is, from the Byzantines."

Regarding the regions populated by the Croats upon their arrival at the Adriatic, Mandić compares the data provided by C. Porphyrogenitus, the testimony of Isidore of Seville and Methodus of 753, and an unknown Croatian chronicle from the 8th or early 9th century used by the author of the treatise Regnum Croatorum. From this, it follows that the Croats occupied the Roman provinces of Pannonia and Dalmatia, which at that time extended from the Adriatic to the Drina River, and Byzantine Illyricum, that is, the coastal lands from Budva to present-day Wallona in Albania (Drač's topic)[52].

If we compare this well-founded opinion with that of Rački and Sisic, who speak of Croatian lands only as far as Cetina and Vrbas, we see that Mandić's documented correction constitutes a valuable contribution to Croatian historiography.

b) The Christianization of the Croats

From Ivan Lucić (1666) to the present day, the baptism of the Croats has been debated, with almost all major historians participating in this controversy. Lucić, based on Porphyrogenitus, placed the date of this baptism at the end of the 7th century, while others, influenced by Dümmler, Duchesne, and Rački, offered different opinions and indicated different years, but all agreed that the Croats were baptized either at the end of the 8th century or at the beginning of the 9th.

Stevban Sakač made a significant innovation by attempting to prove that the Croats were baptized towards the end of the reign of Heraclius I (610-641). This thesis was later adopted by Barada, but Karaman, G. Novak, and Nada Klaić followed the thesis of Bulić and Sisic, the so-called Frankish thesis.

Mandić, therefore, had to contend with all these renowned historians to clarify and refute their theories and defend his own regarding the baptism of the Croats. According to Mandić, this event took place in three stages (depending on the region): the first in White Croatia, in 640, and is linked to John of Ravenna, the first archbishop of the Split metropolis, to which Pope John IV transferred the old rights of the Salona metropolis.

First, he had to refute Barada's thesis, according to which the Croats arrived in the Adriatic as Christians, followers of Arius. Here, Barada hastily adopted the opinion of Thomas the Archdeacon, who confused the Croats with the Goths; and since the Goths were Arians, he concluded from the supposedly Gothic name of the Croats that they, too, were Arians. Mandić published all the documents predating Thomas that conclusively prove the Croats arrived as pagans (Gentiles) (biography of John IV in the Liber Pontificalis, Porphyrogenitus, Regnum Croatorum, the Chronicle of the Presbyter of Dioclea, archaeological findings, etc.).

The "Frankish thesis," strangely enough, offers only two arguments: the widespread veneration of Frankish and Aquileian saints in the "Acta s. Ursii Vicentini." It is true that in the 9th century the veneration of the Frankish-Aquileian saints (Chrysogonus, Ambrose, Marcellus) began to spread, but this only speaks to religious and cultural influence, as, for example, we could cite the cases of Saint George, Cosmas and Damian of Asia Minor, Saint Luke, Stephen, Anastasius, and Tryphon of Constantinople. And from that cult, as Barada had said before, nothing can be concluded.

For the adherents of the "Frank thesis," the Biography of Saint Urso would unfortunately be the only source according to which the Croats remained pagans even in the time of Charlemagne. We say unfortunately because it is a forged document, a fanciful legend, a type of the Golden Legend of Jacobus de Voragine, which arose 500 years after Charlemagne; the critical editors of Acta Sanctorum (1866) declared it a crude forgery and labeled it Acta suspecta.

This Urso exists neither as a saint nor as a historical figure. He is mere fiction of medieval imagination; he doesn't even appear in the Golden Legend, that is to say, he doesn't exist until the end of the 13th century. In Acta s. The Biography of Saint Urso tells of a man who arrived in Croatia and lived there from 779 to 788, that the king was a pagan, that he married his daughter and occupied the Croatian throne. However, at that time, Prince Višeslav, a Christian, ruled Croatia, and there is no evidence of any monarch of foreign blood reigning. Furthermore, this document is not contemporary with the events it describes.

But for Victor Novak, "it constitutes a valuable contribution, which irrefutably proves the expansionist efforts of Charlemagne... who sent missionaries among the Croats."

"Be that as it may," Mandić concludes, "from now on, no serious historian should refer to the Biography of Saint Urso in relation to the history of the baptism of the Croats" [53].

In contrast, Mandić's evidence is serious, abundant, and reliable, so that, making another important correction, he assures the Croats of the honor "of having been the first among the Slavic peoples to embrace Christianity."

1. The testimony of the acts of the Synods of Split (925-928) mentions the dioceses organized from Kotor to the islands of Qarnero and Sirmium, "all populated and with many priests," ancient (antiquitus), except for that of Nin, founded between 863 and 867. This proves that the Dalmatian dioceses were either restored or established no later than the beginning of the 9th century. Regnum Croatorum records, according to Methodos, that in 753 the ecclesiastical conditions for the baptism of Croats were established, new dioceses were founded, and old ones were restored.

2. The testimony of Pope John X. In his letter to King Tomislav in 925, this Pope described the Croats as "the first fruits of the apostles and of the Church in general," who embraced Christianity before the Germanic peoples (Saxons) to whom, as we know, Gregory II (715-731) sent Saint Boniface—that is, long before Gregory's time. All the documents, therefore, point to the 7th century.

3. The testimony of Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus. The emperor mentions the baptism of the Croats three times. The first is in chapter 31 of his *De Administrando Imperio*, when he says: "The Emperor Heraclius brought priests from Rome, among whom he appointed an archbishop... and baptized the Croats, and these Croats, at that time, had Porga as their ruler." In the same chapter, Porga is considered to be the son of the ruler who led the Croats to the Adriatic.

Therefore, this must have occurred before the death of Heraclius I, which took place on February 11, 641. The second time they are mentioned is in an imprecise and confusing text that lends itself to different interpretations. Mandić explained this text with complete clarity: it refers to the baptism in Pannonian Croatia, and the emperor mistakenly placed the event in Dalmatian Croatia at the end of the 9th century. This is further confirmed by information about the actions of Saints Cyril and Methodius in baptizing the Croats of Pannonia, a baptism that began in 867, as also mentioned in two old documents: Regnum Croatorum and the Chronicle of the Presbyter of Diocleia (referring to the conversion of the Croats "by the holy man Constantius").

Porphyrogenitus makes the third mention of the Croats in chapter 29 during the reign of Basil I (867–886), which Mandić interprets as referring primarily to the Serbs and the inhabitants of Neretva ("pagans").

4. The testimony of the Spalatense metropolis. Works written based on the old archives of the Split metropolis, such as the Historia Salonitana Maior (circa 1185) and the Historia Salonitana of Thomas the Archdeacon (d. 1268), expressly mention John of Ravenna, the delegate of Pope John IV (d. 642), who began converting the Croats, first their ruler Porga and the ruling class, between the Zrmanja and Cetina rivers, and gradually continued visiting the regions of Dalmatia and Croatia…,” and “restored churches, appointed bishops, established parishes, and gradually drew the common people to Christian doctrine.” All of this occurred during the reign of Emperor Heraclius I (d. 641).

5. The testimony of Pope Agatho (678–681). From a letter Agatho addressed to Emperor Constantine IV in 680, Mandić infers that the passage concerning the The reference to bishops working among newly converted Slavic peoples refers specifically to the Croats. He then discusses the famous agreement between Pope Agatho and the Croats. Porphyrogenitus mentions this agreement without specifying the Pope's name or the year, although he transcribes the agreement verbatim and notes that it was signed by the Croatian princes. The historian E. Sakač, in his well-known 1931 study, confirmed what Mandić had already established: that it was indeed Pope Agatho.

6. Archaeological Evidence. Regarding the Evangeliarium spalatense, Mandić believes that M. Faber and Barada correctly determined its date, placing it at the end of the 7th or beginning of the 8th century. The existence of Christianity among the Croats in the 7th century is also confirmed by the recent discovery (1958) in Split Cathedral, within a 7th-century sarcophagus, which refers to the transfer of the relics of Saint Daimo. This is the oldest and most recent document concerning the activities of John of Ravenna in Split and Dalmatia.

A year earlier (1957), Mandić had completed his extensive study, proving, unlike Bulić, that Saint Daimo was the first bishop of Salona and that his remains were transferred to Split, not Rome. The aforementioned discovery of 1958 confirms Mandić's thesis and corroborates his theories regarding the baptism of the Croats in connection with John of Ravenna and the founding of the metropolis of Split in the 7th century, not at the end of the 8th century—that is, before the synod held in Split in 925, as Bulić, Sisic, and Barada maintained under the influence of Duchesne.[54]

The significance of Mandić's corrections to Croatian and foreign historians regarding the initial cultural formation of the Croats within the universal community of the Church, which had monopolized culture and spiritual prestige in Europe at that time, can be judged and appreciated by those familiar with the universal character of European culture on the eve of and during the Carolingian era, and with the significance of the papacy in relations with the monarchs and peoples of Europe during that period. Being formed one or two centuries earlier within that universality of "Church-State or State-Church," as C. Dawson summarizes the mentality of the High Middle Ages, is a significant matter. When John X convened the Synod of Split in 925 and considered the Croats a Christian people, officially calling them "chosen sons of the Roman Church," this signified an honorable classification of their universal character, not merely a diplomatic phrase.

c) The Croatian Assembly at Duvno in 753

When discussing Mandić's fundamental thesis on Regnum Croatorum, we emphasized that this key would also clarify the issue of the Croatian assembly at Duvno. We must now examine this correction by our author.

Chapter IX, the most important chapter of Regnum Croatorum, describes this state-ecclesiastical assembly in detail, mentioning the papal and imperial delegates and the crucial provision regarding the division of the state into the mainland and the coastal regions of White and Rubra Croatia.[55]

Much had been written on this subject "without reaching a solution, at least one partially founded and explained in documentary form," Mandić states. It was necessary to study and review copious material and provide "an indispensable scientific argument." To understand the scope of this new and significant correction by Mandić, following our method, we refer to the previous criteria of Croatian historiography.

Rački and M. Kostrenčić attribute great legal significance to the Duvno Assembly, without specifying its date. Farlati placed it in 877, and Sisic moved it to 882. Kukuljević, Smiciklas, and Klaić believe the assembly took place in 925 and that Tomislav, the first Croatian king, was crowned there. Luka Jelić attempted to prove that the assembly was held in 1057. All these efforts by Croatian historiography attest to the value of Mandić's research, who, along with the necessary scientific ability and erudition, takes into account the internal criteria that open doors for him.

Mandić demonstrated that the dates indicated are incorrect. First, he ruled out the year 1057:

1. From the Methodos, it can be inferred that, during the Duvno Assembly, the Croatian state was in its initial phase, which cannot be said of 1057, when Petar Krešimir IV reigned over a territory with an established legal structure and over 130 years of history. Furthermore, at that time, the Croatian state did not extend as far as "Ba(m) Balona," that is, present-day Wallona in Albania, as it did at the time of the Duvno Assembly.

2. The schism between Byzantium and Rome prevented the respective delegates from attending the 1057 assembly together. Regarding the year 925, the Synod of Split took place that year, and the emperor's delegates were not present at it, nor did its conclusions coincide with those of the Duvno Assembly. Furthermore, the people were not present, and at that time there was no Pope Stephen living, nor did the Croatian state extend as far as Wallonia, as it did during the reign of Budimir, whom we cannot in any way identify with Tomislav.

According to the Chronicle of the Presbyter of Dioclea, the names of Pope Stephen and Emperor Michael were mentioned in the assembly, which misled Jelić, leading him to place the event in 1057 when, in fact, it was Pope Stephen IX and Emperor Michael VI. However, Mandić proved that the name of Emperor Constantine (741-775) appears in the Regnum Croatorum, which is closer to the original Methodos. The Presbyter of Dioclea took the name of Michael from the legends of Saints Cyril and Methodius and associated it with Svätopluk, while Constantine was a contemporary of Stephen II (752-757).

With these arguments, Mandić dismissed the year set by Farlati and Sisic, thoroughly analyzing the first passages of chapter IX of Regnum Croatorum and of the Chronicle (Ljetopis) which lack the original value of Methodos, a document contemporary with the assembly of Duvno, since it is the addition and combinations of the same Presbyter of Dioclea in the mid-12th century on the basis of the text of the Regnum Croatorum of the 11th century, prologue which, in turn, was written according to the Biography of S. Methodius (early 10th century), where "Svetopelek" is mentioned.

According to Methodos, the assembly at Duvno involved close collaboration between Rome and Byzantium. This was only possible until 754, when Pope Stephen II, protected by the Frankish king Pepin the Short, provoked the political and state rupture between Rome and Byzantium, a rupture that would deepen with the religious schisms of 863 (Photius) and 1054. Mandić proves that the assembly at Duvno took place in 753 by analyzing the life of the imperial envoy, named John. This was the emperor's secretary who, in 752 and 753, carried out this mission at the court of Pope Stephen II in Rome, and in 756 at the court of Pepin the Short in France.

Furthermore, Mandić provides additional documents and evidence, makes minor corrections to Sisic's theses under the title "Resolving the Difficulties," and concludes: "We have rigorously proven, based on solid internal and external documents, that the Duvno Assembly could not have taken place in the 11th, 10th, or 9th centuries, but only in the 8th century, and more precisely, in 753. This proven historical fact sheds new light on Croatian history of the early centuries and opens new perspectives on the lives of those in the 8th century, hitherto shrouded in mystery" [56] or, as Sisic would say, we were in a "historical vacuum."

Mandić acknowledges that "Sisic was one of the best and most scientific Croatian historians, and that is why his approach and his assessment of the document 'The Chronicle of the Priest of Dioclea' surprised us."

Sisic's main argument for denying the existence of the old Croatian document Methodos was that he could not find the term in dictionaries of medieval and modern Greek. However, the word existed in Greek and must have had a specific meaning in the Byzantine era. Marulic (a renowned Croatian humanist) noted in 1510 that the work was called Methodos in the old chronicle Regnum Croatorum, which, according to Jerome Caletić, "had been transcribed by Dmine Papalić from an ancient book written in Croatian characters." Mandić believes that the work was originally called Methodos in the sense of a manual for the orderly and systematic administration of the state, since both chronicles state that the work contained state and ecclesiastical laws voted on in the assembly of Duvno.

Another argument Sisic made against Methodos was that the Croats, until the end of the 11th century, lacked a developed literary language. “That’s not accurate,” Mandić argues, as he aptly analyzes the ecclesiastical pastoral care from the baptism of the Croats in 640 until 753. This pastoral care compelled the clergy to translate the Holy Scriptures and teach their flock in the national language for over a hundred years, which facilitated the refinement of the vernacular. These reflections lead Mandić to formulate an original hypothesis: that St. Cyril made use of the language and the translations of the Gospels and Epistles produced by anonymous Croatian priests on the Adriatic coast over a period of 200 years, from the mid-7th to the mid-9th century. Moreover, the Croatian Methodos was written 110 years before the journey of St. Cyril and St. Methodius to Moravia.[57]

d) Croatia Rubra

When we spoke at the beginning about the rectifications made by Mandić, we referred to his program, which consists of reintegrating all Croatian regions "into a historical and ethnic area of the Croatian people." But these lands are not only White Croatia, which would later be called the Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, but also Croatia Rubra (that is, Neretva, Zahumlje, Travunja, and medieval Dioclea), Bosnia, and the Republic of Dubrovnik.

For this reason, his first works dealt with Croatia Rubra (1957) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Volume 1, 1960), the first chronologically and because of the interest he showed in them and the new arguments he presented. However, what we predicted when we reviewed the first volume of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1962 came to pass: Mandić had gathered so many documents, theses, and details that a comprehensive and monumental work, a complete panorama of the historical Croatian territory, was already becoming clear. Time has proven us right, and we eagerly await his announced work, The History of the Croats During the National Rule (626-1102).

We now turn our attention to Mandić's favorite topic, his original Croatia Rubra. What has been said so far clearly indicates that the oldest documents refer to Croatia Rubra as extending from the Cetina River to the Walloon and encompassing Dioclea.

Mandić will contribute new documents, found in Western sources and in the Dubrovnik archives, among them:

1. Andreas Dandolo (1309-1354), Venetian Doge and chronicler, mentions the Duvno Assembly and the division of Dalmatia into four parts: "From the Duvno plain to Istria was called White Croatia, and from that plain to Drač, Croatia Rubra; the mountainous region from the Drina River to Macedonia was called Rascia, and from this river west, Bosnia... Modern authors call the entire coastline Dalmatia, and the mountainous region, Croatia" [58]. The novelty lies in the fact that the mainland part (Zagorje) is not called "Surbia" but "Chroatia." The Italian humanist Flavio Biondo (1388-1463) transcribes Dandolo verbatim and concludes: "Rascia and Bosnia are considered lands of the Kingdom of Croatia" [59].

2. The authors from Ragusa and others. Juno Resti, Mavro Orbini, Jacobo Lukarić, and all of them are familiar with the Chronicle of the Priest of Dioclea, all speak of Croatia Rubra. The testimonies of the authors from Ragusa are of particular value. They concern the name of their homeland. They were familiar with popular opinion and old traditions regarding the name of their region and its inhabitants. The same topic is also addressed by Dinko Zavorović (1545–1610), Ivan Mrnavić (1580–1637), Ivan Lucić, Du Cange (Historia Byzantina, Paris, 1680), Pablo Ritter-Vitezović, Farlati, and others.

3. The Venetian chronicler Deacon John noted in his chronicle an anecdote from which it can be concluded that Zahumlje, an integral part of Croatia Rubra, was part of the Croatian state in 912. Mandić's argument on this point, unlike Sišić's, is brilliant.[60]

The following documents on Croatia Rubra come from official sources of the 9th and 10th centuries: the donation of Ban Trpimir of 852; the papal letters of 874 and 879; and the ecclesiastical synods of Split in 929 and 928. Seven Byzantine authors from the 11th and 12th centuries.

"To weaken," says Mandic, "the valuable testimonies of Byzantine authors regarding the Croatian character of Dioclea and all of southern Croatia, the Rubra, in the 11th and 12th centuries, Serbian historians try to prove that these Byzantine authors should be corrected, and where the documents mention 'Croatia' and 'Croats,' those names should be replaced with 'Servia' and 'Servians'... An objective and serious critique cannot accept such an interpretation of the Byzantine sources."

What is the reason for this difficulty? Ivan Skilices describes the Serbian-Croatian collaboration against the Bulgarian rebels to liberate Bulgaria from Byzantine rule, which he calls the conquest of Bulgaria, writing verbatim: "During the first year of that emperor, the eleventh year (1073 BC), the Serbian people, whom they also call Croats, went out to subdue Bulgaria." Serbian historians will conclude that "the process of differentiation between Croats and Serbs in the 11th and 12th centuries had not advanced enough for foreigners to notice it."

The name "Croat" is thus synonymous with "Servian" and "inhabitants of Dioclea." However, this refers to the Bulgarian uprising of 1073. The Serbs provided significant assistance to the Bulgarians, but under the leadership of the Croat Bodin, son of Michael, "ruler of those called Croats." At that time, in Rascia, the Grand Comites (prefect) was Petrislav, son of Prince Michael of Dioclea. Skilices refers to this Serbian dependence of the Croats, so this passage should be interpreted as: "During the first year of that emperor... the Serbian people (ethnically) who are also called Croats (politically) left (Rascia) to subdue Bulgaria."

Another difficulty The problem lies with Porphyrogenitus, who, in one passage, contrary to other assertions, writes that the Serbs populated the Neretva River basin, Zahumlje, and Travunja. Besides contradicting numerous reliable documents, both domestic and foreign, dating from before and after Porphyrogenitus, he himself states in several places that the inhabitants of these regions are not Serbs.[61]

Thus, Mandić resolves several difficulties, including Jirecek's identification of the "Servian of Trebinje" with "Vojislav of Dioclea," an argument he used to declare Stephen Vojislav and Dioclea Serbian lands.[62]

Elucidating such "difficulties" is a particular pleasure for Mandić. A consummate scholar, he considers every detail; before issuing an opinion, he studies not just a single sentence, but the entire text, other contemporary texts, and the prevailing circumstances that clarify the logical structure. They shed clear light, justifying an addition or correction. That's why, as we said, he always seeks new documents and testimonies.

Regarding Croatia Rubra, he finds them, in addition to those already mentioned, in archaeological documents, in linguistic unity, in ecclesiastical conditions, in the observations of foreign itinerarists and in the tradition of Montenegro itself. "Throughout the entire area of Rubra Croatia, up until the Nemanids, there are no Serbian cultural or archaeological documents. Until that time, there were neither Serbs nor Orthodox Christians in all of Rubra Croatia except for a handful of emigrants in northern Travunja and some political refugees in other regions.

Even the early Nemanids, when they ruled in some province of Rubra Croatia, had to adapt to the religion of their subjects and return to the Catholicism of their ancestors, Catholic Croatian nobles.[63] Of particular note is Mandić's theory that the Croats arrived in the South with the Croatian language in the čaiavski dialect and found in their new homeland the Slavs of the first migration who spoke the Kaiakski and štokavski dialects. From the beginning, in all Croatian territories, from Trieste to Wallonia, from the Adriatic to the Drava River in the north and the Drina in the east, the čaiavski dialect was spoken." The čakavski dialect, brought from beyond the Carpathians, mixed over time and merged, depending on the province, with the Kajkavski and štokavski dialects. But, after White Croatia, the influence of čakavski was strongest in the old territory of Rubra Croatia.[64]

It is to Mandić's great credit that he established and proved that the lands of Rubra Croatia were from the beginning an integral part of Croatian history and that medieval Dioclea, notwithstanding its current status, was unquestionably a Croatian province[65] and as such must be treated within the framework of Croatia's political and cultural history, especially in the 11th and 12th centuries.

What our best historians, F. Rački and F. Sišić, omitted in their historical studies—and historically ceded regions south of Cetina and Neretva to the Serbs—Mandić conclusively rectified as one of the champions. larger and more meritorious of the Croatia Rubra[66].

M. Sufflay wrote extensively about the problems of the Croatia Rubra and concluded in his insightful study "The Croatia Rubra and Dubrovnik" Hrvatska Revija, No. 1, 1930: Croatia Rubra that the priest of Dioclea actually had a Croatian ethnic background...

My friend and colleague in the university classrooms in Zagreb, V. Tripunov, a native of Kotor, published in Hrvatska Smotra (8(1), 12-27, 1940) a study entitled On the Periphery of Croatia, attempting to prove the origin, name, and territory of the Croatia Rubra. Aware of the probative force of many authors, he writes: "To record all the historical facts that created Rubra Croatia and to analyze all the main factors that broke the integrity of the Croatian people at that critical juncture of Croatian identity implies proving and explaining the aforementioned assertions." Today we can say that Dr. Mandić recorded all that data, analyzed and organized it, interpreted and explained it with scientific rigor, and established the historical truth. 

Dr. Ante TRUMBIĆ (1864 -1938)

Belief and Disillusionment of a "Yugoslav"

BOGDAN RADICA

At the beginning of this century, Croatian politics was subjected to great trials, the full implications of which have not yet been sufficiently clarified in universal historiography. The firm rejection of the Dual Monarchy and its consequent transformation into a federal or confederal system of states, in order to satisfy all the constituent nationalities and, in particular, the Slavic peoples, was reflected in Croatian political life. This position affected not so much the broad social strata[67] as the intellectual group and the political "elite" who, while on the one hand tending towards the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy, on the other hand envisioning a broad union of the states and peoples of the South Slavs who, upon the ruins of the old Monarchy, would form their new state.

Anti-Austrian, anti-Hungarian, and anti-German sentiments were quickly replaced by Pan-Slavic trends and the union of the South Slavs. The new conceptions centered on the creation of a new South Slavic state that would unite Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and the regions of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia. A common state, thus conceived, would save Slavicism and all Slavic peoples, protected from the growing Pan-Germanic impulse by the power of Russia.

These ideas, introduced into Croatia, originated in Prague where, under the spiritual leadership of Tomáš Massaryk, the thesis of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was formulated, upon whose foundations both Yugoslavia and a union of the Czech and Slovak peoples would be created. These people, like the South Slavs, felt threatened by the Austrians and Hungarians. This perception was reinforced by Serbia's transformation from an Ottoman subjugation into an independent Balkan state. This development held considerable appeal not only for Croatian intellectuals but also for the Serbian minority, who lived under the Dual Monarchy and preferred incorporation into Balkan Serbia to the alternative of living in a community with an Austrian solution, where they would enjoy the same equality of status as the Croats.

In Croatian lands, the Dalmatian intellectual class participated with a distinctly Mediterranean enthusiasm in the struggles for unity among the South Slavs, setting themselves apart from their compatriots in Central Croatia and from those in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dalmatian Croats were directly influenced by the results of the Italian Risorgimento and, consequently, harbored the idea that only by uniting with Serbia and Croatia could they free themselves from Austro-Hungarian hegemony and the unexpected and growing influence of Italy.

Under a similar predisposition, on April 17, 1897, at the Imperial Council in Vienna, Trumbić thus presented the problem of Italian imperialist nationalism. There was a genuine fear that the latter could threaten the freedom and independence of the Croatian Adriatic, from Istria, along the Croatian coast proper, and throughout Dalmatia and all its islands. Since the Italian minority in the Dalmatian cities was rapidly transforming into an irredentist Italian community, the Croatian intellectual class, faced with this danger, believed that the national and political integrity of the Croats could be saved by uniting with the South Slavs of the Balkans.

At the forefront of this policy was Dr. Ante Trumbić, followed by prominent Dalmatian politicians and intellectuals, among whom the publicist Frano Supilo and the sculptor Ivan Meštrović stood out. Dr. Ante Trumbić was born in Split in 1864 and excelled in classical studies. After completing his legal studies, he became one of Austria's most prominent politicians and jurists. In his youth, he had been a supporter of Dr. Ante Starčević, an eminent Croatian politician who clearly and concretely awakened the awareness of the Croatian state and became one of its most ardent advocates.

In accordance with his brilliant vision, political experience, and knowledge of historical facts, he maintained the thesis that a political symbiosis between Croats and Serbs was impossible without causing serious harm and even endangering Croatian national identity. Trumbić abandoned his youthful ideals for the sake of creating a broader community. Nevertheless, he inherited from Starčević not only his unwavering faith in Croatian independence but also the Christian integrity of a Catonian character and faith, which always distinguished Starčević in the political arena. All of Trumbić's oratory in the Dalmatian Diet bears the hallmarks of Starčević's political approach. Aware of the political maneuvering of the Dalmatian Serbs, autonomists, and Italians, he tenaciously defended the union of Dalmatia with Croatia, without which he could not conceive of not only the subsistence and national expansion but also the economic existence of his homeland.

As an expression of Trumbić's profound conviction, under the influence of Starčević, we must refer to his declaration of February 12, 1897, during the budget debates in the Dalmatian Diet in Zadar:

"I am a son of the Croatian people, an unfortunate nation, but with a noble soul and keen intelligence, a people who throughout the centuries have demonstrated their inclination towards noble deeds. If today they have fallen into the misfortune that oppresses them, they cannot be blamed for it. Culture is rooted largely in the adverse circumstances that time has accumulated around them, as well as in the malicious neighbors that fate has placed beside them. The Croatians have nevertheless survived all the great storms, and today they appear on the stage, together with other civilized peoples of the earth, seeking their heritage and their freedom. If anything is sweet to a noble soul, it is working for the homeland and the effort put forth so that the oppressed people may achieve their happiness. For that happiness of the Croatian people in whose I was born and raised here, and I offer my meager strength, imbued with unwavering faith in our Resurrection, which I hope will come as soon as possible so that Croatians can attend to their well-being with greater peace of mind.

"Under a similar predisposition, on April 17, 1897, in the Imperial Council of Vienna, Trumbić thus presented the problem of Yugoslavism: "For Croats, Yugoslavism once had a literary and political-national significance. In the Yugoslav form, there was a deliberate and even well-intentioned attempt to bury the Croatian national and political name, thereby also burying all the rights of that people and even their very national identity. Thanks to the conscience of the true sons of Croatia, and especially to the genius of Ante Starčević, that attempt failed, and 'Yugoslavism' was likewise thwarted, while the Croatian name was revived and shone even brighter. 'Yugoslavism,' therefore, was despised by Croats, not only as a topographical term but also as an artificial and literary word that sought to acquire a national meaning. For this reason, we, the deputies of the Party of Right in the Imperial Council, for whom the Croatian people are..." sacred and the foundation of our public activity, and we would never, under any circumstances, have joined the Club that would be called "Yugoslav." On the contrary, we wish that this Club be organized under the Croatian-Slovenian banner so that the former name may stand out before the world, both domestically and internationally."

At the same time, on March 30, 1897, in the plenary session of the Vienna parliament, Trumbić made a public declaration regarding the union of Dalmatia with Croatia, the text of which is as follows:

"The undersigned Croatian deputies, while acknowledging that Dalmatia currently belongs de facto to the Kingdoms and countries represented in the Imperial Council, must declare that Dalmatia belongs de jure to the entirety of the Kingdom of Croatia."

"The undersigned Croatian deputies, while recognizing that Dalmatia currently belongs de facto to the Kingdoms and countries represented in the Imperial Council, must declare that Dalmatia belongs de jure to the entirety of the Kingdom of Croatia." Following that declaration, Trumbić, in an article published in Narodni List (Zadar), made the following clarification: "The importance of the declaration lies in the fact that, for the first time in the Vienna parliament, all the Croatian deputies from Dalmatia testified that this territory is not legally an Austrian region but an integral part of the entire Kingdom of Croatia. The Croatian idea is prevailing."

Trumbić, in his subsequent political career, remained faithful to this fundamental premise, as did all prominent Croatian politicians. This is evidenced not only by the disillusionment that marked the end of his political life but also even during his intense struggles with the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia during the First World War.

Immediately after the assassination in Sarajevo, aware of the imminence of war, Trumbić sought refuge abroad where, together with Frano Supilo and Ivan Meštrović, he initiated efforts to overthrow the Dual Monarchy and form a union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. After 1903, and especially after the end of the Balkan Wars, Trumbić, like many Croatian intellectuals, still viewed the transformation of Serbia and its role in the Balkans with great hope. These hopes were bolstered by the constant refusals of Vienna and Budapest to grant certain concessions, indispensable to the Slavs, in order to bolster the confidence of the conservative Slavic circles within the Empire. This intransigence on the part of Vienna and Budapest convinced the progressive and revolutionary Slavic elements of the Monarchy that Austria had to be destroyed—Austria delenda est.

As an émigré, first in Italy, then in France, and later in England, Trumbić, along with his close collaborators and friends, Frano Supilo and Ivan Meštrović, created the Yugoslav Committee, whose purpose was to initiate talks on the fate of Croatia and Slovenia with representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia and with those of the Allied powers: Great Britain, France, Russia, and later Italy.

From all the documents published to date, it appears that neither Trumbić nor any of the other Croats on the Yugoslav Committee (which was mostly composed of Croats) held any decisive or concrete opinions on the national and political life of Serbia, nor were they aware of any claims regarding its political leadership. They all saw Serbia as a small Yugoslav state that had managed to free itself from Turkish rule and, as such, believed it could be transformed into a stronger entity capable of uniting with its Croatian and Slovenes neighbors. Such views stemmed more from romantic idealism than from pragmatic reality.

The fundamental idea was inherited from 19th-century romantic idealism, according to which Serbs and Croats were believed to be "one people with two names," to speak "the same language," to have "a shared destiny," and, consequently, to live in a common state. But that idea shattered during the first contacts with Serbian representatives. Never, not even in the Middle Ages, had Serbia participated in the political and social life of the West. It was first an integral part of the Byzantine world and, later, of the Ottoman Empire. As such, it never felt the need to share life in a multinational context according to the forms and concepts of a Western European federation. Its political and state structure was based exclusively on the Serbian national dynasty, the monarchical army, and the Serbian national Orthodox Church.

Therefore, any collaboration with Croatian representatives in the diaspora was rejected unless it was based on strict and exclusive Serbian centralism. Representatives of Serbian political life, and first and foremost Nikolai Pašić, Prime Minister and leader of the majority Radical Party, saw the creation of a potential new state solely and exclusively as the aggrandizement of Serbia into a Greater Serbia. Thus, the idea of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, within the Serbian political conception, was considered only as a Serbian state. Such a state would be governed from Belgrade, the Serbian capital, under the rule of the Serbian dynasty, with the Orthodox Church privileged and favored over other churches and denominations. The military and administrative apparatus would remain in Serbian hands. From all this, it was quite clear that this Byzantine-Turkic-Balkan conception had to be confronted with the thesis put forward by the Croatian representatives.

Croatia, which, according to its history, is a quintessential Western country, primarily due to its Catholic identity and its development and formation within the Roman Catholic world, and which later, under the Habsburgs, maintained a prolonged and constant struggle in defense of its state and national identity, immediately clashed with Great Serbian centralism. Both Trumbić and his collaborators Supilo and Meštrović requested a federal solution in their talks with Serbian representatives. However, Serbian intellectuals not only lacked sensitivity to such a proposal but, instinctively, like good Balkan people, distrusted it. The mere fact that the Croats were Catholic and accustomed to employing legal and political means in their struggles within the Habsburg Monarchy was enough to further entrench the Serbs in the spirit and obsession of their exclusivist centralism. Ultimately, this spirit deprived Croatia of its autonomist and historical identity.

Due to the clash with its own concepts and a primal distrust, evident in Prime Minister Pašić and even King Alexander, Trumbić had inexplicable difficulties in reaching a satisfactory agreement. Both the Serbs and the Russians, who exclusively defended Serbian interests, showed no trust whatsoever in the Croats simply because they were Catholic. At one point, they were even prepared to abandon the idea of creating a common Yugoslav state, accepting the unification of all Serbs into an exclusively Serbian state and leaving the Croats and Slovenes to their fate.

Precisely because Italy entered into an alliance with the Entente powers and was awarded most of the Croatian Adriatic coast by the secret Treaty of London (1915), Trumbić feared that Serbian representatives might, in turn, accept the sacrifice of a vital part of Croatian national territory—its Adriatic coast—in exchange for an arrangement with Italy that would grant Greater Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea.

Since his essential goal was to maintain the unity of Croatian lands at any cost, Trumbić diligently sought solutions for Croatia's potential fate in relation to Serbia. He hoped that the Croats, now within a common state and through appropriate political means, could achieve extensive and genuine autonomy. He knew that simultaneously fighting against Serbian domination and Italian imperialism was not possible. Hence the concessions Trumbić made to Serbia, especially since he believed it would be easier to later impose conditions on a backward Serbia that would gradually be forced to share power with the Croats in the governance of a modern state.

The Krf Declaration (1917) was, in reality, Trumbić's compromise, which he saw as a realistic way to preserve the integrity of Croatian lands while leaving room for future solutions upon the creation of a common state. In essence, Trumbić was a federalist, as he was aware that neither the Croats nor the Slovenes, nor any other ethnic groups, would accept a unitary state at any price.

However, he was mistaken in failing to recognize that the Serbian concept of the state was exclusively unitary and that only in this form was it possible to exercise hegemony over other nationalities. A special role was played by the fact that the Kingdom of Serbia was itself an ally of the Western powers. Consequently, the new state would have to retain the Serbian dynasty, army, and administration, as well as its capital, Belgrade. Serbians harbored the hope that the new state would not be a completely new state, founded on equality according to Croatian conceptions, but rather the old Serbian state, enlarged into a Greater Serbian state, preserving all the characteristics of a Balkan state, backward in that part of the Ottoman Empire, the main cause of the cultural backwardness of the peoples of that region.

Trumbić's position sparked lengthy discussions within Croatian politics, as he was criticized for yielding to Serbian hegemonic tendencies that became evident even during the war in the controversies between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government. The clash, even within the Committee itself, between Trumbić and Supilo, is well known. Supilo urged Trumbić to halt talks with Pašić and even proposed, as an alternative, the possibility of an independent Croatia, albeit a much smaller and diminished one. Supilo sensed that the Croats faced a long road of arduous struggles for self-determination in the face of Serbia's staunch opposition to resolving national issues on equal terms.

While Supilo still felt in the prime of his physical and intellectual strength, to free himself from responsibility for further talks with the Serbian government, he resigned his position as a member of the Committee and left it. A letter from Supilo to a friend in Italy states that he had accepted the Corfu Declaration as the lesser of two evils, even though his mental illness had progressed and he no longer felt fully in control of himself.[68] Thus, the responsibility for reaching a minimal agreement with the Serbian government fell exclusively on Trumbić's shoulders.

He always believed that, at last, the integrity of Croatian lands would at least be saved, which proved to be true. Regarding the outcome of Trumbić's activities and his efforts in emigration, perhaps the most accurate and best opinion is that formulated by the last president of the Croatian Peasant Party—the majority party—Dr. V. Maček, in the following terms: "History will take note of Trumbić's activities in emigration, and it will do so favorably because he did what he could, taking into consideration those circumstances.[69] It was he who made it possible for all of us Croats to meet together and be united."

In other words, Dr. Trumbić managed to preserve the integrity of most Croatian lands, thus preventing their partition among foreign powers through equally dubious arrangements. This would have resulted in the loss of territories and, consequently, jeopardized the sense of national unity. The political evolution that took place in Yugoslavia between the two world wars sufficiently justified this assertion, because the Croats, under the hegemonic oppression of the Serbs, managed to strengthen their sense of national community and forge their national identity, tending toward the renewal of their own nation-state.

It is well known that Trumbić was hardly satisfied with the work he carried out abroad during the First World War. For this reason, he declined any important position in the new state after the Treaty of Rapallo, by which Italy was ceded the city of Zadar in Dalmatia, Istria, and some islands in the Adriatic. Resigning from all public offices in the Belgrade government, he went to Zagreb, where he took an active part in Croatian political life, especially in the opposition that manifested itself in the struggle against Serbian centralism. Trumbić even voted against the Vidovdan Constitution (the first Constitution of 1921) because he knew it had been drafted by Serbian politicians and the dynasty against Croatian national interests, later becoming a source of scandal and, at the same time, a cause of the Yugoslav tragedy.

In one of his speeches in parliament, Trumbić explained the reasons for his negative vote and warned of a future catastrophe for Yugoslavia: "Will the current Constitution be the basis for the consolidation of the State, or will it open up new debates or prolong new struggles whose complications only God knows? Major problems cannot be solved in this way, and certainly not with this first Constitution that we are offering to our national history. What kind of Constitution is this? It lacks the fundamental idea of the State, which should be the essential principle of our national life. This principle has been replaced by a tendency that seeks to make the people's participation in public life illusory, while at the same time a bureaucratic centralist system assumes power over the people."

He then went on to say with great precision: "They intend to administratively dismember Croatia without respecting circumstances, needs, administrative interests, and all this against the will of the vast majority of its people. The authors of the Constitution demanded that power be handed over to them hastily and through a set of regulations that would ensure order and respect for the state, a state in which political crimes and the brigandism of the Hajduk had reached their peak. We have freed ourselves from the foreign yoke, but the people still await their internal liberation. This Constitution does not signify such liberation. I worked during the war to free us from foreign domination. With equal sacrifice, I have decided to contribute my help to shake off internal oppression. For me, the issue of the Constitution is not a matter of expediency but a personal conviction and also a matter of the life of the people. I will consciously vote against this entire Constitution because it is untimely and because it is flawed."

Lamenting the destruction of all those illusions that had served for the union with Serbia and making direct reference to his aggressive policy and the new Constitution, Trumbić explained the situation of Croatia at that time as follows: "Croatia was always a political factor. For the sake of national interests, it must be so today as well... Until the destruction of Austria-Hungary, Croatia had preserved its political individuality within the framework of the Monarchy. On October 29, 1918, Croatia broke all its ties with Hungary and Austria and with the throne; on that date, it declared its independence. But Croatia in due course handed over political power to the National Council—through its legitimate representatives—which had been constituted for all the regions of the former Monarchy. A few days later, on December 19, 1918, the National Council, in agreement with the representatives of the Kingdom of Serbia, proceeded to unite our people and our State[70].

Therefore, Croatia, of its own free will, established this new relationship in which it finds itself today voluntarily.[71] Consequently, both Croats and Serbs, as well as the inhabitants of the entire country, must bear in mind what has happened, namely: that all actions were carried out with the will and consent of the people. Therefore, the consequences of those actions must also be accepted... In Croatia, the vast majority of our people demonstrate peculiar characteristics. Both Croats and Serbs who live there have a pronounced characteristic—the unwavering resistance to any kind of oppression.

This capacity for resistance, which is the energy and common capital of our people, must be harnessed for the good of our community and not squandered, both internally and fraternally, in Croatia and throughout the country. Croatia was the political factor. It is today and must be, from the point of view of the interests of consolidating our country, because it has all the necessary authority in this regard. Its geographical position is such that without Croatia in this new state of ours, there would be no unity of the country nor unity of our people" [72].

With this position, Trumbić offered the Great Serb usurpers a last chance to open their eyes and embark on the path of compromise with the Croats, if they did not intend to completely alienate the Croats from the idea of a common Yugoslav state. This was the final appeal of a Croat who still believed in the possibility of maintaining the Yugoslav community and who favored changing the centralist system of state governance. But neither the Serbian political bosses nor the dynasty abandoned their plans, which consisted of dominating all the nationalities and national minorities of Yugoslavia. In the outside world, especially in the West, there is a mistaken opinion that the Croats suddenly decided to destroy the Yugoslav state.

The Croats were reacting rationally, as a mature nation He demanded a position of equality with Serbia, which, moreover, was announced and emphasized in the Corfu and Geneva Declarations. In other words, Croatia was entering a common state on equal terms. This is how Dr. Trumbić expressed himself to me, telling me that his conversations and agreements with Serbian representatives during the war were based on this principle. But Trumbić was already aware that political circles were not receptive to this proposal and, therefore, that equality would only be achieved after the war and within the new political framework.

However, the opposite occurred. King Alexander, who was the only one with the means to resolve the problem of national equality through the armed forces, opted for a so-called Yugoslav integration. This amounts to a legalization of the absolute preponderance of Great Serbia and its ruling class over the other Yugoslav nationalities. This spurred all Croats, united under the leadership of Esteban Radić opposed such oppression. The Croats, as a whole, were excluded by the will of the Great Serbian dynasty from the power of an exclusivist, centralist, and hegemonic system. The entire centuries-long Croatian struggle for self-determination was in danger of being lost, and the Croatian people were threatened with becoming a third-class nation within a political-state complex run exclusively by the Serbs.

Furthermore, the Serbs lacked the sensitivity for a conception of the state that was not of the Balkan type of oppression. A modern state in the current era required an administration capable of leading it to the goal of progress, and the Serbian political and administrative class lacked the necessary ideas and even the minimum preparation for this. They were therefore forced to resort to vulgar police methods and Balkan persecution against the Croats, further distancing them from any illusions they might have formed about the Yugoslav idea of a shared life with the Serbs.

Trumbić felt the Croatian national pulse and, during the period of the application of the persecutory instrument of "Obznana" [73] against the majority party, the Croatian Peasant Party, which meant against the entire Croatian nation, he made the following declaration on January 10, 1925: "Faced with the struggle imposed upon us, we Croats will not retreat; we accept it head-on and with both hands, and we will pursue it to the end through legal channels and by all permitted means. That is our position, and no one will move us from it."

However, the continuation of the persecutions unleashed by all governments, whether dictatorial or pseudo-democratic, and the assassination attempt against the Croatian national leader, Esteban Radić, in the Belgrade Parliament, placed Trumbić in the common front with the other Croatian national fighters who struggled for national independence. Not only did he side with Radić and Macek, but later he fully endorsed the actions of Croatian groups abroad that were fighting for Croatia's complete secession from Yugoslavia. Completely disillusioned with that country, Trumbić maintained the view that if the Croatian people wanted to preserve their national and political identity, they had to create their own state.

In 1925, Trumbić declared: “Looking especially to the past, I have the deepest confidence that there is no danger whatsoever of the Croatian nation succumbing, for it possesses vital forces, and moreover, exceptional vital forces. First of all, the people have preserved their national territory to this day, and this is a most important fact. It is the prerequisite for national existence, because without territory there is no nation. The territorial area that our people have preserved coincides in size with that which they possessed at the beginning of the national movements in the Balkans. Furthermore, our people have maintained intact another condition, extremely useful for speaking of their national identity, and that is their deep-rooted sentimental commitment to the solidarity of national consciousness.”

All these sentiments were held within Dr. Trumbić during the last years of his life, that is, from his negative vote against the Vidovdan Constitution until his death in 1938. In this way, Trumbić remained faithful to the principles of Croatian independence. He stood with Esteban Radić when the latter resisted Belgrade. He also accompanied Radić's successor, Dr. Maček, when he confronted Belgrade's hegemony. On the eve of King Alexander's dictatorship, in 1918 he visited Paris and London to warn responsible political circles to prevent the imposition of that regime by force and to favor a state organization based on a broad federation in which Croatia would ensure its self-determination and, at the same time, restore human relations between Serbs and Croats. All these final efforts of his were thwarted. The shortsightedness of Greater Serbian hegemony prevented the problems from being resolved.

The advent of the Second World War found Yugoslavia completely fragmented and, at the same time, politically and militarily unprepared to offer resistance. The supposed armed forces of Yugoslavia, led by Serbian generals, dissolved within days. What Trumbić had so desperately tried to prevent at the inception of the Yugoslav community, when he advocated for equal partnerships among all nationalities in Yugoslavia, actually came to pass. He had foreseen it all and made this clear to everyone who visited him until the end of his days. This writer recalls how Trumbić clearly sensed that Yugoslavia would fall in the same way as Czechoslovakia, because just as the Serbs treated the Croats mercilessly, the Czechs ruthlessly subjugated the Slovaks.

Trumbić died convinced that Croatia should be free and independent because, due to Serbian hegemony under any form of Yugoslav government, it would be politically and economically subjugated and exploited. He was also convinced that his dream of an egalitarian Yugoslav state had been forever shattered by the harshness of Greater Serbian hegemony, the only constant in the failure of the old Yugoslavia.

Trumbić remains deeply remembered and respected by the Croatian nation. He is considered a man of pristine purity. Therefore, upon his death, the Croatian people bestowed upon him honors rarely given to other national politicians.

(All comments 1-7 are from the S.C. Editorial Staff).

THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE CROATIAN BISHOP JOSIP J. STROSSMAYER IN THE FIRST VATICAN COUNCIL (1869 - 1870)IVAN TOMAS

If Kant once emphasized that historians and interpreters of a philosopher can often understand the ideas expressed by that philosopher better than the philosopher himself, what should we say regarding the understanding of historical events in general, and especially those pertaining to ecclesiastical life? We all live in the climate of the Second Vatican Council; everywhere within the Church, we observe novelties and changes that some fifteen years ago we could not have even glimpsed.

From now on, we can affirm that the Second Vatican Council is the most important event in the life of the Church in this century, as the First Vatican Council was in the last. Regarding the latter, a highly distinguished scholar of ecclesiastical doctrine and the development of theological thought laments that he was only able to define the Chapter concerning the Pope and the doctrine that elevated infallibility to the rank of dogma, due to the tragic circumstances that occurred in July 1870. But it highlights the merits of the former for the further development of theological thought concerning the Church.[74]

The powerful development of modern communication media is the reason why we now have a more abundant body of literature on the Second Vatican Council than on the First. In the latter, often one-sided, certain attitudes and positions, which have been misinterpreted, are attributed to some of its participants and continue to be attributed to them to this day. Only in light of the Second Vatican Council can we begin to better understand the oppositional role of some members of Vatican I.

From what has been said, it follows that 100 years in the history of the Church is both a long and a short period: long, because no one could participate in the work of both Councils; Short, because we feel that the first was merely a brief introduction and preparation for this one, which John XXIII opened in 1962 and which Paul VI continued and concluded in 1963.

Among those who were not well understood at the First Vatican Council, but to whom Vatican II granted very visible recognition, is the Croatian Joseph George Strossmayer (1815-1905), who in 1849 was appointed Bishop of Diakovo, where he remained until his death in the same year.

Due to the death of the Archbishop of Zagreb, Cardinal Georg Haulik, a few months before the convocation of that Council (1869), Metropolitan Strossmayer, and the fragmentation of the Croatian people at that time into several political regions—the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, as well as the Turkish part, since the Turks held the two Croatian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina until 1878 [75]—the Croatian bishops at the First Vatican Council were divided into several groups, unable to demonstrate the unity and cohesion they displayed at Vatican II.

Strossmayer was the most representative of the Croatian bishops at that Council. His natural talent, his broad culture and erudition in both ecclesiastical and secular disciplines, his religious zeal, his patriotism, the series of ecclesiastical and cultural undertakings he had successfully carried out, as well as the renown and honor he enjoyed among the international public as a result, made him deserving of this prestige. Unfortunately, neither contemporary nor later literature has always accurately portrayed Strossmayer or his diocese, thus distorting the role played by this dynamic Croatian bishop. We will mention here, as an example, the best-known historian of the First Vatican Council, the German Jesuit Theodor Grandarath. This author lists Strossmayer among the "Hungarian" bishops, even though he knew him to be Croatian, noting this in the footnotes of the text in Volumes II and III of his History of the First Vatican Council [76]3.

To graphically illustrate how the previously disseminated inaccuracies are still attributed to Strossmayer today, we will quote one of the best historians of Church councils, the German Monsignor Hubert Jedin. He also writes the following on page 560 of the second volume of one of his works: "The most temperamental adversary of infallibility..., Bishop Strossmayer of Diakovar in Bosnia" [77]. This is despite the fact that the bishop's see was not officially called "Diakovar" in the 19th century, not to mention our own, in which Djakovo has its internationally recognized Croatian name. That city never belonged to Bosnia, even though for a certain period, the bishops of that region had their see in Djakovo, and the bishop of this city still bears in his title the memory of that distant past, when Bosnian affairs were the focus of Djakovo's concerns.

It is necessary to add here that it is premature to list Strossmayer among the "opponents of infallibility." In reality, he was against the very definition of infallibility, even though—as we shall see later—he had his own particular ideas about the conception and interpretation of that proposed dogma and its relation to the role of bishops in the Church's magisterium. Moreover, he was not alone in this position. His opinion was shared by bishops from the most advanced countries: France, Germany, and Latin America. Latin America was not adequately represented at the First Vatican Council due to the upheavals and liberation struggles it was experiencing in the first half of the 19th century. But despite this, and perhaps precisely because of it, the famous and apocryphal "Strossmayer Discourse" against papal infallibility, translated into several languages and disseminated not only in the last century but also in our own, originated in Latin America.

That "speech" was immediately refuted by Strossmayer himself, who declared it false and apocryphal. This is one of the reasons why we are presenting to the Spanish-speaking public the role Strossmayer played in the First Vatican Council within the framework of fundamental theological themes, so that the memory of that great bishop, apostle of ecclesiastical unity, precursor of ecumenism, and devoted follower of Saint Peter and his successors, may be restored to its former glory.

The "old Catholics" wrote extensively and very unfairly about Strossmayer as an adversary of papal infallibility shortly after the First Vatican Council and after the prelate's death. The Yugoslav unitarian-totalitarians of various factions, especially the communists, presented him in a similar way at the end of the Second World War. But, needless to say, once they became convinced that Strossmayer had been, throughout his long life, faithful to the Pope and the Holy See, they ceased to present him as the author and promoter of a kind of "national Catholic church, independent of Rome and the Pope." Moreover, they also lost interest in studying Strossmayer's life and writings, because they could perfectly understand that he was consistent and faithful to his motto: "Everything for Faith and Country!"

The Second Vatican Council fully recognized Strossmayer and his ideas, and it would not be too much to say that we expect a Third Vatican Council, when it is convened, to find in the proposals of that Croatian bishop very useful material for its discussions. All the more so since the political circumstances and setbacks that occurred in Rome and the Papal States in 1870 did not allow the full completion of Pius IX's conciliar program, within which framework Strossmayer's role would have been more prominent, more worthily accepted, and exerted a more fruitful influence within the Church and Christianity.

The history of the First Vatican Council was written by Catholics and non-Catholics. It may be that the latter, due to their approach, exerted a more decisive influence on world opinion than the former. Regarding Strossmayer's role, conciliar historiography was biased and limited in emphasizing his opposition to the definition of infallibility, even though his speeches also contain elements of a different nature. In the best-known collection of the acts of the General Councils, edited by Mansi, Vatican I and Strossmayer's speeches were discussed by Petit.

Two Croatians—Mons. A. Spiletak and Monsignor J. Oberski published Strossmayer's interventions in 1929 in their original Latin and in Croatian translation, with the most essential interpretation of certain fragments. Evidently, the influence of these writings remained limited to the Croatian linguistic field. In the most prestigious encyclopedias and in dictionaries for Catholics and non-Catholics alike, there are condensed articles on Strossmayer that mean nothing to the uninformed and do not satisfy specialists either, even though these articles were written by those who appreciated Bishop Strossmayer, thus presenting Catholic ecumenism in a distorted way. Some ecumenical manuals mention Strossmayer occasionally, but not all.

Partly due to a lack of knowledge of the Croatian language and history, and partly due to a very limited and incipient understanding of ecumenism, most of these authors tacitly overlook the figure of Strossmayer, thus presenting Catholic ecumenism in an incomplete way and precisely omitting his Croatian contribution.

It is well known that the idea of ecumenism already represented a novelty and the beginning of a new era in the person of that "divine adventurer," so to speak, George Krizanić, a 17th-century Croatian priest, not only for his compatriots and Slavs in general, but also for the entire Christian world and, consequently, for humanity. It is almost commonplace to completely forget the recognition by the "Russian Newman," V. S. Soloviev (1853-1900), who openly declared that, in his ecumenical ideas and endeavors, he owed a great deal to Krizanić and Strossmayer—two great Croatians. And, carried away by his sincerity, he confessed to having said "amen" to everything preached about ecumenism by the brilliant Croatian priest Krizanić in the 17th century and the far-sighted 19th-century bishop Strossmayer.[78]

It would be unjustifiable to exaggerate in appreciating this recognition by the great mystic and apostle of ecclesiastical unity, Soloviev, but likewise, it is unforgivable to overlook it or fail to recognize the value he found in the works and ideas of Krizanić and Strossmayer.

The Context and Purpose of this Essay

The aim of this modest essay is to shed light on the role of J. J. Strossmayer at the First Vatican Council, to the extent strictly necessary for our purposes and doing so in a spirit of objectivity and fairness. At the same time, we will try to present some details of Strossmayer's pre- and post-conciliar life, solely to better understand his attitude and his role at the Council.

