STUDIA CROATICA

Year VII, Buenos Aires, 1966, No. 22-23

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF CROATIA'S EMANCIPATION STRUGGLE DURING THE LAST WAR

CROATIA'S INDEPENDENCE IN ITS DEMOCRATIC FUNCTION

AMALGAMATION, NOT COEXISTENCE

THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA FROM 1941 TO 1945

THE ARMY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA 1941-1945

COLONIZATION BY THE SERBS UNDER THE PRETEXT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

DISPOSSESSION OF THE MUSLIMS OF BOSNIA UNDER THE PRETEXT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

NICOLÁS ZRINSKI - LEONIDAS OF CHRISTIANITY

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF CROATIA'S EMANCIPATION STRUGGLE DURING THE LAST WAR

By the Editorial Staff

A quarter of a century has passed since April 1941, when the crisis in international relations in southeastern Europe—already a major cause of tension and the immediate trigger of the First World War in 1914, later inadequately addressed by the 1919 peace agreements—culminated in the blitzkrieg in the Balkans, the disintegration of the Yugoslav monarchy (strictly speaking, the Serbian monarchy), and the re-establishment of the Croatian state. The events of 1941, their causes, and their consequences in the ongoing struggle for national relations in a significant part of Europe have still not been thoroughly studied or properly evaluated in international political literature.

This fact should not be surprising. The collapse of the Yugoslav monarchy coincided with the highly complex events of the Second World War, and its end gave rise to extremely important problems of global significance in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, during and after the war, issues of greater magnitude than the Croatian or Yugoslav question captured the attention of international public opinion.

Moreover, the official policies and vested interests of the Western democracies, architects of the first, monarchical Yugoslavia, and those of the Soviet Union, architect of the second, communist Yugoslavia, fostered biased interpretations of national conflicts and political events in the region. Furthermore, the Western Allies, who shortly after the war's end protested vehemently and justifiably against the violation of the Yalta agreements—according to which Yugoslavia should have freely decided on its form of government—provided the Yugoslav communist government with economic and military support, as well as substantial financial aid, following the Stalin-Tito conflict in 1948, after a brief period of hesitation. Consequently, public opinion generally held the impression that the events in the Yugoslav area between 1941 and 1945 were merely an accidental wartime phenomenon, and that, with regard to the national question, the situation in Yugoslavia in 1945 had reverted to what it had been after the First World War.

However, those familiar with the complex political and national problems of Southeast Europe know very well that there was not, nor can there be, a return to the status quo ante in the sociopolitical process of the emancipation of the nationalities of that sensitive area of great power rivalries, which until recently was known in political literature as the Eastern Question. The animosity of that time was transformed, under the new circumstances, into Soviet dominance at the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, this state of affairs cannot be permanent. This is evidenced by the growing resistance of the Central European peoples to Soviet imperialism, to the point that even the imposed communist rulers of the Soviet empire and its European satellites had to react accordingly.

The foregoing applies especially to the peoples of Yugoslavia, despite the fact that the much-publicized Moscow-Belgrade conflict, which began as a clash between Stalin and Tito, is of such interest to foreign observers that they fail to see the true causes that define the entire problem. The new communist Yugoslavia is also overwhelmed by the problems that monarchical Yugoslavia neither knew how nor wanted to solve. Replacing one dictatorship with another cannot stop or divert the resistance of the nationally oppressed peoples in Yugoslavia and their neighbors to Serbian expansionism.

Yugoslavia could only be restored by communist force and remains compulsively imbued with the spirit of Greater Serbian conceptions. Its restoration cannot be considered a mere return. The emergence of true nation-states from the ruins of the Ottoman and Austrian empires, antagonists for centuries, cannot be halted. From the moment Turkey became a nation-state, and when, by the will of the victors and by virtue of the right to national self-determination, the Danubian Habsburg monarchy was dismembered for proving inept as a multinational entity in coordinating the interests and aspirations of its peoples, and from the moment multinational states like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia emerged in its place, faring no better in addressing national problems, the process