Strossmayer was well prepared for his conciliar role. Granderath recorded the ages of the participants at that Council. The youngest was 36 and the oldest 90.[79] When the deliberations began, Strossmayer had already been a bishop for 20 years and a priest for 31. He had been appointed bishop at a very young age, and after the Council ended, he continued to serve as bishop for another 35 years. This means that he was in full physical and intellectual vigor when he participated in the conciliar discussions. As bishop, patron, and politician, he had already accomplished many works of extraordinary importance by 1869.

He had promoted and organized some of the important institutions for the education and culture of the Croatian people and the neighboring Slavic peoples in southern Europe. Thus, for example, in 1867 he founded the Academy of Sciences and Arts in the Croatian capital, Zagreb, and promoted the initiative to found and organize the Croatian University, the first in southern Europe. Meanwhile, within his diocese, he carried out an extraordinary pastoral ministry, increasingly demonstrating his special concern for Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were still under Ottoman rule. From 1851, he served as the apostolic administrator of the Bishopric of Belgrade-Smederevo in the Duchy of Orthodox Serbia, also under Turkish rule, lending his support and assistance to the Bulgarians and Macedonians in their efforts to unify the Churches; that is, he dedicated a significant portion of his efforts to restoring and improving relations with the separated Christians.

In his homeland, Croatia, in the narrowest sense, he was a very active politician and one of its leading figures. He was a member of the Sabor in Zagreb, the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest, and the Imperial Council in Vienna. In Croatia, he even served as a high-ranking administrative official, specifically as Grand Governor of the Virovitica District. We briefly outline these facts to better understand his attitude at the Council, highlighting his eloquence, the clarity of his ideas and proposals, and particularly the style of his speeches.

His concern for the spiritual and material well-being of his diocese of Djakovo—where he was appointed bishop in 1849—is provided by his deed of donation or foundation, written in Vienna on June 14, 1856. In it, he sets forth the following objectives: First, he declares that in place of the old, small, and already dilapidated cathedral, he will build a new and more dignified one because "the cathedral... is the mother and teacher of all the churches in the diocese." For its style, its grandeur, and its aesthetic harmony, it must be a place worthy of God. At that same time—1856—he deposited 50,000 fiorins as initial capital.

Providence made it possible to begin the construction work of the new mother church before the convocation of the Council, but could only finish it with great sacrifices and bless it in 1882. Secondly, it planned the construction of the episcopal seminary for young candidates for priests, contributing 30,000 fiorines. For the completion of the monastery of the sisters of Saint Vincent de Paul he deposited 10,000 fiorins. For the asylum fund for retired priests he contributed 10,000; For the extraordinary needs of the priests of the diocese he deposited 5,000. For the books and manuals necessary in pastoral activity, he allocated 5,000; For chaplains who lacked resources in certain places of their service, he also gave 5,000 fiorines[80].

Strossmayer's ecumenical work in the era before the First Vatican Council was considerable. The best testimony in this regard is the movement of Bishop Sokolski, who tragically disappeared, who had embraced union with the Catholic Church together with a large number of Bulgarians from this country and Macedonia. Strossmayer also provided for the education of a number of Bulgarian priestly candidates.[81] But his ecumenical work, which could be the subject of a special study, barely developed after the Council.

Pius IX was well aware of Strossmayer's desire to reorganize the Croatian institution of Saint Jerome in Rome, because that bishop had already allocated, in 1859, 20,000 fiorines for that purpose. Explaining and justifying this donation, Strossmayer stressed that this institution should constitute the link between the Croatian people and the Holy See, that is, between Rome and the successors of Saint Peter, teacher of truth for all peoples. The principle of this founding document seems to be inspired by the ideas of Saint Irenaeus and other Christian thinkers of the first centuries of the Church, who sought security and tranquility in its doctrine and found it there[82].

In his episcopal, ecumenical, political and cultural work, Strossmayer dedicated special care to his own dignity, maintaining in all circumstances in good relations with Pope Pius IX, known for his deep devotion. That is why that pontiff distinguished Strossmayer in the tenth year of his bishopric with the title of "Assistant to the Papal Throne and the Count of Rome", a distinction that the Holy See only used to grant to bishops of great merit and on the occasion of celebrating their silver jubilee. And this, without mentioning the sympathies of Pope Leo XIII for our Croatian bishop[83].

Whoever wishes to understand Strossmayer's attitude at the Council well and thoroughly must keep in mind his patriotic-political activity, developed in the decade prior to the convocation of the Council. He hoped for the liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two Croatian provinces still under Turkish power, and their logical and natural connection with Croatia. He also became an apostle of the reorganization of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with a federalist sense, within which Croatia, together with Austria and Hungary, should be the third factor and state community of the Habsburg Empire. Hence his conduct at the Council, revealing himself as an experienced political fighter and parliamentary orator, by formulating his thoughts and ideas, freely and moderately.

It is also necessary to highlight Strossmayer's general and theological culture here. Both by divine gift and by nature, he possessed great talent. He had completed his studies in Croatia and then in Hungary, where he was promoted to the honor of doctor of philosophy and later in Vienna, 1842, to that of doctor of theology. He presented his doctoral thesis titled: De Unitate Ecclesiae according to the doctrine of Saint Cyprian. For a short time he served as a professor of various disciplines, including canon law, which allows us to follow the luminous and less luminous moments of his philosophy and his theological and legal culture, which were revealed in his speeches at the Council.

Historians of 19th-century ecclesiastical science commonly agree that the development of philosophy, theology, and canon law was quite modest. It is publicly known that only after the Council did the renaissance of those subjects begin. The initiative came from Pope Leo XIII. His Encyclicals mark a new era in the scientific life of the Church, and his opening of the secret Vatican archives to students of history earned him the title of benefactor of ecclesiastical and general history.

It is also known that theology had developed in Spain; later, in France and Italy, and finally in Germany. The Spanish bishops, well-versed in these topics and their historical development, unanimously supported the thesis of papal infallibility. Among the Germans, there was some influence from English currents of deism and rationalism, including Febrinianism, while among those of Austria and Hungary, there were traces of Josephinism, and among the French bishops, remnants of Gallicanism could be observed. All these currents were welcomed within the discussion on infallibility.

Strossmayer acquired his higher education among Hungarians and Austrians and, moreover, was a devoted reader and connoisseur of French literature, both ecclesiastical and secular, as well as of French culture in general. Therefore, it should not surprise us to find traces and shadows of this spiritual wealth in his personality. His pastoral letters and sermons contain numerous ideas from the Church Fathers, Sacred Scripture, and ecclesiastical history, which also merit special study.

But it is no secret that Strossmayer did not teach any subject for a significant period due to his many commitments, and therefore could not dedicate himself to the study of theology. This is why, despite his solid background in ecclesiastical disciplines, we cannot say that he was as well-versed in them as his fellow council member, Bishop Hefele, historian of the Councils, or that he was as masterfully versed in dogmatic theology as the Austrian Bishop Fassler, Secretary General of Sent Pölten, or the Bishop of Brixen, Gasser. Strossmayer possessed many of the qualities of the Archbishop of London, Manning; But this man, as a convert, had a better understanding of the Church's organizational doctrine and teachings. Thanks to his literary work, zeal, and activity, a friend of Strossmayer, the French bishop Dupaloup, became one of the leading figures at the Council.

We cannot exaggerate the extent of Strossmayer's ecumenical activity. The religious constitution of his diocese, his homeland, and the neighboring Slavic peoples of the separated Christian faith, as well as the Protestants, was ever-present before his eyes and at the Council. Upon taking possession of his diocese, he advised his faithful and clergy in a pastoral letter to treat their separated Christian brothers and sisters, who constituted 50% of the population under his pastoral jurisdiction, with fraternal respect. At that time, as today, that Orthodox population was Slavic, so it is not surprising that Strossmayer, in his speeches, especially the one he delivered against the definition of infallibility, was more concerned with the impact of his words on the separated Slavic Christian community than on the Council itself, considering, in his love for them, that their fate was inseparable from union with Rome.

It should also be remembered that Pius IX had invited the most prominent representatives of the separated Christians of the East and West to the Council. Their absence deeply saddened the Pope because it revealed the lack of understanding of the separated Christians, as he himself was accustomed to calling them. The Council of John XXIII and Paul VI marks, in this sense, a great progress that we should not consider as a definitive success, but as the starting point for an ever more sincere ecumenical work in the spirit of the most select representatives of Catholics and the separated, following the path of Bishop Strossmayer.

On December 8, 1854, Pius IX proclaimed the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, and on September 29, 1868 he convened the First Vatican Council for December 8, 1869, that is, for the feast of the Immaculate Conception, proclaimed by him only 15 years ago. Strossmayer, especially devoted to Saint Peter, to whom he dedicated his new cathedral, led a pastoral on the feast day of that apostle in 1869, explaining to the faithful the meaning and importance of the Council that was going to be held. He stressed on this occasion that the Council would brilliantly show, with the consensus of a large majority of bishops from around the world, the strength of the unity of the Church, led by the vicar of Christ and successor of Saint Peter. In all his pastoral letters, Strossmayer pays tribute to the primacy and supreme authority of the Pope within the Church, from which comes the invincible force of divine truth, revealed by Christ and entrusted to the Church for its propagation throughout the world.

Our bishop describes the divine origin and character of the episcopal hierarchy: the bishops are intimately linked to the Pope by the bonds of truth, love, obedience and fidelity, and whoever attempts to separate them from the Pope would separate them and distance them from their divine source. In this pastoral, Strossmayer cites several times the ideas and names of bishops from ecclesiastical antiquity as well as from modern history in the various nations, which he would repeat later at the Council. In the same pastoral he vigorously defended the need for freedom and independence from the Holy Father, as it is the foundation of the Church and the guarantee of the true freedom of Christianity and humanity. The freedom of the Pope was considered by Strossmayer as a world problem and the essential condition of the cultural development and freedom of the entire human race.

Strossmayer's First Public Presentation at the Council

Pius IX gave the directives and regulations for conciliar work in an apostolic constitution of December 2, 1869, entitled Multiplices inter, that is to say: the right to propose questions for conciliar debate was reserved to the Pope; It was determined to keep the deliberations secret; The presidents of the sessions were appointed and the order of the public sessions was prescribed, with the expected presence of the Pope, and the decision to publish the conclusions of the Council[84]

It was declared solemnly opened on December 8, 1869 in the presence of 774 participants from all over the world in St. Peter's Basilica in the Vatican. Artillery salvos were fired from the Castillo de San Angel. The security of Rome was guaranteed by the French troops stationed in the Papal State by Napoleon III, which is why in the aforementioned castle, next to the papal flag, the French flag was raised.

On December 12, twenty bishops presented to Pope Pius IX in a special memorial their wishes to soften some excessively harsh points in the conciliar regulations and procedures. The first to appear in that report with his signature was Strossmayer, whom Granderath designates as "bishop of Diakovar", adding, however, "in Croatia" [85]; but he always mentions it among the "Austrian" or "Hungarian" mitrates, as did other contemporary conciliar chroniclers or historians. Along with Stressmayer, the petition addressed to the Pope was also signed by the American Archbishop Kenrick of St. Louis, the French Dupanloup of Orleans, Place of Marseille and other high dignitaries of the hierarchy of several countries. In the petition, the signatories, recognizing the supreme power of the Pope and his right to decide on issues of the conciliar regulation, requested that the bishops also be recognized the right to propose issues and problems, because this would publicly show the divine character of the institution of the episcopal hierarchy and its power, in communion with the Pope.

The signatories especially emphasized that such an attitude was in accordance with the liberal spirit of the century in which the Council was convened. In addition, they requested that the bishops be able to name their representatives in the commissions and councils already designated by the Pope, which would facilitate communication between them and said bodies and give more expeditious agility to future work. They also proposed relaxing the rigor of keeping conciliar secrecy, especially taking into account the development of modern media, which despite the secret nature of the deliberations allowed the news to reach the public because the bishops were forced to answer numerous questions asked of them and deny distorted versions.

This petition, which bears traces of Strossmayer's style and argumentation, was not answered in writing by Pius IX, but he verbally told one of the signatories that his Regulations remained in force and that, should the need for a change arise during the deliberations, he would be in favor of it.[86]

A similar request was addressed to Pius IX on January 2, 1870, signed by 26 Council Fathers, including the Archbishop and Cardinal of Paris, Schwarzenberg, Strossmayer, and others, mostly from Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Croatia. In it, they appealed to the Pope to grant bishops the right to propose questions in their own right, not as a favor bestowed by the Pope. Recognizing the primacy of the Pope, the signatories recalled that the bishops' rights within the Church are of divine origin and, consequently, it was only right that these rights be manifested in the work of the Council, always with due reverence for the supreme authority of the Pope and the Church.

The Holy Father replied that his rights did not infringe upon those of the bishops and that, therefore, the Regulations would remain as established. The third petition, signed by 88 bishops from Europe and America, met with the same fate. In it, the latter requested, among other things, certain technical changes to expedite the work, improvements to the conference hall, the printing of the conciliar acts, and the formation of special commissions of bishops who spoke the same language or came from the same states. The Pope responded verbally to the Council's secretary, Monsignor Fessier, that it was also not possible to grant these requests. Fessler explained all of this to Cardinals Schwarzenberg (Prague) and Rauscher (Vienna), as well as Archbishop Darboy (Paris).

Time passes, and history judges the past. It would suffice to reproduce here what Bishop Jadin said in our time: "I can find no other reason for this than the will of Pius IX, who wanted to keep the agenda strictly and absolutely in his hand" [87].

Jadin almost entirely accepts the reasons put forward by Strossmayer and other signatories for these petitions regarding the right of bishops to propose questions for conciliar discussion, affirming that they are, in the Council, the successors of the apostles under the guidance of the Pope and together with him, but not his plenipotentiaries.

Strossmayer's First Speech at the Council

The Bishop of Djakovo took to the Council pulpit in the early days of the debate on the draft of the dogmatic constitution on doctrine Catholic. His speech was delivered on December 30, 1869. Granderath, who was not a supporter of Strossmayer's attitude at the Council, but who wanted to maintain his objectivity in the face of this temperamental bishop, summarizes his positive and at the same time negative opinion of Strossmayer's first speech at the Council as follows: "Bishop Strossmayer, of Diakovar (sic!), is a man who attracted great attention to his personality by his initial intervention and, especially, by the subsequent speeches. He showed a certain freer spiritual orientation, but, even more so, his great audacity to say without fear what he thought and held in his heart; these were his special characteristics. He used Latin with great skill and seemed to have appropriated not only the theoretical vibrancy of Cicero but also the 'breadth of Cicero's vision'" [88].

In a brief introduction, Strossmayer emphasized his sincere manner of speaking and his openness, asking those present to listen to him with the same spirit of love preached by Saint Paul and Saint Augustine. At the same time, he announced that he would refer to the proposed outline of the dogmatic constitution concerning Catholic doctrine and then address the content and form of the proposition.[89] Strossmayer was well acquainted with the conciliar regulations and it was clear to him that the Pope had determined that the decisions and canons of the Council should be published in the following form: "Pius episcopus... sacro approbante Concilio" (Pious bishop... with the approval of the Council), but nevertheless he ventured to demonstrate that a form more in keeping with ecclesiastical tradition would have been more appropriate.

The doctrine concerning the relationship between the Pope and all the bishops, as well as the needs of the Church and contemporary Christianity, would have been more visible and clearer, highlighting the essential role played by the bishops alongside the Pope. It is especially noteworthy that Strossmayer expressly emphasized the "collegium episcoporum" and the rights of this "college of bishops" in the administration and doctrine of the Church. A century ago, Strossmayer's insistence on this reference to the "college of bishops" seemed to most of the Council Fathers and theological scholars somewhat unclear, superfluous, even rebellious, because the primacy and infallibility of the Pope sufficiently protected the Church, its priests, and the faithful as a whole.

But by the time of the Second Vatican Council, the episcopal college and, after the Council, the Synod of Catholic Bishops, which meets periodically under the guidance of the Pope, were already institutions of significant importance within the Church and in the world. This alone is sufficient justification for Strossmayer's idea and aspirations, as well as for his enthusiasm in defending the idea of the episcopal college.

By highlighting the unity and necessary consensus of the Pope and all the bishops in the conciliar decisions and in all the work of the Council, Strossmayer corroborated not only Christ's prayer at the Last Supper for the unity of the apostles and their successors until the end of the world for the benefit of the Church, but also proposed a modification of the terms in the spirit of the First Council of Jerusalem, when the decisions were made under the following rubric: "Visum est Spiritui Sancto et nobis (The Holy Spirit and we have seen)" —Acta Apostolorum, 15, 28—. Strossmayer affirmed that St. Peter held primacy over the bishops, but that the resolution was carried out in the name of all the apostles, who had the duty and the right to preach the Gospel and strengthen the nascent Church in their own name, without any other authority, even the highest.

In support of his proposal, he invoked the modern secular spirit that seeks solutions to general problems through common collaboration. It is true that the Church is not a civil and democratic institution, which should be guided by the votes of priests and parishioners as citizens do in constitutional states, but Strossmayer mentions this only to better illustrate his point about the concord and unity existing between the Pope and the episcopate. He also invoked the Council of Trent, which formulated its resolutions in the name of the entire Council and not only in the name of the Pope with the Council's approval, as had been foreseen in the Regulations of Vatican I. Strossmayer emphasized that the Council of Trent, its doctrine, and its terminology had become ingrained in his own life and in that of the entire Church, permeating theological schools, books, and the practical life of the Church. Therefore, he could not see why this Tridentine model should be abandoned and a new one introduced. His proposal was to adhere to that one.

When, after a brief debate with the supporters of the Regulations, he expressed his desire that the Pope attend not only the solemn sessions of the Council but also the ordinary and working sessions, Strossmayer began by presenting his third argument for changing this proposition, but the presidents of the Council, Cardinals De Luca and Capalti, abruptly cut him off without much consideration for his words. Capalti clarified that the Pope personally had determined that article and that, consequently, there was no room for discussion about a possible change, since this would constitute an offense to the relics of Saint Peter in whose basilica the Council was being held.

The second reason the president mentioned was that, according to the tradition of Councils, when the Pope presides, it is the Council members who formulate their conclusions in his name. Upon hearing these words, Capalti signaled for him to continue his speech, and voices of approval for the presidents were heard in the Council Hall.[90]

Strossmayer then politely excused himself, declaring that he had said nothing that could offend the rights of the Apostolic See and the Pope. He also repeated Bossuet's words: that he would sooner allow his tongue to be paralyzed than say anything against the Holy See. He immediately pointed out that the Acts of the Council would remain for posterity, which could easily see that Strossmayer said or did nothing against the Pope or the Holy See. He clarified his ideal of the Council by establishing that decisions should be formulated unanimously and with the consensus of all the council fathers, so that the Church would appear before the world as a firm war phalanx, like a castle on high, firm in love and obedience for the good of all peoples when the world finds neither peace nor concord and continues to be the victim of wars, conflicts, and disputes.

Referring to the project's content, Strossmayer acknowledges that it is more academic than relevant to practical life and the needs of contemporary generations. He then proposes modifying it, suggesting a more lively style better suited to modern sensibilities; the names of major heretics should be omitted, as they are irrelevant and already unknown to many. He emphasizes that modern man needs ecclesiastical doctrines presented to him in a constantly updated, concise, and clear manner.

This is all the more crucial since the enemy is not trying to attack one institution or another, or ecclesiastical truth, but rather aims to eradicate all religious belief from the human soul. This anti-religious campaign is being waged especially in newspapers and books. Therefore, he specifically proposes modifying the agenda in accordance with the experience and recommendations of the bishops in major cities, where the furious struggle against religion is taking place.

ince Strossmayer looked prophetically far into the future, it is clear that his proposal aimed to eliminate from the text crude and unjust terms and expressions such as: antichrist, shame, pity, cursed, hatred, atheism, monster of errors, plague, cancer, and other similar discourteous and offensive words. Instead, and because they are inappropriate, he proposes using the words of Christ crucified, the pious Galilean, good shepherd, merciful father, who always welcomed the prodigal and repentant son back into his bosom. Christ had treated the Samaritan woman with compassion near the spring of Jacob. Thus, the Church, in condemning errors, must remain the mother of peoples and generations, and must feel love and understanding even for those who have gone astray. Although the Church condemns errors, it loves those who have gone astray and, with love, conquers them and wins them back to unity.

Although the council presidents had procedural grounds for opposing Strossmayer, his personal esteem, thanks to his calm and consistent conduct at the Council, grew not only among the opposition, which was a minority, but also within the ranks of the majority, not to mention the applause in his honor and his growing renown in the world press and among opponents worldwide later on.[91] After Strossmayer's speech, the Bishop of Orléans, Bishop Dupanloup, declared: "The Council has found its man." That same afternoon, bishops from America and France came to congratulate Strossmayer, of whom—they said—their homeland, Croatia, was very proud. In the following days, there was criticism of the presidents who interrupted him during his speech.

Even before the Council concluded, the Council Fathers were divided into a majority and a minority over whether or not this was the right opportunity for a dogmatic definition of infallibility. The dilemma had already been hotly debated before the Council between Catholics and the Separatists. Strossmayer was among those who opposed dogmatic infallibility, but his opposition remained in the minority.

When the first proposal for a definition of infallibility was presented on December 25, 1869, the opponents discussed how they should fight against it. Strossmayer was the most active. He had even prepared, at the beginning of 1870, a special request in this regard, but withdrew it when the Cardinal of Vienna, Raucher, prepared his own. - By January 29, 1870, five similar requests had been drafted by German, Austrian, Hungarian, French, Italian, American and Eastern bishops.

There were a total of 136 signatories. Strossmayer, Smičiklas (of Krizevci), Dobrila (Porec-Pula), and Legat (Trieste) signed the first petition due to their state affiliation with Austria. These petitions were the subject of deliberations in February 1870. Historians will study the First Vatican Council and these petitions for a long time, and will surely arrive at the same conclusion as Archbishop Manning, who noted that not a single voice was heard at the Council denying infallibility; the discussion focused solely on the appropriateness of its dogmatic definition.

Strossmayer on Episcopal Rights in the Church and the Council

When ecclesiastical discipline began to be addressed, it was logical to also examine the episcopal office and authority. If the bishops had gathered to deliberate in their capacity as successors of the apostles and as teachers and pastors of the Church on the great problems of religion and society, it was natural that the question of their duties and rights should be the subject of careful examination. Strossmayer spoke on this matter on February 24. The attention of those present was absolute, given that the topic concerned each and every one of them.

With his customary frankness, and from the very beginning of his speech, he expressed his discontent that many things had been included in the Council's program that should not have been there, and that others, which, due to their importance, should have been debated, had been omitted. He made the same criticism of the fact that the treatment of the bishops' duties had been placed before that of their rights and dignities, since these are like the coin bestowed by the Lord, which they must repay with the highest interest to God, the Eternal Judge.

He also observed that the problem of the supreme authority of the Church, or rather, the authority of the cardinals, as proposed by Cardinal Schwarzenberg, had not been raised first. Strossmayer noted that the need for reform of the College of Cardinals had already been discussed at the Council of Trent. That Council, the speaker said, sought to internationalize it so that all peoples could participate in the election of the Pope and so that the Pope would become the center and focus of the entire Church, thus attracting everyone equally.

Furthermore, the cardinals, as the Pope's closest collaborators, must discuss and address the problems of the universal Church. Therefore, only when gathered in a college composed of representatives from various nations could these nations have in them their advocates and protectors. Only cardinals elected in this way would have a thorough understanding of the specific conditions of the Church in different parts of the world. The cardinals would fulfill a liaison role and be the link of Christian unity with the Holy See, toward which they direct their gaze. They would do so, however, with greater confidence and fervor if they saw their cardinals at the Pope's side. Strossmayer also demanded the internationalization of the highest positions in the ecclesiastical administration and the Roman congregations, because by modifying them in this way, they would acquire a better understanding of the world and also perform their tasks more effectively.

These proposals of Strossmayer would only find a favorable response at the Second Vatican Council. Only now is the process of internationalizing the Roman Curia underway. Thus, for example, a fellow countryman of Strossmayer, born the year of his death, the Croatian Cardinal Francis Šeper, heads the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, while the French Cardinal Villot is the Secretary of State to Paul VI. These are two of the most important positions, held by non-Italians.

Strossmayer also complained, in the speech we are presenting, that the issue of the nomination and filling of vacant bishoprics had not been included on the agenda, even though their freedom and advancement depend on the merits of the bishops. The proposal, worded in the sense that the Church, to defend its freedom, should seek the support of states and their leaders, seemed to Strossmayer ineffective and, moreover, dangerous. Dangerous, because times have changed and rulers, instead of offering help, can impose the Church's submission; ineffective, because sovereigns, according to their constitutions, can no longer offer their protection to the Church.

Strossmayer was of the opinion that the best and most effective protection for the Church should be based on public law and the civil liberties of nations. In accordance with the Lord's admonition, the Church must sheathe its sword. Instead of the pious rulers of old, men without a legitimate mandate, without authority, govern today; and it is the ministers who decide for them. They have their own objectives, showing no interest in the Church and even trying to harm it. The Bishop of Djakovo emphasized that the greatest defense of the Church and its progress lies in manly men of God, in resolute and virtuous bishops, who, in the manner of Chrysostom, Anastasius, Ambrose, and Anselm, know how to fight for the freedom of the Church.

For this reason, Strossmayer proposed a return to the ancient Church custom of convening provincial synods, which played a considerable role in the nomination of bishops. Indeed, at the time of the convocation of the First Vatican Council, some sovereigns—such as the Emperor of Austria-Hungary—had an ancient right to interfere in the nomination of bishops.

The Council was to try to convince them of the advisability of renouncing this right. He also believed that the sovereigns, using appropriate means, would accede to this demand if the Council carried out a decisive reform of the College of Cardinals and other ecclesiastical institutions. In his opinion, modern means of communication are sufficiently developed to facilitate the convocation of synods and general councils. State and social order is beginning to feel insecure, and therefore the Church should not rely on states. On the contrary, it is the Church that can render great services to society through its principles and the wholesome lives of its parishioners.

The desire of peoples to resolve their problems, increasingly and consistently, in common parliaments, Strossmayer says, has been learned from the Church, Mother and Teacher of the universe (hence the title of John XXIII's important encyclical), when she herself frequently convened her synods and councils.

This is why Strossmayer invokes the Council of Trent and the Council of Constance, which proposed more frequent convocations. While the Council of Trent had received instructions from Pius IV to convene every twenty years, the Council of Constance, under the guidance of Martin V and Eugene IV, had decided to convene every ten years. By invoking this historical fact, Strossmayer asserted that if councils had been convened more frequently in the 16th century, the Reformation would not have occurred. Therefore, he proposed that, if it were not possible to adhere to the decisions of the Council of Trent, at least councils should be convened every 20 years according to the formula established by the Council of Constance.

}Strossmayer proclaims the unity of the Church, but speaks out against those who would want to reduce everything to one type of activity, because they do not see the beauty in the diversity of things that are not essential to the Church. He emphasizes, therefore, that he perfectly understands the conditions and needs of the Church of France, defending it against accusations of being infested by Gallicanism.

Referring to his experience with the Orthodox bishops, he declared that they feared losing their tradition, their customs, ceremonies and privileges by uniting with Rome; but he had tried to convince them that the objective of the Holy See was to protect and strengthen the special rights of each of the Churches as well as the idea that, for separated Christians, union with Rome was of vital importance. "Until now I have spoken to the deaf," he said verbatim, and then expressed his fear that things would get worse if the centralizing tendencies of some conciliatory fathers were realized. He later reiterated that he was ready to sacrifice his life for the rights of the Holy See and the unity of the Church, but recommended caution in respecting the peculiarities of each ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

As a parliamentarian and former Grand Župan (governor), he challenged the opinion of some prelates that a bishop could not, at times, leave his diocese for reasons of state or for patriotic reasons. Priests and bishops are also integral parts of their people, he said, committed to the common good. As Bossuet highlighted, Christ wept for the fate of his people and Jerusalem; and Saint Paul even wanted to be cursed by his people.

He then cited the example of Hungary and Croatia, where no one reproaches an honest priest for his participation in public life. Consequently, it is his opinion that the Church should not prohibit such activity. His words in this sense had a prophetic inspiration: "Non quaerat concilium Vaticanum, ut iura civilia sacerdotum et episcoporum minuantur; id praestantissimus praesul hoc tempore ne immutet. Nam tempus illud est, ut post parvum tempus nos omnibus iuribus civilibus simus privandi." From these words of the Croatian bishop it is easy to deduce how he foresaw the time in which bishops and priests would be deprived of all their civil rights. This happened, abruptly, in 1945 in Strossmayer's homeland of Croatia, as well as in many other parts of Europe and the world.

Strossmayer spoke of the relations between nuncios and metropolitans as if he had kept in mind the general conditions of the second half of our century: he highlighted the imperative need for reciprocal trust in fraternal love between bishops, metropolitans and nuncios, abhorring denunciations between ecclesiastical dignitaries.

When requesting provincial synodal convocations, Strossmayer addressed the question of capitular vicars and advocated that apostolic vicars, without being bishops, be granted the same rights as residential prelates. At the end of his speech, he recommended that ecclesiastical laws be adapted to the conditions and needs of modern times, expressing his hope that the Council would form a special commission of experts for this purpose.[92]

Analyzing this speech, it was easy to deduce, as Granderath and other historians who were not sympathetic to him or the opposition have done, that Strossmayer circumvented the provisions of the conciliar agenda and skillfully proposed many of his ideas and concepts, always unofficially and almost imperceptibly. Granderath, as if he even wanted to praise "the eloquence of the Bishop of Djakovo," acknowledges his conduct and that of his supporters in frankly expressing what was in their hearts and communicating it to the Council. The reproach leveled by historians against Strossmayer and other opposition speakers for having spoken rather vaguely and indeterminately is understandable, since Strossmayer and the other opponents did so intentionally; they wanted to speak about the problems they considered important, but which were not included in the regulations and the agenda of the Council.[93]

Strossmayer continually emphasized the duty of his "conscience," and when it came to his duties as bishop, priest, man, and patriot, he spoke decisively and clearly to the extent that he was able. Where a strong reaction might have been expected, he also knew how to use the platform to attract the attention of an adverse audience. He proceeded in this way during the accelerated work of the Council, and had more time been available for the sessions, it is very likely that today we would have more important interventions from Strossmayer in which he would have made proposals, suggestions, etc., that would reveal his concern for the Church and for the union of separated Christians with Rome. Even his adversaries recognized Strossmayer's oratorical skills and listened with genuine pleasure to his Latin dissertations, about which even Cardinal Di Pietro—who opposed Strossmayer's views, especially regarding the relationship of bishops with the Pope and the "Infallibility," he declared upon hearing him speak on the rights of bishops: "rara venustas (rare beauty and grace!)." It is therefore no surprise that the world press praised Strossmayer.

From the capital of his homeland—Zagreb, as well as from other locations—Croatian priests and political leaders sent him their congratulations and expressions of their recognition and gratitude. The Croats listened with particular satisfaction to Strossmayer's proposal that each nation should have its own capable and virtuous sons as bishops, patriotic priests, and not have foreigners imposed upon them, who had previously had no contact with their dioceses and did not even know the language of their flock.

Strossmayer's views on the relationship between priests and their bishops

Strossmayer delivered a speech on February 7, 1870, referring, according to the agenda, to the life and dignity of the priests[94]. In it, his pastoral experience and democratic conviction regarding the bishop's relationship with priests found expression. He began by emphasizing the need to highlight on the conciliar agenda the high and divine dignity of the priesthood, which would more easily allow for the deduction of the rights and duties of priests. Just as bishops—Strossmayer emphasized—defend their rights resolutely, priests deserve the paternal protection and understanding of bishops, since they are their brothers, co-priests, collaborators in the vineyard of God.

Priests carry out the greater part of the work of the Church; without their love, trust, and adherence, the office and efforts of bishops would be in vain. Strossmayer knew well from experience that malicious people try to provoke quarrels and disputes between priests and their pastors. For this reason, he proposed removing from the draft the paragraphs on the vices and general negative phenomena of priests in the French clergy. He then praised the French Church for its missionary activity in every corner of the world, for its exemplary conduct during times of persecution, for its scientific and theological endeavors, and for its defense of the faith in general. "It is not wise to reopen the wounds of the Church if we do not also offer the medicine," he added. He then thanked God that the Church today does not suffer from the vices that existed at the time of the Council of Trent. "If among such a large number of priests there are also some weak ones, they are the exception," Strossmayer affirmed. After all, even Saint Jerome himself acknowledged that priests also had their weaknesses and vices, and had to do penance for their sins. In the college of the apostles, there was a traitor, Judas, and Peter himself had denied Jesus.

In the trials against priests, Strossmayer called for fair and proper procedures so that the priest would be convinced that the legal measures applied to him were justified. The malicious, for example, in Austria, emphasized that the Concordat diminished the emperor's rights, granting the Church too much freedom, while on the other hand they claimed that the Concordat granted rights only to bishops, almost completely neglecting subordinate priests. In this way, they sought to create discontent in both Church and State and cause a schism between the highest and lowest offices. He then recalled his pastoral experience: his priests conveyed these kinds of accusations to him, but he strove to explain to them more precisely the benefits of the Concordat for both Church and State, and even for bishops and priests.

On the same occasion, Strossmayer recommended the need for priests to advance in both secular and ecclesiastical sciences. In the early centuries of Christianity, Christians were recognized by their mutual love, their brotherhood, and their selflessness toward their neighbors. In modern times, the life of a priest must be an open page of the Gospel, so that both the educated and the uneducated can read what Christianity and the Church truly are. Contemporary enemies of the Church point the finger at the "obscurantism" and "backwardness" of priests. Therefore, Strossmayer, mindful of the example of Saint Jerome, recommends the study of the Bible and expresses his admiration for the learned men of France, especially Ravignan, Lacordaire, Félix, and others, who desire that new Ambrosians arise everywhere to convert new Augustines and make them protagonists of Christian generations. He offers special recognition to the German bishops for their efforts in establishing Catholic universities.

Against the flood of the corrupt press, Strossmayer proposed creating a Catholic press, which should not only defend the Church but also immerse contemporary society in Christian principles and encourage young people. Bishops should set an example in the propagation of Catholic sciences. Without being immodest, Strossmayer could have mentioned all he had done for his Croatian people by founding the Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb and initiating the work of organizing the University.

On the same occasion, he condemned all commercial activity by priests, which other council members viewed with more tolerance. The example of the traitor Judas clearly illuminates the consequences of commerce by servants of the Church; for this reason, it is prohibited in America, France, Germany, Hungary, and Croatia. But at the same time, Strossmayer condemned the negligence of bishops and other ecclesiastical dignitaries in meeting the material needs of priests. He specifically cited the Italian example, where conditions in this regard are certainly not praiseworthy. But he simultaneously emphasized Benedict XIII's concern for the priests of Rome, which should serve as an example for the clergy throughout the world.

Strossmayer concluded his speech by expressing his dissatisfaction with the technical shortcomings of the Council hall and the lack of trust among the Council Fathers, but placing it in the Holy Spirit, who knows how to transform human weaknesses into assets for achieving higher goals.

This intervention did not find a negative echo in the Council, as it was entirely dedicated to the advancement of priests and the improvement of relations between the clergy and the episcopate.

Strossmayer's most stormy presentation at the Council

Strossmayer was abruptly interrupted during his first speech at the Council by his proposal to modify the article of the draft. On March 22, he spoke in a special discussion about the already modified text, referring to the Catholic faith. Both things are extremely significant in understanding the general climate that reigned in the First Vatican Council, unimaginable in the Second.

He began his address by warning that he would be brief due to his indisposition and the adverse conditions of the conference hall, where many of those present could not hear the speaker. He did not address the style of the project, even though he did not accept it. Turning to the heart of the matter, he expressed his satisfaction that at least some of his proposals had been accepted to better highlight the role of bishops in the conciliar definitions. The accepted formula was: Sedentibus nobiscum et indicatibus universi orbis episcopis (Being present and sharing our opinion, the bishops of the whole world).

Strossmayer further proposed adding the word *definientibus* after the word *iuditibus*, because *iudicare* (to opine) lacked the force it once had, while the term *definire* did not align with the conciliar tradition, when bishops signed: *Judicans et definiens et definiens scripsi* (Opining and determining, I signed) or *definiens subscripsi* (I signed determining), as was the custom at the Council of Trent.

Addressing those present, he admonished them, in the manner of St. Cyprian in his book *De Unitate Ecclesiae*, to always remain obedient to the ecclesiastical primacy and ready to die for it. But he immediately added that the rights of bishops are also of divine origin, not the property of each individual, and that they cannot renounce them, but rather must use them for the benefit of the Church and the people.

*Definientibus* Another observation Strossmayer made at that time concerned the extremely harsh criticism leveled against Protestants, despite the fact that the Council had directly attacked pantheism as the source of so many errors. He emphasized that prior to Protestantism, there had been pockets of rationalism in the 17th century within humanism and secularism. Thus, for example, in France, Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, with no connection whatsoever to Protestantism, formulated very pernicious doctrines and errors not only against religion but also against the social order. Offering arguments as justification for Protestantism, Strossmayer ideally traced it back to the early centuries of Christianity, in which errors similar to those of Protestantism were observed.

To demonstrate that it was unfair to attribute all evil to Protestants, he cited the cases of Leibniz and Guizot, both Protestants. Guizot opposed Renan's book against the divinity of Jesus. Therefore, he recommended that the priests read this author's work, in which a few minor amendments should be made. Upon hearing murmurs of protest, the speaker said verbatim: "I believe that there are still many among Protestants who follow the example of those men—in Germany, England, and America—who still love our Lord Jesus, and thus deserve to have the words of St. Augustine applied to them: 'They are in error, in error, but wandering about they believe they are in the true faith'" (the murmurs continued, but Strossmayer continued): "They are heretics, truly heretics, but no one considers them as such."

Cardinal De Angelis, the presiding officer, briefly warned the speaker to avoid "the words that caused scandal among some of those present." As Strossmayer attempted to continue his speech, Cardinal Capalti, presiding over the Council, explained that the issue was not Protestants in general, but Protestantism as a system, from which so many errors had originated. Consequently, he argued, the text of the proposed document contained no offense to Protestants. Thanking the presiding officers for their warning, he added that these arguments could not convince him that all those errors stemmed from Protestantism: "I seriously believe that among Protestants there are not just one or two who love Jesus Christ, but a multitude of them." Upon hearing these last words, many in the congregation protested loudly. The president had to remind Strossmayer that the Council of Trent had already addressed Protestantism and that he should refer to the proposed articles, not to matters that scandalized the bishops!

True to his temperamental nature, Strossmayer declared that he was concluding his remarks, but at the same time affirmed that many Protestants wholeheartedly desired that nothing be said or decided at the Council that might place new obstacles in the way of the grace working among them. He recalled that Protestantism had been discussed with consideration at the Council of Trent and that Protestants would have been welcome at that Council had they attended. A rare exchange then ensued between President Capalti and Strossmayer: Capalti asserted that the Pope, in convening the Council, had also paternally invited Protestants; that the Church treated everyone maternally, that they had fallen into error, while the Church condemns error, advising Strossmayer to stick to the topic in his speech. In an atmosphere of general excitement and clamor, Strossmayer tried to finish his speech, complaining about the rather sad conditions imposed on the Council. He also warned that he did not approve of the already accepted idea of voting on the conciliar conclusions by majority vote, since from very ancient times these decisions had been adopted unanimously. Capalti replied that this matter could be discussed when the draft was being addressed.

All of this had caused a tremendous uproar in the Council, with the presidents protesting on one side and Strossmayer on the other. From all sides, the most despicable insults against Strossmayer could be heard: for those who censured his speech, Strossmayer was Lucifer, Luther, a condemned man; others told him to leave the podium, while he insisted on the idea of the ancient unanimity necessary for ecclesiastical conclusions, emphasizing his faith in the immutability of the Church and the need to continue in that unity; finally, he apologized for his words if they had not been used appropriately at all times, and decided to leave the podium.

The bishops present jostled to leave the conference hall, while the presiding officer announced the next session and its program. It is somewhat strange that Granderath accuses Strossmayer of this disorder, justifying the presiding officer's procedure, but at the same time adds that the bishops "could have behaved more calmly and with dignity" [95]. Such a phenomenon in our current ecumenical historical moment seems almost impossible in the time of Pius IX.

The opponents of infallibility who wrote the chronicle and history of the First Vatican Council, Lord Acton and Friedrich in particular, attributed to Strossmayer words and ideas that are not mentioned in the Council's acts. This allows us to say that Strossmayer did not utter them because, otherwise, they would have been recorded by the stenographers. The world press wrote about this turbulent session according to the orientation of each newspaper: while some highlighted Strossmayer as a champion of freedom and progress, others vilified him as a heretic.

It is a fact that Strossmayer also encountered reproaches within his own circle of supporters. Thus, for example, Cardinal Schwarzenberg visited him on March 23, 1970, and during the visit reproached him for "having spoken too much, having gone too far, and having compromised others as well," and things of that nature. Strossmayer was annoyed by the cardinal's attitude and reportedly decided to leave the group of German bishops he had formed on his own initiative. The fact that the opposition did not split is due to the French bishops, especially Dupanlou, who expressed their full agreement with Strossmayer's speech.[96]

He would not back down. In a letter of protest addressed to the presidency of the Council, he even demanded redress for the offense committed against him. In it, he also defended his idea of the "spiritual unanimity of the Council," lamenting that he had not been allowed to present arguments on the matter. Several others protested against the treatment of Strossmayer, notably the Archbishop of Paris, Darboy. Strossmayer himself had mentioned in that letter the idea of leaving the Council if he was not given the opportunity to justify his assertions and if he was not given some redress.

On the eve of the session that was to vote on the Constitution of the Catholic Faith—De fide catholica—Strossmayer, the American archbishop Kenrick, and six French bishops sent a petition to the Council presidency requesting the removal of the numerous anathemas from the prepared text, the revision of the overly general and indeterminate conclusion, or, failing that, that the signatories and others would not vote for it. On the back of this petition—which is in the Council archives—is noted the date of April 25, 1870, as the date of receipt, that is, one day after the respective vote. All the signatories voted for the Constitution except Strossmayer, who did not attend the session because he had not received any response to his petition.[97]

Thanks to his speeches at the Council, Strossmayer provided material for statements and letters, written outside of it, that lent themselves to a wide variety of interpretations. He even dared to celebrate the rebellious former Oratorian, Gratry, a member of the French Academy, who, nevertheless, died in peace with the Church. He also corresponded with the most prominent figure among the opponents of infallibility, Döllinger, who, before the convocation and during the sessions of the Council, incited passions and provoked numerous demonstrations against it in his writings, especially in Germany and the city of Munich, where he was a professor at the Faculty of Theology.

Some authors claim that Strossmayer provided Döllinger with arguments against the Pope and the Council, but more respected scholars caution against accusing Strossmayer in this regard without clear documentation, based on his alleged collaboration with that defamed man and enemy of the Church, Döllinger. The Protestants and all those who wrote against the Council and infallibility sought to have Strossmayer's authority on their side, which is why his renown was considerable both in the world and within the Council.

Right at the beginning of the Council, on December 30, 1869, an unfounded rumor was launched about an alleged assassination attempt against Strossmayer, motivated by his speech against the Jesuits. Regarding this rumor, it should be noted that the Jesuit Granderath expressly acknowledges that Strossmayer carefully avoided impertinent remarks against his adversaries in his interventions.

Newspapers around the world wrote according to their own whims, without publishing corrections, thus weaving a web of lies about the details of the Bishop of Djakovo's conduct at the Council. Nor were there any shortage of reports about petitions against infallibility arriving "from Bohemia and Hungary" through Cardinal Schwarzenberg and Strossmayer.[98] Therefore, it is necessary to consider all members of the "opposition," their attitude before and after the Council, and their almost filial relationships with the Popes until their deaths, in order to form a complete judgment about their views on the infallibility of the Pope and the Church.

Of essential importance in this regard is Strossmayer's speech, delivered on June 2, 1870. It contains the very essence of his attitude toward the imminent definition of infallibility. It was his last address at the Council.

Strossmayer on the Inopportuneness of Defining Infallibility

Within the scope of our modest work, it is almost impossible to analyze (study) all the facets of Strossmayer's complex and peculiar personality. Documenting him alone would require such breadth that it would overshadow the role he played at the Council. We have no intention of writing his apology, nor of inquiring into the inspiring origins of his ideas about papal infallibility, nor even about the similarity or differences between his opinions and those of the other council fathers in his group.

Strossmayer, in fact, believed throughout his life in the infallibility of the Church and in the role of the supreme teacher and head of the church that belongs to the Pope. Before concluding his speech against the definition on June 2, 1870, he said verbatim: Ideo mihi videtur factum esse, quod Ecclesia catholica octodecim saeculorum decursu divinam infallibilitatis suae proerrogativan maluerit exercere potius quam definere (It seems to me, in fact, that the Church has preferred to exercise its divine prerogative of infallibility in the course of 18 centuries, rather than defining it[99].

In the third fragment of his speech after the preceding formulation, he adduced his most important argument against the expediency of the definition of infallibility: Schisma orientale, iam non amplius graecum dici debent, sed proh dolor schisma slavicum, quorum octoginta millions ab Ecclesia catholica extorres vivunt, qui suae autonomiae, suis particularibus iuribus addictissimi suet, et nihil aliud bothpere aversantur, quam illud quod vel suspicionem ingerere istis possit, quod autonomiae et iurium suorum periculo sit. Ego inter southern Slavs moror, ex quibus octo millions schismatici, tres autem millions catholici sunt. Ego no possum satis divine mercye gratias agere, quod gens Croatorum, quam tantapere diligo, sit catholica, et possum dicere in tota cordis mei sinceritate, Sedi apostolicae addictissima (The Eastern schism should no longer be called the Greek schism but, unfortunately, the Slavic one, because 80 million Slavs live outside the Catholic Church.

These are very addicted to their autonomy, to their special rights, and in nothing are they as suspicious as in what could call into question their autonomy and their rights. I am working among the South Slavs, of whom 8 million are schismatic, while only 3 million are Catholic. I can never thank divine mercy enough that the Croatian people, whom I love so much, are Catholic, and I can say with all the sincerity of my heart that they are very devoted to the Holy See.[100]

This statement by Strossmayer needs to be supplemented with a paragraph from a letter of December 11, 1875, addressed to Pius IX, referring to the essential role of the Croats among the South Slavs: "The Croats are the only Catholic people among the South Slavs who have remained faithful to the Catholic faith until now, even under the most difficult conditions... It is of utmost importance that the Croats remain devoted, with all their soul and all their heart, to the Catholic faith, because in this way they are in a certain sense predestined to become a leaven that will penetrate, with divine help, the whole multitude of the southern Slavs, and returning them to the bosom of the Catholic Church"[101]

Because the Croatian people were thus mentioned in Strossmayer's plan as the leaven of Christian unity among the southern Slavs, we must pay attention to a fragment of his speech of June 2, 1870.

After having explained in it the religious situation of the Croats and the southern Slavs in general, he explained the main reason for their fear at the definition of the Pope's infallibility:

Verum si haec definitio effectum habeat, vereor, ne, quantum nos scimus, illud fermetum bonum a Deo praedestinatum reliquam Slavorum massam penetrat et ad unitatem reducat; vereor ne nova nobis pericula impendant, et ex nostris quidam misere ab unitate Ecclesiae rescindantur, sum-mo certe — qucumque novit historiam Our times—the greatest and most serious detriment to humanity and all future culture (But if this definition is carried out, I fear that that good leaven, predestined by God, as far as I can tell, will not be able to penetrate the remaining multitude of Slavs, nor bring them back to ecclesiastical unity; I fear that a new danger will threaten us and that—as anyone who knows the history of our time might fear—some of our people will sadly sever that ecclesiastical unity, which would certainly result in the most serious detriment to humanity and all future culture)[102].

The First Vatican Council is now behind us, but the transcribed words of Strossmayer have not lost their relevance, and in them shines the perspicacity of this man of God: the principal obstacle to the reconciliation and union of both the Orthodox and the Protestants with Rome remains the dogma of papal infallibility.

Having briefly highlighted these major concerns and ideas of Strossmayer, we will now examine his speech, which Granderath proclaimed "a very elegant and very beautiful speech" [103]. Granderath does not conceal his admiration for the style and magnificence of the form of his discourses, but he criticizes him for not being more profound in explaining his ideas.

The difficulties in Strossmayer's conception of the relationship between the Pope and the episcopate

At the beginning of his address, Strossmayer emphasized the connection between the episcopate and the Pope, "the most worthy head of the Church and of the episcopate," but he considered it logical to discuss both rights together and not separately, because in this way the primacy of the Pontiff and the rights of the episcopate would be ensured. “Christ sent out all the apostles and gave them authority to teach all nations, promising to remain with them until the end of the age” (Mt. 28:19-20).

Explaining the constitution and role of the ecclesiastical magisterium, he quoted St. Ignatius of Antioch, who repeatedly compared the bishop to Christ among the people, affirming that whoever obeys Christ obeys the bishop. From this, Strossmayer drew the difficulty of the Pope and the bishops simultaneously holding identical power in the same diocese. To justify this incompatibility, he invoked Gregory the Great's protest against John the Faster (Ioannes leiunator) and his title of “ecumenical patriarch,” Gregory calling himself servus servorum Dei (servant of the servants of God).

In this intervention, Strossmayer insistently adhered to Saint Cyprian and his book *De Unitate Ecclesiae*. It should be noted that Strossmayer presented his doctoral thesis precisely on the doctrine of Saint Cyprian expounded in the aforementioned book.[104] And according to Strossmayer, that saint pays homage to the divine primacy, emphasizes the need for a permanent connection between the bishop and the Holy See, and speaks of the See of Peter as the chair of unity, but at the same time also establishes the rights of the other apostles and bishops: so that they may guide the entire Church in the spirit of unanimity of all the apostles.

Strossmayer did not like the interpretation of Jesus' words to Peter, recorded by Matthew and John, that in Matthew 16 and John 21 they referred to the "personal and absolute infallibility of the Pope" (personalem et absolutam pontificis infalibilitatem). Cyprian, in Strossmayer's opinion, taught that the other apostles were also equal to Peter in honor and power, and that all of them together led the Church and shepherded God's flock with complete unanimity and harmony. Consequently, bishops, as successors of the apostles, have "some virtual right over the rest of the Church"—virtuale quoddam in reliquam Ecclesiam ius. Strossmayer finds this "virtual right" in the writings of Gregory of Nicaea, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, John Chrysostom, and in the epistle that Pope Celestine addressed to the Council of Ephesus. Describing Cyprian's controversy with the Pope regarding the validity of baptism for heretics, Strossmayer reproaches Cyprian for his pronounced resistance to Pope Stephen, but affirms that, in accordance with the words of St. Augustine, we can excuse him, since Until his time, nothing was known about the personal and absolute infallibility of the Roman pontiffs.[105]

It is clearly necessary to pay attention to this "virtual right of the bishops over the rest of the Church" and to the expression "personal and absolute infallibility of the pope," according to Strossmayer's view.

Until the Second Vatican Council, it was not always clear to theologians and church historians what Strossmayer meant and what his mention, at the First Vatican Council, of the "virtual right of the bishops to administration throughout the Church" signified. As if it had provided the answer to these questions, the Second Vatican Council reduced the doctrine to a "collegiality of bishops," which is currently being implemented through the periodic "episcopal synods" in Rome.

As for the Pope's "personal and absolute infallibility," which Strossmayer found so objectionable, it was never discussed within the Church, nor was it addressed at the First Vatican Council. The Pope's infallibility is indeed personal, but not "absolute": it refers only to the official definitions of the truths of faith and morals revealed by God, which bind the entire Church. Strossmayer spoke out against "absolute" infallibility, but he did not invent it, and while some fought against it, he strategically sought to prevent that definition in the sense of the First Vatican Council. This is because Strossmayer was primarily concerned with the issue of the union of the Eastern Orthodox Christians with Rome, who found the primacy and infallibility of the Pope deeply objectionable.

Throughout his life, Strossmayer was a devotee of French culture and literature, and it is therefore not surprising that in this speech he also paid homage to the Catholic leaders of that country, such as Bossuet, rejecting the attacks of those who slandered the French Church for its Gallicanism.[106] 33. But it must be acknowledged that his speeches are not without minor intrusions of Gallicanism, particularly when he speaks of the relationship between the papacy and the episcopate.

Strossmayer recognized the "fullness of power" of St. Peter and his successors, as well as the popes' right to convene general councils, preside over them, and approve and define their conclusions. However, precisely because of the high esteem he held for the role of these councils, he opposed the definition of "personal and absolute infallibility." To reinforce his thesis, he cites the assembly of the apostles in Jerusalem, when Peter and Paul were reconciled. He mentions how Gregory the Great compared the four general councils to the four Gospels, and, along with the medieval theologian Durand, considered them the best means to counteract errors and evil in Christian society.

The second reason that moved Strossmayer to oppose the definition of infallibility was his high opinion of the role of general councils. In his view, the definition of infallibility would render these councils superfluous in the future. That his fear was not unfounded is easy to deduce precisely from the work of the Second Vatican Council, after whose conclusion new problems arose that would, within a foreseeable time, require the convocation of another general council.

Strossmayer then developed his ideas about the harmony that should reign between the primacy and the rights of bishops. These bodies can not only confirm, interpret, and approve, but also repeal and eliminate as the case may be. If this is not accepted and acknowledged, Strossmayer cannot understand how the meaning and force of Christ's words to all the apostles can be preserved: "Whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven." If the natural meaning of these words of Christ is not recognized, then Cyprian's ideas concerning the indivisible episcopate throughout the world, in which each bishop receives a share common to the other bishops—in solidum—also lose their value. Strossmayer argues that bishops should never renounce this divine right because otherwise, they would endanger the authority and freedom of the general councils. In his historical account, Strossmayer emphasized that this is an affront to the historian of the Councils, Bishop Hefele, who also belonged to the conciliar opposition.

The epistle that Pope Leo I addressed to the Council of Chalcedon, greeted by the assembled Fathers—"Peter speaks to us through Leo, so we all believe, we all give our assent to his epistle"—Strossmayer attempted to explain by suggesting that those bishops acted as judges and critics; they examined the letter and, finding it orthodox, accepted it. Indeed, Leo's letter is one of the most eloquent proofs of faith in papal infallibility within the 5th-century Church.

Strossmayer attempted to demonstrate, with enviable dialectic, that Leo's writing was not an act of the Pope's sovereign power but rather an instruction to the bishops, who were authorized to study, examine, and then accept or reject it. To corroborate his opinion, Strossmayer also invoked the opinion of Cardinal Bellarmini, but he could not prove that the bishops at Chalcedon had any doubts about the truth of Leo's doctrine. They simply became aware of its content and verified its concordance with what they themselves had found in divine revelation and were preparing to define.

"The inalienable rights of bishops" constantly attract Strossmayer's attention, and their "divine origin," he affirms, cannot be repealed or even diminished by a general council. This is also proven by the attitude of Pius IV during the Council of Trent. At the bishops' request, two words were omitted from the Pope's message because they considered them detrimental to the freedom of the council members. Strossmayer pays homage to that Council, which did not define papal infallibility; he acknowledges the valor and courage of the French Church, which overcame its own difficulties without taking a position on papal infallibility; and he praises Pius IV, who, advised by St. Charles Borromeo, established the rule that no conclusion should be reached without the general or near-general consensus of the participants.[107]

"The general consensus of the bishops" at the Council constitutes the third theme of Strossmayer's speech. The idea was not his own, but he, as a brilliant orator and staunch defender of his ideas, presented himself as the most sincere and open champion of this principle, which the conciliar opposition saw as the most effective means of preventing the definition of infallibility. For this reason, Strossmayer spoke at length on the subject. He wanted to obstruct the pronouncement of the council and thus ensure greater freedom for the Church, enabling the promotion of unity among separated Christians of the East and West. This was a way of interpreting not only the history of Christianity but also the writings of Irenaeus,

Tertullian, and Cyprian on this subject. Strossmayer interprets these opinions rather artificially to support his own, even though Irenaeus, relying on the infallibility of the Roman Church and the Pope, more easily proves the doctrinal orthodoxy of all other parts of the Church. He recognized infallibility before and during the Council itself, but he did not fail to emphasize the need for all the apostolic churches to be in agreement with the Roman See and the bishops.

It is curious that all the bishops present listened calmly to Strossmayer's intervention, even when he argued against the appropriateness of defining infallibility, relying on the work of Vincencio Lirinensis: Commonitorium and his famous principle that the surest sign of doctrinal orthodoxy was that which "always, everywhere, and by all" (quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus) was believed.

He attributed too much and too exclusive importance to this rule, even though it is not the only way to ascertain the truth of the faith in the Church and among the Christian people. Lirinensis did not know of papal infallibility in the form of "personal and absolute infallibility," but he taught the necessity of unanimity among the bishops when it came to defining a truth of faith.[108] He also invoked St. Augustine and the warning he addressed to the Church: ecclesiastical authority must be guarded with serenity and moderation so that the Church is not exposed to the ridicule of its enemies, who might say that everything within it is governed by the will of a single man and by superstition, as the Manicheans argued in St. Augustine's time.

To prove that the procedures in the time of the First Vatican Council were the same as in St. Augustine's, Strossmayer mentioned the appearance of a document entitled "The Necessities of Our Times," in which some enemies of the Church offered proofs for the necessity of defining infallibility, certain that in this way the Church and its magisterium would completely lose their authority. Condemning this work, he added: "Trust me, our fears are not in vain, nor are the dangers we foresee in vain." Ego saltem dicere possum coram Deo, qui me iudicaturus est, quod definitione hac de qua agimus, in effectum deducta, gregi meo, cui praesum, multa pericula sint creada (Believe me, our fears are not in vain, the dangers we foresee are not in vain. I can say before the God who is to judge me, that the definition we are discussing, if it comes to be proclaimed, will create many dangers for the flock whose shepherd I am)[109].

We have already mentioned Strossmayer's ideas and ideals concerning the return of the separated Slavic Christians to the bosom of the Church through Croatian Catholics. Imbued with these ideas and desires, Strossmayer, at the end of his dissertation, addressed his appeal to the Pope and the Council for the Church's scope to be broadened rather than restricted; He advocated for the ever-increasing spread of Christian peace, concord, and unity throughout the world, for humanity to become "one flock under one shepherd" (grex unos sub uno pastore). He expressed his hope that the Pope, who surpasses all other bishops in authority and virtue, mindful of the example of St. Peter, who in his humility asked to be crucified upside down, would deliver the Church from the danger, through his humility and sacrifice, into which it would fall with the definition of infallibility. For the same reason, he mentioned the Apostle Paul, who praises the greatness of the Savior precisely because of his humility and self-sacrifice (Epistle to the Philippians, 2:5-11). Finally, addressing all the bishops present, he expressed his hope that they would imitate Christ Jesus, the Good Shepherd, who for one lost sheep left ninety-nine, found it, carried it on his shoulders, and brought it to his fold.[110]

It would be unnecessary to emphasize that The enemies of the Church and the Papacy also gave extensive publicity to Strossmayer's speech, highlighting the breadth and characteristics of his theological knowledge. The Council itself listened to it calmly. It would be very interesting to compare his dissertation with those of the opposition, which included Dupanloup, Hefele, Haynald, Ketteler, Schwarzenberg, and others. We can say that Strossmayer, in his interventions, was more moderate than, for example, Dupanloup, and in terms of his style, he always tried to maintain the necessary decorum. Only in the heat of discussions, in private letters, or in sentimental and dialectical moments did he reveal himself, according to those who knew him personally, as "very impulsive by nature and almost like a fanatic of his faith and conviction... He could momentarily become exasperated and express concepts that could not escape reproach... Therefore, his ideas must be taken from a scientific point of view, without exploiting them for political or other ends." Transitory[111].

Apocryphal Speeches of Strossmayer

The enemies of the Church were displeased that Strossmayer's speech of June 2, 1870, had been allowed to pass without incident or interference; and this prompted them to immediately produce a pamphlet, riddled with attacks against the Church and the Pope, and disseminate it everywhere as if it were the bishop's authentic text. Those familiar with the work of the Council and Strossmayer's speeches soon realized that it was a malicious forgery invented to harm the Church and the Pope, and to cause confusion and discord among the clergy and the faithful throughout the world. Bishops from various parts of the world wrote to Strossmayer asking him to reveal the truth about the pamphlet. Strossmayer, in fact, repeatedly denied its veracity and offered proof that it was a clear fabrication by the enemies of Catholic unity.

Finally, in 1876, it was confirmed that a former Mexican priest, Dr. José Agustín Escudero, initially an Augustinian friar but later an apostate from the Order and the Church, a Freemason, and a rebel against ecclesiastical and civil authority, driven by the remorse of his own conscience, confessed to being the author of the document. He later made a penitential declaration in the newspaper América del Sud. The Lazarist missionary, Father Pedro Stollenwerk, sent this newspaper, along with a personal letter, to Strossmayer on August 18, 1876. Stollenwerk had included his home address: Calle Libertad, Hospital Francés, Buenos Aires. Strossmayer's secretary, Joseph Wallinger, confirmed the authenticity of this letter, and thus the whole world learned the definitive truth about the pamphlet.[112]

The fabrications originating from liberal circles, claiming that Strossmayer was being offered the "most brilliant" deals to lead the rebel Catholics, have been categorically denied by a canon of Strossmayer—Father Vorsak—who at that time was living in the Croatian Capitol of St. Jerome in Rome.[113]

Granderath and Kirch also mention Strossmayer's pastoral letter, relating to Saints Cyril and Methodius, dated February 4, 1881, where the pamphlet was also exposed. We reproduce the fragment that interests us: "Some years ago, a horrendous speech circulated under my name, a speech as far removed from me in form and content as the place in South America where a priest, repentant, confessed that he had written and disseminated it under my name, offering me, through his confessor, any satisfaction I might ask for. Although this writing itself displayed evident and undeniable characteristics of its apocryphal origin, it caused much confusion among those who did not know that my speeches were kept in the Vatican Archives and are not accessible to just anyone. Despite the fact that things happened this way, I am pleased to be able to confess also on this occasion, before the whole world, that I would prefer my right hand to wither or my tongue to be paralyzed rather than say or write a single one of the propositions of that horrendous speech that was disseminated under my name"[114].

A year later, on February 4, 1882, Strossmayer repeated almost verbatim this statement in a written reply to the Orthodox bishops who had attacked him for his pastoral letter on Saints Cyril and Methodius.[115]

Strossmayer did not vote for infallibility, but once the vote was taken, he accepted it.

The incident of the apocryphal speech took us back to the distant years following the Council. It is necessary to return to it and continue analyzing Strossmayer's attitude until its conclusion and even afterward.

At the beginning of June 1870, the majority of the Council asked the presiding officer to conclude the debates on infallibility, avoiding repetitions of what had already been clarified. On June 13, the president, Cardinal De Angelis, read the petition that 150 members of the majority had addressed to the presiding officer, requesting a vote on its conclusion. The majority of the bishops declared themselves in agreement, and the presiding officer declared the discussions closed.

But on June 4 of that same year, the leaders of the opposition, Cardinals Schwarzenberg, Mathieu, and Rauscher, supported by 81 signatures of council fathers, protested against this decision, arguing that all members of the Council had the right to express their views on such important matters for the Church and its doctrine. The presiding officer of the Council replied to Schwarzenberg, as the first signatory, that everything foreseen in the Council's regulations had already been done and that, for this reason, the protest of the minority could not be taken into consideration.[116]

The political outlook in Europe and Rome had already worsened due to the approaching war between France and Prussia. The council fathers attached great importance to the holding of the fourth solemn session and the proclamation of the dogmatic constitution on the Church. This constitution contained the definition of papal infallibility when, "ex cathedra," that is, officially and in his capacity as Pastor and Teacher of all the faithful and according to his sovereign apostolic power, he defines and determines doctrines of faith and morals revealed by God and binding on the entire Church.

At the beginning of July, a large number of the speakers who had pre-registered to speak declined to deliver their speeches. Among them was Strossmayer, who communicated this on July 2, 1870.[117] Two days later, the other speakers followed suit, and the discussion was concluded. It was officially declared that this had occurred because the bishops could not endure the heat for four hours a day in the assembly hall. The presiding officer mentioned Schwarzenberg, Blanchet, Dupanloup, and Strossmayer among those who had declined to speak. Therefore, the majority of the Council could feel satisfied.

On July 13, at the eighty-fifth general congregation, the vote on the entire draft was held. 601 members of the Council voted: 451 in favor, 88 against, and 62 in favor, but on the condition that their observations be taken into consideration.

Time was running out. On July 16, the Council's general congregation convened. The international opposition council decided to send six of its members to Pope Pius IX requesting: 1) that the expression "plenitudo potestatis" (full power) be removed from Chapter 39 of the draft, and 2) that the phrase "with the consent of the bishops" be added to Chapter 49, when defining papal infallibility. The opposition delegates were the French (Darboy, Ginoulhiac, and Rivet), the Germans (Ketteler and Scherr), and the Hungarian Simor. They delivered the petition to the Pope. Ketteler begged Pius IX on his knees to accept both points, arguing that this would ensure unanimity at the Council for the definition of infallibility. How or what the Pope replied is unknown, but the request was not considered. Officially, it was stated at the Council that the Pontiff had submitted the matter to the Council itself.[118]

Strossmayer's relative moderation can be better understood if we consider that Dupanloup requested in writing that the Pope thank God and the bishops, after the solemn session, that the overwhelming majority had declared themselves in favor of the Holy See's privilege, but that the Pope, taking into account the inconveniences of the prevailing summer weather and considering everything carefully before God, decided to postpone the definition of infallibility until a more opportune time, when tempers had cooled. Dupanloup, with the vigor of his eloquence, tried to convince the Pope of the good consequences that such a decision would bring, but Pius IX dismissed the request of the Bishop of Orléans after having rejected the much more modest petitions of the opposition during the course of the Council sessions.[119]

The day before the solemn session, that is, on July 17, 1870, the opposition met to determine what stance they would take. Several proposals were put forward: to attend the proceedings and vote against the definition; and if asked to submit to the majority's decision, to refuse. Some preferred not to go so far and advised general submission to the Council's decisions.

Finally, they reached an agreement and sent the Pope a joint letter reiterating their disagreement with the majority's decision and announcing at the same time their departure from the Council on the eve of the session, so that, in the Pope's presence, they would not be forced to vote against his infallibility. The letter was signed by 55 Council Fathers, but it made no mention of the idea that they would not submit to the majority decision. Some prominent members of the opposition did not sign it, such as Cardinals Rauchner, Melchers, and Ketteler. In fact, the opponents left Rome on the eve of the solemn session on July 18, 1870, which voted on the Constitution on the Church and the dogma of papal infallibility.

Then what Strosmayer had anticipated in his speech of June 2, 1870, came to pass: Of the 535 Council Fathers present, 533 voted for the definition, and only two voted against it, subsequently submitting to the decision. In this way, the definition was voted on "unanimously," something that Strosmayer considered so dear and of such importance. While the solemn session was taking place in St. Peter's Basilica, a storm with thunder and lightning broke out over Rome, which the historians of the Council compare to the storm that descended upon Mount Sinai when God gave Moses the stone tablets. In his brief address, Pius IX emphasized that the supreme authority of the Bishop of Rome does not destroy, but rather protects, the rights of the bishops. He commended the Church and its representatives to God, desiring in his prayer to embrace all his fellow bishops to his paternal breast, for he loves them, esteems them, and wishes to be one with them. After a solemn Te Deum and the imparting of the blessing, everything concluded at 12:30 p.m. Taking into consideration the general conditions of the Council and the world, Pius IX did not order the corresponding salutes to be fired from Castel Sant'Angelo because in doing so, the thunder and lightning in the sky would resemble those of Sinai at the historical moment of Moses and humanity.[120]

Although the Papal States were temporarily dissolved on September 20, 1870, the First Vatican Council marked a new era in the history of the Church and of humanity. A month after the dissolution of that state, Pius IX adjourned the Council indefinitely, condemned the violence by which the Pope had been deprived of his liberty and security, and authorized the bishops present to return to their respective dioceses because of such difficult times.[121]

The Council, thus adjourned, was never reconvened. John XXIII and Paul VI, at the Second Vatican Council, attempted to address various issues left unresolved at the First Council, but these were conceived and conducted independently of the First. Neither of these two Popes wished to proclaim new dogmas or pronounce new anathemas.

We do not yet have a critical history of the First Vatican Council. Grandehart's, especially in French opinion, is biased and unfair to the opposition, not to mention the accounts of Protestants and others, which are utterly biased and unreliable. In recent times, notes or memoirs of some participants in the First Vatican Council have been published, from which we can also obtain some details regarding Strossmayer: some are unfavorable, others favorable, with some even calling him "Saint Bernard of the First Vatican Council."

Strossmayer left Rome on July 17, 1870, that is, one day before the solemn definition of infallibility. By the 27th of the same month, he was already back in Djakovo. The Council facilitated the spread of this prelate's oratorical glory throughout the world, with some calling him primus orator christionitatis (First Orator of Christendom). The Croats greeted and congratulated him, joined by some other Slavic peoples, both within and outside the Dual Monarchy. One of the finest Croatian poets, Peter Preradović, dedicated a poem to him, highlighting his oratorical skills, which ended: "Thanks to you, small and despised Croatia, almost forgotten by the world, has once again become known" [122].

The details concerning the behavior of Strossmayer and other dissenting fathers after the Council are interesting. There were no schisms, as the enemies of the Church had expected, with the exception of the "Old Catholic" movement within the German-speaking world. Strossmayer was the last bishop in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to publish the Council's decisions and did everything necessary in accordance with his duties as a bishop.

Döllinger and the "Old Catholics" tried to win him over to their movement, but, apart from a few letters, they got nothing from him. In those letters, he managed to say, purely out of emotion, some things that lacked foundation, but it is extremely important that he rejected Friedrich's request to consecrate some of the excommunicated priests as bishops.[123] From this, it is easy to see how Strossmayer's conscience remained alert when it came to matters of importance to the Church. While at the Council he made sharp judgments, outside of it, and especially before the Council's historians, he gave proof of filial devotion and obedience to the Church and the Pope, whenever these were required.

During 1871, Strossmayer corresponded with Lord Acton, Döllinger, and Reinkens, but his letters contain no elements of importance in this regard. It cannot be denied that Strossmayer intended to appeal to the aforementioned figures to soften their judgments regarding the Church, the Pope, and its supreme magisterium. He remained silent throughout 1872. On December 26, 1872, he signed his decision concerning the publication of the Council decrees.[124]

The publication appeared in the January issues of the official newspaper Glasnik of the Diocese of Djakovo.[125] Some time later, Strossmayer was received by Pope Pius IX in a private audience. On February 5, 1873, he wrote to his friend Francis Rački, a university professor and priest, expressing his high praise: "I was with the Pope these past few days; he received me very kindly. What the newspapers say about submission is just a myth. I will tell him everything when I return."[126] Granderath, in turn, who showed no understanding of Strossmayer's ideas and attitude, openly praises his obedience to the Church and his filial fidelity to the Pope, his sincerity in publishing the conciliar decrees and all his activity as a bishop.

Among the Croatians, there were no cases of apostasy after the definition of papal infallibility. On the contrary, we could say that the love and affection of the faithful evidently grew toward the Holy See and the Pope. That insignificant movement of the "Old Catholics" that appeared in monarchical Yugoslavia after the First World War had no connection, genetic or ideological, with papal infallibility or with Strossmayer's stance at the Council, even though they tried to associate the ideas of Strossmayer, who had already died, with their untenable positions.

The same year he published the decrees of the Council, Strossmayer withdrew from active (Croatian) political life, where until then he had played a prominent role. He lacked serene restraint in politics, for he was an emotional man, which negatively impacted his assessment of the circumstances and the decisions to be made. Of him, his great devotee E. de Laveleye wrote: "He says exactly what he thinks, omitting nothing, without diplomatic considerations, with the enthusiasm of a young man, and as sagaciously as a genius" [127].

Strossmayer's speeches secured his worldwide fame, and thus this exceptional bishop was soon freed from political strife: he was 58 years old at the time and still had a long and successful episcopal ministry ahead of him, that is, until April 8, 1905, when the Bishop of Djakovo exchanged mortality for immortality. If the powerful of this world had valued Strossmayer's attitude and character in their true measure, it is plausible that he would have been appointed Archbishop of Zagreb and elevated to the cardinalate.

But his conscience remained his constant and most faithful advisor; Whether before the Emperor or the Pope, he always spoke what he considered true and just, and for this reason he was the sole Bishop of Djakovo. From that moment on, he dedicated himself entirely to the religious and cultural progress of the people of his diocese, in accordance with the motto he had engraved on the facade of his magnificent cathedral, consecrated on November 19, 1882, to Saint Peter, the first Pope: "To the glory of God, the unity of the Churches, and the concord and love of my people."

Not everything in Strossmayer's life and episcopal work was perfect, but his activity was always guided by grand ideas, bold achievements, and a series of successes, through which Strossmayer became, in a sense, the "spiritual father of the nation" for the Croatians. And in the Church and the cultural world, he was assured a venerable and lasting memory. His ecumenical ideas dated back to years before John XXIII was even born, and they will continue to be alive and dynamic long after all of us are gone. Without ecumenism, it is impossible to interpret or understand the life and work of Strossmayer.

But he was not a victim of unfounded fantasies: He used to tell his friends, first and foremost Canon Franjo Rački (1828-1894), a pioneer of Croatian historical scholarship, that the ecclesiastical union of the separated Slavs could occur toward the end of the 20th century. Whether he was an optimist or a pessimist in this prophetic enthusiasm is still difficult to say.

But without his ecumenism, we could not understand Strossmayer's stance at the Council, his patronage, his concerns in the field of education among Croats and Slavs in general, or even his role as bishop. However, time is the fairest judge of everyone's ideas and attitudes. In our time, the most serious teachers of the Church, the forerunners of ecclesiastical science, sincerely regret that the First Vatican Council was only able to accomplish part of its tasks. For this reason, papal infallibility was defined incompletely; there was insufficient time to clarify, according to Strossmayer's ideas and proposals, the role and importance of the apostles and bishops. Many ideas of the non-opportunists, among whom Strossmayer was one of the most fervent, are now very timely and useful so that ecclesiastical science does not develop unilaterally.[128]

Strossmayer was a friend of Pope Pius IX and, especially, of Leo XIII; he visited them, sought their advice, presented his proposals, and led pilgrimages to Croatia and Slavic countries.

All that has been said so far can serve only as an introduction to the study of Strossmayer's speeches at the First Vatican Council. His ecumenism and the work he carried out for the unity of the churches are a wonderful example, worthy of imitation even today and will continue to be so as the Church enters deeper into the third millennium of its existence.

Rome, 1969.

"PRAXIS", SOCIALIST BUREAUCRACY AND ALIENATION

OBSERVATOR – Hrvoje Lorković

In 1960, I attended a meeting whose participants were the current editors (the author is referring to 1966) of Praxis (a journal of communist intellectuals, published in Zagreb—Editor's note). My comment on their presentations was: "It's pure revisionism!" Engels and the Dialectics of Nature, The Origin of the Family, etc., then the interpretation of Marx that today is held only by Edgar Hoover and his acolytes, an interpretation that was far removed from the Marxism as it was taught to us in 1947-48 by philosophy professors with the desire (and the mandate) to astonish the petty bourgeoisie who perhaps still harbored religious and idealistic tendencies; mentioning, I say, that Marxism in 1960 was tantamount to committing a faux pas. Engels? Bah!... Marx? Yes, but the young Marx, the discoverer of alienation and the one who fought against it, the humanist Marx.

However, the progress from 1960 to Praxis is enormous. The main difference lies in the activity toward revisionism, which is no longer taboo; on the contrary, being a revisionist is today the greatest virtue of the thinker, and it is even their duty to be a revisionist, and so it must be, if human practice is incessant change ("and so it will be"—Grlič). Revision is now "the imperative of the historical moment to save the humanist essence of Marxism."

Here the avalanche began, determined and facilitated by the very nature of Marxism, and that is due to the nature of Marx. Marx perceived that dialectics was a double-edged sword, capable of simultaneously deifying the Prussian monarchy and inciting the romantic rebellion of the Jena students.

The avalanche wipes everything out—practice and theory. In theory, G. Petrovic argues that the dialectical triad—capitalism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and communist society—is nothing but a crude distortion. In his view, the dictatorship of the proletariat as the permanent form of the socialist state is a falsification and a contradiction in terms. The transitional phase is communism, and its adjective—socialism—which, once realized, justifies nothing more than that name and must be replaced by humanism. In this way, the name that, despite everything, is linked to unpleasant associations of the destruction of all human values and implacable terror is denied and discarded. Likewise, "materialism" is mentioned only in relation to "vulgar" materialism, and is eliminated on the same basis.

The ideological content has already been reduced to "humanism." Now comes the height of absurdity: it is argued that socialist practice is a mystification, a deception, an abuse of a great idea, of humanity's deepest and noblest social aspirations.

Morally outraged, the philosopher confronts the tyrant here, as was inevitable. He despises the idea of a vile struggle for power, placing himself above it (of course, because technically he cannot even approach it), and allows himself to lash out at the shameless careerism, the intellectual cowardice, and so on, in the tradition of free intellects. But he went further: his criticism and moral outrage led him to idealist voluntarism, so fundamentally alien to Marxist determinism.

Many contributors to Praxis warn that the socialist citizen should not await the coming of a better communist world in the same way that some Christians await the coming of the kingdom of heaven. Despite the invalidity of such eschatological perspectives, Rudi Supek tries to persuade us that Stalinism is not, or at least should not be considered as, "historical necessity," but rather as "a form of abuse of objective historical possibilities." Supek doesn't say what Marxist methodology can justify the alternative "either historical necessity or abuse." The necessity-abuse opposition demonstrates that Supek doesn't conceive of abuse as "a necessary abuse," as something inevitable, as is the case with everything historical in classical Marxism. The concept of abuse here presupposes will as conceived by voluntarism.

When it's necessary to impress the world with the idea that the rise of the communists to power and the realization of a classless society, the abolition of private property, etc., is imminent, unavoidable, and indispensable, then the old Marxism that affirms that communism is historical necessity, as it was in all past eras, is acceptable. When, on the other hand, communism doesn't materialize, it's not the guilty historical necessity, as the communists conceived it; Here, individual guilt, personal error, the free will of someone who chooses to "abuse" a historical opportunity that "objectively" still tends toward communism must intervene. In this way, dialectical-materialist logic is discarded, and idealist, voluntarist logic is adopted with great moral indignation.

Our "eschaton," the kingdom of communism on earth, is thus spared (at least in appearance) the shame of being unmasked as a subjective fantasy. The need for a luminous ideal remains; there are only evil men like Stalin, who, out of malicious whim, deceive us at the last moment and prevent us from enjoying the communist paradise. Thus, Stalin's will proves stronger than Marx's historical necessity.

But we were taught Marxism, and it is not difficult for us to perceive how and why various forms of Stalinism are an indispensable consequence of socialist revolutions. I will attempt here to give a brief outline of the development of Stalinism and bureaucratism.

It is a fact that peoples pass through the era of industrial civilization at different stages of development. Capitalism, the agent of development, is pervasive; the means of communication are perfected: news of prosperity in industrialized countries easily reaches underdeveloped countries. Discontented intellectuals here become opponents of conservative, reactionary, and corrupt power. These intellectuals, more than others, experience the feeling of national inferiority. But they know that action along national lines in a nation whose national present is far from brilliant is not persuasive. Moreover, under such conditions, there are always numerous groups that, through national affirmation, try to resist the colonizing influences of their powerful neighbors, and these elements are usually conservatives and opponents of industrialization.

Therefore, it is more effective to disguise the movement that pursues national revival with social overtones, since it suggests that national inferiority does not exist, that fundamentally everyone is equally capable, and, therefore, the differences are due to better or worse social systems. Marxism finds very fertile ground; it addresses the proletariat as the "base" of society, the same in all nations. By calling themselves a proletarian, a member of a backward nation can identify with and equate themselves with the proletariat of advanced nations; they become a member of an imaginary supranational entity that claims to be the bearer of the progress of civilization.

Moreover. Maintaining faith in progress, identified with technical progress (so unattainable) and the "standard of living" of civilized man at the industrial level, the socialist of a backward nation, lacking concrete, methodically and gradually achievable goals, and therefore neurotically ambitious, sets unattainable objectives. He is prone to believe even in his own messianism: the future of humanity depends on him, not on the rich. That future is nothing less than permanent happiness and well-being for all.

Socialism is now beginning to organize and fight for power. Intellectuals always offer simplistic ideas because they do not belong to the class they want to redeem. He is not proletarian, but in his complexes, he likes to become one. By breaking with his class, he gained a great moral advantage. He dedicates all his forces to the conquest of power, which can be achieved by submitting to the most rigorous discipline. Whoever fights for power in this way ultimately wins.

When, under one circumstance or another, power is seized—which usually occurs during profound crises of national pride, often as a consequence of a lost war—every factor mentioned bears fruit. The economic ineptitude of the new leaders is immediately apparent. Educated and guided by simplistic sentiments and ideology, they find themselves adrift in the new situation. But the experience gained in the struggle tells them that success is not immediate, that they must continue fighting patiently. However, while perseverance yields results in the conquest of power, it cannot transform absurd economic measures into rational ones. The socialists, accustomed to drawing great moral strength from the forced belief in grand future goals, continue with the same mental tradition. However megalomaniacal these goals may be, now equivalent to religious ideals, they stubbornly strive to achieve them.

But the majority of the people do not accept the motives that instilled courage in the "elite" during the struggle. Therefore, socialization can only be achieved by resorting to force. The communists now have reason to believe that the struggle is far from over. They hold power, which belongs to a minority that clings to it with the utmost effort. They feel threatened, as do their great goals. Everything must be secured in an organized manner.

First, public ownership is a source of attacks from the instincts of private property, now considered relics of the past, but which are in reality a manifestation of the innate and irrepressible tendency to possess, an instinct akin to that of self-preservation. As it becomes evident that the socialist economy is incapable of satisfying human needs, selfish impulses grow. Control agencies are thus created, employing a greater number of agents. But these same agencies must be controlled: the number of idealistic fighters is too small to exercise control. In the general climate of distrust, people are more concerned with monitoring, snooping, and denouncing than with working constructively. The bureaucratic control apparatus is a product of distrust, and in turn, breeds distrust. But the bureaucratic apparatus cannot grow without restraint; the number of privileged positions is limited. Those who fail to attain such positions become disillusioned; all avenues are closed to them. They become passive, self-sabotaging, and alienated from themselves and those around them.

Moreover, the consequences of socialism are harmful—as is any disruption of an organization—that arises more or less naturally and gradually. People unaccustomed to work and those who attribute their social position to the unjust distribution of wealth do not instantly become capable and inclined to work. Others, active and adaptable, suddenly lose their footing: normal economic expansion through activity and profit is now out of their reach. They seek a new arena for self-affirmation: participation in leadership. In this way, they become bureaucratized. Some very quickly learn the rules of the new game: blind adherence to the idea, use of fetishistic vocabulary, intrigue, and the elimination of rivals under ideological pretexts. They did not create party discipline, but they know it is the indispensable condition for their career; they accept it and, in its name, commit various "abuses" mentioned by philosophers, frequently becoming victims of these abuses of power. They never even attempted to understand the essence and content of the ideology in whose name they act. For them, ideology is a priori a means to their career.

In some, the innate instincts to possess goods manifest themselves, and they become economic criminals. Others, incapable of committing embezzlement, misappropriation, and fraud, aspire to social prestige. These ambitions pervade even the humblest ranks of the bureaucracy. These people are very sensitive to official praise and criticism. Their social role, artificial and ultimately often unnecessary, seems to them the axis of power. They enjoy being elected to various committees and commissions, and they endlessly argue about trivial matters. The inefficiency of the socialist bureaucracy is directly related to the unnatural orientation of the energies and ambitions left to man in a communist regime. No one is entirely responsible or guilty of the embezzlement and errors they commit: they simply follow the only path left to them under certain social conditions.

Under certain social and ideological conditions, the genesis of bureaucracy is therefore a necessary process that depends on: 1) the neurotic, excessively ambitious leaders of the movement; 2) its disciplined, perhaps more accurately, fascist organization; 3) the repression of the innate instinct to possess private property; and 4) the distrust that this aspiration generates. When, then, Mihailo Markovic, puzzled, observes that "to eliminate exploitation, it is not enough to abolish private ownership of the means of production," the response is: the abolition of private property does not eliminate but rather generates the exploitation practiced by the socialist bureaucracy.

We could almost say: what economic expansion is in capitalism, in communism is equivalent to the expansion of bureaucracy. This process is certainly favored in underdeveloped countries where the rural-urban divide is greater and where the "white-collar" ideal dates back to the pre-communist era. But communism does not diminish these tendencies; rather, it strengthens them. Even Supek perceives this, and in his scientific, "sociological" voluntarism, he too found the culprit here. The bureaucratization of the former peasants is not the responsibility of the revolution but of the peasants themselves; they, being temporary allies in the revolution, should have been discarded upon its victory; the error lies in not having done so in time.

It is cynicism beyond cruel. When, some twenty years ago, the industrialization campaign began in Yugoslavia, encouraging the migration of peasants to the cities, accompanied by onerous taxes and the repression of private property, Supek did not protest. Today, when that migration is bearing tremendous fruit, he proclaims the need to send these unfortunate souls back to their remote villages, where they have, in the meantime, lost their sense of direction and purpose. Who will restore to them the love and attachment they once felt for their peasant homes, their sense of security? Who will free them from their unhealthy ambitions? No one asks.

In the idea of the peasant's guilt—as an accidental ally in the revolution who then betrays it to become a bureaucrat—there is another element: among these peasants are now also included the mass of combatants, elevated by the revolution to high positions, who now so greatly compromise it and mortgage the state treasury. If we consider the national composition of this "peasant" element, we see that the problem posed to communism by these "former allies" and the political forces of these "bureaucrats" does not stem solely from their peasant origins, but rather from the fact that most of them belong to the privileged nation. Without a clear distinction between the peasant who migrates to the city in search of bread and the "peasant" who arrives in the city to occupy a managerial position, there is little room for discussion. Although both types deserve to be labeled "bureaucratized," their socio-political content is entirely different.

The question arises: how did the critics grouped in Praxis diagnose the four factors mentioned, and what do they propose to change this state of affairs?

I will begin with the most important one, the third factor. Nowhere do we find it clearly detailed, and there seems to be no clear understanding of it. The myth of communism is still too attractive for philosophers, even if only covertly, to attempt to attack it. They, of course, point to the failure of the attempt to build a humanist socialism, but they don't emphasize the basic economic component of that failure; they sentimentally complain that economic criteria and concerns prevailed, the hypertrophy of material interests. Is that the result of the propagated Marxism they now want to forget?

In other words, does man in our socialism abandon spiritual values because Marx told him they weren't essential, and starve himself to death so he can buy a car because Engels believes that material progress is essential? One sometimes gets the impression that some philosophers in Yugoslavia, in their voluntarist impulses, tend to repudiate materialism because it dehumanizes. On the contrary, their diagnosis and treatment are reversed: man becomes dehumanized not because of philosophy but because of his yearning for the material goods he sees but cannot attain. Dehumanization and alienation are products of economic failures, which in turn are due to the unbalanced economic methods of communism.

The reason this understanding is imprecise lies perhaps in the fact that Western capitalism's socialization has gone so far that its advantages are undeniable. But there is a difference between capitalism and state socialization being directed by competent individuals in the midst of natural progress, and neurotic, delusional types from semi-backward countries who know only the "leap" to Eldorado.

Most of the writers belonging to the "Korčula School," whose work is published in the journal Praxis, maintain that the affirmation and consolidation of self-management will solve current problems.[129]

Another group sees salvation in automation. But automation doesn't fall from the sky. Moreover, according to Mallet, for automation to be effective, an extraordinarily stable market must be ensured. Where is this market in the Yugoslav conglomerate? I have already pointed out that our intellectuals moved hastily and instinctively from the positions of political handmaidens to a romantic rebellion against fossilized ideology, against the "vulgar" material criteria of valuation (for which they blame the "bureaucracy"), against the glorification of the masses, and in favor of the rebirth of the individual (in the midst of a campaign against the cult of personality), that is, in favor of building a society in which the Marxist ideals of a person, rich in every sense, would be realized in all people. This new group of intellectuals, still "utopian" (according to Pejovic), relativizes the notions of "left" and "right" and has once again understood that the function of intellectuals (and their only possibility of compromise) is nonconformity. Yet, they remain so conformist that they find a foothold for relativizing many dogmas within the framework of Marxism itself.

The umbilical cord to Marx is maintained through his conception of alienation. This conception varies among Yugoslav authors; sometimes it is equated with the division of labor, other times with the lack and incapacity for genuine love of humankind, of authentic community. But, although certain authors advocate for the psychological study of the person under socialist conditions of life, they do not adopt the thesis that alienation is a psychological notion and not an anthropological or ontological one. This academic rigor is interesting. I believe it is worthwhile to analyze the factors that give rise to the resistance to the psychological aspects of alienation.

In any case, it is a residue of Marxist distrust of everything "spiritual." Admitting that alienation is a psychological notion seems to provoke in some philosophers the idea that alienation is not eliminated through socialization but through "spiritual exercises," through inner rebirth, through introversion. This fear is reinforced by the fact that neither Marx nor any of his followers elaborate on the mechanism by which the socio-economic revolution will eliminate alienation. Practice, however, teaches that in communism, as we experience it, alienation is not disappearing, and if it temporarily diminishes, it is generally due to nationalist stimuli.

The most important reason for avoiding psychology is that alienation, by its very nature, is closer to the notions employed by psychoanalysis and its many subfields. Both the official Marxist classical philosophers, who, according to Markovic, tend toward a voluntarist approach to the future and socialist objectives, and their adversaries, the group comprising Praxis, turn a blind eye to this affinity. Both are bothered by the subconscious (and some are also bothered by scientism). One does not always know what one truly wants, and even if one does, one cannot explain why, cannot always predict one's behavior, and is not master of oneself. These ideas are unacceptable to a "conscious" communist, who knows no limit to his power, and also to a voluntarist, who finds those responsible for "historical abuses."

Psychoanalysis knows neither the guilty nor the just; it recognizes psychic determinism, inner necessity, and attempts to reconstruct the causes of human behavior when it clashes with rationality. While everyone agrees that socialist practice is replete with absurd irrationalities, psychoanalysis in Yugoslavia is still in disgrace.

A serious rehabilitation of its various forms is far more necessary than the incompetent critique of "psychological" interpretations of the notion of alienation, such as Tucker's (criticized by G. Petrović). If they knew more about this subject, it would be evident to them that psychoanalytic methods and individual psychological goals of therapy (which are fundamentally social) can hardly be described with terms like "moral revolution," as Tucker apparently wants. We have nothing against the moral revolution, but it can be identified with psychotherapy. The aspect of alienation in neurosis allows us to perceive that philosophers' manipulation of the notion of alienation is often superficial. The multivalence and complexity of alienation, of its concept and its forms, the relativity of the criteria by which one judges whether an individual, a group, or a portion of the population is alienated, the naiveté and schematism of the notion of the "integral man," the "complete man," "full of the development of human creative powers," does not allow us to speak of alienation and de-alienation as concrete processes, which is what our philosophers suggest. Such a treatment of the term alienation implies a symptom of a peculiar kind of alienation.

It is another matter entirely when attention is focused on a limited field of human activity and when processes are analyzed from the perspective of alienation. Marković did this for the realm of political activity in socialism. His analyses clearly demonstrate the appropriateness of applying the notion of alienation in this field. To extend this perspective to specific Yugoslav conditions, it would be necessary to distinguish between passive and active alienation. Passive alienation occurs when individuals abandon political activity, even political opinion, because the only mode of political life that aligns with their notions, criteria, and ideals is impossible, proscribed, repressed, or has disappeared. Personal moral norms, family tradition, membership in a social class, religion, or nation—all these elements stand in stark contrast to the form and character of political activity, the only possible form.

But a normal, psychologically balanced, positive, and constructive person, who needs to engage in political activity to some extent, cannot be content to merely take note of this state of affairs. To defend themselves against self-accusation of political passivity, cowardice, and indecisiveness, they are creating an ideology of the apolitical and the anti-political. Daily experience teaches them that political activity is a preserve reserved for primitive, aggressive, unscrupulous, uncultured, and unintelligent types. In such a situation, one is tempted to paraphrase Goethean's maxim on modesty as a virtue, applying it to the idea that, when engaged in political activity, one cannot be content to merely take note of the incapable. Beneath this thin layer of haughty contempt for all things political lies, in fact, an abyss of political inferiority, which manifests itself in distorted and misguided interpretations of political events. How often have we heard that the Tito-Stalin conflict, or the more recent Khrushchev-Mao one, is mere window dressing, a disguise concealing a premeditated and cunning conspiracy? The underestimation of politics and politicians has been reversed here, attributing almost superhuman powers to certain politicians.

This principled rejection of politics is certainly not confined to the theoretical realm. It is reflected in the daily practice of the non-political individual. By imposing total political abstinence, this person renounces even the most basic spontaneous reactions in which their political security is not at risk. Their inhibitions gain such momentum that they are exposed to neurotic attacks—"the spasms of personality"—as soon as the opportunity to define themselves arises. It often happens that they let slip the chance when even the slightest political commitment could have a significant impact.

In the extreme case, no benefit is gained whatsoever from political abstinence. Instead of facilitating a sincere and free relationship with family, friends, and society, their freedom becomes a victim of general inhibition. Thus, general passivity, the loss of ideals—all these much-emphasized ingredients of alienation in socialism—depend largely on political alienation.

In active political alienation, under our conditions, the breaking point is joining the Communist Party. It is preceded by dilemmas and hesitations. The alienation is all the worse the greater the sacrifice is in relation to the reward. It now manifests itself as aggression, cruelty, and destructive power toward oneself and others. It is natural that socialism, bringing with it a new wave of alienation of unprecedented scope, acts not as an instrument of rapprochement among the peoples of Yugoslavia but as a factor that accentuates the discrimination between them. Even without historical antagonisms and age-old hostility among the peoples of the Yugoslav conglomerate, the burden of alienation imposed by communism, coupled with existing regulations, would be enough to definitively separate them.

Political alienation in Yugoslavia and its specific forms in Croatia and other nations constitute a very important topic to which Praxis should devote at least as much attention as bureaucratic leaders devote to the "phenomenon" of nationalism. We hope that its contributors and editors will tell us something about this.

(Translated from the "Croatian Review" (Hrvatska Revija) No. 24, Year XVI, 1966.) 

THE CENTENARY OF THE HUNGARIAN-CROATIAN COMPROMISE (1868-1968)

MILAN BLAŽEKOVIĆ

"Since the kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia, for centuries, belonged, de facto or de jure, to the lands (Leander) of the Crown of Saint Stephen, and considering that the Pragmatic Sanction established their indivisibility, therefore, based on these grounds, the Kingdom of Hungary, united with Transylvania, on the one hand, and the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia, on the other, in order to settle the legal and state problems that have arisen (over time), agree to the following Compromise."

(Preamble to the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868)

In November 1968, the centenary of the negotiation and ratification of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise, or rather, of an international agreement, was commemorated. This agreement legally established Croatia's position within Austria-Hungary, which in 1867 became the Danubian Monarchy or Dual Monarchy.

Given that the Hungarian-Croatian state community dissolved 50 years ago, in 1918, and considering that the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise was intended to be the definitive solution to the legal and state relations between Croatia and Hungary, which dated back to 1102, it is unnecessary to give preference in this dissertation to its historical and legal character.

The Compromise did not satisfy the wishes of the Croatian people, even though Croatia retained in its provisions the essential foundations of its former independence. The implementation of the Compromise led to the erosion and mutilation of Croatian autonomy, the main cause—aside from other international factors—that led to the cessation of Croatia's state relations with Hungary and Austria in 1918. An expository analysis of the Compromise and its operation during the period when the national consciousness of the numerous nationalities within the Monarchy was awakening is highly instructive, especially for the present and future of Croatia.

The Compromise and its operation highlight why Croats cannot accept a unitary type of state within a community with other peoples, as was the case in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941), nor a supposedly federal type of state community, as exists in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 to the present.

In both monarchical and communist Yugoslavia, as well as in the Hungarian-Croatian legal-state community, according to the Compromise, the central power of the state was, and is, located outside of Croatia and under the control of another people who, despite all guarantees (promises) of equality, continue to exercise a type of hegemony over Croatia and infringe upon its traditional national rights. This circumstance also clarifies why the majority of the Croatian people accepted the creation of Banovina Hrvatska on the eve of the Second World War (August 26, 1939 – April 10, 1941) only as a temporary solution to the Croatian-Serbian conflict, and why the overwhelming majority of Croats enthusiastically accepted and defended their Independent State (1941–1945) despite all the external and internal difficulties of the last world war.

The historical background of the Compromise will also provide the answer to the question of why Croatians have written and spoken of the Croatian state since 1102, when Croatia entered into a personal union (common king) with Hungary, until 1918, when it abolished all political, state, and legal relations with Austria-Hungary, despite the fact that most world maps and foreign writers and their works of universal history depict Croatia, or rather, the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, as geographical entities with a degree of local autonomy within larger state formations or empires—that is, as their provinces. Foreign works, as well as national legal texts, address this issue, paying particular attention to the legal status of Croatia after the Compromise, and presenting a wide range of opinions.

To interpret the Compromise, its concepts, and provisions, it is necessary to explain Croatian-Hungarian relations when they were two separate states (1102–1526) and later, their relations under the shared Habsburg kings. These relations must be considered especially in relation to the following concepts and expressions: "The Crown of Saint Stephen," "the Hungarian crown," "the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen," "one and identical act of coronation," "the common inaugural diploma," "the pragmatic sanction," "the indivisibility of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen," and so on.

I

THE HUNGARIAN-CROATIAN COMMONWEALTH FROM 1102 TO 1868

This period of Hungarian-Croatian relations can be divided into three main phases: a) relations until the election of the first Habsburg as common king (1102-1526); b) relations under Habsburg dynastic rule until 1848; and c) the cessation of relations with Hungary and the signing of the Compromise of 1868.

a) Hungarian-Croatian relations until the election of Ferdinand of Habsburg as Croatian and Hungarian king in 1526/27.

Croatian history and the first state formations, from the arrival of the Croatian people in their current homeland at the beginning of the 7th century until 1102, developed under the shadow of the Franco-Byzantine conflict, integrating into the areas of their respective influences: Pannonian Croatia (Frankish influence) and Dalmatian Croatia (Byzantine influence). The latter was under Duke Branislav (879-892) as the first independent Duke of Croatia. From 925, when the Croatian king Tomislav was crowned with the crown sent by Pope John X, Croatia bore the diplomatic title Regnum Croatiae et Dalmatiae (Kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia), which remained until the proclamation of the so-called "Vidovdan Constitution" of 1920, when it was absorbed by Yugoslavia; first under a monarchy and then under communism.

During the national dynasty, Croatia was a unitary state. With a certain dependence on Byzantium as the holder of political universalism at that time, until King Krešimir IV (1058-1074), who broke relations with Byzantium, drew closer to the Papacy and extended the borders of his state to a limit that would not be reached in the 20th century (the Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945). King Krešimir's rapprochement with the Papacy and his struggle for the Romanized Dalmatian cities (Thema Dalmatia) with a view to seizing all of Dalmatia through them provoked discord among the Croats regarding the language used in the liturgy. The victim of this discord would later be King Zvonimir Demetrius (1076-1089), brother-in-law of the Hungarian monarch Ladislaus.

When he attempted to send the army against the Seljuk Turks at the Pope's request, his adversaries—according to Professor F. Sisic—assassinated him.[130] To protect his sister's rights, Ladislaus occupied Pannonian Croatia, while Byzantium secured its possession of Dalmatia. After several years of wars between the Croats and the Hungarians, especially under King Peter II (1091–1097), the last of Croatian blood, the Croats signed the Pacta Conventa in 1102 with the Hungarian King Koloman, Ladislaus's successor. Koloman was then crowned in the city of Biograd as the Dalmatian Croat sovereign and successor to Zvonimir.

On this occasion, King Koloman swore an oath to guarantee the Kingdom of Croatia all its rights and its constitution. Hungary and Croatia would in the future have a common king, but two independent kingdoms would remain, which would be evidenced especially by the fact of a double and separate coronation, as well as by the oath to the Constitution[131]. Croatia's status as an independent state and political unit remained unchanged; only the rights of the Croatian king were transferred to Koloman and his successors (the appointment of ban (prorex), the granting of privileges and donations, the sanctioning of laws passed in the Sabor—the Croatian parliament—, the collection of taxes and customs duties, the supreme command of the Croatian army—exercitus croaticus—, and the direction of foreign policy[132].

Although Croatia had been federated with Hungary since 1102—without, however, forming a unitary state with regard to internal administration—that is, both kingdoms remaining separate political, territorial, and national units, foreigners did not pay due attention to this internal autonomy, focusing only on the fact that foreign policy was common and governed by a common king. Over time, some of the obligations of the Pacta Conventa began to be disregarded. First, the double and separate coronation.

Thus, King Béla III (as Hungarian monarch, Béla IV) accepted (1235-1270) the coronation in the same ceremony as both King of Hungary and Croatia, with the separate Croatian coronation being omitted thereafter. The main reason for this was that the order of succession established by the Árpád dynasty followed the principle of primogeniture, since during the reign of King Koloman, that branch of the family was considered the heir to the throne, although there was some possibility of choice among the members of the reigning family, as the king designated his successor.

The form of that designation was precisely the coronation. And that is what established the custom of crowning the successor during the king's lifetime. For the same reason, from the moment the son succeeded his father in Hungary, the separate coronation in Croatia became of secondary importance. But even though from that moment on the coronation was joint, it should be noted that the kings swore their oaths separately before both the Hungarians and the Croats. That is to say: they swore to respect their rights and observe their respective Constitutions in accordance with the Croatian kings. The corresponding act of this oath was drawn up, and, under Andrew II (III), who died in 1301 as the last king of the Árpád dynasty, a diploma was presented before the coronation, which was merely read aloud, and was given at that time the technical term "Diploma inaugurale" [133] [134].

The coronation ceremony, consequently, included the oath and the publication of the aforementioned "Diploma inaugurale," which was later drafted by the parliament of the respective kingdoms.[135] Thus, through the common coronation and the common royal oath, the already existing Croatian-Hungarian union was transformed into a closer unity, since the Croats had given their consent to these ceremonial acts.[136]

It is a historical fact that King Koloman and his successors up to Bela III (IV) – 1235–1270 – wore the Croatian crown, called the Zvonimiro crown, in Croatia, until separate coronations were performed. This was the time of the unquestionable personal union of Croatia and Hungary. In the former, the king's substitute was the herzog (dux) – usually a member of the royal family – the son or the brother; and if there were none, the ban. Since the coronation was a joint ceremony, it is reliably documented that it was performed with a "Hungarian crown," or rather, with "the crown of Saint Stephen," the first Hungarian king (1001-1038), as a symbol of the state community.

Consequently, along with the aforementioned formal acts of the coronation and the "Diploma inaugurale" recorded in the preamble and the first articles of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise of 1868, the expression "crown of Saint Stephen" and, by extension, the expression "lands of the crown of Saint Stephen"[137] take on special significance.

[137] Clarifying the origin and initial meaning of these acts is all the more important because the Hungarians—who must be acknowledged for their great skill in handling legal and state concepts—managed to develop and derive from the pure Byzantine concept of the "holy crown" the new moral and legal-state basis for the political federation of all the territories subject to that crown, namely: Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia.[138] Under the crown of Saint Stephen, the Hungarians, over time, began to call the Hungarian-Croatian state community Hungary, because they also called and considered the crown "the Hungarian crown."

Historically and de facto, this was the case, but its legal meaning was—or should be—different. For this reason, the Croats, whenever the opportunity arose, emphasized the difference between the Croatian kingdom and the Hungarian kingdom of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, rightly considering that the kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, in relation to that of Hungary, were regna socia or "associated kingdoms" of the Crown of Saint Stephen, and in no way partes adnexae or partes subjectae to Hungary.[139]

This identification of the idea of "lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen" with the concept regnum Hungariae, which dates from the 13th century, found its clear expression in the first codification of the private customary law of the Hungarian and Croatian nobility, drawn up by Stephen Werbđczy at the request of the noble estates and published in Vienna in 1517 under the title: Tripartitum opus juris consuetudinarii inclyti regni Hungariae.[140] This work was never elevated to the status of law because it lacked the royal seal, nor was it sent to the zupanias (comitatus) for promulgation. Later it was incorporated as the first part in the private collection of decrees and laws of the Jesuit Martin Szentivanyi, published in Trnava in 1696 under the title: Corpus juris Hungarici seu decretum generale inclyti regni Hungariae partiumque eodem adnexarum —abbreviated: Corpus Juris Hungarici.

World opinion accepted the name Regnum Hungariae thanks to these and other legal works, especially by virtue of Werböczy's Tripartitum, tendentiously written and opposed by Croatians, identifying it with the name "lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen." The title of Werböczy's work, however, is consistent with its content. According to it, Croatia is merely a municipality of Hungary, and its autonomy has no legal or state character. Therefore, it was incomprehensible to its author that Croatia had its own laws, customs, and special institutions.

Werböczy opines that Croatia only enjoyed these prerogatives by royal grant, since all Croatian lands were nothing more than a mere possession of the holy crown of the first Hungarian king. According to him, all Croatian rights were due exclusively to royal grants that could be revoked and were invalid if they did not conform to Hungarian laws and customs. The estrangement between Croatia and Hungary during Werböczy's reign was logical and understandable, as this tendency became more pronounced, perhaps due to his efforts to underestimate the Croatian position vis-à-vis Hungary.[141]

The question then arises: How could the Croats, who had entered into a personal union with the Hungarian King Koloman, accept a certain position of inferiority within this new state community?

The answer lies in the Byzantine concept and expression of the "holy crown," as well as in its rights—a matter that was not unknown to either the Hungarians or the Croats. These peoples, in the 7th century, like the Hungarians in the 9th century, populated the territory of Roman Dalmatia and Pannonia, subject to the supreme power of the Byzantine emperors until the death of Emmanuel I Komnenos (1180), with brief interruptions. According to Byzantine law, the emperor had the right to dispose of these Dalmatian and Pannonian lands. This imperial right was transferred, first, to the Croatian monarch (Thomislav was distinguished with the title of Imperial Patrician) and, later, to the Hungarian sovereign, who was elevated to the honor of Imperial Patrician, accepted into the royal family, and crowned with a diadem that later became a constituent part of the Crown of Saint Stephen.

By transferring the diadem, the right to dispose of the lands of Roman Dalmatia and Pannonia was also transferred. Because this authorization was only conferred through the transmission of the diadem or holy crown (which, according to Byzantine ceremonial, was considered a charismatic act), the opinion arose that all the territories belonged to the crown and that the king was authorized to dispose of them immediately after his solemn coronation. This authorization was made effective through the king's donation of the lands of the holy crown to dignitaries and nobles.[142] The Hungarian king had received the crown and, with it, the mandate to administer Pannonia and Dalmatia; a mandate that, according to Hungarian opinion, continued to be renewed until the reign of Béla II(III), who had spent 11 years at the Byzantine imperial court.[143]

And only from then on did the idea of the "holy crown" emerge to symbolize the political community of all the lands subject to that mandate. Through the personification of the "holy crown," by considering it the source of all public power and all rights, the concept of a broader state community is formed; that is, that all territories subject to the "holy crown" constitute one and a single state jurisdiction, since that royal symbol is the root of all possessions (Radix omnium possesionum). Whoever has received possession of a territory from the "holy crown" becomes an integral part of it, part of its mystical body (corpus sacrae regni coronae). Only with the death of the recipient is their possession reintegrated into the "holy crown" [144]. By the succession agreement and by some other elements, the Hungarian-Croatian donee system differs from the feudal system of Western Europe [145].

Through royal donations, the Hungarian-Croatian kings of the Árpád dynasty gave rise to the nobility, which would later limit and diminish royal power. To effectively resist the dominance of the nobles, monarchs had to support the common people, granting them ownership of the royal lands they cultivated. To repopulate the national territory—thinning after the Tatar devastation—(1242), King Béla III (IV) (1235-1270) summoned foreign artisans, especially Germans, granting them significant privileges to exempt them from the power of the nobles. From this point onward began the so-called "free royal cities" in Hungary and Croatia.

The king elevated his employees to the rank of nobles (Nobiles... qui serventes regales dicuntur), and these, in turn, together with the lesser nobility (gentry), compelled King Andrew I (II) – 1205–1235 – father of Béla, to guarantee their rights and freedoms. The obligation of 1222, known as the "Golden Bull," which also established the right of the nobles and the Grandees to resist – jus resistendi – against its violation by the king, was renewed in 1231 (although without the right to armed resistance), and in 1256 it became the most important law of the land and the foundation of the constitution.

Therefore, the Hungarian-Croatian king continued to swear an oath on the "Golden Bull" until his final coronation. This "Bulla" only had the force of law in Hungary and Slavonia up to Mount Gvozd (in Croatia), that is, for Croatia north of Gvozd, while it never came into effect for Croatia south of Gvozd or for Dalmatia. At the time of the "Bulla's" promulgation, King Andrew was on bad terms with his son Béla, who had previously been crowned "junior king" (rex Hungariae junior) and appointed Doge of Croatia (dux totius Sclavoniae, Croatiae et Dalmatiae).

This Doge had his court and administration with two banes (viceroys): the one for Slavonia and the one for Croatia-Dalmatia. In reality, Béla's opposition to his father's excessive spending and confiscation of the nobility's property caused a rebellion among them in Hungary and Slavonia. The condition for reconciliation was the publication of the "Golden Bull." Thus, an administrative dividing line was drawn between the territories north and south of Gvozd, respectively, which until then had formed a single political and administrative unit of the Kingdom of Croatia. When, in 1226, Bela's youngest son was appointed titular king of Galicia and, at the same time, dux et rex, Slavonia was also called a "kingdom" (regnum), whereas until then it had been a banatus, because it was administered by the ban (prorex), or a ducatus, ruled by the duke or herzog (dux). This division of the territories into distinct political and administrative units—that is, the Kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia, on the one hand, and the Kingdom of Slavonia, on the other—would remain in place until the end of the 16th century [146].

What, then, were the Byzantine principles introduced by King Bela II (III) in Hungary upon his return from the Byzantine court?

Unlike Rome—which allowed the conquered peoples to retain their language and customs, limiting itself to their economic exploitation—Byzantium, lacking sufficient military force, attempted to subdue them morally, granting them complete freedom to organize themselves internally. This moral submission was pursued through two avenues: the ecclesiastical and the national.

Regarding ecclesiastical matters, the emperor reserved the final decision for himself. This unconditional conception of a sacred Byzantine state, protected by divine authority, was brought to Hungary by Béla II. As holder of the holy crown, Béla was the guardian—"appointed by God"—of the religious unity of the peoples under his rule. His kingdom, according to a manuscript from his time, consisted of Hungary, which was the head (Hungria, caput, regni), Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia (Rama). This Byzantine conception of total religious subordination to the central power also corresponded to the demand for national unification or the adaptation of all constituent parts to the Hungarian center.

But this adaptation was not in the Hungarian national sense, but rather in that of an internationally recognized community of Latin culture. Religious unity also brought with it a common official language, which facilitated the administration of all regions, even those that did not consider themselves Hungarian. To these two conditions must be added another, also centrally accepted according to the Byzantine example: that of complete internal freedom. And just as Byzantium was a democratic community in the full sense that all its subjects, and the emperor, were Orthodox, so too did Hungary have to be a free country, but only for those who freely declared themselves subjects of the holy Hungarian crown, in the same way that the Slavs did with respect to the Byzantine emperor.[147]

This political conception of Byzantium, transplanted by Béla II (III), became a secular conception of the Hungarian state. With it, the Convention of 1102 (Pacta Conventa) was also superseded in its entirety. The idea of a contractual union, founded on the equality of the contracting parties, was relegated to a secondary position.[148] The idea that land ownership and possession belonged to the crown is a Byzantine legal concept, well-known earlier in Croatia than in Hungary, which later became somewhat dependent on Byzantium during the rule of the Komnenos dynasty.

From the fact that Béla II obtained investiture for Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Croatia from Emanuel Komnenos, Werböczy deduced that the same diadem received from Byzantium signified the subordination of Croatia to Hungary. Although unsuccessful, this hypothesis first appeared in the "Inaugural Diploma" of Ladislaus II Jagiello in 1490, when, at the insistence of the Croatian delegates, the title "Hungary and the kingdoms and territories subordinate to it" was replaced by "Hungary and the associated kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia and their subordinate territories" [149]. Meanwhile, the Croats were also successfully imposing their point of view under Habsburg rule. Despite constant Croatian opposition to what appeared to be Hungarian rule, Werböczy's Tripartite Theory was a powerful weapon in the Hungarian hands.

According to this theory, the territories, the people, and the king were merely links in the chain of the holy crown. The king became its guardian through the act of coronation, which had to be carried out according to the customs of the people—that is, the common people and the nobility. The equal standing of the lower Hungarian and Croatian classes before the king as sovereign allowed for the entanglement of the king's mandates, from which Werböczy's Tripartite Theory of the indissolubility of the territories' relationship to the Crown of Saint Stephen arose.[150]

This theory will find its fullest expression especially at the beginning of the 18th century in the Hungarian Pragmatic Sanction, mentioned in the preamble to the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise of 1868, which we will discuss later.

With the election of the first king of the House of Árpád and Croatia's entry into a legal and state community with Hungary, the Hungarian kings—like later kings of other dynasties—assumed the obligation to defend Croatia against Byzantium and Venice. Their fulfillment was made possible by the system of donations, which created a powerful noble class in both Hungary and Croatia. The power of these lords, among whom the princes of Bribir from the šubić family and those of Krk—Babonić-Blagajski, Kontromanić of Bosnia, and Nelepić—were particularly prominent in Croatia, was not only unconquered by the Golden Bull of Andrew I (II), but some of them, such as the aforementioned princes of Bribir, were practically sovereign, independent in their marches or feudal territories. As the Árpád dynasty distinguished itself, these nobles wielded considerable influence in the selection of the new dynasties that would ascend to the Hungarian-Croatian throne. Due to a lack of unanimity among the Croatian and Hungarian nobility, both countries would simultaneously have two sovereigns each.

Thus, for example, upon the death of Andrew II (III) (1290-1301), lacking direct successors, the ancient right of election came into effect, and the Croatian ban Paul Šubić of Bribir seized the opportunity to elevate the Neapolitan Angevin dynasty (1301-1395, or until 1409), a traditional rival of Venice, to the throne. Although Louis I, the strongest representative of the Angevin dynasty, proclaimed "great" for his military successes against Venice and in the Balkans against the Serbs and Bulgarians, had diminished the power of the Croatian nobles of Bribir and Nelepić through his centralized rule, the Croats remained loyal to this dynasty, placing King Charles II (Charles of Drach) on the Hungarian-Croatian throne as a rival to Maria, daughter of Louis I and betrothed to the Czech Sigismund of Luxembourg, younger son of the German Emperor Charles IV.

The Angevin dynasty disappointed the Croats because they had chosen it precisely as a counterweight to Venice; And it was precisely the last king of this dynastic branch, the Croatian king Ladislaus of Naples (1386-1409), son of Charles of Drach, who sold all his rights to Dalmatia to Venice in 1409. He did so after having been provisionally crowned king of Croatia by the Archbishop of Ostrogon in Zadar on August 5, 1403, because Hungary refused to recognize him, despite his having sworn to defend and protect all the rights of Croatia. This was the last coronation on Croatian soil.[151]

The loss of Dalmatia represents the most critical moment in medieval Croatian history after 1102. It deprived Croatia of the cornerstone upon which all its political and administrative importance rested. The Croatian state did not disappear, because its center of gravity was shifting ever further north, but Venice, taking advantage of the dynastic internal wars in Croatia and Hungary, managed to consolidate its power in Dalmatia and remain there until its demise in 1797.[152]

The struggle to recover Dalmatia after the first and second wars with Venice (1411–1413 and 1418–1420) was replaced by the war against the Turks, who became the principal enemies of Hungary and Croatia. Such conflagrations were conducted with the greatest success by Sigismund of Luxembourg (1409-1438), by the first Habsburg on the Hungarian-Croatian throne, Albert (1438-1439), by his successor King Ladislaus of Poland (1440-1444), killed in the battle near Varna in Bulgaria, and later by Ladislaus IV, Postumus (1444-1457), defeated by the Turks on the field of Kosovo, where the kingdom of Serbia had also succumbed 59 years earlier.

King Matthias Korvin (1458-1490) temporarily managed to restore royal power, but the Kingdom of Bosnia collapsed in 1463 under the onslaught of the Turks, who for the first time reached the Sava River. The Bosnian nobility, Catholics, and Patarenos-Bogumilis mostly embraced Islam, thus preserving their material possessions and the Croatian language and securing for their country a unique position within the Ottoman Empire until 1878. In 1909, after its annexation by Austria, it became a territory of the Habsburg Crown under the special Constitution of February 20, 1910. This proved to be a very serious legal, state, and political problem for the Monarchy.[153]

In such a critical period as this, the dynasty of the last Jagiellonian kings squandered their own forces and those of the state in the struggle with Poland and Austria. Thus, the son of Ladislaus II (1490-1516), Ludwig II (1516-1526), without waiting for the Croatian army under Prince Krsto Frankopan, nor for the Transylvanian army led by Ivan Zapolia, and relying solely on Hungarian troops and supported by some nobles from Croatia and Slavonia, and advised by the Hungarian State Council and against the suggestions of his chancellor, Bishop Stephen Brodaric, engaged in battle on the plain of Mohač against the troops of Sultan Suleiman, on August 29, 1526. He was defeated and even lost his life.

Regarding Hungarian-Croatian relations and their specific relationship with the king, there are two very characteristic documents about them, written prior to the Battle of Mohač. In the Hungarian royal council before the decisive battle, the nobles spoke to King Ludwig as follows: "In this kingdom, glory belongs to us alone and to no one else. It would be a disgrace to you and to us if it were said that we did not know how to fight the Turks alone; if you wait for Prince Kristo Frankopan and his Croats, then the glory of the victory we hope for would belong to him alone."

On the other hand, Prince Krsto Frankopan, having learned that the battle had been lost, though without any news of the king's death, rushed to his aid and wrote to the Bishop of Senj, Francisco Jozafatić, the following words, highly significant for the time: "Since the king had escaped, I consider that God permitted this misfortune for the king and the Hungarians not for evil or perdition, but for the eternal good of the kingdom: for if the Hungarians had defeated the sultan, when would his vanity end and who could endure his arrogance!" [154].

King Ludwig died without an heir, and the throne remained vacant, raising once again the question of the right to elect a new king.

a) Hungarian-Croatian relations under the Habsburg dynasty until 1848.

The election of Ferdinand of Habsburg, King of Bohemia and Archduke of Austria, brother of Charles I of Spain and V of Germany, held in the city of Cetin on January 19, 1527, as King of Croatia, was driven by Croatian special interests without any consideration for Hungarian interests. This election was legally identical to that of Koloman as Croatian King in 1102. The Inaugural Diploma of Ladislaus II Jagiello was modified and supplemented in 1490, Habsburg right to the territories of Croatia was recognized, regardless of the position taken by the Hungarian estates.[155]

Furthermore, on the eve of the Battle of Mohač, at the beginning of 1526, the question of whether Croatia should separate from King Ludwig II, i.e., from Hungary, was debated in the parliament convened in the city of Križevci. Ferdinand invoked not only his right of succession, by virtue of his marriage to Anne, daughter of Ladislaus II, but also the contract of July 22, 1515, stipulated between Ladislaus II and Maximilian of Habsburg. This contract secured, for the fourth time, the right of succession to the Hungarian-Croatian throne should Ladislaus's dynasty become extinct: the first time in 1463, the second in 1491, and the third in 1506.

Meanwhile, the Hungarian parliament, meeting on October 12, 1503, in Rakos, passed a resolution against the election of Ferdinand. This resolution, adopted under pressure from the paladins Esteban Zapolia and Esteban Verbózcy, was sanctioned by the king and thus became law. According to this law, no one could henceforth propose a foreigner as king of Hungary and Croatia under penalty of high treason. This law was clearly intended to prohibit the Habsburg candidacy, favoring John Zapolia, whom the Hungarians intended to crown as sovereign.

Thus, two factions formed regarding the election. The majority of the Hungarian estates, adherents of the "national party," elected John Zapoli as King of Hungary on November 11, 1526, while a smaller number voted for Ferdinand of Habsburg in the city of Požun on December 16, 1526. The Czech estates had already unanimously elected Ferdinand on October 23, 1526. Hungary thus had two kings until the death of John Zapoli in 1540, at which point the kingdom was divided in two, one of which—John Zapoli's—remained under Turkish rule.

It should be added that the Kingdom of Croatia was also divided in two over the same issue, with the difference that the majority of the Croats at the Sabor (Diet) of Cetine elected Ferdinand on January 19, 1527, while the minority had opted for John Zapoli. Although Hungary had elected Ferdinand as King of Hungary on December 16, 1526, the Croats did not grant him this title in the electoral charter, calling him only King of Bohemia and Croatia, in order to emphasize the free and independent nature of their act.[156]

Although Bohemia, Hungary, and Croatia entered the community of Austrian territories only to form a personal union, Ferdinand sought to make it a real union. When his attempt to send representatives to Vienna to discuss common affairs was thwarted by the opposition of these kingdoms, Ferdinand organized several bodies at his court (the war council, the secret council, the chancery, and the treasury) that increased his importance but also provoked Croatian-Hungarian discontent.

Under the reign of Maximilian (1564-1576), Ferdinand's successor, the Hungarian-Croatian struggle against Viennese centralism began in order to protect the Constitution, which shaped an essential aspect of the internal life of Hungary and Croatia until 1790. This explains and provides the main reason for the Hungarian-Croatian alliance against Vienna, despite their mutual discord. Each time it came to protecting the rights and privileges of the Kingdom of Croatia, it was a matter of protecting them. During the reign of Rudolf, Maximilian's successor, a Military March (Military Boundaries) was established for defensive purposes against the Turks. He entrusted a strip of Croatian territory to his uncle, Archduke Charles, for administration, and also placed his soldiers and officers under his command.

Thus, at the end of the 16th century, a new political territory began to take shape in Croatia, free from the power of the Croatian Ban and Sabor. But the demand for its restoration to the Ban's power would not only constitute the central theme of Vienna's claim, but would also become the subject of the Hungarian-Croatian stipulations in the Compromise of 1868. The importance of the Military March in European history from a military point of view is considerable because, thanks to the fact that Ferdinand I became Holy Roman Emperor in 1556, that March was established as a defense of the Empire against France in the west and against the Turks in the east.

With his election as Hungarian-Croatian kings to the Holy Roman Emperors of German nationality, Croatia and Hungary did not become integral parts of the German Empire, because Ferdinand was chosen to hold the Crown of Saint Stephen, which, in turn, thanks to its legal and state conception, did not recognize the precedence of any other crown. Thus, the concept of the holy Hungarian crown protected Croatia from becoming a territory of the German Empire (Reichsland), which would later happen to its province of Dalmatia after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Furthermore, the Hungarian interpretation of the concept of lands (possessions) of the Crown of Saint Stephen constituted a permanent reason why Croatia did not become an integral part of Hungary, or, rather, its province. Moreover, although the Hungarians and Croats had elected the Habsburgs as their monarchs, all kings until 1867 required an electoral process in the Hungarian Parliament and the Croatian Sabor, respectively, since the order in which the vacant throne was to be filled was not established when the Habsburgs were elected [157].

With the Habsburgs' ascension to the Hungarian-Croatian throne, political and religious influences found their first echoes in Hungary and Croatia, and this would compel the people of these countries to participate in European events, especially the Thirty Years' War. Under Ferdinand's reign, Protestantism began to spread in Hungary, but Rudolf, a devout Catholic, of his own accord signed Law No. 22 in February 1604. This law not only rejected all petitions from Hungarian Protestants and confirmed the pro-Catholic provisions of King Saint Stephen, but also stipulated that anyone attempting to raise religious issues in parliament would be considered an instigator of sedition.

The rebellion of the Transylvanian nobleman, Stephen Bockay, elected by his supporters as Duke of Hungary, who immediately allied himself with the Turks, ended with the Peace of Vienna on June 22, 1606, after crossing the Drava River. However, the Croatian ban Ivan Drašković, with the royal troops, defeated the rebels. On this occasion, the peace provisions repealed Law XXII of 1604 and established that only Hungarian citizens and nobles (infra ambitum regni Hungriae solum) could profess the religion of their choice, thus settling religious matters until 1848.

Before the signing of the Peace of Vienna, its draft was sent to the Croatian Sabor, which accepted most of its text, but categorically opposed religious freedom. It also requested that Rudolf's Law of 1604 remain in force. On January 16, 1608, the king sanctioned the Croatian Sabor's decision regarding the exclusive recognition of the Catholic religion within the territorial boundaries of Croatia and Slavonia, thus granting Croatia a religious law completely opposed to that of Hungary. Although this law may seem intolerant, it contributed significantly to safeguarding Croatia from Magyarization, since Calvinist and Lutheran Hungarians were prohibited from acquiring property or settling in Croatia.[158]

In 1558, the last separate session of the Croatian Sabor was held in Steniénjak. From then on, the Sabor of Croatia and Slavonia was to meet jointly. The kings of the Habsburg dynasty did not attend the Croatian Sabor as kings of other dynasties usually did.[159]

Thus integrated, the Sabor of Croatia-Slavonia began sending its deputies (Nuntios, solemn oratores), as the Sabor of Slavonia had done previously, to the Hungarian parliament convened by the king. The king was represented by his special staff, and the envoys sat with him in a place of honor. They were to strictly adhere to the instructions received from the Sabor. Croatian wishes and proposals could not be rejected by the Hungarian deputies but only by the king. If, regarding one of the proposals presented in parliament, the Croatian delegates lacked instructions, nothing could be approved that was binding on Croatia.

Only laws passed by the Hungarian parliament were in force in Croatia, and even then, only after the Croatian delegates had given their consent, always in accordance with the instructions they had received. If the parliament accepted a royal proposal or the monarch sanctioned a particular law, it only came into effect in Croatia after its eventual approval by the Croatian Sabor. Therefore, from the 16th century onward, it became customary for the Croatian Sabor to convene immediately after the sessions of the Hungarian parliament, at which time the Croatian delegates would report on the laws passed. The Sabor could reject them, as is evident from the case of the law on religion.

Croatia remained faithful to the principle formulated by the Croatian ban Tomáš Erdődy during the reign of Rudolf: Regnum regno non praescribit leges (The kingdom does not prescribe laws). These customs and privileges of the Sabor would be modified by the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise, both with regard to the Croatian delegation in the joint Hungarian parliament and the instructions that Croatian delegations were no longer bound to follow.

The 17th century witnessed the Thirty Years' War and the Hungarian-Croatian struggle over the Constitution. The Croats had to wage a relentless fight for the incorporation of the Military March, a promise that had been solemnly made to them several times, especially by Ferdinand II in his "Inaugural Diploma." A series of acts and omissions by the Viennese court—the failure to incorporate the promised Military March, the increasing number of German officers and soldiers in Croatia and Hungary, the growing centralist desire of the Viennese government to turn both countries into its provinces as they had done with Bohemia after the Battle of Bijela Gora in 1621, and especially the discontent over the Peace of Vasvar of August 10, 1664, following the victory over the Turks at St. Gotthard—led to a rapprochement between Hungarian and Croatian nobles under King Leopold I (1657–1683) and the conspiracy led by the Croatian ban Nicholas Zrinski and the Hungarian paladin Francis Wesselényi.

After their unexpected deaths, Nicholas's brother, Ban Peter Zrinski, along with Christoph Frankopan and the Hungarian Francis Rakozcy, continued the rebellion, hoping to break free from Habsburg rule with the help of France and Turkey. This rebellion, known in history as the "Zrinski-Frankopan Rebellion," failed. Its leaders not only lost their lives in Wiener Neustadt on April 30, 1671, but the Habsburgs also exterminated both families—the Zrinskis and the Frankopans—and confiscated all their property.

With the expiration of the 20-year term of the Peace of Vasvar, Sultan Mehmed IV declared war on Leopold, and his troops reached Vienna itself in 1683. However, he was defeated with the help of the Polish King John Sobieski and Archduke Charles of Lotharingia, thus forever breaking the expansionist power of the Ottoman Empire. Leopold took advantage of this victory to convene the Diet in Požun. On October 18, 1867, the law of succession of the Habsburg dynasty through the male line, according to the principle of primogeniture, was solemnly proclaimed there, both in Hungary and Croatia. At the same time, Article 33 of the Golden Bull of 1222, which allowed the nobility to interpret the right of rebellion in defense of constitutional guarantees, was repealed.[160]

But even during Leopold's lifetime, the rebellion of Franz Rakozcy, grandson of Peter Zrinski, Duke of Transylvania, arose. At his request, the assembly of his supporters in Onof, on June 14, 1707, during the reign of Joseph I (1705-1711), deprived the Habsburgs of the Hungarian crown. Fearing that the Croats might also join Rakozcy's rebellion, Vienna restored part of the Military March to the control of the Croatian ban. Rakozcy's uprising ended with the Peace of Szatmar on May 14, 1711, which proclaimed a general amnesty and once again guaranteed freedom of Protestantism in Hungary.

The Peace of Szatmar brought about a change in the relationship between the throne and the estates. After centuries of rebellions and internal struggles, a period of reforms began, with the Hungarians attempting to exploit the situation to their advantage. Until 1790, a rapprochement between Hungary and Croatia continued, despite the fact that the Hungarian estates had tried to pass a resolution in the Diet of Požun in 1708 stipulating that the king could only ratify those rulings of the Croatian Sabor that did not contradict Hungarian law—a principle known as concordantia. This was intended to unite Croatia with a liberated Hungary.

This failed attempt to subordinate Croatian law to Hungarian law sparked the first Hungarian-Croatian conflicts and, at the same time, fueled the Croatians' desire for swift independence from Hungary, thus emphasizing their need for self-determination. A favorable opportunity arose at the beginning of the reign of Charles III (1711-1740), or rather, of Charles VI as Holy Roman Emperor. With the death of Joseph I, who left two sons, Charles II remained as the sole male heir of the Habsburg family, having no male offspring of his own at that time. According to the law of 1687, the Croats and Hungarians had the right to freely elect the king should the male line of the Habsburgs become extinct.

The problem of such a choice, or that of succession through the female line, was the dilemma of the estates, assembled in the Sabor of Zagreb on May 9, 1712, when they had to appoint their delegates for the coronation ceremony in Požun, scheduled for March 3, 1712. The decisive step towards solving the succession problem was taken by this Croatian Sabor with its Law VII of March 13, 1712, which states, among other things, that "the right of succession will be entrusted to that female line of the Austrian house which possesses not only Austria, but also Styria, Carinthia, and Crania, having its seat in Austria" [161].

The reason why the Croats opted for the female line of the Habsburg dynasty in the event of Charles's death without male heirs is found in the Sabor's minutes: "Undoubtedly, a kingdom with an election will become a scene of bloody and horrific wars, a place of rebellions that will destroy the well-being of the citizens, exposing the homeland to the inevitable danger posed by foreign princes, our potential tyrants.

Without leadership, without a king, we will be dealt with according to the will of the powerful, and we will be subjugated, and our rights, our freedom, and the advantages of our people will be trampled upon. We have a distant example in Poland: by freely electing the king, we will perish" [162]. Confident of the Hungarian reaction to this Croatian decision, the Sabor clarified it in a special note addressed to the king, which the delegates delivered to the monarch along with the resolution of April 25, 1712, and the following message: "Having received our benefits, we are not at all afraid to become part of Hungary.

According to the laws, we are associates of Hungary, but not subjects. We once had our own kings and not Hungarian sovereigns. We were not forcibly subjected to servitude to Hungary, but we voluntarily accepted not the Hungarian kingdom but its king. We recognize him as long as he remains the ruler of Austria, but if this were not the case, we will not lend our ears to the seductive voice of free choice (that is, the choice granted by the Law of 1687) as if we were indissolubly bound to follow Hungary; we are free and not slaves." This resolution of the Sabor —Law VII— later called "the Croatian pragmatic sanction", clearly expresses that the state community between Croatia and Hungary consists in the person of the king: as long as both kingdoms have a common king, the state community will exist, removing this condition means there is no more talk of it[163].

Three days after the audience with the Croatian delegates, the king, in a secret conference, ordered the Austrian councilors to enter into negotiations regarding the Croatian resolution. Although this conference had accepted the resolution and expressed the desire to persuade the Hungarian estates to do the same, and although a suggestion had been made to confirm the Croatian decision (probamus, acceptamus et conformamus), the king did not sign it, taking into account the lack of support from the Hungarians, assembled in the parliament of Požun. Instead of his sanction, on May 16, 1712, the king granted the Croatians a diploma, which, in his name and that of his successors, guaranteed their rights, privileges, and freedom (diploma securitatis et privilegiorum).

On May 22, 1712, Charles III was crowned in the Parliament of Požun, when the Hungarians again proposed discussing and legislating on the freedom to choose the new king in the event of the extinction of the male line in the Habsburg dynasty, as well as on the king providing assurances to the Hungarian estates in the event of the secession of any part of the Hungarian kingdom. This proposal, along with another from Croatia, was sanctioned by the king, who had to dissolve Parliament due to the uproar that ensued.[164]

On April 19, 1713, Charles III convened a meeting of his secret advisors in Vienna, revealing the hitherto secret pact—the pactum mutuae cessionis et succesionis—stipulated between Leopold I and his sons Joseph I and Charles VI in 1703, which was considered the domestic law of the Austrian family. In the official record of this state step, the law was called "the principal instrument" (Hauptinstrument). The term "pragmatic sanction" appears for the first time in the document by which Archduchess Maria Josepha, daughter of Joseph I, renounced her right of succession.

It was on this occasion that the law was called "Lex fundamentalis Sanctio Pragmatica ac Pacturn Augustae Familiae" (Fundamental Law of Pragmatic Sanction and Pact of the Augustan Family). In 1719, it was sent by means of a circular from the Emperor to all the Austrian states (Länder) for their approval. Charles III personally called it Sanctio Pragmatica, lex perpetuo valitura (Pragmatic Sanction, Perpetual Law).

This document, described with the pragmatic sanction of Charles III, was not sent to the Hungarian parliament, since its terms were still being debated there. Nor was it sent to the Croatian Sabor, taking into consideration its decision of March 11, 1712 [165]. The Pragmatic Sanction of Charles III contains three main points: 1) that the lands of the House of Habsburg cannot be divided, meaning that none of them can choose its own king from among the successors of the House of Habsburg; 2) that in the aforementioned lands and kingdoms, if, after his death, Charles III does not leave a male heir, his sons or legal heirs will succeed him to the throne, according to the principle of primogeniture; 3) that if this line becomes extinct, the crown will pass to the daughters of his brother Joseph and their descendants.

After the Hungarians had rejected the pragmatic sanction in the joint parliament of Požun in 1714-1715, at which time they accepted the Croatian proposal regarding the non-interference of the Hungarian parliament in matters of internal legislation of the Kingdom of Croatia (Law No. CXX of 1715), and after having accepted almost all of the Austrian hereditary lands, the pragmatic sanction, together with the Hungarians, suddenly and without discussion, on June 30, 1722, was given in Laws I, II, and III of 1723 the character not of an expression of sovereign will—hence its name, pragmatic sanction—but rather as the new order, established in the exercise of the right of election of the estates (Law No. I).

Law No. II stipulates the order of succession in the female line of the House of Habsburg for "the Kingdom of Hungary and its associated lands," that is, also for Croatia, until the extinction of that line, the successors of Charles III, Joseph I, and Leopold I (usque ad exitum sexos Leopoldini), at which point the right of succession will be debated again. Furthermore, it was established that in all future cases, the successor, male or female, must be crowned King of Hungary and the associated lands and kingdoms, which are to be considered inseparable, while also recognizing the indissolubility of Charles's Austrian lands.

In Law III, the Emperor and King confirmed the privileges and liberties of the Hungarian estates and of the associated lands and kingdoms. Emphasizing the unity of the territories of the Crown of Saint Stephen, the Hungarians wished to stress that they considered the union with Croatia not as a personal union but as a real one.[166] By the sanction of Laws I and II/1722-23, that is, the Hungarian Pragmatic Sanction, Charles III established the core of the future dualistic organization of the monarchy, an act that would be formally manifested in the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867: With Law III/1740 and with the intervention of the Crown, the Croatian Sabor accepted the Hungarian Pragmatic Sanction, and the Transylvanian Sabor did so in 1744.[167]

From the Croatian decision of 1712 it is clear that it was their legal-state position that the Pacta Conventa of 1102 was equivalent to an agreement with the king and not with the kingdom; that the Croatian kingdom as a free factor of legislation had renounced in 1527 its union with Hungary and that in the exercise of its full independence it proclaimed Ferdinand of the Habsburgs as king. In accordance with this viewpoint, the Croats, completely disregarding the Hungarians, declared in 1712 that they would accept Charles's female descendant as sovereign, thus considering his "pragmatic sanction" as a legal-state act independent of Hungary.[168]

Charles III began introducing reforms that would be continued by his successors. For example, in 1722 he created the Royal Lieutenant Council (Consilium Regium Locumenentiale) in Hungary as the supreme administrative body. This Council immediately attempted to extend its power over Croatia, although without success, because the Croatian Sabor vehemently opposed it in 1725, declaring that it would never allow the Council's interference in the country's affairs.[169]

Charles's daughter, Maria Theresa (1740-1780), continued the policy of centralization and gradual Germanization of both the Hungarian and Croatian nobility. She founded the Order of Saint Stephen was proclaimed "Apostolic King" (1758) with the prior consent of Pope Clement XIII, which gave him the right to appoint the highest-ranking ecclesiastical dignitaries. He appointed his son Joseph, crowned King of Germany in 1765, as co-ruler. In 1767, he organized the Royal Council (Consilium Regium) against the will of the Croatians, modeled after the Hungarian Lieutenant Council, in order to exercise power in political, economic, and military affairs, which until then had been the responsibility of the Croatian Ban and Sabor.

This Council became the first local government of Croatia, diminishing the power of the Ban and Sabor, because Maria Theresa, without convening the Hungarian parliament or the Croatian Sabor, governed by decrees and patents, which she sent to the županias (comitatus) for execution, effectively using the Royal Council in Croatia and the The Lieutenant Council in Hungary acted as intermediary bodies. Meanwhile, the Hungarians attempted to subject the Royal Council of Croatia to the Lieutenant Council of Hungary, which they achieved in 1789 when Maria Theresa dissolved the former, transferring its powers to the latter. By this act, Croatia, for the first time in its history, was subjected to Hungary and its rule.

This sinister decision later manifested itself in the question of the port of Rijeka (Fiume), which was the subject of discussions during the negotiations surrounding the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise. The Compromise did not reach a solution, but the court and the Hungarians found it unconstitutional, provoking great discontent among the Croats.

In a handwritten note dated August 9, 1776, addressed to the authorities of Rijeka and the Croatian government, Maria Theresa communicated her decision to incorporate that city, along with its port, into the Kingdom of Croatia (inmediate regno Croatiae incorporentur), but on the condition that it operate as a free port in the interest of maritime trade. At the queen's recommendation, the authorities of Rijeka and the Croatian government drafted a proposal according to which "Rijeka and its district should be considered a separate body united to the Holy Crown" (separatum sacrae regni Hungariae coronae adnexum corpus). Indeed, after incorporating the towns of Bakar, Bakarac, and Kraljevica into Croatia and forming the Zupania of Severin with its capital in Mrkopolje,

Maria Theresa issued a Diploma on April 23, 1779, granting it autonomy in accordance with the aforementioned proposal. According to this provision, Rijeka, which had been an integral part of the Croatian state in the 10th century and had been a possession of the Habsburg family since 1467, was to be considered a special part of the common Hungarian-Croatian crown, without being excluded from the territory of the Kingdom of Croatia. However, when Maria Theresa dissolved the Croatian government on July 30, 1779, Rijeka was placed under the Royal Lieutenant Council of Hungary. On the basis of this decision, the Hungarians later acted (or pretended to act) as if the queen had directly incorporated Rijeka into the Kingdom of Hungary.[170]

The reforms of Joseph II (1780–1790), the first Hungarian-Croatian king of the House of Habsburg-Lothringen, who was never crowned as such, affected both Hungary and Croatia. Both were to be united and amalgamated with the other Habsburg lands into a special German state. To this end, he abolished the Zupanias and the two kingdoms—Croatia and Hungary—dividing them into 10 districts (circles). His decision to abolish Severin's Zupania had a particularly unpleasant impact, creating a special region called "the Hungarian Littoral" (littorale Hungaricum), comprised mostly of the territories of the Rijeka, Bakar, and Vinodol districts.

This region was governed by a governor with a special agency for commercial and health matters, and a municipal council for administrative affairs. Both authorities were directly subordinate to the Hungarian government, while judicial matters were reserved for the higher courts of Croatia. After a decade of absolutism and the military defeat against the Turks, Joseph II, to avoid rebellion, revoked all his reforms (except for the Patent on religious freedom and tolerance, as well as the emancipation of feudal serfs), restoring Croatia and Hungary to their old constitutions. He removed the Crown of St. Stephen from the museum and returned it to Budapest, promising to convene the coronation parliament; however, this could not be fulfilled because he died on February 20, 1790.

When his younger brother, Leopold II (1790-1792), succeeded him, Hungarian and Croatian national consciousness was already awakened. No one wanted to speak German anymore, preferring Hungarian or Croatian. But the Turks and Venice still held sway over large portions of Croatia. Such was the reason for the Croatian Sabor's proposal on May 14, 1790, to organize a Hungarian-Croatian government until a sufficient number of Croatian territories were liberated, but without infringing upon the rights of the Kingdom of Croatia. Thus, the Croats, in their own Sabor, sanctioned Maria Theresa's unconstitutional act of 1779.

In accordance with their already awakened national consciousness, the Hungarians then formulated their new policy in parliament: one state, one people, and one language. They thus accepted Joseph II's suggestion, replacing the unitary state of Austria with that of Hungary and the German language with Hungarian. In a session of this parliament in Budapest, the Croatian ban, Stephen Erdödy, opposed the measure, declaring that such a step would provoke a conflict between the two kingdoms and that one kingdom cannot impose its laws on the other (Regnum regno non proescribit leges)[171].

Discontent in Croatia against Hungary over the language issue grew to such an extent that the convocation of the Zagreb Zupania was expected, where the separation of the two countries would be proclaimed, forming a separate Croatian government.[172] At the coronation parliament in Požun in 1790/91, the king assumed the obligation to consider Hungary and Croatia as an independent state, enacting 74 laws, among which was Law XIV, according to which supreme power in Hungary was concentrated in the Royal Lieutenant Council; Law LVII, according to which the Croatian Zupanias (of Zagreb, Krizevci, and Varazdin) were placed under the power of the Hungarian Royal Council; and Law LIX, which stipulated that the discussion of Croatian military contributions would take place only in the joint parliament, but separately for Hungarian contributions on the same matter.

In the opinion of the Hungarians, this eliminated the equality between Hungary and Croatia, considering the latter an integral part of the former. This situation would remain until 1848. Just as the Croats, fighting for the integration of their kingdom since the creation of the Military March under the first Habsburg kings, demanded its reincorporation into the authority of the Ban and the Sabor, since the Peace of Campo Formio (October 18, 1797), concluded between Napoleon and Francis I (1799-1835), which forever sealed the fate of Venice by handing Dalmatia over to the power of King Francis I, the Croats of Dalmatia and the Banat (Croatia proper under the rule of the Ban) demanded the union of Dalmatia with Croatia. The king opposed the movement for this union until the loss of Dalmatia with the peace signed in Požun on December 2, 1805, and again later, when, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, he formed the Kingdom of Illyria with part of Napoleon's Illyrian provinces, declaring himself "King of Illyria." The problem of uniting Dalmatia with Croatia remained unresolved until the dissolution of the monarchy in 1918, despite the Hungarians' efforts to achieve this union.

As a consequence of the French Revolution and the growing influence of France over Germany, events of paramount importance unfolded. On August 10, 1804, Francis I adopted the Austrian system of imperial succession, forming a new state: "the Austrian Empire," which from then on sought to impose centralism with greater zeal. But despite the common Hungarian-Croatian defense against such an attempt, especially after Francis I's abdication of the title of Holy Roman Emperor on August 16, 1806—an act that led to the formal dissolution of the First German Reich—the Hungarians insistently demanded the introduction of their language throughout the territories of the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen. The Croats fought against Hungarian claims in the parliament of Požun in 1805, Budapest in 1807, and again in Požun in 1825–27 and 1830.

This struggle continued until 1830, when they accepted the compulsory teaching of Hungarian in their schools; however, Latin remained the official language. The Croats desperately defended it, knowing that only in this way could they participate in parliamentary debates and collaborate on common affairs, upon which, if not the fate of the nation, at least the system of administration depended. The proposal for the recognition of the Croatian language in the administration could not succeed because, given the international situation at the time, the repeal of Law XVII/1791, which subordinated the Croatian administration to the Hungarian one, was unthinkable. Therefore, the Croats fought to maintain Latin. They wanted to preserve their age-old identity, now endangered.[173] The struggle between the Croats and the Hungarians, which would culminate in 1848, began in the sessions of this parliament.

Conversely, Hungary's vehement insistence on introducing Hungarian as the official language produced the opposite result: in Croatia, increasingly unanimous calls arose for Croatian to be introduced as the official language. Popular support was sought, and a national renaissance began in the cultural and literary sphere under the name of the "Illyrian Movement," later becoming a political movement.

On the eve of the convocation of parliament in Požun in 1832, the Croatian Sabor instructed its delegates to request the king to reinstate Ban's former dignity and authority, reinstate the Military March of Rijeka, which since 1808 had been sending its deputies to the Hungarian parliament and the Croatian Sabor, and reintegrate Dalmatia. It was said: "If the futility of discussions with the Hungarians becomes evident to them, they should leave parliament and the Croats will take matters into their own hands. This would mean a complete break with Hungary and war" [174]. In this parliamentary session, Croatian was spoken for the first time, when General George Rukavina thanked the assembly in his language for his election as deputy captain of the kingdom.

The session of this parliament in Požun from 1832-1836 coincides with the period of the developing nationalist idea, which, within Hungarian-Croatian relations, signifies the beginning of the end of their state community. During these sessions, Francis I was succeeded by Ferdinand V (1835-1848), who governed through a "state conference" headed by the Duke of Metternich.

Hungarian nationalism and progressive liberal ideas already posed a threat to the existence of the Habsburg state. For this reason, the king now favored Croatian petitions against the Hungarian parliament's decisions regarding the introduction of the Hungarian language in Croatian schools, denying them the necessary sanction on April 28, 1836. From this 1836 parliament emerged the Croats and Hungarians as open enemies. After seven centuries of shared statehood, a chasm opened between them that would only deepen each day. In 1840, the Croatian Sabor decided to establish chairs of the Croatian language at the Academy of Law and in secondary schools.

Until 1840, the Croats fought against the Hungarian language and the Hungarian idea of a unitary state through various groups formed around specific, occasional issues. Until that time, there were no political parties in Croatia. However, the failure of the proposed legislation to introduce Hungarian as an official language in schools and administration, as well as the rise of the "Illyrian movement," which aimed to unite all Croatian lands (provinces) culturally and politically under a single banner, prompted Hungarians to organize their supporters into a genuine political party to counter "Illyrianism."

Thus, in 1841, the "Croatian-Hungarian" party (Horvatsko-Ugarska stranka) was formed. Its program was to unify Croats and Hungarians as closely as possible in a politically unified state, ensuring that Croats would accept Hungarian not only as the language of instruction in schools but also as an official language, and that each province would henceforth send two representatives directly to the Hungarian parliament, as was the practice of the other Hungarian provinces and those of Slavonia. In terms of its political and legal content, this would amount to the elimination of Croatian municipal rights, the abolition of the Croatian Sabr, and the transformation of Croatia into an integral part of Hungary. That party, called "Magyarons" by the people, would sign the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise in 1868, but based on its original program.

Against the "Magyarons," the "Illyrian" party was organized, called "the Croatian National Party" since 1843. Its program insisted that "the legal and state relations between Croatia and Hungary should be modified to form a unity of the Croatian provinces—Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, the Military March, and Rijeka—independent of Hungary, with the Ban as its head, and with Croatian as the official language" [175].

At the Croatian Sabor of April 22, 1843, held on the eve of the Parliament of Poiun (common in Hungary), the Croatian delegates were instructed to use their language and not Hungarian, which was, at that time, the official language of the Hungarian parliament. At this same Croatian Sabor, on May 2, 1843, Deputy Ivan Kukuljevic delivered his first speech in Croatian, advocating for its use as a diplomatic language—that is, as the language that should be used in parliament, schools, and public education, replacing Latin.

The king, "against the decision of the Parliament of Poiun that the Hungarian language should henceforth be the official language in administration and schools throughout Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and the Littoral," issued a resolution (October 12, 1843) allowing Croatian deputies to use either Latin or Hungarian, as they saw fit. However, since the Hungarians prevented the Croats from speaking Latin and demanded the use of Hungarian, he issued a new resolution (January 23, 1844) stipulating that Croatian deputies should use Hungarian in parliament from 1850 onward. The monarch, however, refused to sanction the introduction of Hungarian into public offices and schools.[176]

In 1845, the problem of electoral order arose in Croatia, specifically regarding the right to participate in the Sabor and župania assemblies, a right enjoyed only by the kingdom's nobility. Following the king's instructions, Ban Haller did not convene the Croatian Sabor to accept the conclusions of the Požun Parliament until the Zagreb župania was restored, that is, until its body of dignitaries and officials was elected. With the help of the rural nobility of Turopolje, who until then had not participated in either the Sabor or the župania assemblies, the "Magyarons" won (1,289 to 974), violating an essential right of the Croatian Sabor by proclaiming the decisions of the Požun Parliament in the Župania assembly, first in Latin and then in Hungarian.

But this was not the first victory for the Magyarons. Unfortunately, whether through misunderstanding or intentionally, this victory turned into a massacre on July 29, 1845, when the 13th Battalion of the Wimpfen Regiment, composed almost entirely of Italian soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Sartori, opened fire on the "Illyrians" and a group of ordinary citizens, resulting in 13 deaths and numerous injuries. "These victims pierced the soul of the Croats, for this was their first encounter with the Hungarians" [177]. At the Sabor of Zagreb, convened on September 23, 1845, without the nobles of Turopolje—that is, without the Magyareans—it was decided to petition the king for the restoration of Croatia's independent government, as it had been in the time of Maria Theresa, and the elevation of the Diocese of Zagreb to the dignity of an independent archbishopric of Hungary.

At that time, Lajos Kossuth, a radical politician with democratic convictions, led Hungarian political life. He advocated for the independence of a popular-democratic country, not one controlled by the nobility. He also called for a government accountable to the parliament of national deputies. Reorganized in this way, Hungary should maintain a personal union with Austria. According to his political ideas, Hungary was conceived as a unitary state stretching from the Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea, with a single political people: the Hungarian people.

Because of this situation in Hungary and Croatia, in October 1847, the Sabor (the Croatian Parliament) decided to elect deputies to the parliament in Požun, aiming for the complete liberation of Croatia from Hungarian rule, but without severing relations with the crown. At the suggestion of a Sabor committee, Croatian was elevated to the status of an official language, abolishing the use of Latin. On the same occasion, it was decided, reaffirming the integrity of the lands and the demand for independent government, to accept the use of the Hungarian language in the common parliament as a sign of friendship with Hungarians. This Sabor, by its very nature, was the last of the nobility estates in Croatia, which was a feudal state like Hungary itself.

The fact that King Ferdinand V inaugurated the Požun Parliament in the Hungarian language, something that had not happened for centuries, strengthened the hopes and aspirations of the Hungarians under Kossuth's leadership. Despite Croatian protests, this parliament passed several bills in favor of Hungarian unity, that is, "of the Hungarian language and nationality." According to these bills, all public offices and employees of the "Hungarian Littoral" were to use Hungarian with Hungarian authorities, while in local affairs they could also use Italian; the Slavonian Županias could use Latin for only six years, after which they would speak only Hungarian. All Hungarian coins were to bear the Hungarian inscription with the Hungarian emblem. The Hungarian flag was to be flown on all public buildings and ships.

The Croatian authorities, in their communications with the Hungarians, would use only Hungarian, and Latin in local matters; in all Croatian schools, even primary schools, the study of Hungarian would be compulsory. In a discussion on citizenship rights, Kossuth declared "that there was no Croatian name or people" [178]. Thus, faced with the Croatians' willingness to speak Hungarian in the joint parliament, the Hungarians responded by attempting to completely deny Croatian nationality. Therefore, they had no other option but to ask the king to refuse to sanction these bills.

During the sessions of this parliament, the February Revolution broke out in Paris, spreading almost throughout Europe, its severity being felt particularly acutely in Austria. On March 3, 1848, under Kossuth's leadership, the Hungarians demanded a responsible government, a national army, and the extension of the right of representation to the common people. When the revolution broke out in Vienna on March 13 of that same year, the king promised the Austrian people the restoration of the Constitution and dismissed Metternich.

On March 16, 1848, he promised the Hungarian delegation a responsible government, which was formed on April 7, 1848. Ludovico Batthyany was appointed Prime Minister, Kossuth Minister of Finance, and Francis Deak Minister of Justice. On April 11, 1848, at the close of the sessions, the king sanctioned all the laws passed there except for the bill "on the Hungarian language and nationality." Law V stipulated that Croatia would henceforth send 18 elected deputies to the joint parliament instead of its two delegates, while Rijeka and Slavonia would send their representatives directly to the Hungarian parliament. Under the new organization of the Hungarian government, according to which the king could no longer refuse to sanction laws passed by the Hungarian parliament, the Croats were left at the mercy of that parliament.[179]

The 31 laws passed during this session, the last of a noble-feudal character drafted according to the Belgian model, constitute the Hungarian Constitution of April 11, 1848. In this way, the Hungarian revolution was legalized, and the Habsburg Empire was divided in two. Hungary, until then a Habsburg province—albeit a privileged one—became a sui generis state.[180] To defend this Constitution, the Hungarians launched a revolution. It (the Constitution) would later form the basis of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, along with the Pragmatic Sanction of 1722/23.

At the same time, the revolutionary movement also spread to Croatia, albeit with a notable difference: the Croats, in addition to reforms in keeping with the spirit of the times, also demanded complete liberation from Hungarian rule. Croatia at that time did not have its ban, and the ban's lieutenant, the Bishop of Zagreb, Haulik, was not in Zagreb. The laws passed in the Požun parliament were not in force in Croatia because they had not been ratified by the Sabor, which, in turn, could not convene due to a lack of authority to do so.

The Magyarans emigrated to Hungary. Unaware that the king had already appointed Joseph Jelačić, Colonel-Baron, as Ban of Croatia on March 23, 1848, he was elected by the Grand People's Assembly on March 25. This assembly sent a special delegation to the king in Vienna requesting Jelačić's appointment, the reunification of all Croatian lands, a government responsible and independent of Hungary, a permanent Croatian Sabor as its representative parliament, and the abolition of the last vestiges of serfdom. Although the king granted the Hungarian demands in accordance with his promises of March 15, 1848, he did not accept the Croatian demands because the requirement of separation from Hungary was contrary to the fundamental laws of the community, sworn to by the emperor. One of these laws refers to "the perpetual community of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen" [181].

Ban Jelačić, appointed vice-marshal and commander-in-chief in Croatia and the Military March, issued an order on April 19, 1848, to all Croatian authorities, stating that they were to obey no one until the Sabor was convened, and were to obey only him. In response to this declaration, Croatia severed its centuries-old relations with Hungary.[182] On June 5, the Sabor was convened and solemnly invested Ban Jelačić, but refused to promulgate the laws of the Požun parliament, abolished, on its own initiative, the remnants of serfdom, and introduced the general obligation to pay taxes. Regarding relations with Austria and Hungary, the Sabor advocated a federalist organization with independent national governments and the central parliament and government in Vienna. He then reiterated his request for the restoration of the ban's powers and jurisdiction from the Drava River to the Adriatic Sea, and for the unification of all Croatian lands.

These petitions were presented to the king by the Croatian delegation in Innsbruck, where the Court had taken refuge due to the revolution in Vienna. However, the monarch did not accept the Sabor's decisions, as it could not convene without royal authorization, and he especially rejected the separation of Hungary. Instead, the Court sought to resolve the Hungarian-Croatian conflict. Upon returning from Innsbruck, the delegation and the ban learned that, by an Imperial Manifesto of June 10, 1848—two days before their audience with the king—Jelačić had been deposed as ban. However, the Sabor ignored this Manifesto and, on June 29, 1848, granted the ban unlimited powers for the defense of the homeland. The Hungarians attempted to incite rebellion in Slavonia, but the ban, upon passing through with the army, was received with delirious enthusiasm by the people.

Depending on the situation, the Court's policy leaned sometimes toward the Croats and sometimes toward the Hungarians, seeking to invalidate their Constitution of April 11, 1848. With the victory of the imperial army in Vicenza and Custozza, the Court regained greater freedom of action regarding the revolutionary cities of Vienna and Budapest.

And thus the idea of a counter-revolution, in which the centers of rebellion would be individually eliminated, began to take shape. Duke Windischgratz forcibly dissolved the Slavic Congress in Prague[183]; the Court avoided open conflict with the Hungarians; the Croats lived in fear that the Court might reach a compromise with the Hungarians while simultaneously pursuing Hungarian-Croatian reconciliation. On the other hand, both sides took note of the Court's suggestions to remain intransigent.

Thus, for example, the negotiations in Vienna between Jelačić and the Hungarian president Batthyany ended with the latter's dramatic words: "Goodbye, Baron! We shall meet again on the Drava River!" To the former's reply: "I will look for you sooner on the banks of the Danube River!"[184]. When the mobilization of the Croatian army was underway during August, Batthyany and Deak offered every concession, on the condition that the ban, henceforth, would only accept orders from the Hungarian government. If that were not possible, they would be prepared to accept the separation of Croatia and Slavonia, wishing to address the Serbian problem (Serbian Vojvodina from May 19, 1848 – November 19, 1849) separately from the Croatian one. Due to Serbian freedoms, these negotiations failed[185].

The duplicity of the Court's policies was particularly evident when Ban Jelačić obtained arms and money from Italy through Marshal Radetzky. On September 19, 1848, the ban militarily occupied Rijeka and incorporated it into Croatia, and on the 7th of the same month, he declared war on the Hungarian government, following the formal revocation on June 10 of Jelačić's appointment as Croatian ban. Flying the Croatian flag, on September 7, 1848, the Croatian army marched towards the Drava River, crossing it on the 10th of that month, liberating Medjumurje, and advancing from there under the imperial banner.[186] During a state community of more than seven centuries with the Hungarians, the Croats attempted for the third time, after 1527 and 1712, to secure Vienna's support against them, only to be betrayed once again by Vienna.

c) The rupture of relations with Hungary in 1848 and the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise of 1868.

Due to Ban Jelačić's military invasion of Hungary, Batthyany's cabinet resigned, and the Hungarian parliament entrusted the conduct of state affairs to Lajoš Kossuth. Thus began the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849, led by Kossuth with the national army that had been organized since July 1848. Other nationalities, primarily the Croats, opposed Kossuth's objective—separating Hungary from Austria and creating a large Hungarian empire—and in September 1848 resorted to self-defense.[187]

After the liberation of revolutionary Vienna, aided by the Hungarians, who were defeated at Schechat on October 30 by Jelačić, Jelačić and Windischgratz were preparing to subjugate Hungary completely. At that time, the imperial throne changed. Ferdinand V, incapacitated, was succeeded by Franz Joseph I (1848-1916) according to the law of succession, following the abdication of his father, Ferdinand's brother, Franz Karl. On the same day, December 2, 1848, Franz Joseph I declared his intention to govern "on the basis of equality for all nationalities of the Monarchy and for all citizens before the law, and the participation of national deputies in legislation." At the same time, he appointed Ban Jelačić governor of Rijeka and Dalmatia, and Duke Francis Kulmer minister in Count Schwarzenberg's cabinet as mediator between the Court and the Croatian government.

When the Hungarian parliament, which had been deliberating in Budapest since July 5, declared on December 9, 1848, that it did not recognize the change on the throne, Jelačić and Windischgrätz entered Budapest on January 5, 1849, forcing the Hungarian parliament and Kossuth to relocate to Debreszen. After the victories of the imperial army, and despite Polish aid under Generals Dembinski and Bem, Vienna believed the Hungarian rebellion was crushed, and the king granted a constitution to the Austrian Empire on March 4, 1849.

This Constitution was, in its essential features, essentially the "Kremsier Constitution" (named after the town of Kremsier, Kromeris, in Moravia, where the Viennese parliament had taken refuge on October 22, 1848, following the revolution in Vienna). It was originally intended only for the Austrian territories excluding Dalmatia and was now extended to Hungary and Croatia. This Magna Carta sought to resolve the question of nationalities within the Monarchy, based on the premise that the Monarchy was composed of independent Crown Lands (Kronländer).

Vienna was to be the seat of the central government; legislative power would be exercised by the emperor with the central parliament (Reichsrat) in matters of state, and in local matters, by the emperor with the local parliaments (Landtag). Thus, the Hungarian Constitution of April 11, 1848, was repealed. Regarding Croatia and Slavonia, the new Constitution stated: "In the kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia, with the corresponding Moral and the city of Rijeka and its district, their special organizations will remain in force with complete independence from Hungary. The deputies of Dalmatia will discuss with the Sabor of Croatia and Slavonia, through the administrative power of the state, the conditions of the union of Dalmatia with the kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, and will then present the result to the emperor for his sanction."[188]

Meanwhile, in Croatia, awaiting approval of its June 1848 decisions, the Sabor refused to proclaim the new Constitution, despite the recommendations of Ban Jelačić, on the grounds that it had been drafted without his participation. This constituted an affront to his political power and the long-standing authority of the Ban as prorex, rights for which the Croats had waged a centuries-long struggle.

The new Constitution further inflamed the Hungarians to such an extent that on April 15, 1849, their parliament proclaimed the removal of the Habsburg family from the Hungarian throne and simultaneously elected Kossuth as President-Governor of Hungary. Thus, the Hungarian Revolution entered its second political and military phase. After significant successes and the recapture of Budapest, it was definitively crushed with the help of the army of Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, who had offered his assistance for fear that the revolution would spread to Poland. The Hungarian Revolution ended with the surrender of the Hungarian army at Vilagos on August 13, 1849.

With the revolution suppressed, the Croatian Council of the Ban proclaimed the Constitution of March 4, 1849, as the fundamental law, and on December 13, 1849, declared Medjimurje "provisionally united with Croatia until a decision could be made on the matter through state legislation." On April 7, 1849, Emperor Franz Joseph I ratified the decisions of the Croatian Sabor of June 1848, with the necessary modifications in accordance with the new Constitution of 1849. Hungary was governed by a military administration until December 31, 1851.

That Constitution might have brought order to such a multinational empire had it not been repealed before its entry into force by the "Patent of Saint Sylvester" of December 31, 1851.[189] This "Patent" ushered in the third absolutism in the last hundred years—known as "Bach absolutism"—by the eponymous Minister of the Interior.[190] From 1854 onward, German was imposed as the official language throughout the empire, including in Croatia, while political life was virtually paralyzed. The only advantage of this absolutism for Croatia was its permanent liberation from Hungarian sovereignty in administration, justice, and public education, as well as, to some extent, in ecclesiastical matters, since the bishopric of Zagreb was elevated to the dignity of an archbishopric in 1852.

Financial difficulties and foreign defeats, especially the loss of Lombardy after the defeats at Magento and Solferino, confirmed by the peace with Napoleon III on July 11, 1859, in Villafranca, led to the fall of absolutism and forced Franz Joseph I to gradually shift towards constitutional life. On July 15, 1859, he addressed a proclamation to the people of the Monarchy, promising "the corresponding majority in legislation and administration" without using the word "Constitution."

Of all the constitutional institutions not abolished by the Patent of Saint Sylvester, only the Reichsrat—a body of councilors appointed by the emperor—remained. It was established on March 5, 1860, and comprised 38 prominent figures from all the territories of the Empire. Representatives from Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, one from each, were also summoned to this reinforced Council of State (verstarkter Reichsrat), and within its ranks, a federalist organization of the Empire with a central parliament was approved.[191]

During the struggle between the centralist and federalist conceptions within the aforementioned Council of State, the Slavonian representative, Bishop Joseph George Strossmayer, demanded the immediate reinstatement of the Croatian language in all schools and public offices, while also expressing his hope for the imminent unification of Dalmatia with Croatia. This request was opposed by the representative of Dalmatia, Count Borelli, because, in his opinion, the opportune moment had not yet arrived.

Strossmayer's speech, delivered on that occasion, is considered the foundation of the nationalist party in Dalmatia, while Borelli's is considered the foundation of "autonomism," a pro-Italian party that Vienna would use to prevent the reunification of Dalmatia with Croatia. Ban Baron Joseph Sokčević, who succeeded Jelačié on May 20, 1859, upon the latter's death, introduced the Croatian language in all public offices with the emperor's authorization, expelling from Croatia all foreigners who had arrived during the absolutist period.

Responding to the decisions of the Reinforced Council of Vienna, the emperor issued a Manifesto on October 20, 1861, known as the "October Diploma," in which, emphasizing the indissolubility of the parts of the empire, he restored the Constitution to Hungary and Croatia, promising it also to the other territories (Länder).

This document clearly distinguishes between matters common to all parts of the empire and matters pertaining to local parliaments. It requests in writing that Ban Šokčević submit a proposal regarding the composition of the Croatian Sabor and how Hungarian-Croatian relations should be governed. With a similar act, it restores the Hungarian chancellery at the Court. On November 26, 1860, Ban Šokčević convened a meeting of Croatia's leading politicians to petition the king for the establishment of a Croatian chancellery at the Royal Court and the reunification of all Croatian territories. The emperor replied on December 5, 1860, approving the introduction of Croatian as an official language, the establishment of a provisional Croatian dicastery at the Court (a dicastery is a type of tribunal), and, with regard to Dalmatia, approving the invitation of its deputies to the ban conference, that is, to the central body of Croatia. However, the intrigues of Austrian officials prevented their dispatch.

Although not all expectations were met, the October Diploma aroused great hopes. But the federalist tendencies of the new Constitution displeased centralist and nationalist German circles, who saw in them a return to the dualism that had already begun to manifest itself in 1848. The Hungarians, for their part, did not accept the Diploma because the federalist-centralist tendency seemed clear to them, and they tried to restore the status quo prior to 1848. They succeeded in reintegrating Croatian Medjimurje and Rijeka; they began to support the "autonomists," reopening the divide between Croatia and Hungary, a divide that had been smoothed and almost forgotten due to their shared suffering during absolutism.

The development of these relations ran parallel to the resolution of the German problem within the German League (Deutscher Bund), with Austria at the forefront, though Prussia vied for priority. At the National Assembly, meeting in Frankfurt in 1848, a solution to this problem was found: the Austrian Empire would either cede its territories to the League of German States, dissolving itself into a single nation-state, or renounce its membership in the community with the other German states. The issue was only resolved after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Austria was excluded from the German League, which dissolved and recognized Prussia as its leader. All of this had a decisive effect on the development of the Austrian Empire's constitutional life, whose status as a great power would depend on the Austro-Hungarian relationship.

The next step in this development was the February Patent of 1861, which regulated and implemented the provisions of the October Diploma. This document stipulated a central government and parliament in Vienna. The central parliament would consist of an upper and lower house and would include a certain number of delegates sent by the local parliaments.

For this liberal constitution to become law, it required approval by both houses of parliament and sanction by the emperor. The local parliaments of Hungary, Croatia, and Dalmatia were convened to elect their respective delegates to the central parliament. However, the Hungarian parliament and the Croatian Sabor were soon dissolved by the emperor for refusing to send their delegates to the central parliament in Vienna.

The Croatian Sabor was dissolved on November 8, 1861. On the same day, Law XVII/1861, concerning Hungarian-Croatian relations, was enacted. This law, proposed by Bishop Strossmayer's "national party," would become the foundation of Croatian politics in the following decades.

Regarding relations with Hungary, the law establishes what constitutes the real and virtual jurisdiction of the kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, declaring that, due to the events of 1848, the relationship between Croatia and Hungary ceased de jure, and only the person of the common king united them, who must be crowned with the same crown and in the same act as King of Croatia (Art. 1). Article 2 states that Croatia may establish a "closer union" with Hungary if the latter recognizes its national independence and the real and virtual jurisdiction of its territory; legal-state relations will again be determined by an agreement on the community (Art. 3); legislation in matters of political administration, public education, worship, and justice does not concern this "closer" community, being the exclusive competence of the Croatian government (Art. 4).

As soon as the Hungarians accepted these principles, the delegations, equal in number, would meet to draft a convention on the union (Art. 5), with the obligation to communicate their decision to the Hungarian parliament (Art. 6). This proposal of the "National Party" was also approved by the "Magyarones" (unionists), but without any preconditions for the Hungarian side.

While the national dilemma of whether to choose Vienna or Budapest was being resolved, two new political parties were formed: the "Independent" Party, with an Austrian orientation, which hoped to more easily achieve the union of Dalmatia with Croatia with Vienna's help, and the "Party of Law," led by Dr. Antonio Starčević, which advocated the integrity and totality of Croatian territories, with the independence to be achieved in negotiations with the emperor, admitting only certain common issues.[192]

In the session of the Croatian Sabor, Serbs appear for the first time as a political factor because, at its insistence, elections were also held in the Military March and in Srijem (Sirmium), areas partly populated by Serbs during the Turkish incursions, especially in 1690 and 1737 [193]. These Serb immigrants would henceforth become the political instrument of Austria in Dalmatia and of Hungary in Croatia to obstruct the Croatian struggle for the reintegration of the Croatian provinces and for their independence.

The Dalmatian Sabor, elected according to the Law of February 16, 1861, was composed of 43 deputies, of whom 31 were pro-Italian, and 12 were Croats and Serbs [194]. This Sabor thwarted the sending of deputies to Zagreb and, on the contrary, sent its 5 delegates to the central parliament in Vienna (Reichsrat).

During the period of 1861-1866, Bismarck, Prime Minister of Prussia, provided support to the Hungarians to weaken Austria's position. Therefore, Vienna sought to isolate the Hungarians and draw the Croats into the Reichsrat. The exponent of this policy of the Independent Party was Jan Mažuranić, the first Croatian Chancellor after the formation of the first local Croatian government on March 14, 1861, under the name of the Royal Lieutenant Council, with Ban as its president, and after the Croatian Dicastery was transformed into the Chancellery at the Court on November 20, 1861.

By organizing the "Table of Eight"—the supreme court in Croatia—on June 30, 1862, the last remaining relations with Hungary were severed. The aim of this pro-Austrophile policy of the Independent Party was to find a compromise with Austria rather than with Hungary. For this policy, positive realities were valued more than the legal, political, and constitutional theories of the other Croatian parties.[195] Despite support from Vienna, the elections of July 17, 1865, for the Sabor (Croatian Parliament) gave a majority to the coalition of the National Party and the Unionists, who opposed any eventual compromise with Austria, fearing that Croatia would sink into the German sea and become a satellite of German politics.

The defeat of the centralist policies of Minister Schmerling, the architect of the "February Patent," not only in the Croatian elections but also in Hungary and Bohemia, compelled Emperor Franz Joseph to revoke the February Patent with a Manifesto of September 20, 1865. This Manifesto suspended the activities of the Imperial Council (Reichsrat) and included a further declaration stating his decision to "follow the path of compromise with the legal representatives of the eastern territories of the empire," namely Hungary and Croatia.[196]

The Croatian Sabor, convened on November 12, 1865, to determine its position on matters of common concern to the Monarchy and to send deputies to the Hungarian parliament for the coronation, was unanimous regarding the entirety of the Croatian territories but divided on relations with Hungary and Austria. In response to a note from the majority of the Sabor (the Croatian Parliament), this time composed of the National and Independent parties against the "Unionists" and the Party of Law, requesting that the Sabor resolve joint matters with Austria in accordance with the Kingdom of Hungary, but on a completely equal footing, the Emperor replied with a Rescript on February 27, 1866, to the Sabor, instructing it to elect its regional deputation, which would discuss Hungarian-Croatian reciprocal relations and matters concerning the entire Monarchy with the corresponding Hungarian delegation.

Until this matter was resolved, the union of Dalmatia with Croatia could not even be considered. These two regional deputations, each composed of 12 deputies, met in Budapest on April 16, 1866, without the prior recognition of the integrity and totality of Croatian territories by the Hungarian Parliament, in accordance with Law XVII/1861 of the Croatian Sabor. On June 14, 1866, the delegations left the meeting without achieving their objective, because the Hungarians decided to impose conditions unacceptable to the Croats: the relationship between Hungary and Croatia was not severed de jure in 1848 but only de facto; Hungarian-Croatian negotiations did not concern the common affairs of the Monarchy but only those common with Hungary; Hungary recognized complete Croatian autonomy only in administration, justice, worship, and public education; and neither Rijeka nor Medjimurje belonged to Croatian territory.

The Hungarians had ample reason to be intransigent because time was on their side. As early as June 17, 1866, the Emperor declared war on Prussia, which ended at Sadova on July 3 of the same year, despite Custozza's partial victories in Italy and the naval battle near Vis in the Adriatic on June 20, 1866.[197] With the Peace of Prague on August 23, 1866, with Prussia, and the Treaty of Vienna on October 3, 1866, with Italy, Austria was excluded from the German and Italian Leagues. Thus, the German Question was also resolved.

The Hungarian people, led by Franz Deak, head of the Liberal Party, found a solution to their relations with Austria practically under favorable conditions, taking into account the Austrian situation between Custozza and Sedova (Königsträtz). No sooner had the telegram arrived announcing Custozza's victory than the Hungarian parliament, which had presented its compromise proposal just the day before, was dissolved.

The conditions that, after that victory, seemed to be Hungary's ideal, became, after Königsträtz, a concession to Vienna. The new foreign minister, Friedrich Beust, favored dualism, while federal centralism was championed by Prime Minister Richard Belcredi, who proposed that the unitary monarchy should consist of five states: Bohemia (Bohemia, Moravia, and Slesia), Poland (Galicia and Bukovina), Croatia, and Hungary with Transylvania. The emperor opted for dualism, appointing Beust prime minister on February 7, 1867, with the task of preparing the Compromise with Hungary.

During the emperor's secret negotiations with Deak after the Battle of Kıniggrıtz, the Croatian Sabor and the Hungarian parliament were summoned on November 19, 1866. Knowing Belcredi's plan for the organization of the monarchy, the Croatian Sabor decided to abandon the idea of union with Hungary and accept a compromise with Austria. Meanwhile, Belcredi was forced to resign. Beust signed the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which in reality signified the crown's commitment to Hungary, presenting the Austrian territories and Croatia with a fait accompli.

This compromise bound these territories, but not Croatia, which is why it was not mentioned in the Compromise, except in general terms: "Hungary and the sister kingdoms." According to this Compromise of November 14, 1868, the Habsburg Monarchy, called Austria-Hungary, was a real union of two states, which had in common: 1) joint government; 2) the army and navy; 3) foreign relations; and 4) expenses for these matters. The delegations of 60 members from each side met annually, once in Vienna and once in Budapest, exercising legislative power in matters of common interest.[198]

Regarding territory, Austria retained Dalmatia, while it ceded Transylvania and Croatia to Hungary, with the interested parties having to negotiate their agreements with Hungary.[199] Once the Austro-Hungarian Compromise was reached, the Emperor invited the Croatian Sabor to send its delegates to the coronation ceremony.

The Sabor replied that it could not do so, since relations between Croatia and Hungary were not yet settled.[200] Therefore, on May 25, 1867, the Sabor was dissolved by the Emperor, and the coronation on June 8, 1867, took place without the participation of the Croatians. On June 12, 1867, the Hungarian Parliament promulgated the Austro-Hungarian Compromise with the Basic Law of the State, sanctioned on July 18, 1867, by the King as Law No. XII11867.

Due to this unfavorable turn of events, Ban Sokčević resigned, and Baron Levin Rauch was appointed Lieutenant of the Ban with the task of negotiating the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise in accordance with the principles of the 1868 Regional Assembly. Based on the new electoral system, the Unionists obtained a majority, abandoning their opposition on January 8, 1868. On the 30th of the same month, the Sabor elected the 12-member Regional Assembly, all Unionists, which, together with a similar Hungarian delegation, prepared and drafted the text of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise.

Regarding Rijeka, the delegations were unable to find a solution acceptable to both parties, a fact recorded in Article 1. 66. However, while the Hungarian delegation accepted the Compromise proposal by a majority vote—three of its delegates voted against it—proposing financial independence for Croatia in accordance with Deak's proposal, and that the king would appoint the ban upon the proposal of the Croatian Sabor and not upon the proposal and with the endorsement of the Hungarian prime minister.

Nevertheless, the Sabor accepted this Compromise on September 26, 1868, without any noteworthy discussion, and by a majority vote, sending it to the king on September 24, 1868, for his sanction and requesting at the same time the annexation of Rijeka to Croatia as an integral part thereof, in accordance with its undisputed right. The king immediately signed the text of this Compromise. On August 28, 1868, the Hungarian parliament also unanimously accepted the Compromise, adding to Article 66, concerning the territory of Croatia, that Rijeka, with its port and district, It belonged directly to Hungary and should be incorporated immediately.

Before approving the Hungarian text of the Compromise, and with the intention of harmonizing both texts, the king published a Rescript on November 8, 1868, inviting both parliaments to recognize that "the city of Rijeka constituted a separate entity belonging to the Hungarian crown." The Hungarian text of the Compromise was changed accordingly by the Court Chancellery and had to be redrafted, while a piece of paper with the new content was pasted over the already sanctioned Croatian text. On November 17, 1868, the Croatian Sabor considered the king's Rescript and accepted the new text, which became another source of discord and disputes in Hungarian-Croatian relations until 1918.

On the same day—November 17, 1868—the monarch gave his royal approval to the original Hungarian version of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise. thus becoming the fundamental law of the kingdoms of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia; for Croatia, as Law I/1868 and for Hungary, as Law XXX/1868 [201].

During the emperor's secret negotiations with Deak after the Battle of Kıniggrıtz, the Croatian Sabor and the Hungarian parliament were summoned on November 19, 1866. Knowing Belcredi's plan for the organization of the monarchy, the Croatian Sabor decided to abandon the idea of union with Hungary and accept a compromise with Austria. Meanwhile, Belcredi was forced to resign. Beust signed the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which in reality signified the crown's commitment to Hungary, presenting the Austrian territories and Croatia with a fait accompli.

This compromise bound these territories, but not Croatia, which is why it was not mentioned in the Compromise, except in general terms: "Hungary and the sister kingdoms." According to this Compromise of November 14, 1868, the Habsburg Monarchy, called Austria-Hungary, was a real union of two states, which had in common: 1) joint government; 2) the army and navy; 3) foreign relations; and 4) expenses for these matters. The delegations of 60 members from each side met annually, once in Vienna and once in Budapest, exercising legislative power in matters of common interest.[198] Regarding territory, Austria retained Dalmatia, while it ceded Transylvania and Croatia to Hungary, with the interested parties having to negotiate their agreements with Hungary.[199]

Once the Austro-Hungarian Compromise was reached, the Emperor invited the Croatian Sabor to send its delegates to the coronation ceremony. The Sabor replied that it could not do so, since relations between Croatia and Hungary were not yet settled.[200] Therefore, on May 25, 1867, the Sabor was dissolved by the Emperor, and the coronation on June 8, 1867, took place without the participation of the Croatians. On June 12, 1867, the Hungarian Parliament promulgated the Austro-Hungarian Compromise with the Basic Law of the State, sanctioned on July 18, 1867, by the King as Law No. XII11867.

Due to this unfavorable turn of events, Ban Sokčević resigned, and Baron Levin Rauch was appointed Lieutenant of the Ban with the task of negotiating the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise in accordance with the principles of the 1868 Regional Assembly. Based on the new electoral system, the Unionists obtained a majority, abandoning their opposition on January 8, 1868. On the 30th of the same month, the Sabor elected the 12-member Regional Assembly, all Unionists, which, together with a similar Hungarian delegation, prepared and drafted the text of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise.

Regarding Rijeka, the delegations were unable to find a solution acceptable to both parties, a fact recorded in Article 1. 66. However, while the Hungarian delegation accepted the Compromise proposal by a majority vote—three of its delegates voted against it—proposing financial independence for Croatia in accordance with Deak's proposal, and that the king would appoint the ban upon the proposal of the Croatian Sabor and not upon the proposal and with the endorsement of the Hungarian prime minister.

Nevertheless, the Sabor accepted this Compromise on September 26, 1868, without any noteworthy discussion, and by a majority vote, sending it to the king on September 24, 1868, for his sanction and requesting at the same time the annexation of Rijeka to Croatia as an integral part thereof, in accordance with its undisputed right. The king immediately signed the text of this Compromise. On August 28, 1868, the Hungarian parliament also unanimously accepted the Compromise, adding to Article 66, concerning the territory of Croatia, that Rijeka, with its port and district, It belonged directly to Hungary and should be incorporated immediately.

Before approving the Hungarian text of the Compromise, and with the intention of harmonizing both texts, the king published a Rescript on November 8, 1868, inviting both parliaments to recognize that "the city of Rijeka constituted a separate entity belonging to the Hungarian crown." The Hungarian text of the Compromise was changed accordingly by the Court Chancellery and had to be redrafted, while a piece of paper with the new content was pasted over the already sanctioned Croatian text. On November 17, 1868, the Croatian Sabor considered the king's Rescript and accepted the new text, which became another source of discord and disputes in Hungarian-Croatian relations until 1918.

On the same day—November 17, 1868—the monarch gave his royal approval to the original Hungarian version of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise. thus becoming the fundamental law of the kingdoms of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia; for Croatia, as Law I/1868 and for Hungary, as Law XXX/1868 [201].

Given the significant numerical disparity between Croatian deputies in the joint parliament and, consequently, also in the Hungarian delegation (5 Croatians to 55 Hungarians), Croatia's practical influence in joint affairs was negligible in both the legislative and administrative spheres. This influence was further diminished in the political arena by the fact that Article 55 of the Compromise abolished the Croatian-Slavic Chancellery at the Imperial Court, which, since November 20, 1861, had served as an intermediary between the Croatian Sabor and the King, headed by a Court Chancellor. F

urthermore, according to Article 51 of the Compromise, the ban, head of the Croatian autonomous government, appointed by the king upon the proposal and signature of the common Hungarian prime minister, could not communicate directly with the king, but only through a special Croatian minister without portfolio in the central government in Budapest, whose function was to serve as a liaison between the king and the autonomous government of the kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia (Article 44).

Through these provisions of the Compromise, the Hungarian ministerial council intervened regarding Croatian interests between Zagreb and Vienna.[204] Articles 51 and 55 made the dualism of the Monarchy effective to an extreme degree with respect to Croatia.

b) Croatia's Legal and State Relationship with Hungary

Within this dual spirit, Article 1 of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise emphasizes that Hungary and Croatia form "a single state community both with respect to the other countries under His Majesty's rule and in relation to other states." In order to highlight to the king that this state unity—derived from the indissolubility of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, foreseen and confirmed by the Pragmatic Sanction [205]—and to eliminate any trace of the previous personal union, Article 2 of the Compromise stipulates that the king of both kingdoms (Hungary and Croatia) must be crowned in a single solemn ceremony and that the "inaugural diploma" will be promulgated in the common parliament for all the kingdoms of the Crown of Saint Stephen. Because the Croatian Sabor refused to send its delegates to the parliament convened for the coronation on June 8, 1867, the ceremony took place without the participation of the Croatians. Article 2 itself stipulates that "the same inaugural coronation diploma of 1867 shall subsequently be prepared in the Croatian language and shall be sent as soon as possible to the Sabor of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia." In the Croatian version of each of the future "inaugural diplomas," "the autonomous constitution of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia shall be fully guaranteed."

Taking into account the state community and the indissolubility of the territories expressed in Articles 1 and 2, Article 3 provides that, with respect to all matters common to all the lands and kingdoms of the Hungarian Crown and of His Majesty, Hungary and Croatia shall have the same legal representation, common legislation, and common government. Consequently, by approving the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise, the Croatian Sabor, in Article 3, legitimizes the mandate of the organs of a broader community, namely, that of Austria-Hungary. But because, in addition to matters common to the Monarchy, there are also matters common to Hungary and Croatia, Article 5 recognizes the need for common legislation and government for the latter.

The Croatian-Hungarian Compromise, therefore, details: a) common matters and b) common bodies.

a) Common matters between Croatia and Hungary.

According to Articles 6-9, these are as follows: 1) Establishment of expenses for the Court; 2) Approval of the conscription of soldiers; legislation on defense and military service; provisions relating to the territorial distribution and supply of the army. In this regard, the following provisions apply to Croatia: a) the number of conscripts for the common contingent must be determined according to the proportion of the population of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia; b) conscripts from these kingdoms must be incorporated into their respective units; and c) conscripts from the coastal regions must be incorporated into the navy.[206]

3) Financial matters, specifically listed in Article 8, fall within the competence of the Common Sabor (joint drafting) of a tax system; its levying and collection; the determination of new taxes; the establishment of the common expenditure budget; the control and amortization of state debts; the administration, encumbrances, and sales of state real estate; and the management of monopolies and royal revenues. It was expressly emphasized here that, "in the case of the sale of state real estate located in Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia—such as land and forests—it was necessary to consult the Croatian Sabor, and no alienation could take place without its consent." In all these matters, the competence of the common financial administration, headed by a common minister responsible to the Common Sabor, also extends to Croatia.

Article 9 also exhaustively enumerates further common matters, such as: the monetary system; The issue of coins and banks; commercial and state contracts integrating all regions of the Crown of Saint Stephen; credit, insurance, measures, trademarks and standards, copyright, navigation, trade, exchange, and mining rights; in addition, telegraphs, postal services, railways, ports, shipyards, and those routes and rivers affecting both Hungary and Croatia.

Article 10 establishes matters of common legislation, but executive power is reserved for the autonomous authorities. These matters include: crafts, private civil societies, passports, police for foreigners, citizenship, and naturalization. As for the central government, it would have no executive bodies for matters common to Croatia, since that power belongs to the Croatian executive bodies (Article 45). Croatian is the official language for the joint bodies, as well as for Croats in the conduct of joint affairs (Art. 57).

b) The joint bodies.

The joint bodies of the State are the following: the King, the joint ministers, and the joint government.

1) The King. — The person of the King is not subject to the stipulations of either the Austro-Hungarian or the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise, although both contain stipulations concerning the head of state in relation to the former constitutional and state law of Hungary and Croatia. The King is the supreme commander of the army; he declares war and concludes peace; he appoints the joint ministers, the Croatian ban, the županes (heads of the administrative districts), judges, and university professors. It is the King's prerogative to appoint representatives of the high nobility to the Hungarian House, and aristocrats and virilists to the Croatian Sabor. Through this privilege, he was able to exert his influence over legislation. Furthermore, he possessed the right of initiative in legislation and the sanctioning of laws. Because the constitutional state had been established through the two Compromises with the responsible governments, a certain limitation was also introduced on the real right to issue regulations and orders. From then on, matters common to Hungary and Croatia had to be countersigned with the signatures of the respective Hungarian ministers, or, in matters of Croatian autonomy, with that of the ban[207].

2) Common Ministers. — For all matters considered common in accordance with Articles 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the legislation, as well as for matters provided for in the Austro-Hungarian Compromise as common, according to Article 43, the executive power would be vested in the central government in Budapest through its own organs, and also in Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia. The common ministers were: the prime minister, the finance minister, the minister of public works, communications, and navigation (later reorganized as the Ministry of Commerce), the minister of agriculture, industry, and commerce (later reorganized as the Ministry of Agriculture), and the minister of national defense. In addition, according to Article 48, alongside these common ministers, there was another a latere (the Hungarian minister at court, representing the king), the minister of the interior, the minister of religious affairs and education, and the minister of justice, who were exclusively Hungarian ministers, as Croatia had full autonomy in these latter matters.

The wording of Article 43 was not entirely clear. According to Article 27 of Law XII of 1867 (the Austro-Hungarian Compromise), executive power in the common affairs of the entire Habsburg Empire belonged to the common ministry in Vienna, not to the Hungarian ministry, as would follow from the wording of Article 43 of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise. Therefore, the Croatian regiments in the common army, with regard to executive power, were subject to the war ministry in Vienna and not to the Hungarian Ministry of Defense.[208]

The Minister of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia held a special position in the Ministerial Council and also in the Hungarian Ministerial Council, with the responsibility of representing their interests (Article 44). As a member of the entire Ministerial Council, and having the right to vote, this minister was responsible "to the common parliament of the State." His position was the same as that of the other members of the common ministerial council, and he could be removed in the common parliament through a vote of no confidence. This minister was the link between the Croatian government and the Hungarian prime minister.

His inescapable duty was to deliver all the ban's petitions to the king. In case of doubt regarding the community formed by the Compromise to Common Interests, which could not be clarified after the ban's intervention, this minister, and possibly the common government, would submit his opinion simultaneously with the ban's. In matters of Croatian autonomy, he signed the king's decrees along with the ban, thus giving them force. Because he lacked direct influence in Croatian autonomy, this minister was not accountable to the Croatian Sabor.[209]

3) The common parliament. — Articles 31-42 regulate the constitution and responsibilities of the common parliament (the parliament of the State). According to Article 31, the legislative competence of this parliament included all matters common to the lands (Láneder) of the Crown of Saint Stephen, as well as those of the other regions of the Empire, and all matters declared common by the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise (Articles 6-10). This parliament was to meet annually in Buda-Pest. Since this parliament was composed of representatives of the nobility or upper house (high nobility, prelates, the Croatian ban, etc.) and the representative house, lower house, the kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia (Dalmatia was not mentioned), excluding Fiume (Rijeka) because no compromise had been reached regarding it, it sent 29 deputies (from 1881 the number was 40) to the lower house, and two to the upper house (from 1881, 3 deputies) according to Articles 31 and 36.

The term of office of the Croatian deputies was the same as that of the deputies in the common parliament, without being affected by the eventual dissolution of the Croatian Sabor (Article 34). According to Article 35, the Croatian representatives in the common parliament had the personal right of discussion, that is, a free mandate like the rest of the deputies of that parliament without any restriction.[210] The joint parliament debated, first, common matters and, then, those of Hungary, but granting Croatian deputies a minimum of three months to discuss their autonomous affairs in the Croatian Sabor (Art. 38).

Article 59 of the Compromise was of particular importance, both with regard to the use of Croatian in the joint parliament or in its delegations, and with regard to the legal-state relationship between the kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia and Hungary (Dalmatia is not mentioned). Its text is as follows: "Considering that the kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia are nations in the political sense, having their own territory and, in internal affairs, their own legislation and government, it is established that the deputies of said kingdoms may use the Croatian language both in the joint parliament and in their delegations." The further consequences of the Compromise amount to saying that Hungary and Croatia are two different nations in every sense, that the laws voted in the common parliament and signed by the king should be sent in the Croatian original to the Croatian Sabor (Art. 60), that in the autonomous affairs of Croatia the colors and the emblems (seals, symbols) of the kingdoms of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia should be used, in which case the emblem of the crown of Saint Stephen had to be added to them (Art. 62); and, finally, that the Croatian flag should be hoisted alongside the Hungarian flag in the building where the common parliament of the lands of the Hungarian crown deliberated (Art. 63).

From the above, it logically follows that the common parliament was, in reality, the Hungarian-Croatian parliament.[211]

It is generally believed that the Croatian delegates, when discussing the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise—with minimal exceptions—placed greater importance on maintaining Croatian independence in the legal and state sense than on the financial issue. Consequently, this part of the Compromise, addressed in Articles 11-30, constitutes the weakest aspect of this interstate contract.

Articles 11-13 establish the general principles upon which the financial agreement between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia was concluded, and this is expressly addressed in Article 14. According to these principles, Croatia declared itself obligated to contribute to the expenses for matters common to all the lands of the Monarchy, as well as for matters common to the lands of the Hungarian crown (Article 11). It is further established that Hungary's expenses, together with Transylvania, are to be covered by 93.5592201%, and Croatia's by 6.4407799%, of the total common expenses, which in turn correspond to the lands of the Hungarian crown for ten years, the period of validity of the Compromise.* The third principle emphasizes that Croatia's net income must first cover the expenses of autonomy—which will be determined later—and only then, from the surplus, will the common expenses be covered (Art. 13)[212].

According to Art. 15, the expenses of Croatian autonomy are determined for the first 10 years at 2,200,000 fiorin. This sum had to be covered by 45% derived from direct and indirect taxes and other public revenues (Art. 16), while 55% of all public revenues had to be paid into the common treasury of the State for common expenses (Art. 17). Of these revenues, which are divided between the expenses of autonomy and common expenses, those from the sale of wine and meat, earmarked for the expenses of the communes, are excluded, as are customs revenues, considered a common matter of the Monarchy according to Law XII/1867.

Art. 19 provides for the application of the same rate—45% to 55%—in the event of the expansion of Croatian territory—incorporation of Dalmatia or the territory of the Military March. Art. 20 and 21 deal with the tax and debts of the agrarian reform, caused by the liquidation of serfdom, maintaining the guarantee of the kingdoms of the Hungarian crown. The advance of loans from the common treasury of the State is also foreseen for the same purpose. The common minister of finance directs collections in Croatia through the Zagreb Financial Directorate, appointed by him, for direct and indirect taxes, for state monopolies, for stamp duties, fees, and income from state property (Art. 22). Croatia's balance sheets in its autonomous affairs must be communicated by the local financial authorities to the common minister of finance so that he may have access to the economic data of all the lands of the Hungarian crown, while the Croatian government will assist the organs of the common government of finance in order to secure and collect public revenues and comply with the legal orders of the minister of finance (Arts. 23 and 24).

The financial aspect of the Compromise initially appeared advantageous, as it stipulated that the Kingdom of Hungary would increase its deficit if 45% of all revenues were insufficient to cover the 2,200,000 fiorin allocated for autonomous expenditures (Art. 25), and that if the 45% figure exceeded this amount allocated for Croatian autonomy, the surplus would be earmarked for common expenditures (Art. 26). Croatian contractual representation could be favored by Art. 27 in relation to Art. 25, which relieved Croatia of the obligation to repay the advances under Art. 25 calculated to cover common expenditures if Croatia's increased taxpaying capacity led to a rise in revenues exceeding 55% for the common obligation; such a surplus would be placed at the disposal of the autonomous government.[213]

Despite Article 29 stipulating that the accounts of all the kingdoms of the Hungarian crown would be communicated to the Croatian Sabor for its information, the Croatians were practically never able to ascertain how much tax was collected in their territory, nor how it was distributed, because, according to Article 22, the Hungarian finance minister acted through the Directorate of an agency he appointed. Beyond this cause of discontent, there was another. With the transfer to Hungary not only of the Croatian treasury but also of legislation on trade and industry (Article 8), Croatia experienced economic stagnation under new conditions and at different times. Economic and commercial levers became the principal weapon of Hungarian policy in Croatia following the signing of the Compromise.[214] From this arose and was fueled the Croatian conviction of being exploited by Hungary. The magnitude of this discontent was made clearer by the fact that four of the six subsequent revisions to the original Compromise concerned financial matters.[215]

c) Croatian Autonomy under the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise.

The Compromise makes no mention of the existence of the long-established Croatian constitutional institutions, such as the Sabor (Legislative Council) and the Ban (Executive Council). The Compromise only leaves within its purview those matters and actions not reserved therein for the common parliament and the central government. In all matters not common to the common government, Croatia consequently has the right to full autonomy in both the legislative and executive senses (Art. 47). Within the scope of this autonomy for Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia lies the power to legislate and administer all matters of domestic affairs, religious affairs, education, and justice at all levels, with the exception of the judiciary in maritime matters (Art. 48).

According to the foregoing, Croatia's affairs were divided into the group of those transferred, or rather, those under the jurisdiction of the common bodies, which we have already discussed, and the group of the autonomous area, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Croatian constitutional bodies. The Compromise does not address the organization of the Croatian constitutional bodies, especially the Croatian Sabor, nor could it, since the Sabor was the equivalent contracting party that stipulated the Compromise.[216] In Articles 50-53, the Compromise addresses the ban and its power as the secular executive power, modifying it only to a certain extent.

Within the autonomous area, the legislative bodies of Croatia were the King and the Sabor of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia. The King's position in relation to the Croatian Sabor is not regulated by the Compromise, as it is practiced according to custom. This is equivalent to saying that it is the same as that adopted before the Hungarian or common parliament, respectively, when the latter dealt with the common affairs of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen. Article 69 of the Compromise alludes to these positions when it stipulates that "in the future, all those constitutional rights and all fundamental laws whose enjoyment and protection extend directly and equally to the Kingdom of Hungary and those of Croatia and Slavonia shall be considered as common rights and fundamental laws of the Hungarian Crown, provided they do not conflict with the present Compromise." Formally, the Sabor was not subordinate to the king, but it had the right not to sign a decision proposed by the Sabor and to reject a requested sanction whenever dynastic interests or the interests of the entire Monarchy so required; and, in particular, it had the right to dissolve the Sabor, thus placing it in a position of superiority over the Hungarian parliament and the Croatian Sabor.

This was, however, the supreme legislative body, for which reason the king could not modify or repeal de jure the legislative acts sanctioned by the Croatian Sabor.[217] That the Sabor refused to obey the king is evident in the first and historical part of this dissertation. According to the Compromise, the Croatian Sabor was not in a subordinate position with respect to the common parliament, so the latter could not modify or repeal its decisions, and, moreover, these decisions did not require confirmation by the common parliament. The Compromise was approved by three equal powers: two equal parliaments and the king, the latter participating with his intermediary proposals only when the respective royal delegations could not reach an agreement, as in the case of Rijeka.[218]

The executive bodies of Croatia's autonomous government were the ban and the local government. The overall organization of executive power in Croatia was determined in Article 50 of the Compromise, which states: "At the head of the autonomous government of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia is the ban, responsible to the Sabor of said kingdoms." Unlike the previous proposal to the king for the nomination of the ban, according to the Compromise, the king appoints him upon the proposal and countersignature of the common Hungarian minister-president (Article 51). Recalling Ban Jelačié, who led the war against Hungary in 1848 at the insistence of the Hungarians themselves, Article 52 establishes that the office of ban is separate from military rank, and that no military figure may exert any influence over civil affairs in Croatia.

Article 52 establishes the title of the Ban: The Ban of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia—emphasizing that the Ban will also remain in the future as an ex officio member of the House of the High Nobility in the common parliament. Because he was responsible only to the Croatian Sabor, the Ban was not subordinate to the common minister, but rather considered equal to him. Therefore, he had no right to interfere in autonomous affairs according to the law governing civil servants, but was governed by the Compromise.[219] However, the Ban had a de facto responsibility to the common prime minister, by virtue of having been nominated for appointment in accordance with Article 51, even though this responsibility was of a meta-legal nature with political consequences.

Since the objective of the Compromise was to regulate the legal-state relations between Croatia and Hungary, this document did not apply to the organization of the Croatian government and its subordinate bodies. This was the task of the Croatian Sabor, which carried it out at the proposal of the ban and with the consent of the king (Art. 54). Consequently, the organization of the Croatian government into its departments for internal affairs, worship and education, and justice, and later for the 2upas (districts), cities, and communes, as well as the electoral system, were left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Croatian Autonomous Government.[220]

The Compromise, according to Art. 70, and after its sanction by the king, became the fundamental law of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia. Therefore, its final article stipulates that the Compromise cannot be the subject of legislation by any contracting kingdom separately and that its modification can only be carried out in the same manner in which it originated, that is, with the collaboration of all the powers that participated in its drafting: the two parliaments, equal in law, and the king.

At the end of the 19th century, the Compromise was the subject of serious study even outside the sphere of the Monarchy. Inspired by his friend Bishop Joseph George Strossmayer, a great Croatian patron of the arts, Gladstone used the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise as a model for Ireland's Home Rule Bill. Gladstone's proposal did not succeed. After being accepted by the House of Commons, it was rejected by the House of Lords.[221]

The problem of the legal nature of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise will be the subject of the third part of this dissertation.

III

THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE HUNGARIAN-CROATIAN STATE COMMUNITY ACCORDING TO THE COMPROMISE OF 1868

Just as there are different opinions on the legal nature of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, formed by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (The Austrian Law of Delegations of 21 December 1867 and the Hungarian Law XII/1867 of 12 June 1867), there are also different views on the legal nature of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise and the legal-state relationship between Hungary and Croatia.[222]

This relationship between the two kingdoms after 1868 was the subject of dissertations and controversies in its time and continues to be discussed today in legal literature from opposing viewpoints and with contradictory results. Nearly all the leading legal scholars participated in the controversy, whether in works directly dedicated to the legal nature of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1867, or in works specifically aimed at determining the specific character of the associated states.[223] It must be emphasized that Austrian legal literature, regarding the question of Dalmatia, failed to provide an adequate answer. Dalmatia was part of the Croatian community, but nevertheless, as a crown land (Kronland), it belonged to the Austrian half of the Monarchy.[224]

When assessing the legal character of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise, the fundamental question is its legal nature; that is, whether it constitutes an international agreement or is merely a measure of domestic policy by which Hungary grants one of its constituent parts the rights of autonomy. The answer to this question is beyond doubt simply by considering that the negotiations were conducted as between nations, with the contracting parties formally possessing the same degree of equality.

However, the political status of the contracting parties was not equal. Hungary had a larger territory and a larger population than Croatia. Consequently, its economic capacity and power were also superior to those of Croatia and Dalmatia. Furthermore, the Military March was not united with it. This position of Hungarian superiority, both politically and in practice, was further reinforced by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, as Vienna recognized Croatia as an integral part of the Hungarian half of the Monarchy. Consequently, despite the formal and theoretical equality of the contracting parties, Hungary enjoyed certain legal and political privileges, thanks to these advantages just mentioned.

Although the Compromise, by its very nature, is an instrument of public international law, creating a sui generis community in which both nations safeguarded their individuality and sovereignty, different, and quite justified, interpretations arose regarding the legal character of the national community thus created and also regarding Croatia's status within it, or rather, between Hungary and Croatia.

Considering the relationship between these kingdoms, we can already distinguish two fundamental opinions: 1) According to the Compromise of 1868, Croatia, within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was an integral part of Hungary, that is, one of its provinces; 2) Croatia, according to the aforementioned Compromise, had the status of a separate state.

Logically, and in the first instance, the first opinion was defended by Hungarian writers and some foreign writers, while Croatian men of letters, and also numerous writers from abroad, defended the second, as we shall see shortly.

Matijas Gastony considers Croatia an integral part of the unitary state of Hungary, albeit with a decentralized character. The unitary idea of Hungary was also defended by Gustav Beksics, but he acknowledges that Hungary's centralism was seriously challenged by Croatia's state attributes. The Hungarian theory of Croatia as an autonomous province within the decentralized state of the Crown of Saint Stephen was developed especially by Professor Kmety.

According to his view, Croatia is not a state, despite Article 59 of the Compromise recognizing its people as a "political nation," because Article 1 of the same document states that "Hungary and Croatia form a state community," and because Croatia thus lacked the legal personality of a subject of international law.

Furthermore, the entire Hungarian half of the Monarchy shares a single common citizenship, meaning that Croatia does not have its own citizenship, army, or finances. Finally, he argues that the king appoints the ban of Croatia upon the proposal and endorsement of the Hungarian prime minister (Art. 51), and that the minister for Croatia—as a member of the Hungarian government—is a minister of that kingdom and responsible only to the Hungarian parliament.

Contrary to Kmety's opinion, Professor Edmund Bernatzik emphasizes that the circumstances cited are insufficient to deprive Croatia of its status as a separate state. Bernatzik underlines, firstly, that the concepts of "state community" and "political nation" lack a specific meaning, being, due to their elasticity and plasticity, suitable for all kinds of opportunistic interpretations. Nor is the lack of a single citizenship essential, because the largest state at the time, Prussia, also lacked a single citizenship.

For Professor Bernatzik, Croatia's state personality arises from Article 50 of the Compromise, according to which the ban is responsible only to the Croatian Sabor. This also stems from the fact that the laws of that Sabor, according to Articles 47 and 54 of the Compromise, have the same legal standing as the laws of the Hungarian parliament, and that, according to Article 4 of the Compromise, Austria, Hungary, and Croatia are considered equivalent.

Bernatzik finds the strongest argument for this equivalence in Article 70 of the Compromise, according to which none of the contracting parties can make this Compromise the object of its exclusive legislation, further establishing that its modification is subject to the procedure by which it was created, that is, it must include the participation of the Croatian Sabor, which acts as an equal party. Therefore, the Hungarian state did not have a "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" role on this crucial point. This provision of Article 70 of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise takes on added significance given that Article 69 of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 stipulated that Hungary's relations with Croatia would be governed by Hungarian law.

In short, according to Bernatzik's view, the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise is an international contract, and the state relationship established by it constitutes a closer and more equal real union (Unio realis jure inaequali).

Friedrich Tezner had previously defended the same opinion, in substance. According to his thesis, Croatia could not be denied the personality of a state, especially because its power was original and not derived from a state power—a thesis he maintained at the time of the Compromise. The intervention of the Hungarian central authorities ended with the Ban's seizure of power, while the reasons for the cessation of his power only affected Croatia, because the Sabor, in accordance with its autonomous law, could bring the Ban to trial before the royal court, whereas, conversely, the Hungarian ministry could not demand its removal.

There was no right of enforcement against Croatia's unconstitutional actions. Nor was the principle of Reichsrecht bricht Landsrecht (national law supersedes provincial law) in force. According to this author, Hungary and Croatia constitute a federal state (Bundesstaat) with strong elements (Ansátzen) of a real union, but with the caveat that Hungary, to achieve the absolute power of a state, lacked free control over its military forces.

Meanwhile, in the opinion of Professor George Jellinek (Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, Vienna 1882), "Croatia and Slavonia, in the legal-state sense, are nothing more than Hungarian provinces, even though they enjoy very extensive autonomy, which, moreover, can only be modified with their consent, but from no point of view is it a state." The writer and professor José Pliverić reacted against Jellinek's view (Das rechtliche Verhiiltnis Kroatiens zu Ungarn, Zagreb 1885), arguing that the Hungarian-Croatian state relationship was a genuine union of two sovereign states between which there was unquestionable parity. It is true that this union exhibits certain anomalies, but these do not alter Croatia's statehood.

After the debate with Professor Pliverić, Professor Jellinek partially reconsidered his original opinion, later avoiding designating Croatia as either a state or a province. For him, Croatia was more than a province, but less than a state, because it possessed many, though not all, of the elements necessary to constitute a state. For the case of Croatia, as well as for some other regions in a similar situation, Professor Jellinek coined a new legal concept: Staatsfragment (the fragmented state). In line with this view, these would be state formations that possess state attributes, but in an incomplete form.

Jellinek's opinion that the supreme organs of fragmentary states could not be considered state organs, since their jurisdiction did not extend to the entire territory of the state, was rejected by legal scholars, who argued that, in similar cases, and when the organs in question do not act on the basis of political autonomy, they do so on the basis of an official state administration and, consequently, in that capacity, perform acts that involve the nature of state acts. According to Hermann-Rehm, Jellinek's conclusions are inaccurate in general, and particularly with regard to Croatia. However, under the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise, Hungary was only granted the exercise of state power; therefore, this power was not based on its own laws, as Jellinek erroneously asserted. According to Rehm, Croatia was a state —always according to the Compromise— with intertwined institutional and corporate elements.

In addition to Bernatzik, Tezner, Rehm and Pliverić defended the opinion that Croatia preserved its state character in the Compromise, maintaining that it was a global real union between Croatia and Hungary, Ladislao Polić and Bogoslav Šulek on the Croatian side, and on the Hungarian side, Istvan Pesty, who sees in the Hungarian-Croat relationship a relationship similar to dualism, while Prof. Ernest Nagy emphasizes that the legislator recognized, through the Compromise, a special state life. A real union in this relationship was also seen by Karel Kadlec, Siegfried Brie - who pointed out the relationship discussed as abnormal Real-union - F. Holzendorf and Joseph Ulbrich. The latter used the term "unequal real union" approaching Bernatzik's opinion. Eduardo Horn, when analyzing the Compromise, concludes that it is an "interstate act", preserving in it Croatia its character as a State. Horn went a step further by stating that the lands (Lander) of St. Stephen's crown should be called Hungary-Croatia and the Austro-Hungary-Croatia Double Monarchy.

Meanwhile, in opposition to all the opinions favorable to the thought that Croatia, through the Compromise, saved its character as a State in the form of a real union - to which we could add F. R. Dareste and Luigi Palma -, there are others that glimpse in this relationship the elements of a federation. Thus, for example, Seton Watson, who assumes the intermediary position between complete sovereignty and pure federalism; and the opinion of H. J. Bidermann, according to which Hungary, after the Compromise, was constituted by two states: Hungary-Croatia.

Jellinek opposed the ruling that this would be a federation, stating, as we have already seen, that Croatia was "a Hungarian province with broad autonomy." Also Prof. Pliverić disputed Bidermann's opinion that this would be a case of federation, basing his position on the institution of "common parliament". Against this argument Herrnritt qualifies the lands (Laender) of the crown of St. Stephen as a composite state which, taking into account the common parliament and the common affairs for all the lands (Laender) of the Hungarian crown, resembles more a type of federalist state, thereby attributing statehood to both Hungary and Croatia.

The uniqueness of the state-legal position of Croatia is expressed by Woodrow Wilson in the following terms: "There is no provincial organization in Hungary analogous to that which we have seen in Austria (772-773). Croatia-Slavonia is the only one of the constituent parts of Hungary that has its separate Landtag. The organization of that territory is exceptional in all respects. It has been given legal rights that cannot be denied without its consent; it has a distinct administration, responsible to the king and to the Landtag. However, it is an integral part of the Hungarian monarchy" [225].

In order to create this type of state community, two constitutional acts of two parliaments were needed – the Hungarian in Budapest and the Croatian in Zagreb. This essential characteristic, as well as the primordial legal factor of the Compromise, was also seen by foreign writers such as, for example, by Prof. Demonbynes, who summarizes the Hungarian-Croatian relationship as follows: "Croatie et Slavonie... ont conservé une autonomie particulière... ils forment dans la Hongrie un countrys distincte, à peu près comme la Hongrie elle même est distincte de l'Autriche" [226].

Based on such disparate opinions and the Compromise itself, Schrems draws the following conclusions:

1) The Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia was a truly independent state, thanks to the continuity of its ancient state law. Hungary, through the Compromise of 1868 and by force—jus fortioris—deprived this state of some of its sovereign rights. But Croatia retained its statehood, as evidenced by the Compromise document itself, from its very development, its form of publication, and its content (Articles 4 and 70). For Croatia's statehood and its parity with Hungary, the provisions under which Croatia appears as a contracting party, while supreme power (Kompetenzhoheit) does not belong to Hungary, are decisive. This meant that the Compromise could not be modified without Croatian consent. The observation that Croatia lacked certain sovereign rights is not decisive, because the prevailing theory also recognizes as states non-sovereign state regions (Gebietskörpenrschaften). Therefore, Croatia had statehood, if not in the strict sense of international law, at least in the legal-state sense.

2) Croatia's legal-state relationship with Hungary did not correspond to any known case of state relations (Staatenverbindungen). It was neither a confederation (Staatenbund) nor a real union; it was neither a simple personal union nor a federation.

2) 3) If we recognize Croatia's statehood, then all the preconditions existed for a league of states that did not sacrifice their sovereign character. This new state creation—called a "state community" by the Compromise in Article 1—presented a "sui generis state union," which Bernadzik had already ingeniously described as unio realis iure inaequali [227].

The Soviet writer N. Ratner recently addressed the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise, concluding that Croatia, according to the Compromise itself, was a Hungarian province; that at the time the Compromise was negotiated, Croatia was not an independent state from Hungary; and that Croatia's situation after the Compromise had nothing in common with independence and was far from federalism.

Ratner's assessment of Croatia's provincial character and of federalism and unio realis iure inaequali was criticized by Professor Ferdo Culinović of Zagreb. Regarding federalism, čulinović argues that every federation is characterized by the following: a) the transfer of some of the affairs of a member state to the federal state; b) equality in the execution of common affairs through the common organs of the federal state. The first element of federation, according to the Compromise, existed, but not the second.

Consequently, according to this author, there was no federation between Croatia and Hungary. Regarding the "real union," Culinović asserts that it contained a fundamental element. In international relations, Hungary and Croatia constituted only a single legal entity, specifically in relation to Austria. The other elements were absent; nor was there complete independence for the member states thus united. Croatia and Hungary were intimately bound by the Compromise, sharing common affairs and organs of power, which is not the case in a true union. He states that the defining characteristic of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise was a unio realis inaequalis, meaning that the view that this union was truly a real union is rejected.

Analyzing the Compromise from a real or legal standpoint through the lens of the three fundamental elements of a state: territory, population, and the specific organization of power, Culinović draws a series of conclusions:

a) The Compromise between Croatia and Hungary of 1868 created "the state community" (Art. 19)[228]. Those who see in this relationship "a provincial character of Croatia" should be reminded of the legal status of the state before the Compromise, especially Law XLII/1861 of the Croatian Sabor, which confirms that the Sabor severed its legal relationship with Hungary in 1848. Thus, N. Ratner's opinion that Croatia "had obtained certain rights through the Compromise" is unfounded. Hungary could not give Croatia at that time what it did not possess itself;

b) The Croatian Sabor, through the Compromise, had transferred a portion of Croatia's state affairs to the aforementioned "state community," which was precisely created by this act of transfer, and the scope of its activity was also defined;

c) At the same time, in the same act, the Croatian Sabor granted this state community the authority to exercise acts of power over Croatia. Therefore, the "common organs" did not carry out "common affairs" in their own right or by right received from Hungary, but rather ex mandatu from the Croatian Sabor and in accordance with the provisions of the Compromise, that is, jure delegato from the Croatian Sabor itself;

d) For the handling of its "autonomous affairs," Croatia neither requested nor obtained authorization from Hungary; it carried them out itself in its own right. The Compromise itself clearly shows how Croatia transferred a portion of its affairs and retained the rest for itself, thereby establishing itself as the only entity authorized from the outset;

e) Both Croatia and Hungary, according to Article 70 of the 1868 Compromise, were equally limited de jure in their reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the Compromise, neither of which could unilaterally modify or deny them. The Compromise was reconsidered several times in accordance with the aforementioned Article, which means that Croatia had retained its status as a contracting state, or rather, that Croatia and Hungary were formally equated and not considered as parties in relation to the whole (the State and the province);

f) By using the common organs, that is, by giving the Croatian delegation a majority in the "common parliament" and imposing hegemony over Croatia in the same "common government" through its dependence on the Hungarian parliamentary majority in the common parliament, the Hungarians imposed a system of supremacy on Croatia.

From what has already been said, it follows: 1) That Croatia, after the Compromise, maintained its status as a state de facto and de jure; 2) That this status was considerably curtailed; 3) That, nevertheless, this status was never liquidated. Croatia, therefore, according to the Compromise of 1868 and until 1918, was, despite everything, a state and in no way a Hungarian province. "The relationship between them, that is, between Croatia and Hungary, would not correspond entirely to either a federation or a real union."

All this is evident from the specific characteristics of this relationship. Due to its singularities, this relationship between Croatia and Hungary was a special form of composite state, similar to the category of this class of states already defined by some German theorists as "the state of more states" (Staatenstaat). For this reason, "some scholars rightly emphasized that Croatia and Hungary in 1868 were in a relationship of dualism" [229].

Croatia acted jointly with Hungary before Austria, and although its statehood was not expressly mentioned in the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, it was manifested in the constitution and actions of the Hungarian delegations (actually, the Hungarian-Croatian delegation). The Austro-Hungarian dualism did not abolish Croatia's statehood as a partner (by virtue of the Compromise of 1868) with Hungary. Within the Austria-Hungary-Croatia community, associated with Hungary, it was a member state.[230]

FINAL REMARKS

The fundamental characteristic of Croatian policy from the moment of its entry into the union with Hungary was the struggle for the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence. Located within the sphere of influence of Rome and Byzantium, the Croats resisted the Frankish and Byzantine empires, and in the course of this struggle, they allied themselves with the Hungarians, who, at almost the same historical moment, found themselves in identical circumstances. Their long-standing enemy emerged first as Venice and later as Turkey, seizing Croatian territories one after another, until, in 1594,

Croatia was reduced to only 16,800 square kilometers, "reliquiae reliquiarum olim inclyti regni Croatiae" [231]. Parallel to this territorial loss, the Hungarian authorities and the Habsburg dynasty began their attempts to similarly limit the power of the Croatian ban and Sabor. The struggle to maintain these powers intact—two fundamental institutions of the Croatian Constitution—gave rise to and developed a special sense of and sensitivity among Croats regarding their state rights, which would take center stage upon signing the Compromise, somewhat overshadowing economic and financial matters, so important for the modern state after the dismantling of feudalism.

While feudalism existed, and especially during the reign of the Hungarian Árpád dynasty, the institution of the Ban had acquired great importance due to the fact that the king, as the source of all power, did not reside in Croatia. For this same reason, the Hungarian institution of the Paladin was not identical to the Croatian Ban. The Paladin was the king's lieutenant in Hungary, while the Ban was viceroy in Croatia, which is why he is sometimes mentioned and written in documents before the name of the Paladin.[232] Although both belonged to the four highest dignitaries of the kingdom—the "iobagiones regni"—the Croatian Ban held a special position in military affairs. Indeed, as in all feudal states, Hungary also had a king's army alongside the armies of the high nobility. In Croatia, there was no "royal Croatian army." Or rather, there was, but it was called the "Ban's army."

This was a specifically Croatian phenomenon with no precedent elsewhere. As high nobles, the paladin and the ban had to maintain these armies of the high nobility, but in Hungary, there was no additional paladin's army, as there was for the ban in Croatia, nor in Poland or other states of the Empire. The king paid the ban's army, and if he failed to do so, the ban was considered diminished in power. Consequently, it was not merely a matter of terminology, but also an essential difference. This meant that the king had to maintain an army in Croatia—as in other parts of the country—but supreme command over it was not exercised by the king but by the ban. These troops did not go to war under the royal banner but under the Croatian ensign, which bore the image of Mary with Jesus on one side, just like the Hungarian flag. As for the power of the ban, and especially his right to mint his own coins, it surpassed that of the viceroy; he was the personification of the monarch residing outside the Kingdom of Croatia.[233] During the reign of the Croatian dynasty, the ban was the substitute for the sovereign in Croatia, analogous to how the paladin was in Hungary.

On the other hand, the Croatian Sabor's privileged position in accepting or rejecting laws passed in the common parliament, as well as its form of representation in the common parliament through its own delegates—nuntii vel oratores regni—strictly adhering to the Sabor's instructions, had effectively transformed the Hungarian parliament into a common Hungarian-Croatian parliament when discussing matters of the kingdom. This was because the Croatian delegates, as representatives of the Kingdom of Croatia, held as much power as the Hungarians, representing their own.

In light of these constants in Croatian politics and the attributes of the ban and the Sabor as high organs of state power alongside the king, the content of the Compromise and its implementation had not satisfied the Croatians. The discontent was heightened because the Compromise had been stipulated by a party that lacked popular support, and, in particular, because it later accepted Article 66—an apocryphal and arbitrarily added article to the already sanctioned text, which concerned the situation in Rijeka (Fiume). Therefore, the struggle against the Compromise, or rather, for its revision, began the moment it was signed. To prevent this revision, the majority of Magyars voted in the Sabor for a law declaring it a criminal attempt to disturb public order and an act of high treason.

Despite this, in the 1871 elections, the Unionists (Magyars) won only 13 seats, while the National Party won 51 and the Party of Right 1, out of a total of 65. In any case, it was unfair to label the Croatian signatories to the Compromise with the terms their political adversaries used. Croatia, according to the Compromise, enjoyed greater state independence than any other region or people of the Monarchy, with the exception of two dominant factions: Germans and Hungarians. To get a clear picture of this, it suffices to recall that in half of the Empire (Transleithania), the Hungarians comprised 48% of the population, compared to only 8% for the Croats. Meanwhile, in the other half (Cisleithania), or Austrian part, the Germans made up 36.2% and the Croats (including Serbian immigrants) barely reached 2.6%, according to the 1900 census [234].

These statistical data also clarify why the Germans and Hungarians, despite their constant disagreements, were always united, and why the Poles enjoyed a special privilege within the Monarchy. In other words, the Germans and Hungarians—the “dominant nations”—only held a majority over the Slavic population on the condition that they had the support of the Poles. Hence their special importance within the Monarchy.

The Compromise also failed to fulfill Croatian hopes regarding territorial integrity. Rijeka remained a “separate body” of the national territory, despite having, according to statistics, 12,000 Croats and 651 Italians—that is to say, a “purely Croatian city” [235]. Austria prevented the unification of Dalmatia with Croatia, using the intrigues of the autonomists (“autonomaši”), who numbered 16,000 Italians according to the official 1910 census and were a Serbian minority, against the express will of the Croatian deputies. After the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Emperor Franz Joseph I rejected the Sabor's request to unite them with Croatia, reproaching him for overstepping the bounds of his authority.

In reality, the reunification of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia would have been thwarted by the Serbian position, a circumstance exploited by the Hungarians through the Magyars party, even until 1905 (the year the Rijeka Resolution was passed and the Croatian-Serbian coalition was formed), to prevent any struggle against the Compromise and to advocate for its revision—a strategy similar to that employed by the Austrians in Dalmatia. Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite belonging historically and ethnically to the Kingdom of Croatia, received special constitutional treatment within the Monarchy, thus facilitating both Hungarian and Austrian influence.[236]

One of the most serious flaws of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise was its failure to establish a constitutional body or court—or similar institution—to which the parties could appeal in case of conflict over the interpretation and application of its provisions. Consequently, disputes of this nature were resolved through political and administrative pressure, which was always exerted to Croatia's detriment. This mediating body should have been as it was when the Compromise was stipulated. That is to say, from the Croatian perspective, the state community should be based on royal power, and therefore, the community between Hungary and Croatia would also rest solely on the assumption of a common sovereign.

The laws signed by the king upon his coronation were considered the source, foundation, and guarantee of Croatian independence. These laws, along with the "Golden Bull" of 1222, without Article 1 (ius resistendi), were the result of the Sabor's meeting in Cetin on January 14, 1527, when Ferdinand of Habsburg was elected Croatian king, following the pragmatic sanctions: the Croatian one of 1712, which established Croatia's right to determine its own sovereign, and the Hungarian one, which proclaimed the indivisibility of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen.

This explains why Croatian legal historians considered Article 24 of the Compromise much more important than Article 14, since the former refers to the king as the foundation of the state community, while the latter emphasizes the indivisibility of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen and of the Hungarian-Croatian state community. But since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise was the consequence of Austria's military defeat by Prussia (Kđnigsgrátz), and the emperor, in the realm of domestic politics, was obligated to grant the Compromise to the Hungarians, so too, from the position of the defeated, the emperor had to insist on the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which, by its very formulation, meant the imperial renunciation of many of the prerogatives he held in Croatia before 1867 [237].

Due to the very nature of the Dual Monarchy, the Compromise did not allow the emperor and the king to act as an impartial factor in the disputes between Hungarians and Croats. Maintaining a decisive influence in the appointment of the Croatian ban, the Hungarians, adhering to the letter of the Compromise, circumvented its true meaning. The same occurred with the issue of language, which in the Compromise was resolved favorably for the Croats. As soon as the Compromise was established, the Hungarians gradually began to implement the Magyarization of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, introducing Hungarian into Croatian railways and even displaying both languages on railway station boards. Bilingualism was also made mandatory upon the opening of Hungarian schools for employees and was a condition for career advancement. Hungarian tariff policy aimed to impede the development and progress of Croatian industrial centers.

Thus, for example, transporting grain from Zagreb to Rijeka was more expensive than transporting the same commodity from Budapest to Brazil, while transporting matches from Osijek to Mostar was cheaper by using the Danube River to Budapest and then by rail, rather than directly from Osijek to Mostar.[238] This behavior of the Hungarians in denying others the advantages they themselves had gained, as well as the impossibility or lack of goodwill shown by Vienna in compelling the Hungarians to respect the obligations assumed by the Compromise, led to the situation in which the Croats felt the need to free themselves at any price from that state community. "Franz Ferdinand, aware of the danger and in tacit opposition to the Hungarians, tried in vain to find the solution to the Croatian problem in trialism (Austria-Hungary-Croatia).

His death buried the last attempts to salvage the affection of the Croats for the Habsburg Monarchy and the very existence of that dynasty. The common ownership of the lands of the Danube basin, achieved by the Croats in 1527 from the Carpathian Mountains to the Adriatic, ceased to exist in 1918 at the end of the First World War," concludes Professor Dabinović in his essay on Hungarian-Croatian relations on the 70th anniversary of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise.[239]

Naturally, this Croatian legal historian did not intend to claim that the Monarchy perished due to the wishes of the Croats. The other nationalities acted with the same sentiment, and in the last decade of the Monarchy, even the Hungarians, adopting the refrain—"The von Oesterreich"—which was countered by the Austrians with "The von Ungarn." The adverse fate of this multinational state was manifested in the fundamental structural difference between the Austrian and Czech lands, which belonged to the Central European sphere, and the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, which constituted a marginal European region.[240] Herein lay the true reason for the incessant polemics and permanent conflicts between the two halves of the Monarchy, which, under new conditions and times, led to its destruction, without either side assuming sole responsibility.

From the dissolution of the Hungarian-Croatian state in 1918 to the present day, Croats and Hungarians have maintained good neighborly relations. Furthermore, Hungary was the first of all states to recognize Croatia's independence on April 10, 1941. Finally, it is worth noting that, despite their years of shared political community, no mixed-population regions have formed between Hungary and Croatia that could hinder these good neighborly relations in the future.

COMMENTS

"HEARING THE BELLS" A Yugoslav film about bell towers, minarets, and... knives

The Yugoslav film industry is currently inspired almost exclusively by the cult of the so-called "national liberation struggle." While interest in war films has long since waned in the rest of the world, in communist Yugoslavia the almost narcissistic evocation of those "heroic" days is still in vogue, albeit somewhat forced. These "historical" films flatter the vanity of "the greatest son of our peoples," but also distract the masses from the problems and failures of a rather bleak present.

It is understood that most of these war films are nothing more than communist propaganda; not only do they exalt the guerrillas of that ideology to superhuman dimensions, but at the same time, they degrade their adversaries, especially the Ustaše, to such an extent that they seem less than human. Such bias toward the defeated adversary is rarely found anywhere else in history. Perhaps precisely because their victory was the result of a combination of international forces, not their own.

Perhaps the worst thing of all is the attempt to remain silent or distort the true causes of the conflict, as well as the ultimate goals of the warring parties. The communists are thus portrayed as freedom fighters, hiding in the forests out of a pure and fervent desire to liberate the Yugoslav peoples from the rule of "the occupier and its internal accomplices." At no point do the Yugoslav communists mention how they defended the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact while attacking the Western "imperialists," nor how they only became guerrillas when Soviet Russia was attacked, precisely to relieve pressure on its war front and install their own dictatorship and a regime of terror in Yugoslavia, identical to the one Stalin imposed in the "cradle of socialism." We suppose the Yugoslav communists couldn't now claim to have fought for the socialism of self-management!

We suppose the Yugoslav communists couldn't possibly claim now that they fought for the socialism of self-management! On the other hand, communist propaganda, even today, a quarter of a century after the war, portrays the Croatian regular army (domobrani) as an immobile entity that didn't know what it wanted, while the Ustaše were, for the communists, an incarnation of the devil, whose sole purpose in war was to kill for the sake of killing and to spill blood.

Through these films, the viewer cannot possibly learn that Croatian soldiers fought at least as bravely as the communist guerrillas in defense of their homeland. Since the Yugoslav Communist Party was organized on the basis of a Yugoslav idea (until 1935 the communists advocated for the dismemberment of that state and the organization of independent states for its constituent peoples), it was now necessary to create and maintain the fiction that "our peoples" fought in the last war for a common state. That could only be plausible on the condition of remaining silent about the key fact: that in the last war, three national ideologies clashed: Croatian, Serbian, and Yugoslav.

I patiently read in Vjesnik u Srijedu (March 12, 1969), from Zagreb, something about a new Yugoslav film that was supposedly unlike the others: "a play between propaganda and art." This time, the war events were presented in "another language," and the truth was revealed "for both sides." It is the film "Hearing the Bells," directed by Antonio Vrdoljak, with the war diary of the guerrilla general Juan Šibl serving as its screenplay. Vjesnik u Srijedu published an extensive interview with Vrdoljak and Šibl regarding this film.

Vrdoljak explains what he set out to do with it: "For me, the biggest obstacle was that heritage of ours within which, for twenty years, we presented the partisans (communist guerrillas) as the only heroes—an exclusive pride of this country—as giants who annihilated the blind Germans and the undecided Ustaši, that is: their enemies—so it was implicitly argued—who lived outside of space, and only our mothers cradled brave children... For that reason I wanted to proceed in another way: to communicate the truth, to tell it here from both sides."

As a momentous event, Šibl recounted in his "Diary" how his unit had "given" the life of an Ustaši named Meho, who later, out of gratitude, became a fiercely combative guerrilla fighter. When asked if this actually happened, Šibl replied: "My Meho is a real person. He and Suljica went to buy schnapps, but Suljica was shot, wounded, and had his throat cut (but who did it? Author's note), and Meho was captured, chained, and taken to my unit. At that time, the most normal thing to do would have been to shoot an Ustaši with the letter 'U' on his fez and armed with a rifle, because the atmosphere was thick with blood... But that's not what happened, and Meho wasn't killed."

It is extremely interesting to note that the "most normal thing" for communist guerrillas was to execute captured adversaries. But if, in turn, these adversaries paid the captured communist guerrillas back in kind, then it was a crime of mass murder.

Vrdoljak explains the ideological crux and the film's title as follows: "The historical setting is a restricted area where three religions coexist. The dialogue states verbatim: 'When Vjeko heard that there were two bell towers and a minaret nearby, he declared that this was too much. And then he added: "Three gods for this small piece of land!" Gara replied: "You don't love God."'" And Vjeko continues explaining: “(I have nothing against God, but if three gods become three knives… These are the kinds of problems that need to be addressed…”)

Vrdoljak interjects again and says: “It is necessary to talk about these problems. In the film, I addressed these problems during a terrible time. But a time that could be repeated tomorrow. Let’s not joke! It could happen tomorrow that this country becomes the scene of a war waged from abroad, and then those vampires could spring forth sooner than we expect.”

From the above, it is obvious that, under the guise of telling the whole truth, this film is in reality mere pro-Yugoslav-Communist propaganda. The conflict of the last war was not about national and state ideas, but merely about religious division and backwardness. The blame, therefore, lies with religion, with the fact that in our regions there were “three gods” who became “three knives.”

One only needs to think for a moment to understand how biased and inaccurate this accusation is. The Serbs, the Bulgarians and Macedonians belong to the same Greco-Oriental religion, and yet, in the regions where they coexist, very serious events have occurred, not only during the last war, but also since the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) to the present day. Montenegrins profess the same religion, but at the end of the First World War and during the Second, there were very bloody clashes between supporters of union with Serbia and those of Montenegrin independence. Furthermore, doesn't the case of the Ustaše Meho disprove the film's thesis? It is an undeniable fact that Croats of both Islamic and Catholic faiths fought shoulder to shoulder in defense of the Croatian state, which is one of the irrefutable arguments for the national identity of Bosnian Muslims. How else can Mr. Vrdoljak explain the fact that a bell tower (Croatian-Catholic) and a minaret (Croatian-Muslim) Would they unite against another (Serbian Orthodox) church?

Blaming religion for all evils is an old communist habit. And it is all the more absurd because it is practiced by those who profess—and try to impose by force—a new dogma, a new worldview, introducing into human relations fanaticism, intolerance, and hatred, unknown until now in history. In the name of this new dogma, several million innocent people have been killed so far: more than in all the religious wars. With this ideology, relations between nations are poisoned and bloodied, even between those forced to live under the communist regime, as confirmed by the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Sino-Russian conflict. All this was also happening in our villages and cities.

Meanwhile, we have seen that this film also failed to tell the truth. To avoid acknowledging the existence of the Croatian national identity and its state, the film blames religion and irresponsibly invokes bell towers, minarets, and knives.

Until the unvarnished truth about the real causes of the unfortunate events of the last war can be told in Yugoslavia, and until the yearning for national freedom of the Yugoslav peoples is interpreted as chauvinism, the danger of a repeat of the disasters we deplore will remain. As Vrdoljak aptly put it: "Don't joke around! Tomorrow this country could be exposed to war from abroad, and the vampires could strike sooner than we expect!"

STANKO M. VUJICA: UNPUNNED CRIME OF BELGRADE COMMUNIST AGENTS IN MUNICH, WEST GERMANY

On October 26, 1968, a horrific crime was committed against three Croatian exiles in the German city of Munich. Mile Rukavina, Krešimir Tolj, and Vid Maričić, the victims, were found dead that day at the headquarters of the United Croats of Germany, in the heart of Munich. According to police experts, the victims were shot with a silent revolver at approximately 10:00 a.m. and their bodies were not discovered until 4:00 p.m. The perpetrators, according to public opinion, were Tito's secret agents, operating with diplomatic documents and other means of movement among some 180,000 Croatian workers currently residing in West Germany. The following day, the three were buried in the local cemetery, accompanied by some 5,000 compatriots to their final resting place, where they received solemn funeral honors. For this reason, Croatian organizations sent several memoranda to local and central authorities of the West German government, accusing the Belgrade regime and requesting protection for the lives of their compatriots.

To characterize the hypothetical climate and general atmosphere in which these latest victims of Yugoslav communist terror fell, we reproduce a portion of the article by Dr. W. Sshoetler, a German lawyer and notary, written on the occasion of the discovery of this terrible crime: "...After the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between communist Yugoslavia and West Germany, the terror of the UDBA (Yugoslav Secret Police) has been intensifying. Croatian émigrés have become wild animals for the Great Serbian communists in Germany... The consulates and consulates general, as well as the trade missions of the criminal Belgrade regime, serve as havens for the secret, cunning, and unscrupulous service in West Germany.

The German authorities passively witness the crimes without doing anything to stop them... Anyone who tries to identify the crimes of the UDBA is accused of being a Cold War instigator or a radical right-winger... We live in Germany in A time when the relevant German institutions fraternized and collaborated with the communist dictatorship and its state-run trade unions. Anyone willing to capitulate to the communist dictatorship was given every opportunity... But while these German authorities tolerated the terror of the communist secret service and did nothing against it, the same authorities acted without pity or consideration toward Croatian emigrants..."

To these observations of the German lawyer, we can add nothing but appeal to the German government to provide legal protection to the workers and other Croatians in their country. A Christian philosopher recently wrote a book: The End of Machiavellianism. Can we believe it?

After these crimes, others have occurred. In Spain, a former Croatian general was cruelly murdered, and in Munich, engineer Nahib Kulenović, son of the former president of the Croatian government and one of the most prominent leaders of the Bosnian Croat Muslims, was killed.

Does tyranny have an end or limits?

DOCUMENTS

ROGER BOŠKOVIC WAS CROATIAN

The unjustified Serbian claims are not limited to Croatian territory, Bosnia and Herzegovina for example. These ambitions extend even to our spiritual achievements. They have been proceeding in this manner for a century, spreading propaganda paid for by their government to the detriment of Croatia. Among the mystifications of this propaganda is also the claim that the celebrated Croatian mathematician and philosopher, the father of atomic theory, Jesuit R. Bošković, was of Serbian origin. The Serbian professor Petronijević edited Bošković's THEORIA PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS in London in 1924, presenting him in his preface as a Serbian scholar. The edition was financed by the Belgrade government.

Two years ago, this book was republished in North America, repeating the same Serbian mystification. Given that he is an extraordinary figure, whose dental work is generating increasing interest in the most prominent scientific circles worldwide, especially in North America, in the pursuit of truth, it is necessary to rectify such a significant error and establish Boškovic's origins.

Upon reading the book LE MATIN DES MAGICIENS by the French authors Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier, we find this false assertion about Boškovic's Serbian origin repeated.

For this reason, the Latin American Croatian Institute of Culture on 8/8/1966 addressed the following letter to said writers:

Messieurs

L. PAWELS et J. BERGIER 4 Rue Galliéra

PARIS

Messieurs:

Nous avons lu evec great interest et plaisir le livre- “Le Matin des Magiciens”, mais vôtre affirmation dans le même oevre, que R. Boškovic était Serbe, nous a cause une surprise désagréable.

Certes, on peut trouver des affirmations pareilles dans d'autres publications, de caractère éphemère ou encyclopedique, but tous tous ses auteures son des victimes de la propagande grand-serbe.

C'est pour des raisons d'objetivité historique, aussi bien que pour nôtre intéres special croate, que nous semble nécessaire d'appeler votre attention sur cette tendenciese serbe mystification.

Quant a l'objectivité historique, vous même dites, que Boškovic est né a Dubrovnik. More this city, il y a plusiers siecles, est une ville croate et catolique. (See: Hans Kohn: "Idea of Nationalism", page 545). L'histoire, in fact, ne connait pas un seul pêtre franciscain, dominicain ou jesuite qui eut été serbe. The Serb people, on the other hand, profess the Greek orthodox religion. Où peut on trouver des couvents catholiques serbes? Selon dite mystification serbe, un seul jesuite serbe existait — Boškovic — et justement celui-ci était un genie!

In other words, Dubrovnik is one of the plusieurs formations of Croatian culture, or available is sauvée une part of the Croatian souveraineté, morcelé pendant des siècles de nos luttes contre les Ottomanes et pendent l'occupations d'une part du territoire Croate par eux mêmes.

In the city of Dubrovnik blooms all the world of culture — la peinture, la sculture, la science et la littérature Croatian, point de départ de la littérature Croatian moderne. The Dubrovnik ecrivens appear in “slave or Croatian” language, but never Serbian. All cela a autorisé les historiens croa-tes de proclamer this cité adriatique «Athènes croate».

Bošković's family is originally from the Croatian province of Hercegovine who formed, at the time, the center of the Croatian Rouge. (D. Mandic: “Bosna i Hercegovina”, Chicago 1963 ou de même auteur, dans notre publication: (Bosnia and Herzegovina», que nos vous, envoyans). Cette territoire, les environs immédiates de Dubrovnik, et ses habitants, ont conservé son caractère et sa conscience nationale Croatian jusqu' a present, malgré toutes les tentatives d'inflitration serbe et de leur religion orthodoxe grècque.

La Croatie vit aujoud'hui sous le régime communiste de caractèr Serb, mais si vous vous leadershipz, par example, a l'Académie Yougoslave de Zagreb, vou recevrez, nous en sommes sûrs, la même réponse, que nous vous donons ici. In addition, Bošković lui-même écrit dans une lettre, dirigée a son frère Bartolomé a Dubrovnik, après avoir assisté a un défilé des troupes impériales a Vienne, qu'il a vu «nos croats» dans la parade. Naturelment, Bošković a written are frère in Croatian.

Quant a notre intéret special croate, nous nous permetons la liberté de vous dire, que tous les peuples du monde défendent leur droit d'existence et d'autodétermination nationale, reclamant also bien le titre des leurs apports au trésor common de la civilization. Par consequent, nier a Bošković sa nationalité Croate dans les conditions actuelles, ou son peuple Croate lutte pour sa liberté nationale et pour survivence même, signifie une tentative de diminuer ou de priver le peuple Croate d'un des ses titres de droit a la liberté nationale, suprimée en Yugoslavie grand-serbe.

Because of all this, our prions to verify our contestations and to correct your affirmation in the new edition of "Le Matin de Magiciens" or in your revue of "La Planète", publication of a large diffusion in more lagues and countries.

"En await your response and opinion on your subject, please see, messieurs, assurances of our consideration."

Secretary:

Dr. F. NEVISTIĆ

President:

Dr. M. BLAŽEKOVIĆ

On September 26 of the same year, the magazine STUDIA CROATICA received the following response from Messrs. L. Pauwels and J. Bergier:

PLANÈTE editions

114 champs elysées paris tel. 359 8416 8650

STUDIA CROATICA

Carlos Pellegrini 743 - P. 3 of. 18 BUENOS AIRES

(Argentine Republic)

"Messieurs,

This is our vacation return that Jacques Bergier et moi-même avons pris connaissance de votre lettre du 10 Août.

Vous nous donnez là une précision historique que nous n'avions pas trouvée dans l'importante documentation que nous avons dépouillée pendant cinq ans avant d'entreprendre la rédaction de notre ouvrage «Le Matin des Magiciens». Now all on the verifier for éventuellement en tenir compte.

Avec tous nos remerciements.

"Nous vous prions d'agréer, Messieurs, l'expression de nos meilleurs sentiments."

LOUIS PAUWELS

A few months later, the magazine "Planète"—in its Spanish edition No. 13, September-October 1966, pp. 129-143—published an article by Mr. J. Bergier, which we partially reproduce here, in which he mentions several times that the Jesuit scholar R. Bošković was of Croatian origin.

On page 129, Mr. Bergier quotes from the book "The Morning of the Magicians": "Mutant? Time traveler? What mysterious and unknown being hides behind this mysterious Croatian? He is not only ahead of the science of his time, but also ahead of our own science." In the first edition of "Le Matin des Magiciens" (The Morning of the Magicians), "Serbian" was used instead of "Croatian."

On the same page, Bergier writes: "...The science writer Arthur C. Clarke observes that the great genius of the Renaissance could not have conceived of electronics, and that if a television receiver had been placed in his hands, he would have regarded it as an indecipherable enigma. The mathematician Roger Bošković, on the other hand, is much closer to the fabulous creatures described by Sturgeon in "More Than Human," or to Van Vogt's fantastic novels about slans. If there is a difference in favor of the Croatian mathematician who lived in the 18th century..."

On page 131, Bergier says: "Bošković was the seventh son of a seventh son. It is a lineage of magicians." His birth certificate could never be found, but a baptismal certificate states that he was born on May 18, 1711, and baptized on May 26 of the same year. His father was a freeman, a rare condition at that time. Later, he placed the crown of nobility of the Croatian Boško family on his stationery. It is not certain that he had the right to do so.” Thus Bergier repeats seven times in his article, treating Bošković as a scholar of Croatian origin. Highlighting his scientific work, Bergier quotes Lalande’s text: “In April 1776, the great Lalande wrote to him: ‘You will see in the literary news of 'Le Journal des Scavans' of April a note in honor of your Treatise on Conic Sciences.’” Here is an excerpt: The author's genius shines here as brightly as in his most sublime works... A profound geometer who justifies, even in the smallest details, his long-standing reputation as the greatest mathematician of our century.

Bošković published his book, "Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis," in 1758.

On page 136, Bergier summarizes Bošković's law of the universe attract: "The Croatian scholar's idea was to formulate a single law that would describe everything. This single law is simple: matter is composed of objects called 'puncta'... Puncta each other when they are quite far apart, and repel each other when they are very close... This law, which applies to two puncta, can be mathematically generalized to three, four... puncta, and therefore to all the puncta in the universe."

On the same page, he reproduces the opinion of Bošković's biographer, the Englishman Lancelot Law Whyte: "Bošković's theory is an astonishing effort of imagination, a masterpiece of anticipation. It exhibits, to a very high degree and in an unusual form, a passion for order and spirit... Those who rise above the fashion of the day will discover that Bošković is worthy of particular honor: he defends what is lacking in modern physics: the spirit of clarity in fundamental values."

On page 137, it says, among other things: "Most of Bošković's theory is too advanced to be verified in the current state of our science." Lancelot Law Whyte writes: "If the universe is not composed of puncta, it ought to be." Nietzsche said that "Bošković's theory is the greatest triumph of the human spirit over the senses achieved to this day on this earth..." The theory of quantum mechanics—Bergier continues—was born directly from the work of J. J. Thomson, who, as early as 1905, wrote that he owed everything to Bošković. Rutherford's ideas on the structure of the atom derive directly from Thomson and, through him, from Bošković. Bohr and Heisenberg expressed their debt to Bošković at the International Symposium held in Dubrovnik in 1958."

Bošković died in Monza, Italy, on February 13, 1787. "On March 13, de Lalande will deliver his eulogy at the French Academy." He would insist on his choleric temperament, but add: "It is the only fault he was known to have, but it was compensated for by all the qualities that constitute a great man." Streets in Rome, Milan, and Dubrovnik were named in his honor. A lunar crater bears his name (which would have been the most important thing for him), and in the gardens of the Atomic Institute in Zagreb, a large statue of Bošković, created by the Yugoslav sculptor (the great Croatian sculptor, Ed.) Ivan Meštrović, raises his visionary face toward the sky. “The space age will be more interested in Bošković than we are,” wrote his biographer, Elizabeth Hill.

We believe that this will bring to an end one of Serbia’s less-than-honest adventures. It is the duty of the Croatians to buy as many copies of this journal, “Planète,” distributing it wherever they deem appropriate, especially in universities and among scientists. The Serbian propagandists “deserve” a few copies as well. Considering that Messrs. L. Pauwels and J. Bergier have honestly fulfilled their promise, our Institute, in a letter dated January 26, 1967, thanked them for their intellectual integrity and commitment to historical objectivity.

“Buenos Aires, January 26, 1967.

Messrs.

Luis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier, Editions Planète

116 Chapters - Elysées

PARIS - VIII

Messrs.

We confirm that you have retrieved your letter from 26 September 1966, or that you promise to verify the accuracy, whether Bošković is Croatian or Serbian.

Avec une great satisfaction nous praises in the number 13 of "Planète", from the Spanish edition of the article by Monsieur J. Bergier, in the Croatian origin of Bošković is publicly recognized and confirmed.

Avec l'article cité, Vous avez accomplu sériesment la vôtre promise et confirmé la votre probité intelectuelle, worthy of the western cultural tradition.

"Nous Vous prions d'agréer, Messieurs, l'expression de notre gratitude et de nos meilleurs sentiments".

Secretaire

Dr. F. NEVISTIĆ

President

Dr. M. BLAZEKOVIĆ

A SERBIAN NEWSPAPER ON CROATIAN-SERVIAN RELATIONS

Analyzing the apolitical and national relations between Croats and Serbs in the newspaper of a group of Serbian exiles —"Naša Reč", No. 187-90 of 1967, p. In issue 16—published in London for the past 20 years—Engineer Vladimir Predavec, in his highly original article, states, among other things: "The Croats felt threatened by the State (real Yugoslavia, Ed.) and the Serbs felt it was their State. This fundamental feeling of both sides also determined their attitude toward this community. In such a situation, where one nationalism represents centrifugal tendencies and the other centripetal ones, all issues and problems were misunderstood and posed backward. I will mention just one example.

The majority of Croats declared themselves in favor of an independent Croatian state in 1941. This is, without a doubt, a perfectly legitimate political stance, to which every community has the right. A handful of Croats embraced the ideology and adopted the methods of the Ustaše, which is something else entirely. However, the majority of Serbs still identify the two things today. This is, of course, a grave error." Let's suppose the roles in Yugoslavia had been reversed: the Croats, the majority supporting the state; the Serbs, the minority feeling that the state had been imposed upon them. I am absolutely certain—without fear of anyone in good faith contradicting me—that in such a situation the roles would have been reversed, and the Serbs would have seized the first opportunity to secede from such a state community.

DEED OF GIFT MADE IN 1069 BY THE CROATIAN KING KREšIMIR IV IN NIN[241] TO THE CONVENT OF SAINT CHRYSOGONO

"I, Krešimir, ruling by the grace of God in Croatia and Dalmatia, and reigning after my grandfather of blessed memory, King Krešimir, and my father, King Stephen—both of whom now rest in the field of Klis—assembled in my residence at Nin with the present committees (governors), princes, and bani, and with chaplains of my royal court, began to consider what I might offer to Almighty God to safeguard my rule of the inherited kingdom and grant eternal peace to the souls of my ancestors and forebears. And I found that, of all deeds of piety, none would be more pleasing to God and more worthy of our earthly court than to bestow upon the dwellings of saints and monks possessions and fitting gifts."

And since the omnipotent God extended our kingdom over land and sea, we determined and determined to honor the convent of Saint Chrysogonus in Zadar with possessions and lands. We also find in the works of our predecessors, illustrious Croatian kings, that they too bestowed many estates and properties upon said monastery; and we, wishing to depart in no way from the path of our ancestors concerning the salvation of our souls and those of our deceased, grant to you, Saint Chrysogonus, through the intercession of the venerable Peter, worthy abbot of your holy house, our own royal island, located in our Dalmatian Sea, which is called Maon and to its left lies the island which in Croatian is called Vir. Let this island, therefore, be forever the property of the monastery of Saint Chrysogonus, and let no mortal oppose it, since we so decree with the consent and at the request of the lords of all our kingdom.

In order that this donation of ours may be lasting and valid for all time, We certify and sign it, together with our bishops, and decree that whoever may be... Forgetting divine judgment and despising our royal honor, he wishes to seize that island from the aforementioned convent. May he be guilty of this at the Last Judgment; may he eternally share the fate of Herod, Judas, and Simon the Magician; may he be cursed by God and His apostles, by all the saints, and especially by Saint Chrysogonus.

We further decree that for this criminal act he must pay our court—either during the reign of one of our successors, or during the term of governor or ban—a fine of 100 pounds of gold and be declared forever dishonored in our kingdom. I, Krešimir, King of Croatia and Dalmatia, bear witness to this. I, Stephen, Bishop of Zadar, signed this document. The names of the eyewitnesses then follow: Adamić, Governor of Nin, witness; Boleslav, Commodore of the Court, witness; Velkić, Governor of Luka, witness; Volesa, Senior, witness; Budac, Chamberlain, Governor of Bribir, witness; Ivan, Royal Chaplain, witness; Petar, Judge of the Royal Court, witness; Studec, Royal Cupbearer, witness; Leo, First Royal Swordsman and Governor of Dalmatia, witness; Selislav, Governor of Sidras, witness; Dragomir, Governor of Cetin, witness; Andrew, Mayor of Biograd, witness. In the city of Nin,

Amen.

BOOK REVIEW

Victor E. Meier: Neuer Nationalismus in Südosteuropa (New Nationalism in Southeastern Europe).

Notebooks of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy, ed. C. W. Leske Verlag, Opladen, 1968, pp. 154.

The Swiss journalist Viktor E. Meier gained particular renown for his analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia and other southeastern European countries while serving as a correspondent for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung in Belgrade and later in Vienna. His book also addresses the political problems of these countries and analyzes the new course, current issues, and possible solutions in Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Turkey. In separate chapters, the author later reviews past attempts and current possibilities for closer political cooperation in the Balkans.

The German Society for Foreign Policy (based in Bonn), which published the aforementioned book, does not take a position on the issues discussed in its publications. The same criterion applies to Meier's work, funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.

Given that such a vast subject is summarized in so few pages, it is obvious that many topics are barely touched upon or outlined, and others not even mentioned. The style and mode of exposition are engaging. An extensive bibliography appears in the appendix, but there are no references or citations throughout the text. Meier devotes considerable attention to the problems of Yugoslavia and even suggests perspectives for future solutions. In the internal Yugoslav process, he envisions only one alternative: he contrasts the Yugoslav state community with the exclusivism of the nation-states of the peoples that comprise it, adopting and advocating for the Yugoslav conception as the only viable and accepted political solution. In this way, Meier anticipates a pre-defined position and limits his study, which detracts from the book. From the outset of his exposition, he addresses opposing viewpoints and simply asserts that the Yugoslav solution is the only viable one.

Speaking of the multinational and multicultural character of Yugoslavia, Meier refutes the opinion of German and Austrian historians who maintain that it is an artificial conglomeration, doomed to disappear. He also disagrees with the public consensus in Yugoslavia, as well as with the English historian Taylor, who described Tito as the last of the Habsburgs, intent on restoring the state structures that led to the fall of that dynasty and the bourgeois governments of Belgrade. To these doubts, Meier counters with his unitarian political creed: "The current Yugoslav community, despite so many difficulties, is far from resembling a historical fossil and presents itself as a modern state concept that, with its supranational character and the constant pursuit of internal equilibrium, can serve as a guide for the entire southeastern European region" (p. 36).

Despite this bias, Meier objectively reviews the ideological process of a common state during the 19th and 20th centuries in Croatia and Serbia, and the political evolution in pre- and post-war Yugoslavia. Meier contrasts two divergent conceptions of the state: the Croatian and the Serbian. "While, among the Croats, the Illyrian Movement, Strossmayer, and Supilo disseminated ideas about a common South Slavic state, among the Serbs, Ilija Garašanin, with his Načertanie (Program, 1844), elaborated the concept of an aggrandized Serbia, which N. Pašič later implemented in 1918, extending Serbia's dominance over the peoples and minorities that comprised Yugoslavia. "That program remains influential in Serbian national thought to this day," Meier states.

The new state was founded on a "flawed foundation" in 1918, which provoked widespread opposition from the Croats under the leadership of Esteban Radić. Regarding King Alexander's Yugoslavism, Meier asserts that it was not sincere, but rather "served to mask unrestricted Serbian hegemony." This policy fueled the Ustaša movement, while Dr. V. Maček, following a different approach, sought to resolve the Croatian question within the framework of the Yugoslav state through the 1939 Compromise.

Summarizing the events of the last war, Meier argues that the communists, given their small numbers, would not have come to power under normal circumstances. Furthermore, they were not the first to rebel, as they adhered to the non-aggression pact signed between Hitler and Stalin. "If Germany had not attacked the Soviet Union on June 21, 1941, the communist uprising might never have occurred," Meier writes.

First, the Serbian nationalist četnici rebelled, and the communist guerrilla movement began in Užice, Serbia, later shifting its center to Montenegro. Only after the collapse of Pavelić's regime in the Independent State of Croatia did the communists achieve significant successes on the Bosnian-Croatian border. Meier then argues that Bulgarian policy in Macedonia and Hungarian policy in Vojvodina favored the guerrilla movement.

The Allies began to provide aid to Tito. The Ustaše persecution of Serbs in Croatia and the Italian persecution of Croats in Dalmatia drove people toward the communist ranks. The communists then presented the Yugoslav platform in contrast to the exclusivist Serbian conception, which included revenge against the Croats. In Meier's view, this "Yugoslavism in practice" brought the communists to the forefront of the fight against the occupying forces and, subsequently, to power. Meier also mentions the massacre of the Croatian army in Slovenia at the end of the war. "Once the war was over, the communists liquidated the remnants of the Ustaše, the Croatian regular army (domobrani), and the Slovenian National Guard in Slovenia, which had been partly handed over to them by the British in Carinthia and Styria" (p. 48).

From Meier's account, it is clear that the guerrillas, under communist leadership, came to power due to the mistakes of others and not by virtue of the communist program. But the communists did not fulfill the Yugoslav mandate, and, in Meier's opinion, "now is the time when it must be fulfilled in a new way" (p. 49). "So far, the communists have not managed to solve the national question. They avoided certain pre-war mistakes, but they committed new ones." His conception of fraternity and unity is dead, and as for the solution of emerging national problems, the Communist Party went no further than the pre-war regime in 1939 (p. 58).

According to the author, federation is a dead letter, and centralism, under Ranković, took on a Serbian communist character with "the reincarnation of the old Serbian ambition for hegemony in communist garb" (p. 55). The greatest opposition to centralism comes from Slovenia and Croatia, which, with the help of Macedonia, overthrew Ranković in 1966. Meier notes a great change in Slovenia: before the war, the Slovenes, led by Korošec, were content; now, as a people, they are in opposition, and Meier considers Slovenia to be the focus of the new nationalism in Yugoslavia, since there the people and the Communist Party allied themselves in a united front against central power. From Belgrade. Due to economic exploitation, Slovenia and Croatia currently oppose the federation. Led by these peoples, the opposition is forming in Yugoslavia, while Serbia remains alone as "the base of power for dogmatic forces."

Meier presents a picture of the internally dislocated Yugoslav state, which pays too much attention to foreign policy problems, while internal contrasts are becoming more acute. He believes that the new solution to the national problem requires finding a new Yugoslav synthesis and counteracting the forces now acting in the opposite direction. This synthesis, according to Meier, will be achieved if "the traditions of each Yugoslav people and the South Slavic historical movement are fully integrated in the search for a realistic solution."

He is convinced that only such a solution would be correct, since in that central Balkan region, only a large and powerful state can be permanently maintained—and because the Yugoslav state arose "from real factors." of space and the real interests of the respective peoples." These and similar arguments were wielded with greater justification in favor of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, however, disintegrated, primarily due to its own internal dissolution and decay, and the erosion of the state organization and the ruling class. Yugoslavia is in a similar situation: rotten and worn out, and the idea of a state in that country lacks appeal for new political forces.

Meier also argues that postwar Yugoslavia was restored due to the mistakes of others, the fear of its population, and the lack of any other acceptable state model for the victors. At the same time, he observes that this new Yugoslavia is far from resolving the nation's problems. The situation worsened due to the radical opposition of the Slovenes and the failure of the economic reforms, which Meier only mentions in his book (written in 1967) and which did not yield the expected results: centralism and Serbian hegemony remain in place.

The decentralization of investment policy, one of the main objectives of the reforms, failed, and substantial reform was obstructed by a superficial amendment to the constitution prior to the 9th Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia in March 1969. The key positions in the economy, the army, and various security services are held by Serbs, and the opposition tries, in vain, to gain access to them. It is likely that open clashes between the opposition and the central authorities will occur even during Tito's rule.

National problems have intensified after 25 years of communist rule. What is most important, and what Meier foresees, is the fact that there are no major political forces inspired by the Yugoslav ideal. During the war, at least a handful of communists, in addition to the exiled and compromised monarchist government, believed in the idea and in the Yugoslav state. Today, no one believes in it anymore! Meier insists that the most prominent champion of this new Yugoslav conception is Vladimir Bakaric, who, in reality, asks very little of the central government and lacks support among Croatian communists.

After the failure of economic reform, Bakaric and his policies lack support in Croatia. Meier develops a new conception of the Yugoslav state, based "on the new national consensus." It should, therefore, be constituted with the agreement and consent of all the peoples and national minorities that comprise it, regardless of the issue of "federation" or "confederation," focusing instead on how to enact laws and establish the powers of each republic. Only the laws would provide the appropriate framework, while in each republic they would be supplemented by executive provisions and regulations. With the creation of an appropriate institutional framework, the Yugoslav economic area would not be divided, while "Croatia and Slovenia must continue to contribute for the benefit of the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia. This is the price they must pay for the political protection afforded them by the Yugoslav community" (p. 65).

Meier acknowledges that in the Western republics there is repudiation of Yugoslavia, but he does not mention their right to self-determination and secession. On the contrary, he considers such a process absurd and contrary to historical development. He even opposes the rectification of borders between republics. He disregards the problem of the large Albanian minority, the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo and Metohija, or even its incorporation into Albania. This is a static approach to the national question in Yugoslavia. Meier's entire conception of the reorganization of Yugoslavia boils down to political reforms, which do not differ much from current solutions.

Meier's insistence on the status quo of Yugoslavia as a state and its internal division into republics is outdated. He doesn't even attempt to synthesize the idea of nation-states with the concept of their integration into a broad economic community. Herein lies the possibility of a contemporary solution not only in the Balkans but throughout the Adriatic-Danubian region. In that area, according to political possibilities, an economic community could be gradually established that would smooth out differences and subordinate national interests to common interests.

The demarcation of national borders is unavoidable (as was the case in Yugoslavia), but without national exclusivism or autarkic policies, many existing national antagonisms, primarily those stemming from national minorities, would automatically be mitigated. With the rectification of borders, it becomes possible, in a humane way and to a certain extent, to carry out population exchanges where necessary.

This community should be formed according to the circumstances and needs of the Adriatic-Danubian region, not through the incorporation of individual states into Western European communities, since neither the political conditions nor the level of economic development favor such a link with that Europe. The Adriatic-Danubian area can become a major political and economic power, while the economic community, given existing ties and natural development, will gravitate primarily toward the markets of Central and Western Europe. The Adriatic-Danubian economic community can encompass not only the peoples of Yugoslavia, or rather, its states, but also other nations.

Such a solution is consistent with developments in Western Europe and the world. The realization of the right to national self-determination should be enabled (and not impeded, as V. Meier recommends) in Southeast Europe as well, but the nation-states of that region must immediately integrate into an economic community that will facilitate their political rapprochement with other countries.

Meier also refers in his book to the attempts made for cooperation in the Balkans. His main themes are: the expulsion of Turkey from the Balkans, the maintenance of the status quo since 1918 within the framework of the Little Entente, the attempts to form a Balkan confederation after the Second World War, the imprecise Yugoslav policy, and the new Belgrade-Bucharest axis. In this regard, the author suggests a plan for closer cooperation, which he considers indispensable, and in which he sees an orientation towards Western Europe. He would probably hold identical views had he written his book after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries. Here, Meier is much more flexible than on the Yugoslav question, and he emphasizes certain very positive elements. But in this case, as a precondition, he advocates for the maintenance of state borders in southeastern Europe.

For him, the national problem appears as if it were solved, both for the peoples of Yugoslavia and for neighboring peoples, even though he claims the opposite. Here, his plans diverge from reality and also differ from the postulates of several countries for their national liberation. For him, the virulent problem with international implications—that of the Albanians of Kosovo-Metohija—is, in principle, re-solved by the inviolability of state borders in southeastern Europe. In his opinion, a positive basis for Balkan cooperation will be the current Romanian conception, founded on friendly collaboration between nations, on respect for the status of those nations and their foreign policy orientation. There is no doubt that Romanian policy tends to strengthen the position of states and peoples in that area; it constitutes a new and positive factor. It is determined by current Soviet policy, but despite independence from Moscow, it is not enough for the formation of a lasting community.

To this end, contemporary conceptions are needed that establish a degree of institutionalization, not merely ad hoc agreements. Today, the integration of nation-states into supranational communities is possible without abolishing their respective sovereignties. As we have already emphasized, an economic community is now imperative in the Adriatic-Danubian region, which should begin with a customs union, coordinated investment policies, production, and foreign trade without bureaucratic regulations. A distinct political zone will likely emerge in this area between the military blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Against this reality, Meier imposes a certain political voluntarism, contradicting himself.

Meier brings a valuable new element to the discussion. He takes into account the growing distance between the US and the Balkan countries (though not its withdrawal from the Mediterranean), the increasing independence of Western Europe, and its closer ties with the nations of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. But he emphasizes that, for France and other Western countries, in their task of building bridges with the communist countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union should not be the interlocutor; rather, the interested nations themselves should be the direct interlocutors.

This community should be formed according to the circumstances and needs of the Adriatic-Danubian region, not through the incorporation of individual states into the communities of Western Europe, since neither the political conditions nor the level of economic development favor such a link with that Europe. The Adriatic-Danubian region can become a major political and economic power, while the economic community, given existing ties and natural development, will gravitate primarily toward the markets of Central and Western Europe. The Adriatic-Danubian economic community can encompass not only the peoples of Yugoslavia, or rather, its states, but also other nations.

Such a solution is consistent with developments in Western Europe and the world. The realization of the right to national self-determination must be enabled (and not impeded, as V. Meier recommends) in Southeast Europe as well, but the nation-states of that region must immediately integrate into an economic community that will facilitate their political rapprochement with other countries.

Meier also refers in his book to the attempts made toward cooperation in the Balkans. His main themes are: the expulsion of Turkey from the Balkans, the maintenance of the status quo since 1918 within the framework of the Little Entente, the attempts to form a Balkan confederation after the Second World War, the vague Yugoslav policy, and the new Belgrade-Bucharest axis. In this regard, this author suggests a plan for closer cooperation, which he considers indispensable, and sees in it an orientation towards Western Europe. He would probably hold identical views had he written his book after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Here, Meier is much more flexible than on the Yugoslav question, and he emphasizes certain very positive elements. But in this case, as a precondition, he advocates for the maintenance of state borders in southeastern Europe.

For him, the national question is presented as if it were solved, both for the peoples of Yugoslavia and for neighboring peoples, even though above he states the contrary. Here, his plans diverge from reality and also differ from the postulates of several countries for their national liberation. For him, the virulent problem with international implications—that of the Albanians of Kosovo-Metohija—is resolved in principle. Because of the inviolability of state borders in southeastern Europe, and in his opinion, a positive basis for Balkan cooperation will be the current Romanian conception, founded on friendly collaboration between nations, respect for the status of those nations, and their foreign policy orientation. There is no doubt that Romanian policy tends to strengthen the position of the states and peoples in that region; it constitutes a new and positive factor. It is determined by current Soviet policy, but despite independence from Moscow, it is not enough for the formation of a lasting community.

To this end, contemporary conceptions are needed that determine a certain degree of institutionalization, not just ad hoc agreements. Today, the integration of nation-states into supranational communities is possible without abolishing their respective sovereignties. As we have already emphasized, an economic community is now imperative in the Adriatic-Danubian region, which should begin with a customs union, coordinated investment policies, production, and foreign trade without bureaucratic regulations. A distinct political zone will likely form in this area between the military blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Against this reality, Meier imposes a certain political voluntarism, contradicting himself.

Meier brings a new element of singular value to the discussion. He takes into account the growing distance between the US in the Balkan countries (though not its withdrawal from the Mediterranean), the increasing independence of Western Europe, and its closer ties with the nations of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. But he emphasizes that, for France and other Western countries, in their task of building bridges with the communist countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union should not be the interlocutor; rather, the nations concerned should be the interlocutors directly.

The same applies to the Federal Republic of Germany, which should not orient its policy toward Eastern Europe solely with a view to German unification. This principle was violated by Washington in the last war when it placed the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe within the Soviet sphere of influence. De Gaulle's policy, despite the verbal recognition of the sovereignty of the Central and Eastern European countries and their right to national self-determination, disregarded the vital interests of these peoples. Therefore, Meier's demand that the West collaborate, negotiate, and trade directly with these countries remains highly relevant.

Brugg, Switzerland

Jure Petricevic

Veceslav Holjevac: Hrvati izvan Domovine (Croats living abroad).

Ed. Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1967, pp. 375.

Veceslav Holjevac wrote, to date, the most comprehensive and informative study on the Croats who emigrated from their country and spread throughout the world. According to the statistical data he compiled, more than two million people live outside Yugoslavia; in addition to 1,500,000 Croats, there are 340,000 Slovenes, 200,000 Serbs, 100,000 Macedonians, and 10,000 Montenegrins.

Around 700,000 people emigrated from Yugoslavia during and shortly after the Second World War. Another 300,000, mostly workers and farmers, left from 1960 onward to work "temporarily" in Western Europe, primarily in West Germany.

Holjevac highlights the gravity of Croatia's emigration problem through extensive documentation and statistics. Currently, one in four Croatians lives outside their homeland, and continued emigration at this level will seriously affect Croatia's demographic and economic growth. For example, from 1962 to 1965, 150,000 people left Croatia to work in Western Europe, and only 5,000 have returned since.

As the first comprehensive work of its kind, Croatia's Homeland suffers from unavoidable shortcomings, omissions, and errors. Despite these flaws, the book proves to be an indispensable and highly informative source on Croatian migration, settlements, and colonies, as well as on the lives of Croatian descendants in many countries.

Holjevac is an interesting figure. Born in 1918, he joined the Communist Party in 1939 and was one of the organizers of the communist partisans in Croatia during the last war.

A bold and uncompromising leader, Holjevac rose rapidly through the ranks, eventually becoming political commissar of Tito's Fourth Army Corps. At the end of the war, he was military commander of Istria and other areas annexed by Italy between the two world wars. He rose to the rank of lieutenant general and then headed the Yugoslav military mission in Berlin. He subsequently served in the federal government in Belgrade as minister for the newly liberated regions.

From 1952 to 1963, Holjevac was Chairman of the People's Council of Zagreb (mayor), and in this capacity, he became deeply involved with the issues facing Croatian emigrants. He was president of Matica Iseljenika Hrvatske (Croatian Emigrants' Association), a government-sponsored organization that maintains contact with Croatians living abroad. The Institute for Migration and Nationality (Zavod za Migracije i Narodnosti) systematically compiled documentation on Croats in various countries around the world; this is the material Holjevac primarily used for his book.

Holjevac served several terms as a member of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) and the Federal Assembly (Skupština) in Belgrade; he was also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia until 1967, when he was forced to resign under pressure from Vladimir Bakaric, the committee's chairman. This departure had been anticipated since Bakaric censured Matica Iseljenika Hrvatske at the Central Committee meeting in April for allegedly establishing "links with hostile émigré organizations." A thorough investigation was conducted, and its findings were presented to the Central Committee at its session on October 16, 1967. Holjevac was censored for his liberal politics and for the content of his book, which was about to be published.

The first part of Holjevac's book offers a brief historical overview of Croatian emigration from the 15th century to 1918. The Ottoman invasion forced many Croatians to seek refuge in Austria, Hungary, Romania, Italy, and Slovenia, where their descendants still constitute a minority.

Croats also participated in the transatlantic colonization that began in the 16th century. By 1850, some 13,000 Croatians had settled in the New World. Driven by adverse political and economic conditions, mass Croatian emigration to the Americas began after 1880 and reached its peak on the eve of the First World War. Between 1900 and 1913, 329,251 Croatians arrived in the United States, a high number considering that Croatia in 1910 had only 3 million inhabitants.

Mass emigration continued after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929). From 1921 to 1939, 105,000 Croatians emigrated, and only 46,000 returned. Since the quota for entry into the United States was set at fewer than 1,000 people from Yugoslavia, most Croatian expatriates had to settle in other countries, and many of them established themselves in Canada.

Croats in the United States

The second part of the book, titled "In the New Homeland," describes various Croatian communities and their contributions to their adopted countries. The longest chapter, at 80 pages, focuses on Croatians in the United States. Since Holjevac had to rely on material available in Yugoslavia and did not conduct extensive research in the United States during his brief visit a few years ago, this chapter is necessarily truncated and incomplete.

Of course, even in the United States, it would have been difficult for him to gather all the data on immigrants, since many Croats were registered under the name of their province, namely as "Dalmatians" or "Slavonians," or simply according to the country of which Croatia was a part, i.e., as "Austrians" or "Yugoslavs." It also appears that Holjevac did not have access to the data from the last U.S. census (1960), published in 1963. Overall, Holjevac attempted to gather much interesting information about Croats in the United States. He provides an extensive overview of their cultural and political activities, giving a detailed account of the founding and activities of the Croatian Fraternal Union (Pittsburgh, PA), the largest Croatian organization in the United States. For some reason, he says little about the "tamburitza" orchestras and folk groups, particularly popular among young Americans of Croatian descent.

The book devotes considerable attention to the activities of Croatians in the period leading up to the First World War and to the work of the "progressives" between the two world wars. According to Holjevac, "the most progressive segment of Croatian immigrants was organized in the Yugoslav section of the American Communist Party." Holjevac, however, objectively recounts the activities of the Croatian Peasant Party, but ignores Hrvatski Domobran, an organization influenced by Ustaše political émigrés, which was very active in the United States during the 1930s. Consequently, the reader cannot obtain a balanced picture of the political activities of Croatians in North America.

Likewise, Holjevac says nothing about the political activities of Croatian Americans in the postwar period, except to list several organizations that are, he says, "hostile to present-day Yugoslavia."

The book contains a highly useful bibliography of Croatian newspapers published in the U.S. from 1884 to 1960. The author primarily uses data compiled by George Prpic, a professor at John Carroll University (Cleveland, Ohio). Of course, such a limited book could not include all the data of interest and importance to Americans of Croatian descent. Nevertheless, some notable omissions should be pointed out. Holjevac completely ignores Croatian religious organizations, particularly the Croatian Catholic parishes and schools that played a very important role in the lives of Croatian immigrants, and some of which are still active. But perhaps it would be too much to expect scholarly objectivity on this matter, considering the circumstances under which the book was published in Zagreb. This would have exposed the author to even more bitter attacks from the dogmatists of the Communist Party.

Croatians in Canada, South America, and Australia

Holjevac refers more briefly to those who emigrated to Canada, who are less numerous than those in the U.S. On the other hand, some Croatian communities in that country are very active and maintain their national identity. The context of this section suggests that the material on Croatians in Canada is a sketch, perhaps because Holjevac did not have access to more comprehensive documentation in the Zagreb archives.

Around 250,000 Croatians and their descendants live in Latin American countries, primarily in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela. The author provides an overview of the development and activities of the Croatian communities in these countries. Again, the shortcomings of this chapter appear to be due to a lack of more extensive documentation. For example, the bibliographic data on Croatian publications in Argentina is incomplete and sometimes misleading (Hrvatska is listed as Hrvatsko Glasilo; Hrvatska Revija is quarterly, not bimonthly; the journal Studia Croatica, published in Spanish since 1960, is not even included in the list of publications by Croatian immigrants in Argentina—Editor's note).

In two separate chapters, Holjevac refers to Croatian communities in Australia and New Zealand. The difficulties he encountered in compiling documentation for that part of the world were, of course, equal to, if not greater than, those he had to overcome for the other chapters.

The author, for example, does not even mention several Croatian publications in Australia, such as Hrvatski Dom (from 1958 to the present), Spremnost (1958 to the present), Informativni Vjesnik (1961 to the present), and Uzdanica (1965 to the present). Holjevac also names several football teams, especially "Yugal," promoted by official Yugoslav representatives in Australia, but says nothing about the Croatian team that recently defeated "Yugal." There are a dozen clubs called "Croatia" in various Australian cities. They are members of Australian football leagues, and some are prominent in their respective cities or regions. None are mentioned by Holjevac.

The book briefly touches on various Croatian communities in Europe.

Particularly interesting is the fact that, according to Holjevac, 195,000 Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosmet emigrated to Turkey between 1953 and 1957, and that among them were Croats of the Islamic faith. In the section "The Contribution of Croatian Emigrants to the Struggle of the Peoples of Yugoslavia During the Second World War," Holjevac elaborates on the organization of the "Congress of Croats in North America" in Chicago in 1943 and the "Second North American Slavic Congress" in Pittsburgh in 1944. He also reviews the considerable financial support provided by various Croatian groups to Tito's partisans during that time.

The New Economic Emigration

The final chapter, entitled "The New Economic Emigration," is extremely important because it provides abundant data concerning the mass Croatian migration of recent years. The emigrants are often people in their prime; of the 150,000 who left Yugoslavia between 1962 and 1965, 30% were under 25 years old and 60% were between 25 and 40. They left their homeland because they couldn't find work, because of the meager wages, or because they couldn't afford decent housing. Others went abroad to learn a trade or to earn enough to buy a car and other durable goods.

The gloomy prospects of the workers are reflected in these figures: in 1965 there were 1,058,333 employed workers in Croatia. Compared to 1965, jobs increased by only 29,000 or 2.9%. Since the inauguration of the economic reform in 1965, the job market became even more restricted.

Holjevac fears that many who left "to find temporary employment" abroad will not return because of the unfavorable long-term economic prospects in Croatia.

After listing the positive aspects of mass emigration, such as the acquisition of new professional skills and the increasing influx of foreign currency to Yugoslavia, Holjevac points out the negative consequences of migration:

"A quarter of Croatians live abroad. From a national point of view this fact is of decisive importance. Further emigration can be decisive for the Croatian nation. Frankly, we can say that it endangers the demographic and economic development of the Croatian people. (For the other peoples of Yugoslavia emigration is not so critical because it constitutes a much smaller percentage of their population.)

"Industrial expansion in Croatia is lagging behind the national average of the entire country (Yugoslavia). At the same time, the industrialization of other republics and regions does not provide a source of work for Croatians, since these republics have sufficient labor of their own, both specialized. (because they have the advantage of better-funded schools) and without specialization.

Croatia's industrialization is stagnant also due to impoverishment and underdeveloped areas of Croatia and, consequently, Croatia cannot provide enough jobs to its citizens in those regions. This problem of underdeveloped regions and republics must be re-examined and if the policy of subsidies to underdeveloped republics and regions is continued, considerable sections of Croatia (especially islands, the regions of Dalmatinska Zagora, Lika, Hrvatsko Zagorje, Medjumurje and the interior of Istria) must be included in the category of underdeveloped regions and treated accordingly." (p. 356).

Holjevac emphasizes that there is a constant drain of many specialized workers and professionals leaving the country. In turn, this can have disastrous effects on the subsequent growth and expansion of the Croatian economy.

Due to mass emigration and the declining birth rate, the population of the Republic of Croatia, which had 4,160,000 inhabitants in 1961, will number only 4,420,000 in 1970, and the possibilities of finding employment will remain extremely restricted.

Holjevac praises the examples of Croatian companies that, using Croatian labor, are carrying out construction projects in Germany, Sudan, Austria and elsewhere. Such arrangements are more beneficial for the Croatian economy and the possibilities for expanding this type of international cooperation should be fully explored.

The author also addresses the problem of social protection of Yugoslavian workers employed abroad and cites the bilateral agreements in this regard that Yugoslavia signed with other countries.

In contrast to the official Yugoslav propagandists who try to cover up the truth about the serious political and economic situation prevailing in Yugoslavia, Holjevac not only courageously faced the problems currently overwhelming the Croatian people, but proposed several remedies. He advocates that greater participation be granted to private initiative and free enterprise, especially in crafts and commerce, and suggests the import of foreign capital rather than the export of labor. "This problem," says Holjevac, "must of course be studied in a way that harmonizes with our social and economic structure."

Despite the supposed liberalization and democratization of the Yugoslav system, Holjevac's ideas were considered dangerously unorthodox, and it is therefore unsurprising that he was the target of vehement attacks by the dogmatists of the Communist Party and by the followers of the ousted head of the secret police, Alexander Ranković. To appease these reactionary forces, Holjevac was eventually expelled from the Central Committee of Croatia.

The complex problem of the mass Croatian exodus from their country, its causes, its economic, social, and political consequences, as well as the remedies to reverse this course, are treated with unusual frankness. These qualities make Holjevac's work perhaps the most significant book published in Croatia in 1967. It is no wonder that it became a bestseller, selling out in record time.

New York

KARLO MIRTH

George Prpić: The South Slavs, University of Kentucky Press, 1967, pp. 173-203.

In the symposium "The Immigrants' Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies," edited by Joseph P. O'Grady and published by the University of Kentucky Press in 1967, Dr. George J. Prpič, professor of history at John Carroll University, Cleveland, addresses in his work entitled "The South Slavs" the influence of a million South Slavic immigrants and their press in the U.S. and Canada on American public opinion and official circles regarding the ultimate fate of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the national aspirations of those immigrants.

Of the million South Slavic immigrants on the eve of the First World War, 650,000 were Croats, 250,000 Slovenes, 100,000 Serbs (mostly of Croatian descent), 2,000 Montenegrins, and 10,000 Bulgarian Macedonians. They differed in nationality, religion, language, and alphabet, and therefore also in their political aspirations. The Croats, being the largest group, founded the Croatian National Community in 1894 and the Croatian League in 1912. This political organization opposed Austria and supported an independent Croatian state, which would later unite with Serbia, Slovenia, and Montenegro to form a new South Slavic state.

Consequently, this organization was hostile to the Habsburgs. The press was divided into two groups: those favorable to the Habsburgs, that is, those advocating for the Croatian state within the Danubian Monarchy and opposed to its dissolution (Domovina and Narodni List, with 12,000 daily copies). The newspapers opposed to the Habsburgs were: Hrvatska Svíjest (10,000 copies), Srpski Dnevnik (10,000 copies), Glasnik of the Slovenes (12,000 copies), Hrvatska Zastave (5,000), Clevelandska Amerika, Srbobran of New York, Srpski Glasnik of Chicago, and Zajedničar, the weekly newspaper of the Croatian National Community.

In about thirty pages, Prpic summarized the most important events and apolitical currents among South Slavic immigrants since the arrival in New York of Frank Potočnjak in January 1915, when at the great national congress held in Chicago on 10/3/1915 the resolution on the destruction of the Monarchy and the creation of a democratic Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian State was adopted. On that occasion, the Yugoslav National Council was founded, composed of 37 members. The work in question extends until May 1918 when Wilson changed his mind regarding the preservation of Austria-Hungary.

The author refers to the Pact of London (April 26, 1915), Italy's entry into the war, the founding of the Yugoslav Committee with the purpose of dissolving the Danubian Monarchy, Italian irredentism, Pašli's Great Serbian intentions, then to the second South Slavic Congress that met in Pittsburgh in July 1915, the arrival of Milan Marjanović in October 1915, and the third congress that he organized in Pittsburgh in November 1916, which, among other things, recognized the Yugoslav Committee as the representative of the South Slavs from Austria-Hungary and hailed Wilson as a "defender of the rights of small peoples."

At the same time, the adversaries of the The South Slavic Union—comprised of Croatian and Slovenes priests with Nasrodni List—met in Pittsburgh on November 19, 1916, sent a meiporandum to Wilson and issued a proclamation demanding "the unification of Croats and Slovenes into an independent and free state." Meanwhile, Washington's declaration of war on Germany on April 6, 1917, strengthened the position of the South Slavic movement. The Serbian ambassador in Washington, Ljuba Mihajlović, facilitated Colonel Pribićević's recruitment of volunteers for the Serbian army in Corfu.

Upon the signing of the Corfu Declaration (July 20, 1917), a serious crisis erupted within the South Slavic movement in North America: many emigrants, opponents of the Habsburgs and staunch republicans, opposed the monarchical system envisioned for the future Yugoslavia. To quell the unrest, the Serbian government sent Dr. Hinković, a member of the Yugoslav Committee, turned against Serbian interests and left the Committee. On December 7, 1917, Washington declared war on Austria-Hungary, signaling a shift in American policy that was not implemented until May 1918.

The author reviews the essential moments of the political process from the proclamation of Wilson's Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918), emphasizing its discouraging influence on the members of the Yugoslav National Council and the Serbian military mission in the halls of the US Congress, since point 10, in Lansing's opinion, "did not promote the independence of different nationalities, but rather left the impression that they should be autonomous states within the Monarchy." When, the following day, Lloyd George expressed his hope for the federalization of Austria, Secretary of State Lansing, in his memorandum of January 10, 1918, recommended "the union of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia under one sovereignty," neglecting to include Slovenia.

When the Allies failed to achieve peace with Austria, Lansing's view on the dissolution of Austria-Hungary began to gain traction within Wilson's inner circle. Only on May 29, 1918, after further efforts by Lansing, some American ambassadors in Western Europe, and the Serbian ambassador Ljuba Mihajlović, did Washington adopt the policy of the complete dissolution of Austria and promise independence to the South Slavs, despite warnings from some American ambassadors that Montenegro was opposed to uniting with Serbia and that there were also people in Croatia and Serbia opposed to unification.

Supporters of the South Slavic republican movement, especially the Slovenian Republican Federation, demanded a Yugoslav federal republic, labeling the Yugoslav Committee undemocratic for violating Wilson's principle of national self-determination. The position of the unionist movement was aggravated by the United States government's refusal to recognize the Yugoslav Committee as the de facto revolutionary government of the South Slavs in the Danubian Monarchy. This refusal came at the behest of Italy and Serbia, although on September 3, 1918, the US recognized the Czechoslovak Council as the government, headed by Tomáš G. Masaryk.

After a brief account of the events in Croatia in October 1918, Prpić mentions Lansing's note, dated October 19, 1918, in response to the Austro-Hungarian note of October 7, 1918, which called for peace based on the Fourteen Points of Wilson. Lansing stated in his note that "the President... was no longer free to accept the mere autonomy of these peoples as a basis for peace, but was obliged to insist that they, and not he, should assess what action by Austria-Hungary would satisfy their aspirations." This note dealt the death blow to the Dual Monarchy, asserts Prpić, and he limits the efforts, especially those of Gršković and Hinković, to prevent, through American intervention, the Italian and Serbian occupation of the Croatian and Slovene regions. In Paris, the Adriatic Question almost caused the Peace Conference to fail; finally, this issue was resolved by the Rapallo Agreement of November 12, 1920, by which the Kingdom

Félix Germain: La Yougoslavie, Casa Arthaud edition, "Les Beaux Pays" collection, Grenoble 1968

It is an edition of 178 pages. The text, in the nature of a tourist report, is accompanied by 125 photographs in black and color. The author dedicates the book to Aleksander and Rada from Belgrade, to France and Liliana from Ljubljana, to Nada from Sebeniko and "to all my Yugoslav friends," he says verbatim.

Driving through the main traffic arteries of the country, the author devotes his attention mainly to the natural beauties and artistic creations of each region, adhering to the criteria of the current political division of Yugoslavia. Photographs of landscapes, churches, museums, bridges, etc., should bear lasting testimony to your experiences.

It is necessary to point out that the author has expressed extensive bias. While there are numerous photographs of Ljubljana (Slovenia) and Belgrade (Servia), there is only one of Zagreb (Croatia) sandwiched between those of Ljubljana and the other Slovenian cities, as if it were part of them.

Among the first series of 21 songs, 19 are from Slovenia and only two from Croatia. From Ljubljana there are 6, from Sempeter 4, etc., the Croatian capital deserving only one — the cathedral with the church of Saint Mary, and a boy on a cart, full of pumpkins — "On the Croatian route." At the beginning of the book there are three photographs and on pages 56 and following, 10 more photographs of Belgrade. In addition there are reproductions of Peé, Dećani, Prizren, Gračanica, Sopočani, Studenica, Kragujevas, Topola, Ravanica, Kalendic, Niš, etc., dedicated to Serbian Orthodox churches and their national monuments. There is also the church of Oplenac, where the remains of the Serbian Karageorgevich dynasty rest.

The author expresses his admiration for Serbian architectural, sculpture and painting achievements, always linking them to Serbian history, events and kings. When talking about similar phenomena in Croatian Dalmatia, the author almost always sees the hands of others—from one or another school of the West, especially Italy—but in Serbia almost everything is Serbian, forgetting Byzantine inspirations and foreign masters, especially those from Croatian Dubrovnik.

Furthermore, when referring to churches and other Croatian artistic achievements or historical monuments in Dalmatia, the author avoids or minimizes mentioning the Croatian name. The works of Meštrovic and Rosandic, Croatians, are works of "Yugoslavian sculptors." Describing his impressions of Dubrovnik, although the author appreciates all its natural and artistic beauties, admires its creative, cultural, commercial and political spirit, and fails to mention that all of this, nature and human creations, belong to the Croatian people; its property and the emanation of its spirit. Not once does he mention Croatian literature from Dubrovnik.

The Croatian name is mentioned only when referring to the "Hungarian-Croatian kingdom", remembering that Dubrovnik resisted and defended its autonomy and its state formation against Byzantium, against the Serbian princes and Venice. The entire coastline is called the Dalmatian coastline, but from Hercegnovi we have the "Montenegrin coastline". Dalmatia, cradle of the Croatian State, thus enters this book under the name Dalmatian. and the part of this same Croatian historical and ethnic region, given after the last great war to Monte-negro, is called the "Montenegrin littoral." The Croatian name seems destined to disappear. Aleksandar and Rada almost achieve their goal, informing their French friend.

The bias of the author and his informant friends is even more accentuated if we read the text that accompanies the photographic reproductions. In the historical essay, the author reduces Croatian history to the same category as Slovenian history, dedicating the same number of lines to it. According to their informants, the Slovenes and Croats have been diluted in the Germanic or Roman world, while only the Serbs retained their independence until the mid-15th century. Serbia and Montenegro are, for the author, two Serbian States from the beginning, while the Serbian tribes in Bosnia and Herzegovina "between these two Serbian States and Croatia" fell in the 12th century under the rule of Hungary.

The author thus makes historically false claims. Bosnia and Herzegovina were Croatian lands, and their Bani (prorex) were included in the List of the Seven Greats, who elected the new king of Croatia when the throne became vacant.

The author doesn't mention a single Croatian king, while listing a whole number of Serbian kings and, recalling the Battle of Kosovo (1389), goes so far as to tell us that the corpse of the Serbian "Tsar" Lazar "was thrown upon the corpse of Sultan Murat, who had been beheaded by the Serbian knight M. Obilic." This Battle of Kosovo, according to these "historians," had opened the way for the Ottomans westward to Vienna. They know nothing of the battles of Mohač, Siget, or Belgrade, where, along with the Hungarians, the main force of resistance for centuries was the Croats. There is no mention of Croatian battles against the Ottomans at Bihac, Sisak, Krbavo Polje, Klis, and so many others that earned the Croats the title "antemurale Cristianitatis" (bulwark of Christendom).

Mr. Germain now attempts to convince the Western world that the Serbs, true vassals of the Turks, were the defenders of Christendom. Of course, after the decline of the Ottoman Empire, exhausted in its struggles against Catholic Christian states—Spain, Hungary, Croatia, Austria, Poland, and Venice—Mr. Germain and his informants resume the almost inexhaustible narrative of the Serbian wars of liberation. They detail their rebellions from 1804 to 1815 until they achieved, with the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, their independence after centuries of slavery. The Slovenes and Croats were, throughout that time, an integral part of Austria-Hungary, conveniently forgetting to mention that Croatia at that time lived in its "Reliquiae reliquiarum olim inclyti regni Croatiae," enjoying far greater autonomy than Serbia achieved in 1830. Croatia had its own Sabor (parliament), its own autonomous armed forces, even though under Habsburg sovereignty, forming, along with others, the last remnant of the "Holy Roman Empire," which defended Western civilization, paving the way for the Serbs to also undertake their uprisings and liberation. Now, it seems, the liberated want to proclaim themselves defenders and liberators!

The author's assertion that "the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in the 19th century 'suppressed their individual ambitions in favor of a common Slavic policy'" is absolutely inaccurate. History knows the 19th century as the century of Serbia's greatest efforts, its most unjustified particular ambitions to seize Croatian territories, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina. Spreading Great Serbian propaganda among the Orthodox minority in those Croatian provinces and falsifying history, a fanatic from this minority, G. Princip, assassinated Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 for attempting to resolve the Croatian question within the same political framework as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, thus creating Trialism, in which, alongside their German and Hungarian partners, the Croats and Slovenes would have the same political and state standing.

The criminal attack, which Serbs currently celebrate as a national holiday, erecting monuments and museums in its honor, caused the First World War. At its conclusion, the war imposed a regime of oppression on the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and the Hungarian, German, and Albanian minorities, lasting from 1918 to 1941. After 1945, a Great Serbian regime, bearing the mark of the Unionist movement, was once again established, suppressing all forms and values of democracy and freedom.

The communist and Great Serbian influence is particularly evident in the author's description of Cardinal A. Stepinac, whom he characterizes as "more of a combat bishop than a shepherd," when Pope John XXIII called him "the image of the Good Shepherd." The unprejudiced world cannot conceive that John "the Good" could have formed an opinion without carefully considering what he was about to say. "Monsieur Germain et ses informateures" thus appear utterly ridiculous and beyond cynical.

Worried about the future of that monstrous country, the author entrusts it to God. The ideological indifference of new generations of bureaucrats, particularism, and the struggle for central investment funds, he says, are the problems shaking the foundations of Yugoslavia. But the most serious problem of all is the national question. Germain trusts in Providence that national passions will not be unleashed again.

We Croats and believers in Providence find it very difficult to understand Mr. Germain's trust in Providence, when he knows full well the injustices that have been and are being committed against many, but the most serious ones against the Croatian people, and those that will be committed. The providence that would protect so many injustices would not be Providence.

Mr. Germain's cynicism takes its particular form when he decides to embellish his book, which constitutes a true cultural and political genocide against the Croatian people, with quotes from the American Revolution. All the more so since the Croatian people had to foot the bill for this edition, which must have cost the Belgrade government a fortune.

F. NEVISTIC

BIBLIJA - STARI I NOVI ZAVJET (BIBLE - THE OLD AND THE NEW TESTAMENT), Stvarnost Publishing House, Zagreb 1968.

This is a deluxe edition spanning 1302 pages. This new edition of the Holy Bible in Croatian is the fruit of a collaborative effort. Among them are some of the most prominent theologians and biblical scholars, as well as leading communist writers and philologists from that hybrid society. Hybrid precisely because the communists—one might say the natural adversaries of all religion—and the theologians, priests, their devotees, and equally natural practitioners have come together in a joint work: the translation and edition of the most important document of one of the greatest religions in the history of humankind. In the spirit of coexistence, particularly emphasized in the post-protocol period—the 1966 Protocol signed between the Vatican and the Yugoslav communist government—the communists justify their collaboration with historical, cultural, artistic, and other reasons, while the theologians, in addition, offer reasons specific to the faith.

Thus, for example, the poet Jure Kastelan, Marxist and former guerrilla fighter, says in the Introduction, among other things: "The Bible is the most widely read and translated book that human genius has ever created: For Christians—Catholics and Protestants—it is a sacred book, an inspired book of normative character. For everyone else, the Bible is at once a collection of historical documents and a literary work of original and lasting value. It is an integral part of humanity's culture."

Dr. Bonaventura Duda, a Franciscan, states in the General Introduction: "Christians study it as a normative book and a document in which they find the Message—the word of God. But the Bible is also a historical document, one of the oldest books, where the Hebrew genius assimilated, in its own way, and enriched the efforts and wisdom of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt, transmitting them to the Greco-Roman civilization and ennobling them through the Greek genius. Thus, it became one of the factors of our culture and civilization... Without the Bible, consequently, we cannot study the beginning and development of our own culture. Without it, without its history, without its themes and symbols, the enormous European artistic heritage and our own—literature, music, sculpture, and painting—become incomprehensible."

The principal translators of this great work are: Dr. Ante Sovćé (Old Testament, excluding the Pentateuch and the Psalms). The Pentateuch was translated by the exiled Croatian Franciscan friar Silvio Grubišić, while the New Testament was translated by his fellow Franciscan friar Ludovico Rupčić.

Because of its size, beauty, and linguistic purity, we believe this edition of the Bible to be the most precious of all those published in Croatian, despite the existence of translations dating back to the 14th century. It is hoped that this concrete collaboration will extend to the entire life of the Croatian community, paving the way for more humane general declarations.

F.N.

CHRONICLES AND NEWS

IN MEMORIAM OF REVEREND FATHER CARLOS KAMBER

On June 30, 1969, Reverend Father Dr. Carlos Kamber, the Croatian parish priest of Toronto, Canada, passed away. His remains were given a solemn burial on July 5 in the local cemetery—the section designated for Croatians and purchased by Father Kamber himself.

Born in 1901 in Dalmatia, the cradle of the Croatian nation-state, he moved with his father to Bosnia—a central Croatian province—as a child, orphaned at a young age. Bosnia was the site of the fatal assassination in 1914 (Sarajevo) that triggered the First World War, and it remains the theater of the ongoing Croatian-Serbian conflict.

Father Kamber completed his secondary studies—a classical education—as an outstanding student in Travnik, Bosnia, a city and its surroundings favored by I. Andrić in his literary works. Like the latter, Father Kamber was a student at the Jesuit school in that town, which for a time served as the seat of the Veziers (a local political party).

After being ordained a priest in 1925, Father Kamber continued his studies in Rome at the Pontifical Oriental Institute, where he earned a doctorate in Theology. His studies focused on the Orthodox Church—that is, the separated Eastern Christian tradition—and Islamic philosophy and theology. Upon returning to Sarajevo, he collaborated with Archbishop Dr. Ivan Šarić, a poet and great patriot, who died in exile in Madrid some years ago.

In Sarajevo, Father Kamber developed his many gifts of a superior intellect: he was an excellent orator, a very skilled catechist, and a good organizer. With the approval and support of his archbishop Šarić, Kamber began publishing a Croatian newspaper in Sarajevo in 1932, "The Nation," which was soon banned for defending Croatian and Catholic positions in that city where the dictatorship of Serbian King Alexander only guaranteed freedom for Serbs.

Soon, Father Kamber, due to his intelligence, audacity, and dynamism, became too visible for the Serbian dictatorship to tolerate in Sarajevo. He had to leave the city and move to Doboj and Brčko, small provincial towns. But even there, he didn't remain idle. His pastoral, cultural, and national activities alarmed the Serbs. Especially his sympathies toward Muslims, whom Father Kamber considered and treated as true Croats—and objectively, they were. All of this was considered dangerous by the Serbian regime.

When Croatia declared its independence in 1941, Dr. Kamber enthusiastically placed himself at its service. After the Croatian catastrophe of 1945—the Bleiburg tragedy—he, along with the survivors, traveled to Rome, where he re-established numerous contacts with Italian clergy and politicians. On that same occasion, he engaged in a discussion with the pro-Serbian Cardinal Tisserant, explaining the essence of the Croatian-Serbian conflict in order to defend the Croatian cause before a dignitary whose political sentiments—his alliance with France in the First World War—were more prevalent than the objectivity of strict Christian ethics.

After a brief stay in Rome, Father Kamber arrived in Argentina. There, he participated in the cultural, political, and religious life of the community. The Pirovano Hospital and the parish church on Jujuy Street witnessed the presence of this priest with a broad smile and a most affable manner. From Buenos Aires, he moved to North America. He built the church in the town of Lynch and later another in Detroit, before finally settling in Toronto, Canada, where he erected a monumental basilica for his fellow Croatians, purchased an adjacent park with swimming pools, and a portion of the local cemetery for his compatriots. Among the first to be interred there, this remarkable man, priest, and patriot now rests.

Dr. Kamber left behind countless articles written for various newspapers in his homeland as well as during his exile. Despite being written hastily and without revisions, his articles never lacked brilliance of style, a wealth of insight, ideas, and fresh perspectives. His lectures were always a major event.

To honor his memory, the Bishop of Toronto, Monsignor Fulton, delivered a funeral oration—corpo presente—in the church built by Father Kamber, calling him a "very great priest." In thanking the many priests of various nationalities who had come to Toronto and enriched Canada with new elements, Monsignor Fulton said, "But the most outstanding among them was Father Kamber."

His colleague and seminary classmate, the Croatian priest Father Ante Livajušić, speaking on the same occasion, highlighted the talents and virtues of the deceased, and also stated: "When I reread the breviary, where the first Jewish king Saul is described—'cstetitque in medio populi altior fuit universo papulo ab humero et sursum'—I always remember my comrade Charles." But Samuel did not persevere to the end, while Father Charles faithfully endured even the most extraordinary temptations.

He was born poor and died poor. He wanted everything for others and nothing for himself. The slander of his enemies—the communists and the Great Serbs—could not reach the heights of Father Kamber's moral stature. With Father Kamber, STUDIA CROATICA loses a collaborator, a friend, one of the most serene spirits among the great ranks of Croatian emigrants. We would like these words of gratitude and affection to be forever engraved on the enduring bronze monument that Father Kamber erected in the hearts of all who knew him. May God be his comfort and reward!

F. N.

IN MEMORIAM DEL DOCTOR MATEO JELICIC

Dr. Mateo Jelicič was born in 1916 in Santa Teresita, Santa Fe Province, Argentina. His parents were Croatians from the town of Brusje, near Hvar. Their ancestors had arrived there in the 16th century directly from Podbor, Rama district, Bosnia, fleeing and fighting against the Ottoman invasion.

According to his parents' wishes, Mateo was sent to his ancestral homeland to complete his secondary and university studies. He spent the first four years of secondary school at a Franciscan school on the island of Brač and the final four years, earning his baccalaureate degree in Split, specializing in classical studies. He attended medical school in Zagreb, where he received his doctorate.

The Croatian people's struggle against the tyranny of King Alexander Karageorgevich between 1931 and 1934, or, until 1941, under his militaristic successors, coincided with the studies and national and intellectual formation of Dr. Jeličić. The pillaging, persecution, imprisonment, and execution of Croatians by the Belgrade regime were decisive for his national formation. Intelligent by nature, this young student quickly distinguished himself as one of the leaders of that generation of Croatian students.

While at university, he was soon elected president of the Catholic Academic Club "Domagoj" and later president of the Medical Students' Club. From these two positions within the Croatian university community, along with other clubs, especially those of the law students, he contributed his superior intelligence, dynamism, and ideas to the coordination of the students' liberation activities and, through their organizations, those of the entire Croatian people. Considering him dangerous due to the order imposed by the dictatorship, the Belgrade regime sent him to Bosnia to a confinement camp along with many of his Croatian colleagues and intellectuals.

After Croatia's independence was declared in 1941, Dr. Jeličić placed himself at the disposal of the new authorities, accepting the position of cultural attaché at the Croatian embassy in Madrid. A restless spirit eager to expand his knowledge, he regularly attended the lectures of Professor Gregorio Marañón for three years.

After the war, Dr. Jeličić returned to Argentina, his homeland. He practiced medicine for a time in Capitán Sarmiento and, having had his medical degree revalidated, settled in Buenos Aires, where he was appointed Director General of Public Health for the city. Despite his extraordinary professional, cultural, political, and charitable activity, Dr. Jeličić's health declined rapidly. On June 2, 1969, he died suddenly of a cerebral hemorrhage, and his remains were buried on June 3 in the town of Capitán Sarmiento, where his mother and siblings lived.

With the death of Dr. Jeličić, the Croatian community, especially his colleagues and friends at the University, lost one of its most brilliant intellectuals, whose many talents were constantly directed toward the fields of politics and culture. Driven by this natural passion, he joined the ranks of the National Democratic Party, rising rapidly through the ranks to its highest echelons. Dr. Emilio Hardoy, his political ally and close friend, aptly described Dr. M. Jeličić's personality in his eulogy, which we reproduce in full:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

With infinite sadness that envelops and oppresses us, leaving us motionless, suspended, and disheartened, we, his friends, received the news that we had lost Mateo Jeličić forever. We were immediately overcome by an uncontrollable emotion that we could barely manage to calm. Then shared memories began to flood back, filled with events, great and small, that were all too familiar to us; of undertakings we believed to be magnificent, almost always thwarted; and of attempts doomed to failure, but which, for that very reason, seemed all the more necessary to raise old banners and renew our ideals. How many efforts and sacrifices, which we ourselves had almost forgotten, now return, propelled from the depths of our memory by the absence of the purest spirit we encountered, we who for many years traversed the difficult paths of our politics: the soul of Mateo Jeličić. And on this occasion, his unmistakable physical and moral traits, which time will one day erase, reappear vividly etched. His endless task of leveling the playing field will live on, of course, as long as those of us who knew him and, therefore, could not help but love him dearly and respect him with unwavering courage.

His was a peculiar personality in which the contributions of his ancestral race, on the one hand, and the environment in which he had arisen and developed, on the other, were juxtaposed rather than blended. His outward appearance was that of a typical Croatian, with his powerful physique, his robust bearing, and the direct gaze of his clear eyes. His greetings, his mannerisms, his forms were European and at times seemed to have sprung from the finest military traditions of the Empire that was the homeland of his ancestors.

Even the accent with which he distinctly enunciated his words corresponded to his ancestry. He had absorbed his culture, his vast and inexhaustible culture, with relish, especially from the classics, which he recited with the same naturalness with which he applied, with unparalleled skill, a well-placed anecdote or a witty adjective learned from the mouth of a gaucho. Ladino. His medical degree, awarded in the Latin of Vienna, which still spread its centuries-old traditions, echoed the curious combination of Germanic, Slavic, Gothic, Hungarian, and Roman influences that he himself had experienced. And all this, together with the enduring presence of the land where he was born and raised, was poured into the wineskin of his remarkable physical and moral personality, producing an extraordinary specimen, unique among all others, such as there was and will be no other.

He was a doctor in love with his profession and possessed knowledge in his specialty that very few in the world possess. But at the same time, he felt an invincible inclination toward politics and, within it, more than toward the maneuvers to attain power, toward the practical aspects of official duties, toward the need to govern to achieve beneficial results, even to the point of achieving successes for the common good, successes that were sometimes difficult to learn about because he didn't want them publicized, and at other times he transferred them, attributing them to others because his strict concept of hierarchies dictated it, or because

His excessive modesty and disinterest, from which he could never recover, concealed them. Above all, he was a doctor for the masses, as demonstrated by his chosen career in public health and also manifested in what we might call his public passion.

He lived devoted to others, meticulously following events and anticipating the future, sometimes with hope, but often also, and with ample reason, with terrible anguish, with profound unease. Perhaps the recent terrifying events we have experienced have contributed to destroying his strong constitution, undermined by emotions he could never control. For his immense chest and impressive figure concealed a tender and simple heart, of boundless kindness, of a generosity that bordered on sacrifice for the sake of a friendship often not fully reciprocated, or for a duty he considered too rigorous.

How many times we traveled the province in his old car, which he knew how to make start miraculously, how many times we lived in or visited the prisons, driven by worthy sentiments and Noble passions, how many efforts we made to rebuild an old party and perhaps have it render its last service to the Province and the country. But between what he did and what others achieved lies the difference that he asked for nothing and expected nothing for himself, and that he deferred honors and positions, feeling a profound satisfaction in witnessing the triumphs of his friends.

He wielded his ingenuity with unparalleled skill, uncovering and illuminating the weaknesses of a personality or the absurdity of a situation with precise, insightful, always cordial, and often humorous observations. He foresaw the future and was right because he had a keen understanding of people and events. His advice in the most difficult political circumstances and in the most intimate and tangled problems of his friends was not only fair but also humane and inspiring. Sometimes he corrected with laughter, as in the Latin maxim, and in every case, he taught how to live with honor, without offending, wounding, or punishing.

Who didn't owe him a favor? Who didn't seek his friendship? Who among those who had the privilege of knowing him did not know that the dominant trait of his personality, what transcended his words and deeds, what remains now as a vestige of his human experience, beyond his talent, his wisdom, his inspired intuition and his unerring insight, his energy and his courage, what defined his character, what was, in short, the very essence of his life, was his kindness, his immense kindness, like a halo that never left him? And if anyone did not have his friendship because fortune did not grant them such a high privilege, rest assured that no one could ever be his enemy.

For his friends, it will be more difficult to live without the companionship that has been taken from us. But his voice will continue to whisper close to our hearts, and his teachings will allow us to unravel the most complex difficulties, uncover the most hidden secrets of the powerful and the darkest popular tendencies, until we find the sure path to the future. Someone once said at the open grave of an eminent Argentinian: "The greatest has died." Today, here, as we go to bury this great spirit—who possessed talent, wisdom, experience, and so many other high qualities—in the earth of a humble cemetery, as was his wish, we can be certain that we spoke the truth in saying that the kindest has died.

And what I will say now is what I know Mateo would have most liked to hear from his soul, in his memories and in his future life, in the feats he accomplishes and in his friends at the hour of farewell: You will live on, Mateo, in each of your friends, in the repentance that redeems them, in all the noble, pure, and elevated acts they perform; in your friends and in their hearts you will live, Mateo, our dear, incomparable, unforgettable friend.”

Also speaking at the event were: Dr. Echegoyen, director of Rawson Hospital; Dr. García Díaz, Secretary of Public Health of the City of Buenos Aires; and Juan C. Rangugiu, the mayor of Capitán Sarmiento. Dr. P. Vukota spoke on behalf of the Croatians.

A sea of wreaths covered the building and the coffin of our Mateo, whom his Croatian friends and fellow countrymen will never forget. STUDIA CROATICA thus pays a simple, yet profoundly sincere, tribute to who he was. For a long time, he was one of those who lived almost solely for the freedom of Croatia. To his wife and two children, our heartfelt condolences and deepest sympathies. Dr. Mateo Jeličić has not died, but has merely passed on to eternity.

F. N.

CULTURAL MICRO-NEWS

- LA NACIÓN, one of Argentina's most prominent newspapers, which is celebrating its centenary this year (1969), published a highly interesting article on April 27th: "Yugoslav Crossroads," highlighting the dichotomous nature of Yugoslavia. On one side are the Croats and Slovenes, oriented towards the West, and on the other the Serbs with their Eastern traditions. Currently, very dangerous antagonisms and tensions exist between these two sides. Given the increasingly evident Soviet threat in the Mediterranean, Dr. Alejandro Dusaut, a prominent apolitical figure and former Argentine university professor, who authored the article, advocates before the free world for an effective Yugoslav federation. Only in this way, the author of the article believes, could "unity for war" and defense against the Soviets be ensured.

- LA PRENSA, which also celebrates its first centenary in 1969 and, along with LA NACIÓN, constitutes the pride of Argentine journalism, has published an interview with Engineer Ante Turica, a specialist in the application of nuclear energy to sterilize insects that represent a true plague for fruit, and especially for apples in Argentina. Engineer Turica arrived in Argentina after the war and had studied at the Faculty of Agronomy in Zagreb. He currently works as one of the specialized technicians at the Institute of Plant Pathology in Argentina.

- The Reverend Father Fray Lino PediĆ, spiritual director of the Croatian community in Argentina, who also serves as secretary general of the Argentine Catholic Commission for Immigration, in a press conference on August 19, 1969, and in collaboration with the authorities of Caritas Internationalis in Rome and the International Catholic Commission of The Geneva Migration Office has highlighted the problem of immigration to Argentina from neighboring countries: Bolivia, Paraguay, and Chile.

Currently, there are approximately 1,580,000 such immigrants, and about 60% of them live illegally, populating the shantytowns. Father Pedišić publicly appealed for compassion for this multitude, seeking ways and means for their organic integration into Argentine society. "La Prensa" and several other Argentine newspapers covered Father Pedišić's presentation, publishing his photograph in the presence of representatives from Argentine and foreign authorities responsible for serious immigration and charitable issues.

Ijeposlav PeriniĆ and Dusko KalebiĆ, each in their own way, have contributed to Argentine cultural life. Perinić with the extraordinary exhibition of his dolls, a collection of international significance, and Kalebić with the second exhibition of his Plant Sculptures and Drawings. metallic. The two Croatians have aroused curiosity and interest within the Argentine cultural scene. Perinić in the folkloric and political-humanitarian circles, while Kalebić only within the aesthetic framework. "La Prensa" has published several photographs of Perinić's dolls along with a photograph of one of his daughters in Croatian national dress.

- The Hungarian magazine "TURAN," from Buenos Aires, in its first and second issues of 1968/69, published an article entitled "Hungarian-Croatian Relations." The author does not hide his sympathies with the Croatian people, although, it seems to us, he exaggerates the Hungarian linguistic influence on the Croatian language, especially in the legal field. The magazine's editor is Esteban Foyta, and the article's author is Adorján Bihar von Igló.

- Our compatriot, the painter Z. DuČmeliĆ, has won a prize of 100,000 pesos. In the first painting competition organized by the Italo-Argentine Electricity Company in Buenos Aires in June 1969, "La Prensa" of June 19, 1969, said that this prize of 100,000 pesos "was awarded to the work 'bodies and imaginary spaces' by Zdravko Dučmelić, a painter residing in Mendoza, whose high dignity is only now being justly highlighted."

- In Paris, in October of this year, a retrospective exhibition of the famous Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović was held. His work has aroused great interest in that world center of culture. Rodin was Meštrović's teacher and colleague. Along with Trumbić, Meštrović is considered one of the great Croatian idealists who believed in an imaginary Yugoslav nation, later exploited by Serbia to impose an implacable hegemony on their Croatian "brothers." Meštrović, with his exhibition in London during the First World War, impressed the English public so much that Lord Cecil, on that occasion, said that Meštrović had forever refuted the claims about the supposed cultural and creative inferiority of the "Yugoslavs," represented until then solely by the Serbs.

On October 14, 1969, to commemorate the centenary of the Argentine newspaper La Prensa, the Croatian-Argentine Cultural Club paid special tribute at its headquarters in Buenos Aires to this newspaper, considered one of the best in the world. Dr. A. Dussaut delivered a speech entitled "La Prensa: Bastion of Liberty," offering a fascinating overview of Argentine history closely linked to La Prensa and its struggle for freedom under the Paz family, its owners and directors. Dr. Dussaut was introduced to the audience by Dr. R. Latković, the Club's president. STUDIA CROATICA, as well as many other Croatian organizations, sent expressions of support to such a distinguished newspaper as to its journalistic colleague LA NACIÓN, which also celebrated its centenary in October 1969.

- SREBRENKA (SENA) JURINAC, the famous Croatian soprano, performed five times in October 1969 at the Teatro Colón in Buenos Aires. She sang the role of the shellfish cook in R. Strauss's comic opera "Knight of Roses," confirming her extraordinary qualities as a singer and actress, which had already placed her at the pinnacle of theatrical art in the European and North American world. Her artistic career began in Zagreb, Croatia. She currently performs regularly at the Vienna State Opera.

FIFTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE "CROATIAN ACADEMY OF AMERICA"

EXCERPTS FROM THE ADDRESS OF ITS PRESIDENT

On the occasion of the anniversary celebrated on January 18, 1969, when its previous president, Dr. Stanko Vujica, professor of philosophy, was re-elected, we reproduce some of the most characteristic excerpts from his address on that occasion:

"In recent years, a growing interest in the Croatian Academy of America has been observed among Croatian immigrants in the United States and Canada...

"Alongside this interest, the conviction is taking root that the conditions are now in place to expand its activities, both qualitatively and quantitatively." Reflecting this mood was the meeting organized by the Croatian-American Academic Club, with the collaboration of the Academy, under the presidency of Professor Branko Yirka...

"As, to date, the main objective of the Board of Directors has been the publication of the Journal of Croatian Studies. Volume 7-8 has just appeared this fall. I have been pleased to hear some flattering reviews, even from foreign colleagues. An American printer praised its graphic quality, calling it a true 'labor of love.' Volume 9-10 is already in preparation. According to the material prepared by the directors, this double issue will be more current, more homogeneous, and will include several references and reviews of various books dealing with our national issues. I would like to emphasize that at this moment the most urgent duty of the Board of Directors and of all members of the Academy is to give the editors their full support to ensure the printing of this volume in 1969, as this would remedy the problem, or That is, the delay in the publication of our yearbook...

"Our members also achieved remarkable successes in their professions this year, and many of them published studies in their fields. I would particularly like to highlight the publication of the second volume of the Symposium on the Cultural History of Croatia: Croatia Land, People and Culture, Vol. II, edited by our members, Doctors Eterović and Spalatin, by the University of Toronto Press, as well as Dr. Bombelles' book: Economic Development of Communist Yugoslavia, published by the prestigious Hoover Institution at Stanford University. To the Academy's benefactors, especially those who contributed substantial sums, I express my deepest gratitude...

"I am pleased to inform you that the Academy, with a financial contribution from Dr. Tuškan, has established a prize for the best essays written in English on Croatian culture and history. The call for submissions was published in English last summer in all the immigrant newspapers; And finally, in the January 15, 1969 issue, it appeared in Zajedničar. We hope that these contests will continue in the coming years and that they will contribute to promoting and disseminating Croatian cultural heritage, even among the third generation of Americans of Croatian origin.

"Speaking of this cultural heritage, allow me to briefly mention in this annual report certain significant developments in Croatian culture over the past year. This culture appears to be gradually freeing itself from the shackles of Stalinism and the monopoly of a single ideology, returning to cultural pluralism. The religious press is experiencing a clear resurgence. The former Society of St. Jerome has resumed its work under the name of the 'Society of St. Cyril and Methodius.' The publication of the Bible, with the cooperation of leading exegetes, writers, translators, and linguists, is a monumental undertaking. We are pleased to hear that a similar edition of the Quran is being prepared. It is worth noting the founding of the Hrvatski Književni List (Croatian Literary Gazette) exactly one year after the well-known Declaration on the Status and Designation of the Croatian Language.

This journal was received with enormous enthusiasm in Croatia, given its frank and decisive advocacy for cultural tradition." Historical and political. The editorial of the first issue states: “The rejection of tradition, which has lasted for more than 20 years in almost every field, in the name of false avant-garde values and various imported ‘isms’—as a rule, poisoned dross from foreign pseudo-cultures such as a more reactionary nihilism—has inflicted great damage on our culture.

The return to our cultural heritage seems to be the central trend, even among Croatian philosophers. In early March 1969, the Croatian Philosophical Society celebrated its 10th anniversary and, on that occasion, organized a symposium on the theme: ‘Croatian Philosophy in the Past and Present.’ Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers participated. Father Francisco E. Hosiko lectured on scholastic philosophy in the Zagreb Circle of the 17th and 18th centuries. Professor Vladimiro Filipović referred to the work of his colleague, the philosopher Dr. Alberto Bazala; María Brida spoke about Pablo Vuk Pavlović, while Kruno Krstić chose the topic: "The beginnings of philosophy in Croatia."

"We at the American Academy applaud this new process and these trends in our culture. We are convinced that drawing from the living national sources and this return to the ancient and humanistic Croatian cultural tradition, after a quarter of a century of various foreign influences, will have the effect of a fertile rain after long droughts, especially among the new Croatian generations.

At the beginning of this report, I highlighted the growing interest in the Academy and also the desire to see its activities intensified and diversified..."

On the same occasion, the new Board of Directors was elected, and its president, Dr. S. Vujica, was confirmed. The editors of the Academy's yearbook are: Dr. J. Jareb, Eng. K. Mirth, Prof. K. Spalatin, Dr. M. Meštrović, Prof. Nada Kesterčanek-Vujica, A. Nizeteo, Dr. D. Mandić, M. Kroker Tuškan, and Prof. Dr. S. Vujica.

300 YEARS OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN CROATIA

According to information from "Glas Koncila" (The Voice of the Council), of the Archdiocese of Zagreb, Croatia, the 300th anniversary of the founding of the Faculty of Theology in Croatia was solemnly celebrated on November 9, 1969. The beginning of higher theological education, at the academic level, dates back to 1633, organized in the Jesuit seminary. By 1662-1666, the study of philosophy was organized, with three-year courses.

This organization was made possible by a donation from Canon Nicholas Dijanešević, Prefect of the Capitol of the Zagreb Cathedral Church. Bearing in mind these moral and material precedents, Emperor Leopold I of Habsburg, on September 23, 1669, with a Royal Diploma, granted this Academy of the Jesuit Fathers all the rights and privileges common to other universities. This decision of the emperor was accepted and promulgated by the Croatian Sabor (parliament) on November 3, 1671, thus recognizing theological studies at that Faculty as equivalent to the study of public law, on par with other university studies.

Since then, this Faculty has continued its charitable work within the Croatian community. For a time, one of its professors served as inspector of all university teaching (praefectus scholarum superiorum). After some difficulties caused by the suppression of the Society of Jesus, this Faculty achieved its full organization and firm incorporation into the University of Zagreb in the 19th century, thanks to Cardinal Haulik of Zagreb and Bishop Strossmayer. This Faculty remained part of the University until 1952, when it was separated and has since functioned as a legal-ecclesiastical institution. Naturally, the communist state authorities have denied it any material support. Its operations are conducted within modest economic means, its funds formed by donations and contributions from parishioners, bishops, and priests of the Croatian people. The professors, as the current dean, Dr. Tomislav Šagi-Bunic, points out, receive "symbolic amounts instead of salaries."

Before a large audience of students, professors, and representatives of national and scientific authorities, Dr. Šagi-Bunic gave a brief but significant history of this Faculty, which we can rightfully consider the beginning of the Croatian University. The separation of the Faculty of Theology, its dean emphasized, is linked to the name of Dr. Miloš Zanko, who was at that time the Minister of Public Instruction of the communist republic of Croatia.

"Although the Faculty of Theology has not held the public status within the State since 1952, a status granted to it by virtue of the Diploma of Leopold I, it cannot be denied the right to celebrate its 300th anniversary, because as a living and creative cultural institution, it has enjoyed uninterrupted continuity from then until now. That Diploma marks the starting point in its formation as a higher education institution at the university level."

"On that occasion, the Rector of the National University, Dr. Ivan Supek, also spoke, saying, among other things: "It is certain that Leopold I's Diploma was not only a recognition of the efforts of that Jesuit Academy. That Diploma signified, above all, the recognition of Croatia's cultural tradition and all the efforts of the Croatian people in the struggle against the tremendous Ottoman invasion. It must be emphasized that your Faculty, as well as our entire University, was, throughout that time, the bearer of our national identity. It must also be said that your Faculty, like the others, was driven by a profound desire to overcome centuries of backwardness and approach the European standard."

The President of the Academy of Sciences and Arts, Dr. G. Novak, invoked the close ties between the Faculty of Theology, its professors, and patrons on the one hand, and the members of the Academy on the other, adding: "Offering greetings in my capacity as President of this highest Croatian scientific institution and the oldest of all the South Slavs, I consider this a source of pride for us, the pride of the Croatian people and the city of Zagreb..." The question inevitably arises: In what other ways do Messrs. Supek and Novak demonstrate their pride in this regard? Have they effectively refuted their Minister Miloš Zanko?

---

[1] Rudolf Bićanić, Ekonomska Podloga Hrvatskog Pitanja (The Economic Basis of the Croatian Question), Zagreb 1939, p. 14.

[2] Rudolf Bićanić, Op. cit., p. 30.

[3] Rudolf Bićanić, Op. cit., p. 19.

[4] Rudolf Bićanić, Op. cit., p. 34, 36, 37.

[5] Rudolf Bićanić, Op. cit., p. 52.

[6] Rudolf Bićanić, Op. cit., p. 112.

[7] Rudolf Bićanić, Op. cit., p. 223. Furthermore, our readers can consult in this regard STUDIA CROATICA, number 1/1961, the article Affaire Stepinac, by the prominent French politician Ernest Pezet. Also: Dr. Roko Rogošić, Stanje Katoličke Crkve u Yugoslaviji do Sporazuma (The State of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia until the Compromise) (with Belgrade in 1939. — N. Obs.), Šibenik 1940, where there are extremely interesting data on the favoritism for the Serbian Church to the detriment of the Catholic (Croatian-Slovenian).

[8] B. Bušić, The Working Class and the Nation, in Hrvatski Književni List (Croatian Literary Gazeta), No. 13/1969, p. 2.

[9] "Practice and theory of the construction of socialism in Yugoslavia", special edition. in Medjunarodna politica (International Politics), Belgrade, 1965, p. 291.

[10] B. Bušić, Casual Sentences, in Hrvatski Književni List, No. 13/69, p. 8.

[11] For an optimal development of Yugoslavia, radio discussions between Šime Djodan, U. Dujšin, Marko Veselica, Vladimir Veselica and H. šosić, see: Kritika, Zagreb, No. 6/1969, p. 299, 300.

[12] B. Bušić, The Distribution of the Net Product, in Hrvatski Književni List, N' 11/1969, p. 3.

[13] Marijan Hanžeković, "The distribution of budgetary receipts between social-political communities", in Ekonomski Pregled, Zagreb, XIX, 1968, No. 7-8, p. 345.

[14] Kritika, No. 6/1969, p. 273.

[15] See: Ekonomika Jugoslavii, Moscow, 1966, p. 62, according to Kritika, No. 6/1969, Zagreb, p. 379.

[16] See: Statistical Bulletin, No. 2/1969, page. 18-31, according to B. Bušić in Hrvatski Književni List, No. 17, p. 13.

[17] B. Bušić, Radnička Klasa i Nacija, in Hrvatski Književni List, No. 13, p. 2, Zagreb, 1969.

[18] According to Illiquidity of the economy or statism? in Hrvatski Književni List, No. 17, p. 13.

[19] B. Bušić, The distribution of net product, in Hrvatski Knjiievni List, No 11, p. 3.

[20] Kritika, No. 6, Zagreb, 1969, p. 378.

[21] Marko Veselica in Kritika No. 6/69, p. 309.

[22] Šime Djodan, Kritika, No. 6, Zagreb 1969, p. 305.

[23] Victor Meier, Neuer Nationalismus in Südosteuropa, Opladen 1968, p. 154.

[24] André Maurois, Histoire d'Anglaterre, p. 529, Paris, ed. A. Fayard and Cie. 1937.

[25] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito's official biographer and one of the bloodied Serbian guerrillas, writes in his book Die Zeitbambe, Sarajevo 1914, Europa - Verlag, Wien-Frankfurt-Zürich: "For them (South Slavs) the death of F. Ferdinand was a costly case of the death of a tyrant, which they, in the interest of the common good, had committed on the basis of natural law, which says that all men are born equal and that they are authorized to rebel against the antiquated institutions that prevent them from realizing their fundamental human rights, as well as to use terror against the institutions imposed by terror." See: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 1-2, 1968.

[26] Brother Predrag Kordic, in his essay "The Profile of Mandić" (Hrvatska Revija 15 [1-2], pp. 14-23, 1965), familiar with the atmosphere in Herzegovina, publishes several interesting facts and anecdotes on the subject.

[27] I too was a day student at that well-known high school for two years, in the seventh and eighth grades, and I graduated there in 1924. It was there that I first met and got to know Dr. Mandić. Mostar was the receptacle of his actions and initiatives.

[28] This period of Mandić's life is summarized in an excellent essay by Franjo Nevistić, who situated the man, his actions, intentions, and orientation within the "physical and historical-cultural-political environment" of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Knowledge of this environment and the fact that Mandić was born "on December 2, 1889, in a corner of the Široki Brijeg valley, eleven years after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the final collapse of Turkish power there," contribute to understanding Mandić's great work on the problems of these territories. Furthermore, Nevistić provided the correct and appropriate "historical-political framework" for Mandić's political action, without which he would not be understood. Cf.: F. Nevistić, O. Dominik Mandić; životni put i djelo (Life and Work of D. Mandić), on the occasion of his 70th birthday. Hrvatska Revija 9(4); p. 383-395, Buenos Aires, 1959.

The aforementioned essay by P. Kordić also refers to Mandić's political activity, attempting to explain his "great political failure," stemming from the beliefs of the leaders of the Croatian Catholic movement in the Yugoslav idea. While writing this work, Mandić himself pointed me to the book Hrvatska politika i jugoslavenska ideja (Croatian Politics and the Yugoslav Idea), Split, 1969, by I. Mužić. This book includes several excerpts from the letter Mandić wrote to Mužić (Chicago, July 8, 1968) that explain the scope and intentions of Mandić's "political moment." We will now reproduce the most important passages of that letter: "I witnessed with concern, as did most Catholic intellectuals, the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy and the creation of the joint state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

However, Doctors Pero Rogulja and Janko Simrak instilled hope and encouraged a positive attitude toward the new state. For family and ecclesiastical reasons, both were inclined toward collaboration and unification with the Orthodox Serbs. They shared the idealism of the Slovene Krek, that honesty and upright, capable men would prevail in the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian state community. Given this situation, the leadership of the Croatian Catholic movement, of which I was also a member, accepted the fait accompli and resolved to act positively for the good of the Croatian and Catholic population in the new state. In order to act in a Catholic spirit in the socio-political sphere, we decided to found our own party. Dr. Rogulja arrived in Mostar with the draft statutes, and there we analyzed and studied the statutes and regulations of the new party. Rogulja proposed that it be called "The National Party," in accordance with the "National Gazette" that we published in Zagreb. By doing so, he argued, the party would acquire a broader character and would have the door open to a segment of Orthodox Serbs with a social Christian orientation. I demanded, and it was finally done, that the name (The Croatian People's Party) be changed, because it was necessary to retain that name in the title itself and emphasize that, first and foremost, we would strive for the peasant class to which, at that time, the overwhelming majority of that people belonged. In the regulations, we included some designations taken from the organizational practices of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Regarding the program, Mandić writes: "I articulated the program in the conclusions accepted at the assembly of the Croatian People's Party in Mostar and published in 1920. According to that program, the new party demanded that the State be divided into provinces that would be governed autonomously by provincial governments, dependent on provincial assemblies with legislative powers. The term 'autonomy' appears in the conclusions, but, in fact, the federal organization of the State was demanded."

[29] See details about these works in the second part of this study.

[30] Friar Basilio Pandzic published the A complete bibliography of that period and the preceding one is available under the title "život i pisana djela O. Dominika Mandica" (Life and Written Works of D. Mandic), by Mandićev Zbornik, Rome, Croatian Historical Institute, pp. 1-10, 1965.

[31] Cf. D. Mandić, The Construction of the New Church of the Franciscan General Curia and the Croatian Ornaments Therein.

^[32] Cfr. Dominik Mandić, "Postanak Meštrovićvih Rana Sv. Franje" (Stigmata de San Francisco de Meštrović), Hrvatska Revija, 12, 1962, pág. 388-395. En estas interesantes memorias relacionadas con Ivan Meštrović, Mandić describe en detalles cómo había entusiasmado al célebre escultor para ejecutar un grupo marmóreo Stigmata de San Francisco con destino a un altar de la nueva iglesia; cómo le sirvió de modelo e, incluso, sugirió ciertas correciones, cómo elegía con él los mármoles y buscaba marmoleros y cómo Meštrović regaló esta hermosa obra religiosa a él y a la Orden franciscana "en retribución por el bien que vuestra Orden hizo a mi pueblo croata".

[33] In the cited article, Friar Predrag Kordic publishes much data from that period.

[34] With his work, Mandić honorably continues the glorious tradition of Croatian priest-historians: Rački, Markovic, Zlatović, Batinić, Bulić, Jelenić, Sakac, Barada, Katić, and so many others. We could say that history is the specific subject of Croatian priests, a legacy of the medieval clergy who were the only ones to record the deeds and misfortunes of their people.

[35] In this regard, Ivo Guberina's work, *The State Policy of the Croatian Monarchs, Part II — From Krešimir III to Zvonimir*, Zagreb, 1945, is instructive. "The opinion held until now regarding the policies of our monarchs was entirely mistaken... The forerunners of Croatian historiography, Hauptmann and Sišić, labeled them national traitors... All these attacks are due to flawed assumptions," p. 208.

[36] D. Mandić, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Vol. I, Chicago, 1960, p. 9.

[37] D. Mandić, *Red Croatia*, Chicago, 1957, pp. IX–XI.

[38] Trogiranin Ivan Lucić (Ioannes Lucius, 1604–1679).

[39] D. Mandic, "Croatian History in the Middle Ages, as interpreted by University Professor Nada Klaić in Zagreb," Hrvatska Revija 17, 1967, pp. 278–299. In the prologue to this interesting work, Mandic emphasizes: "We have carefully studied her lectures and believe it is our duty as historians and patriots to warn the Croatian public, both at home and abroad, that her views are erroneous and harmful to the education of young Croatian historians and to the Croatian people in general."

It is necessary to reproduce here the observations of two authors, I. Mužic and Sava M. Stedimlija. The latter, in response to Mužić's book, *Croatian Politics and the Yugoslav Idea* (Split, 1969), published the following in the journal *The Church in the World* (Year II, No. 5, Split): "The problem of 'updating our medieval past' arose when, in the first half of the last century, national consciousness began to awaken in the more progressive circles of the educated class. Through an incomprehensible inertia, this problem became relevant in monarchical Yugoslavia. Medić refers to this period when he says: 'Certain authors and historians politically updated the Croatian High Middle Ages to suit their desires and the interests of their 20th-century employers.' Because of this updating, and in order to achieve the proposed ends, many problems of the Croatian past and the past of its neighbors were left in the shadows and unresolved. Instead of works on national history and culture, books appeared that were not, and it was impossible to analyze them and point out their negative effects." Even the best-written books under such conditions were, in fact, political treatises, in which their authors presented and commented only on what served their purposes, and what did not, they silenced or simply omitted. In this way, the "updating of our medieval past" became a powerful obstacle to the development of historical science, even in certain high-ranking scientific institutions. That is why Muzić is right to reframe this problem that modern historiography, governed by classical principles, must solve: to present objectively, without national bias, only the truth, regardless of whether it pleases anyone.

[40] "The history of the medieval Church and its relations with the State and society cannot be understood if we consider it analogously to modern conditions. The Church was not only a much more universal and far-reaching society than the medieval State, but it exercised many functions that today we consider essentially political... In the Middle Ages, the ultimate social reality was not the nation-kingdom, but the general unity of the Christian people, the State being merely the temporal organ of that union, and the king, sentinel and defender, appointed by the divine.

"This religious conception of the State and of royal service was fully manifested in the Carolingian Empire, which had a great influence on the subsequent evolution of medieval culture." Christopher Dawson, Essays on the Middle Ages, pp. 98-99, Aguilar, 1960, Madrid.

[41] D. Mandić, Studies and Contributions of Old Croatian History, Rome, 1963, p. 36.

[42] D. Mandić, Op. cit., Hrvatska Revija 17, 1967, p. 290.

[43] Studies and Contributions..., pp. 32-50.

[44] See Mandić's comprehensive study on "Dalmatia, its denominations and division up to the 12th century" in La Croacia Rubra, pp. 51-95.

[45] Mandić, Bosnia and Herzegovina, I, 367-473.

[46] F. Heer, Eastern Europe in Europe. Essay in the book Open Humanism, Ed. Estela, Barcelona, 1969, p. 232.

[47] In addition to F. Heer, Arnold J. Toynbee should be mentioned here, who, in classifying civilizations, distinguishes between Western and Orthodox Christian civilization, each with its own cultural individuality, its own genesis, evolution, and conflicts.

[48] Both manuscripts are in the Vatican Library. Ivan Lucić was the first to publish the Chronicle of the Priest Duklianin (in 1666), and Ivan Kukuljević the Croatian Chronicle (in 1851). For details on the transcriptions, various editions, and translations, see Mandić, Studies and Contributions..., pp. 443–448.

[49] Ibid., pp. 185–190; 443–469.

[50] Mandić, The Croatian Chronicle, pp. 18–36.

[51] See the chapter "Upper and Lower Dalmatia" in The Croatian Chronicle, pp. 74–95.

[52] D. Mandić, Studies and Contributions, pp. 51–76; The Croatian Chronicle, pp. 1–17, 54 73, 191-198.

[53] Mandić, Studies and Contributions, pp. 109-120.

[54] Saint Venantius or Saint Daimo, first bishop and founder of the Salonitan-Spalatian diocese? Cf. Studies and Contributions, pp. 1-18.

[55] This historical study was first published in Hrvatska Revija (1957) and later, in an expanded version, in Studies and Contributions, pp. 145-193.

[56] Studies and Contributions, p. 191.

[57] Mandić devoted considerable attention to this hypothesis, basing it on interesting documents. He pointed out the fact that historians of Croatian literary creation had thus far started from the Bašća Tombstone (Bašćanska ploća), which they dated to around 1102. They did not take into account the Croatian cultural creations from 626 to 1102, in fact the most splendid period of its national life. Cf. "The Unpublished Chapter of Croatian Letters", first published in Hrvatska Revija (1961) and reproduced in Studies and Contributions, pp. 390-422.

^[58] La Croacia Rubra, pág. 39.

^[59] "También Rascia se menciona por primera vez en la asamblea de Duvno de 753. Configura un conjunto étnico servio particular. Pero como en la primera mitad del siglo VIII a o fines dal siglo VII, se puso bajo la protección del Estado croata temiendo la amenaza avara o búlgara, en la asamblea de Duvno fue anexada a la Croacia continental (Zagorje) y recibió nuevo nombre "Surbia" (Servia), pues constituía la parte principal de la nueva región estatal". Mandic, "La asamblea croata en el campo de Duvno", Estudios y Aportes, pág. 191.

[60] La Croatia Rubra, p. 43-45.

[61] Ibid., p. 156-160; see also medieval Zahumlje and Travunja, chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina I, p. 82-99.

[62] Ibid, p. 160-168.

[63] Ibid. p. 138, notes 24 and 184; Medieval Zahumlje and Travunja, p. 82-98. In that chapter all the details about the origin, size, limits, comitatus (župe) and cities are discussed.

[64] Ibid., p. 187 203.

[65] Zvonimir Bjelovučić wrote about the monuments and archaeological remains of Croatia Rubra in the work published by Matica Hrvatska under the title Croatia Rubra and Dubrovnik (1929), and Sava S. Štedimlija wrote about the Croatia Rubra remains preserved in Dioclea to this day in Zagreb in 1937.

[66] "The Croatian Character of Medieval Dioclea" in Studies and Contributions, pp. 368-375.

[67] To verify this statement, see Studia Croatica, Vol. 28-31, 1968, article: "Croatian Peasants Did Not Want the Union of Croatia with Yugoslavia in 1918" by Professor Stanko Vujica.

[66] "The Croatian Character of Medieval Dioclea" in Studies and Contributions, pp. 368-375. [68] Progressive cerebral palsy had already reduced his mental capacity.

[69] The problem is not yet definitively resolved. A mutilated but independent Croatia, many believe, would have been a better solution than a unitary Yugoslavia. In the former case, Croatia would have been an independent subject of international law, with prospects of integrating the parts of its territory that were not reunited in 1918. The Second World War, for example, could have been the opportune moment in this regard. Croatia—it is very likely—would have found itself on the side of the Western Allies and, instead of paying, only at the end of the war, with 300,000 lives for its separation from Yugoslavia, it would have been able to make claims to the territories denied it in 1918 in the name of its independence. The Yugoslav solution meant the total loss of nationality and, in attempting to regain it, paid for it with a sea of blood, and without success.

[70] Herein lies Dr. Trumbić's fundamental error. The author of the article stated at the outset that Trumbić had abandoned his youthful ideals—that is, the ideas of Starčević and his program of state renewal and Croatian independence—sacrificing them to the idea of Croatian national unity with the Serbs and Slovenes and a common state. This unitarianism of his prevailed over all other considerations that advised fighting for an independent Croatia. Even Supilo's departure from the Yugoslav Committee could not induce Trumbić to follow suit.

[71] To compare this thesis, which is certainly false, with another that is politically and legally correct, see: F. Nevistić: Half a Century of Illegitimate Power, in Studia Croatica, Vol. 28-31, 1968. Where the consensus of 80% of the population was lacking—and Croatian peasants made up 85% of Croatia's population in 1918—one cannot speak of legitimacy or legality. Moreover, Esteban Radić, leader of those peasant masses, aware of the serious political and legal irregularities for which Trumbić and his henchmen were responsible, proclaimed these very acts contrary to the history, will, and interests of the Croatian people. Trumbić's vote against the first Yugoslav Constitution, which sought to legalize everything done to create Yugoslavia, along with all the other votes of the Croatian deputies, indisputably confirmed the illegitimacy and illegality of all that work concerning the creation of the Yugoslav state, which meant the liquidation of Croatia and the Croatian people as subjects of international law.

[72] The unitarist conception, repeated once again, and the fundamental political error of Dr. A. Trumbić.

[73] A special law against communism, later extended to the Croatian Peasant Party in 1925.

[74] Y. M. - J. Congar, O. P., Chrétiens désunis, 2nd edition, Paris 1964, pp. 39-40.

[75] See: Studia Croatica, Buenos Aires 1965, Vol. 1-4.

[76] Th. Granderath und K. Kirch, Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils, II Band, Herder 1903 and III (Schlu-s-Band) in 1906.

[77] Herbert Jedin, Kirche des Glaubens - Kirche der Geschichte, Herder, 1966.

[78] S. Soloviev, La Russie et l'Eglise Universelle, Paris 1889, in the Preface.

[79] Granderath, Op. cit., vol. II, p. 16.

[80] See Ferdo Sisic, José Jorge Strossmayer, Documentos y Correspondencia, Zagreb 1933, (pp. 341-344, where this document is also found in Latin.

[81] Ivan Sofranov, Histoire du mouvement bulgare vers l'Eglise catholique au XIX siècle, Edition Desclée, Rome-Paris-New York-Tournai, 1960, p. 69.

[82] This document was published in Katolički List (Catholic Gazeta) of Zagreb, in 1859, p. 165-166 and in the aforementioned work by F. Sisic.

[83] The pertinent document is found in the cited work of F. Sisic, p. 434-438

[84] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 38-44.

[85] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 44.

[86] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., p. 46.

[87] Jedin, Kirche des Glaubens - Kirche der Geschichte, Vol. II, p. 582.Jedin, Kirche des Glaubens - Kirche der Geschichte, Vol. II, p. 582.

[88] Jedin, Op. cit., p. TB.

[89] Janko Oberski Govori djakovačkog biskupa na Vatikanskom Saboru 1869 - 1870 (The speeches of the Bishop of Djakovo at the Vatican Council of 1869-1870, Zagreb 1929, p. 8.

[90] Janko Oberski, Op. cit., p. 16.

[91] Lord Acton, Zur Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils, p. 75.

[92] J. Oberski, Op. cit., p. 28-54.

[93] Granderath Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 175 and 400.

[94] Oberski, Op. cit., p. 58-72.

[95] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., p. 400.

[96] Granerath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 402-403.

[97] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 473-477.

[98] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. II, page. 655.

[99] J. Obersky, Op. cit., p. 112.

[100] J. Obersky, Op. cit., p. 114.

[101] F. Sisic, Op. cit., p. 390–392. Here is reproduced letter-petition in its entire Latin text.

[102] J. Obersky, Op. cit., p. 114.

[103] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 189 .

[104] Ver. F. Sisic, Op. cit., Book A, p. 504.

[105] J. Obersky, Op. cit., p. 96.

[106] J. Obersky, Op. cit., p. 98.

[107] J. Obersky, Op. cit., p. 102–108.

[108] J. Oberski, O P. cit., p. 110.

[109] J. Oberski : Cp. cit., p. 114.

[110] J. Obersky, Op. cit., p. 114–116.

[111] F. Sisic, Op. cit., Vol. I in preface, p. VII-VIII.

[112] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 189–190.

[113] Granderath - Kirch, Op. also,, Vol. III, note 6, p. 584–585.

[114] T. Smičiklas, Sketch of the Life and Work of Bishop J. J. Strossmayer, Zagreb 1906, p. 430–431.

[115] F. Sisic, Op. cit., Book IV, Zagreb 1931, p. 505 .

[116] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 285–286.

[117] Granderath - Kirch, O n. cit., Vol. III, p. 451 .

[118] Granderath - Kirch, Op. also. Vol. III, p. 478–481.

[119] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 491–492.

[120] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 494–501.

[121] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 536–538.

[122] T. Smichiklas, Op. also,. p. 117.

[123] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 582 .

[124] Granderath - Kirch, Op. cit., Vol. III, p. 584 .

[125] F. Sisic, Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 208.

[126] F. Sisic, Ib. the same.

[127] E. de Leveleye: The Balkan Peninsula London 1886, p. 30. The preface to this work was written by the British statesman W. Gladstone, who was a devotee of Strossmayer and kept in touch with him.

[128] See Y. M. J. Congar, Christian Dèsunis, 1964, p. 40, copied from the book: Ephemerides theologicae Lovannians, 1932, p. 728 in Carton's criticism of Wiart, referring to the work The Vatican Council, published by the Benedictine Dom Butler.

[129] In this respect Yugoslav authors find themselves in a ridiculous relationship vis-à-vis foreigners: the former either extol self-management as the means that will humanize relations in socialism or else criticize the inhumanity of the current practice. Foreigners, not quite knowing what it is about, praise (willing to be careful to with their hosts) self-government as the feat and accomplishment of Yugoslav communism, as if everything had already been done. That disagreement becomes funny when some national authors advocate self-management as "the means of beautification" and humanization as if economic problems were already solved. Empire, it is obvious that any self-management is mere illusion insofar as it is one of the maneuvers in the total march of bureaucratization. Moreover, Markovic himself appears skeptical regarding the immediate realization of self-management in Yugoslavia taking into account its underdeveloped technical and economic base.

[130] The violent death of King Zvonimiro was discussed in nineteenth-century Croatian historiography. But the recent, for the most part, refutes the assassination thesis by providing evidence about the king’s natural death.

^[131] Ferdo Sisic: Hrvatska Povijest (Historia Croata), Tom. I, Zagreb 1906, p. 74.

^[132] Ferdo Sisic: Pregled Povijesti hrvatskog naroda (Historia abreviada del pueblo croata), Zagreb 1916, p. 64.

^[133] Idem pág. 96; idem, Enchiridion fontium historiae croaticae, Zagreb 1914, pág. 545, de acuerdo a la opinión de Nicolás Tomašic en Los fundamentos del derecho de Estado croata (Temelji Hrvatskog Državnog Prava), publicado por primera vez por Juan Bojéié en 1915, la estabilización del orden de sucesión en la casa de los Arpad era una de las causas principales de la omisión de la coronación croata por separado, aún cuando pudo haber también otras. Es de opinión de Sisic que la destrucción de la ciudad regia croata Biograd, cerca del mar Adriático, por los venecianos en 1125 no tuvo una influencia decisiva, porque después de este hecho, los reyes Emérico, Ladislao y Andrés III se coronaron con la corona croata aparte. Sisic conjetura que se dejó o abandonó el acto de la coronación especial croata "por culpa de los propios croatas que trataron de evitar los gastos de ingentes sumas que demandaba el solemne acto" (Sisic, Hrvatska Povijest [Historia Croata], Vol. I, pág. 108).

^[134] Dr. Antun Dabinovic: Hrvatska državna i pravna povijest (Historia de derecho y de Estado croata), Zagreb 1940, pág. 340.

^[135] Aquí cabe destacar que el Sabor croata —a ipesar de que los estamentos de Eslavonia ya desde el siglo XIII iban regularmente al parlamento húngaro, porque cada uno de los nobles de aquel territorio consideraba también noble húngaro— sólo habla enviado una vez sus deelgados al parlamento húngaro antes de la derrota de Mohač en 1526. Eso sucedió en oportunidad de corregirse el "diploma húngaro" de Ladislao II de Jagello (1490-1516) en al que, por exigencia de los delegados croatas, fue intercalada la expresión "Hungría y los reinos asociados de Croacia, Eslavonia, Dalmacia y los territorios subordinados" en lugar de "Hungría y los reinos y territorios sometidos". Después de la elección de 1527 (la elección de Fernando de los Hasburgo como rey húngaro-croata) cuando Croacia fue unida administrativamente con Eslavonia, se impuso la costumbre de que el Sabor conjunto croata-eslavonio enviara a dos oradores al parlamento húngaro de Požun. Hasta 1790 sólo tenían vigencia para Croacia las leyes votadas en este (parlamento, si los delegados habían dado su consenti-miento. (Dabinovié: Op. cit., pág. 346).

[136] Sisic: Enchiridion, p. 546, citing an original indirect testimony from 1518. For Ladislaus II of Jagiello was simultaneously the king of Bohemia and during his lifetime had his son Ludwig crowned as Hungarian-Croatian king (1508) and then in 1509 as Czech king, in Prague. Being a child of three, he could not swear an oath on the Bohemian Constitution. When his father died in 1516, he was ten years old and was the Hungarian-Croatian-Czech king, living permanently in Hungary. When the Bohemian estates asked him to come to Bohemia to be crowned, the king's Hungarian advisors replied that this act of coronation could also take place in Budapest. The Czechs objected "because the successors of Ludwig might want the same thing, and this would mean that the Kingdom of Bohemia could be considered subordinate, just as happened with the Kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia. This practice would introduce a bad habit, the worst imaginable." From the cited text it is evident that, in Bohemia, they considered—writes Prof. Sisic—that Croatia was in the same relationship with Hungary as with Bohemia at the time in question, that is, in a union, which later became a closer relationship through the act of the coronation and the joint Hungarian-Croatian oath.

[137] Tadija Smiciklas: Povijest Hrvatska (Croatian History), Part One, Zagreb 1888, pp. 264 and 301; Sisic: Hrvatska Povijest (Croatian History) Vol. I, p. 74.

[138] Dabinovic: Op. cit., p. 318.

[139] See the correction of Ladislao Jagello's "Inaugural Diploma" in note N9 5. The Croatian Sabor in Cetin also sent a message on April 18, 1527. to the new King Ferdinand, reminding him of the obligation assumed in defense of the kingdom of Croatia; "Know Your Majesty that it is impossible to find in documents that any king conquered Croatia by force; Because after the death of our king, of blessed memory, Zvonimir, we freely associated ourselves with the crown of the Hungarian kingdom and then with that of His Majesty" (Sisic, Pregled, p. 171). The Croats define this legal-state position more clearly towards Hungary with the (proclamation of their Pragmatic Sanction of 1712. There it says: "We were not subjected to Hungary by any force or conquest; we subordinate ourselves not to the kingdom, but to the king of the Hungarians" (... nulaque vie, nulla captivitas nos Hungaris adixit, sed spontanea nostra ultroneaque voluntate non quidem regno, verum eorum eorundem 'regi nosmet subiecimues... ). (Idem, pp. 210-211).

[140] Although Werbözcy's work never received the king's sanction, nor was it sent to the Županies for publication and implementation, despite being a collection of unusual laws, it went through 25 editions. The Ttipartitum remained practically in force in Hungary and Croatia until 1852 when the General Civil Law of Austria was promulgated as general law for the entire Monarchy. Here also arises the problem of what should be understood by the name *populus Hungarorum*, the Hungarian people, or *gens hungarica*, the Hungarian people. At first, he wanted to extend these provisions to the Croats as well as to the other parts of the community. But in the Hungarian translation of the *Tripartitum*, the term "Hungari" is translated as "Magyarok" (the Magyars). Therefore, it is not surprising that the Hungarian intelligentsia was taken aback when the Slovaks and Romanians refused to be Magyars. The Germanization measures obtained by the Hungarians in 1790 from Emperor Joseph II were revoked. Nor could they conceive that the Croats would oppose the common name "Magyarok" (the Magyars). (Esteban Radic: *Suvremena Evropa* [Contemporary Europe], Zagreb 1905, p. 47). Here it is necessary to mention the linguistic difficulties in translating the The word "Hungary" is ambiguous, since it sometimes refers to Hungary in the strict sense and other times to the entirety of the territories and kingdoms of the "Crown of Saint Stephen." Slavic languages are clear and unequivocal in this respect, but foreigners often confuse these two concepts and realities. For example, A. J. P. Taylor writes: "Magyar is merely the Hungarian for a Hungarian. There is no world in Hungarian to distinguish between a citizen of the Hungarian there and one who speaks the Hungarian language. In western countries, Hungarian and Magyar are used to make this distinction." (The Habsburg Monarchy, London 1961, p. 26).

[141] Dabinovic: Op. cit., p. 359.

[142] Ibid., p. 317.

[143] In discussions about succession in the mid-twelfth century, King Stephen IV (III) promised Emperor Emmanuel I Komnenos that he would send his brother Bela to be educated and entrust him with Bela's inheritance for administration according to the right of seniority, that is, Croatia and Dalmatia. Bela spent eleven years at the Byzantine imperial court and was even named successor to the throne because Emmanuel I had no children at the time. But, when he did have a son, Bela returned to Hungary after Stephen IV's death. Through large donations, he transformed Hungary not only into a military power but also persuaded Byzantium, upon Emmanuel's death in 1180, to return Croatia and Dalmatia. Thus Byzantine power definitively disappeared in Hungary and Croatia, although Byzantine principles of law and the state shaped Hungarian political doctrine to this day (Dabinovic: Op. cit. p. 104).

[144] Dabinović: Op. cit., p. 318.

[145] In the Western feudal system, a benefice granted certain income derived from possession and accepted offices. In return, the beneficiary was obligated to be loyal and accompany his lords in war. The relationship was, therefore, primarily personal, ending with the death of the beneficiary or the lord, thus requiring the renewal of the investiture. In the donee system, the donor was the unrestricted owner of the donated property, which almost always belonged to the Holy Crown, ending only with the death of the donee or for high treason against the sovereign. The donation was accepted based on prior merits and did not imply any obligation for the heirs. The feudal relationship arose through a private contract, while the donee system was a privilege of public law. All participants in the donations, together with the king at their head, represented the public unity of the Hungarian-Croatian state community, founded on "the integrity of the body of the holy crown." (Dabinovic: Op. cit., pp. 316-326).

[146] Sisic: Pregled, p. 104; Dabinovic, Op. cit., p. 194

[147] Ibid., Op. cit., pp. 184-185.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Ibid., pp. 358-359. See note No. 5.

[150] Ibid., p. 361.

[151] T. Smičiklas: Povijest Hrvatska (History of Croatia) Part One, Zagreb, 1882, p. 470; Sisic: Op. cit., p. 125; Since the Crown of Saint Stephen was in Sigismund's possession, Sisic accepts as plausible that Ladislaus of Naples was crowned with the Croatian crown that was in a certain place.

[152] Sisic: Op. cit., p. 126.

[153] Cf.: Studia Croatica, Buenos Aires, 1965, special edition entitled "Bosnia and Herzegovina," p. 342, vol. 723.

[154] Smičiklas: Op. cit., pp. 723-724.

[155] Dabinovic: Op. cit., p. 181.

[156] Sisic: Op. cit., p. 169.

[157] Idem, p. 206.

[158] Stjepan Srkulj: Hrvatska povijest u devetnaest karata (Croatian history in 19 maps), Zagreb, 1937, p. 62-3.

[159] The Sabor of Croatia and Slavonia (Generalas congregatio regni Sclavoniae or Regnorum Dalmatiae et Croatiae), when they deliberated together on matters of great importance, were presided over by the monarchs, for example, in 1397 by King Sigismund in Križevci; by King Matthias Corvinus in 1466 in the same city, and in Zagreb in 1481 by the same king; and by King Ladislaus II in Virovitica in 1495 (Sisic, op. cit., p. 157).

[160] Sisic, op. cit., p. 206.

[161] Ibid., p. 210.

[162] Smičiklas, op. cit., Part Two, p. 297.

[163] Sisic, op. cit., p. 211.

[164] Although the king did not sanction Law VII of the Croatian Sabor, it was validated by the acts of subsequent kings. This is why Professor Smičiklas writes that the "Croatian Pragmatic Sanction obtained the king's confirmation" (Op. cit., p. 298). Hans Lentze, referring to it, says: "The king did not expressly sanction the decision of the Croatian estates. According to their understanding, such sanction was unnecessary, as they considered it valid" (Hans Lentze: "Die Pragmatische Sanktion und das Werden des đsterreichischen Staates", Der Donauraum, vol. I, 1964, p. 6). Therefore, Professor Moricz Czikann-Zichy's assertion is inaccurate when, relying on Hungarian literature for the essential points, he says: "The Viennese court, out of consideration for Hungary, delayed responding to the Croatian decision." ("Die Pragmatische Sanktion in der ungarischen Geschichte"), Idem, p. 22.

[165] Hans Lentze, Op. cit., p. 8: The fact that the Law of the House of Charles of 1713, along with the earlier secret laws and wills of 1621, 1635, and 1703, was not sent to the Croatian Sabor demonstrates that the Court considered the pragmatic sanction valid even without the king's participation in Law VII/1721.

[166] A. Dabinović: "Sedamdesetgodiišnjica hrvatsko-ugarske nagodbe (Seventy Years of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise), Hrvatsko Kolo, Zagreb, 1938, p. 141.

[167] Lentze, Op. cit., p. 10: In the note from the Croatian Sabor greeting Queen Maria Theresa, after having notified her of the death of her father, which occurred on December 19, 1740, he emphasizes that Croatia had been the first of all the lands (Länder) to accept and recognize the succession of the female line "before the coronation of the king, with the full right of the kingdom." (Smiciklas, Op. cit., p. 313).

[168] The fact that the Croatian ban had also signed the Hungarian pragmatic sanction in the parliament of Poiun, in 1743, invalidated the Croatian Pragmatic Sanction because the ban, "in his capacity as the king's dignitary and as a nobleman, had the right to sign." Furthermore, the Croats were sent to the aforementioned parliament with the mandatory instruction "not to desist from their demand for the law of succession of the Austrian house" (Smiciklas, Op. cit., p. 305).

[169] Dr. Lovro Katić: Pregled Povijesti Hrvata (A Review of Croatian History), Zagreb, 1938, p. 136.

[170] Sisic: Op. cit., pp. 222-223.

[171] The theme Regnum regno non praescribit leges is attributed by early Croatian historiography to Ban Tomás Erdödy in 1690, while more recent sources (Sisic, Katic) consider its author to be Ban Juan. Erdódy in 1790. Leaving aside the struggle, this motto perfectly characterizes the Hungarian-Croatian reciprocal relationship as it was from the beginning and as it had to be.

[172] Katic: Op. cit., p. 183.

[173] Sisic: Op. cit., p. 274.

[174] Katic: Op. cit., p. 206.

[175] Sisic: Op. cit., p. 292.

^[176] Defendiendo los derechos croatas en el parlamento de Pozun, en 1843 se produjo una discusión interesante acerca de la diferencia entre los derechos municipales y las leyes comunes, al plantearse el problema de la libertad del protestantismo y las razones 1por las cuales los croatas se oponían a O. El ban Haller declinó la entrada legal obligatoria del protestantismo en Croacia con aclaraciones jurídico-políticas. "Ya Werböczy interpretaba —dijo el ban— que los estatutos y decisiones establecidos mediante el consenso unánime de la Monarquía y por la sanción del rey tienen vigor de la ley, mientras el término "los derechos municipales" es restrictivo porque están en vigencia solamente en los municipios que los han creado". Luego citó las pala-bras del palatino húngaro de 1843 referentes a esa misma diferencia entre los derechos municipales y las leyes comunes: "...Los derechos municipales fueron estatuidos por convenio general, y por esa razón no pueden ser modificados a pedido de una parte y sin el consentimiento de la otra". Concluyendo: "Por eso, no es posible de-rogar los derechos municipales sin el consentimiento de las tierras (Laender) unidas" (es decir, de Croacia, Dalmacia y Eslavonia). El conde húngaro Juan Majlath tuvo el coraje de reconocer el aspecto político del problema al manifestar que los croatas no lo consideran como religiosa sino nacional ya que conocen bien la formulación en un libro protestante, escrito por el conde Carlos Zay que dice "el magiarismo y el protestantismo progresan mano a mano y que la propagación de protestantismo y viceversa, es la misma cosa". Los croatas estaban preocupados por su nacionalidad más que por la religión (Sisic: Hrvatska Povijest, Zagreb, 1913, II Parte, pág. 332-334, passim).

^[177] Gjuro Szabo: Stari Zagreb, Zagreb, 1941, pág. 97.

^[178] Kati6: Op. cit., tpág. 118.

^[179] Idem., pág. 220.

^[180] A. J. Taylor: The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, Londres, 1961, pág. 63.

^[181] Josip Horvat: Politicka Povijest Hrvatske (Historia Política de Croacia), Zagreb, 1936, pág. 163.

^[182] šlšić: Op. cit., pág. 301.

^[183] La iniciativa para el Congreso Eslavo fue dada por Juan Kukuljević el 20 de abril de 1848 mediante una propuesta a la Conferencia del Banato, como contrapeso al parlamento alemán de Franckfort. Esta propuesta fue aceptada por los checos con Palacky al frente quien se encargó de la correspondiente organización (J. Horvat : Op. cit., pág. 177).

^[184] J. Horvat: Op. cit., pág. 192.

^[185] Katić : O p. cit., pág. 223.

^[186] Según Katic, el ban Jelačic cambió la bandera croata por la imperial solamente cuando fue nombrado por el emperador generalísimo y comisario de Hungría, después de la violenta muerte del vicemariscal Lambert y de haberle enviado 20.000 soldados para reconquistar a Viena sublevada (Katic: Op. cit., pág. 224).

^[187] Emil Franzi: Der Donauraum im Zeitaiter des Nationalitčitenprinzips (1789-1918), Bern-Munich, 1958, pág. 79.

^[188] Sisic: On. cit., pág. 305.

^[189] E. Franzi: Op. cit., pág. 81.

^[190] El primer absolutismo austríaco fue implantado por el emperador José II (1780-1790) y el siguiente por el rey Francisco José I (1815-1825).

^[191] J. Horvat: Op. cit., pág. 238- 39.

^[192] Sisic: Op. cit., pág. 319; Kati6: Op. cit., pág. 239.

^[193] En las comarcas no comprendidas por la Marca Militar y donde en ningún momento dominaban los turcos, no hubo servios. Por eso hay minoría servia en la Dalmacia septentrional y en Lika (Sisic: Op. cit., pág. 231.

[194] Thus, for example, Sisic, Op. cit., p. 317 and J. Horvat, Op. cit., p. 231, while Ferdo Culinović emphasizes that the census of property, education, and domicile exacerbated discrimination against Croats and Serbs, so that 23 deputies were elected to the Dalmatian Parliament on behalf of 15,000 Italians and pro-Italians, while only 20 deputies reached the Parliament representing 410,000 Croats and Serbs (Ferdo Culinović: Državotvorna Historija Jugoslavenskih Zemalja XIX y XX Vijeka (State History of the Yugoslav Lands in the 19th and 20th Centuries), Zagreb, 1956, p. 233).

[195] J. Horvat: Op. cit., p. 251.

[196] širši6¨: Op. cit., p. 321.

[197] See details of this naval battle in Studia Croatica, Year VIII, Vol. 24-27, p. 139-162 by Karlo Picinic: "The Naval Battle of Vis in 1866".

[198] Katic: Op. cit. p. 242; more details: Der Oesterreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867 - Vorgeschichte und Wirkungen, Vienna, 1967, p. 230.

[199] Sisic: Op. cit., p. 326.

[200] Some prominent Croatian politicians believed that Franz Joseph intended to help the Croats in their struggle against Hungarian rule by inviting them separately to his coronation with the Crown of St. Stephen in 1867. The Sabor's refusal of the invitation was, in this view, a grave mistake, because it deprived the Croats of a strong legal argument in subsequent negotiations with Hungary and, even worse, tacitly recognized the status quo. (B. Pešelj: Der ungarisch-kroatische Ausgleich von Jahre 1868 - Verfassungrechtlicher Ueberblick in the Symposium cited in note 68.

[201] Sisic: Op. cit., p. 332.

[202] Quoted from the text of the draft Compromise presented to the Croatian Sabor, published in Vaso Bogdanov's The History of Political Parties in Croatia, Zagreb, 1958, p. 568. All subsequent quotations from the Compromise are from the same source.

[203] Article 33 of the Compromise had foreseen the increase in the number of Croatian deputies that would occur with the union of the Military March, which happened in 1881, when this number actually rose from 29 to 40. The union of Dalmatia with Croatia and Slavonia was not This continued until the fall of the Monarchy in 1918, even though Hungary, according to Article 65 of the Compromise, assumed the obligation to request the incorporation of Dalmatia into the kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia. The number of Croatian deputies in the joint parliament never exceeded 40, even though, according to population statistics in 1912, it should have been 53; given that the Croatian population in the Hungarian half of the Monarchy had risen to 11.4%. This population was represented in parliament with only 8.8%.

Consequently, the provision in Article 33 that "the number of deputies from the united kingdoms shall be increased in the same proportion as that of the inhabitants" became a dead letter. Regarding Dalmatia, it is necessary to highlight some differences between the Croatian and Hungarian texts of the Compromise. Although Dalmatia was not united with Croatia and Slavonia at the time the Compromise was stipulated, nor during its period of validity, the Croatian text almost always repeats (with the exception of Article 32) "the kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia," while the Hungarian text often omits Dalmatia out of consideration for Austria, which counted Dalmatia among the provinces of its crown (Kronland Dalmatien). As for the territorial extent of the Croatian language, the omission of Dalmatia is understandable because its inclusion would have no practical value, given that the Compromise refers to Croatian in Articles 56 and 58 as the official language. The Croatian text of Article 57, however, states that Croatian is the official language for government bodies "within the limits of the kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia," although the word "Dalmatia" does not appear in the Hungarian text. A further difference between the two texts is that the Hungarian refers to "Hungary" and "Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia" rather than the "Kingdom of Hungary" and the "Kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia." The Croatian text specifies that the contracting parties are "the Kingdom of Hungary united with Transylvania" and "the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia," while the Hungarian text omits the words "united with Transylvania."

[204] Dr. Ferdinand Schrems: Die Rechtsstellung der Kroaten im fruheren Habsburgerreich und im heutigen jugoslawischen Staat, Humburg, 1939, p. 56.

[205] The Pragmatic Sanction is the true foundation of the Habsburg Monarchy in general, but especially of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. However, the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles III of 1713, stipulating the indivisibilitas and inseparabilitas of the Habsburg Empire, concerning the agreement on the order of succession in the female line, should not be confused with the Hungarian Pragmatic Sanction of 1722/23, which established that succession only from Leopoldo I onward and stipulated the indissolubility of the lands (Länder) of the Crown of Saint Stephen.

Even though it was the Croats who, with their 1712 decision in the Sabor, raised the question of female succession, demonstrating once again their independence from Hungary, it was not this Croatian Pragmatic Sanction, but rather the Austrian one of 1713 and the Hungarian one of 1722/23, that formed the basis of Austro-Hungarian dualism and Hungarian-Croatian subdualism. This is because the preamble to the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise expressly emphasizes: "and because it was established in the Pragmatic Sanction that the lands (Länder) of the Hungarian crown were also inseparable from one another." We therefore consider the opinion of Professor F. Čulinović (The Legal-Aesthetic History of the Yugoslav Lands in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Zagreb, p. 117) to be untenable. In the sense that mentioning the Pragmatic Sanction, besides highlighting the state community of Croatia and Hungary, would also emphasize the unique nature of Croatia's existence apart from Hungary. For in the aforementioned preamble to the Compromise, the Pragmatic Sanction is not mentioned to recall the independent act of the Croatian Sabor on a vital matter, but rather to settle Croatian-Hungarian legal and state issues within the provisions of the Pragmatic Sanction.

[206] From a strictly legal standpoint, this provision was outside the scope of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise, because the army, in general, and the navy, in particular, were part of the common affairs of the Dual Monarchy. (Cf., Branko Pešelj: Der ungarisch-kroatische Ausgleich vom Jahre 1868 — Verfassungsrechtlicher Ueberblick in the joint work Der üsterreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867 - Vorgeschichte und Wirkungen, Vienna 1967, p. 173).

[207] Schrems, Op. cit., p. 59.

[208] Ibidem, according to Ladislao Polić in Oesterreichisches Staatsworterbuch, Vol. III, pp. 283-307, Vienna 1907, by Mischeler-Ulbrich.

[209] Ibidem., pp. 60-61.

[210] Article 33 of the Compromise represents a considerable difference from the previous Croatian presentation in the Hungarian parliament, as we have already seen in the historical section of this work.

[211] Schrems, Op. cit., p. 64.

[212] Regarding the second principle, it is worth noting that Hungary, based on the Austro-Hungarian Compromise and without having settled its relations with Croatia, had assumed the obligation to contribute 30% of the common expenses of the entire Monarchy, while Austria was to contribute 70%. Following the incorporation of the Military March, the share of lands belonging to the Hungarian crown was raised to 31.4% in 1887, and to 36.4% in 1907. At the same time, the Croatian contribution was increased from 6.4% to 8.1%. The third principle, elaborated at length in Article 13, clearly expresses Croatian concern that, given its economic situation at the time of the negotiations, it could not directly bear the costs of common affairs without significant detriment to its own expenditures. Croatian taxpayers considered this principle, and the financial arrangement as a whole, a major victory at the time, even though it hindered further progress—even after the 1873 revision of the Compromise. This revision stipulated a 45% levy on all Croatian revenues, as recorded by the common finance minister, instead of a lump sum of 2,200,000 forints.

[213] In subsequent revisions of the Compromise, the phrase concerning the "advance" by Hungary was added to Article 25 because, according to statistical data, there was no need for advances. Indeed, Croatia, before the Compromise, for example, had an income of 6,557,225 forints in 1864; of this, 2,106,420 were spent on Croatia's internal needs, while 3,342,749 went to the needs of the Austrian common government. In 1879, Croatia's tax revenues reached 5,451,481 forints, in 1880 8,578,591, and in 1881 they reached 8,814,039. Of Croatia's total revenue of 9,789,503 fiorin in 1880, only 1,861,411 were spent on autonomous affairs. (See: ulinovié: Op. cit. p. 121).

[214] Josip Horvat: Kultura Hrvata kroz 1000 godina - Gospodarski i društveni razvitak u 18 i 19 stoljecu (Croatian Culture for 1000 Years - Economic and Social Development in the 17th and 19th Centuries), Zagreb, 1942, p. 455.

[215] The Compromise was reviewed and amended in 1873, 1880, 1881, 1889, and 1906, at which time a new "financial arrangement" was incorporated based on the Croatian Sabor Act of August 29, 1906, and Act VII/1906 of the Hungarian Parliament. By this act, both parliaments gave clear evidence that Croatia, in stipulating the Compromise of 1868, did not relinquish its status as a contracting party with the attributes of a state. (Culenović: Op. cit., p. 143).

[216] The Compromise mentions the Sabor as the supreme organ in the system of power within Croatia, that is, with regard to its legislative function in Articles 34, 38, 41, 47, 48, 56, 59, and 60, and with regard to its superior position with respect to the ban and local government in Articles 50 and 54. (Culenović: Op. cit., p. 135).

[217] Čulinović: Op. cit., p. 134.

[218] Vinko Krisković (the Croatian vice-ban until 1918): Posljednji Eseji (Last Essays), Madrid 1955, p. 42.

[219] Schrems, Op. cit., p. 68: The responsibility of the ban before the Sabor, its impeachment and removal, which the ordinary parliament could not initiate and, consequently, remove, was resolved by an independent law of January 10, 1874.

[220] Law II/1869 of the Croatian Sabor established the supreme administrative power of Croatia, that is, the organization of its government. Law XVII of 1870 established the organization of the zupas (7-8 in total), revised on May 31, 1875, and February 5, 1886, as well as the organization of the districts (66 and later 81), in addition to the communes and cities as local administrative bodies.

[221] Schrems, Op. cit., p. 79, Anton Radvansky: Das ungarische Ausgleichsgesetz vont Jahre 1867 in the symposium Der õsterrechisch - ungarische Ausgleich von 1867 - Vorgesehichte und Wirkungen, Vienna, 1967, p. 109.

[222] Within Austrian legal literature we can divide opinions on the legal nature of Austro-Hungarian dualism into two groups. The first group consists of writers who, based on research into events prior to 1848 and those occurring up to 1867, defend the thesis of the unity of the Austrian Empire even after 1867, and affirm its identity with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Wenzel Lustkandl, Herman Ignaz Bidermann, Theodor Ritter Dantscher von Kollesberg, and Friedrich Tezner). The second group comprises authors who, relying on the positive law of their time—the Austro-Hungarian Compromise and practice—defend the thesis of two states, the theory of real union, rejecting the Hungarian view of a personal union. Among these authors are Franz Ritter von Kollesberg. Juraschdk, Georg Jellinek, Edmund Bernatzik and Ivan Zolgar (See: Peter Berger, Der österrechisch-ungarische Dualismos 1867-1918 und die õsterreichisehe Rechtswissenschaft in Der Donauraum, N' 3; 1968, pp. 156-170).

[223] Due to the impossibility of obtaining the original works of the authors who dealt with the legal nature of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868, we will cite the titles and opinions expressed in their books, according to the literature available to us: Ferdinand Schrems, Rechtsstellung der Croaten im fržiheren Habsburgerreich und im heutigen jugoslawischen Staat, Hamburg 1939, pp. 75-79; Bodo Dennowitz, Volk und Staat, aliena 1943, p. 177; Ferdo Čulinović, Državopravna historija jugoslavenskih. zemalja XIX i XX vijeka, Volume I, Zagreb 1956, pp. 123-128; Branko Pešelj, Der ungarisch-kroatische Ausgleich vom Jahre 1868 - Verfassungsrechtlicher Oberblick, in the Symposium Der õsterreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867 - Vorgeschichte und Wirkungen, Vienna-Munich 1967, p. 175 178.

According to what has been said, the best-known works and authors that deal with the situation in Croatia after the Compromise are the following: Beksics Gusztav, Dualizam, njegova historija, državosravni pojam i nasa narodna težnja ... Bernatzik Edmund, Die õsterreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, Vienna 1911; Bidermann Hermann Ignaz, Geschichte der iisterreichischen Gesamtstaatisidee 1526-1804, Innsbruck 1889; Brie Siegfried, Theorie der Staatenverbindungen, 1886; Dareste F. R., Les Constitutions Modernes, Paris 1891; Demonbynes, Les Constitutions Européennes, Paris 1883; Gasztony Matias, Ustavna autonomija Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije, 1892; Horn Eduard, Le compromis de 1868 entre la Hongrie et la Croatie, Paris 1907; Herrenritt Handbuch des 6sterreichischen Verfassungreschts, 1909; Jellinek Georg, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, Vienna 1882 and Ober Staatsfragmente, Hedilberg 1896; Kadlec Karel, Uherska a chorvatska ustava v hlavnich ertach, Prague 1906; Kmety, A Magyor Kõzjog Tankđnye (Handbook of Hungarian State Law), Budapest 1902; Nagy Ernest, Ungarn in Oesterrech.isches Staatswiirterbuch, II., 1897; Pesty Istvan, Die Enstehung Kroatiens in Ungarische Revue 1882; Pliverić Josip, Das rechtliche Verhültnis Kroatiens zu Ungarn, Zagreb 1886; Der kroatische Staat, Zagreb 1887; Beitriige zum ungarisch-kroatischen Bundesrechte, Zagreb 1886 and Spomenica o državopravnih pitanjih hrvatsko-ugarskih, Zagreb 1907; N. Ratner, Postanak hrvatsko-ugarsIce nagodbeod godine 1868, Zagreb 1949, (Ratner is a Soviet legal writer) ; Tezner Friedrich, Die ungarischen Verfassungsgesetze en Zeitschrift für das Privat — und õffentliche Recht der Gegenavart, Vol. Rehm Hermann, Allgemeine Staatslehre, Freiburg 1899; Holzendorf F., Handbuch des Völkerrechts, Hamburg 1887.

[224] Bodo Denowitz, Volk und Stoat, Vienna 1943, p. 177. It seems almost impossible to find a sufficiently adequate and satisfactory solution regarding the legal and state position of Dalmatia during the Austro-Hungarian dualism. According to the Austrian law of December 21, 1867, sanctioned by Franz Joseph in his capacity as Austrian emperor, Dalmatia was incorporated into Austria as its Kronland (crown region). This fundamental law, together with the Hungarian law XII/1867, constitutes the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Conversely, according to Hungarian Law No. XXX/1868 and Croatian Law No. 1/1868, which constitute the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise, also sanctioned by Franz Joseph in his capacity as Hungarian-Croatian king, Dalmatia was part of the kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, as expressly determined by Article 66 of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise,

This contradiction between the Austrian Basic Law, on the one hand, and the Hungarian and Croatian Basic Laws, on the other, was declared absurd by Bernatzik, as a situation could not be both legal and illegal at the same time. However, since Dalmatia, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, had not been subjected to the power of the Croatian Sabor, except for a brief period when Ban Jelačió was governor of Dalmatia, it remained de facto under Austrian rule. In clear opposition to this de facto status, Dalmatia belonged de jure to Croatia. Faced with this conflict, Bernatzik gave priority to the de facto status, that is, to Dalmatia's belonging to Austria. It is clear that this did not resolve the legal problem (Cf. Čulinović, Op. cit., p. 240). The Hiingars, in stipulating the Compromise with Emperor Franz Joseph based on his proposed Compromise, omitted, for political reasons, ensuring the "indissolubility" of the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, as provided for in the Pragmatic Sanction.

[225] Woodrov Wilson, The State, Buenos Aires 1943, p. 337 (The State, New York 1898, D. C. Heath & C.).

[226] Cf. Branko Pešelj, Op. cit., p. 176.

[227] Schrems, Op. cit., p. 79.

[228] On the contrary, at the same time, Transylvania was incorporated into Hungary by a unilateral act of the Hungarian parliament, or rather, by Law XLIII/1868, which declared that Hungary and Transylvania formed a single state. For this reason, the Hungarian text of the Compromise omits the expression "Hungary united with Transylvania."

[229] Čulinovic, op. cit., pp. 142-144.

[230] Ibid.

[231] In 1594, Croatia, together with Medjimurje (775 square kilometers), had only 16,800 square kilometers, while in 1918, without Dalmatia and Medjimurje, it had 42,532 square kilometers (Stjepan Srkulj, op. cit., pp. 50–54).

[232] Dabinović, op. cit., p. 238.

[233] Stjepan Delić-Dubički, Prvi Arpadovići kao hrvatski kraljevi i feudalni banovi (The First Arpads as Croatian Kings and Feudal Banos) (Hrvatska Rolo – The Croatian Symposium, Book XXI, Zagreb 1940, p. 200).

[234] In the Monarchy, taken as a whole, the percentage of nationalities was as follows: Germans 24.7%; Hungarians 19.7%; Czechs 13.1%; Poles 9.3%; Ruthenians 8.2%; Romanians 6.4%; Croats 5.8%; Slovaks 4.4%; Serbs 3.5%; Italians 1.5%; and Muslims 1.3% (the latter mostly Croats. Author's note). These data are according to Emil Franzel (Der Donauraum, Bern 1958, p. 165). According to A. J. P. Taylor (The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, London 1961, p. 1910), Germans comprised 23% (12 million); Hungarians 19% (10 million); Romanians 6% (3 million); Slavs (Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, etc.) 45% (23.5 million); and 5% were other (2.5 million).

[235] Although Hungarians lived far from Rijeka in order to populate it, they attracted Italians and Hungarians, thus giving it a distinctly Italian character by 1910. The Hungarians had 10 secondary schools and 4 elementary schools in Rijeka, the Italians 5 secondary schools and 25 elementary schools, while the Croats had none (Taylor, op. cit., p. 1910). 269).

[236] Dr. Petrinjensis (Dr. Fran Milobar), Bosnien und das kroatische Staatsrecht, Zagreb 1898, p. 261. Having proven that Emperor Franz Joseph I possessed Bosnia and Herzegovina in his capacity as Croatian king, the author cites statistical data as ethnic proof of Bosnia and Herzegovina's belonging to the Croatian national body. Considering Catholics and Muslims as ethnically Croatian, Bosnia at that time had 56.3% Croats and 43.23% Serbs, while Herzegovina had 65.75% Croats and 34.25% Serbs.

[237] Antun Dabinovic, Sedamdeset godišnjica hrvatsko-ugarske nagodbe (The 70th Anniversary of the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise) (Croatian Council, Book XIX, Zagreb 1938, pp. 132/3 and 144/5).

[238] Ibid., p. 151,2.

[239] Ibid., p. 153.

[240] Johann-Christoph Allmayer-Beck, "The End of the Habsburg Monarchy 50 Years Ago" (Der Donauraum, vol. 4, 1968, p. 214), citing the opinion of Otto Brunner.

[241] The Croatian city in Dalmatia, where the Croatian kings of national blood had their first habitual residence. The historian F. Bulić states: "The first Council in Split in 924 was convened by Pope John X, but in accordance with the wishes of the Archbishop of Split… Lately, the territorial power of the Latins had diminished because the Croats had their own bishop in Nin, who wielded considerable influence, not only at the royal court but throughout Croatia and among the people—that is, among the overwhelming majority of the Dalmatian population.

The archbishops of Split had turned their backs on Rome, aligning themselves with Byzantium. This is why Rome supported the bishop of Croatia… The use of the national language in the liturgy, Rome, and the Croatian bishop—the only one—united the Croatian people in a united front against the Latins.

Split's reconciliation with Rome following the Council of 924 changed the course of events. Split became the metropolis of the Croats and Latins, the Croatian bishop of Nin was subordinate to the archbishop of Split, and the Croatian language was adopted.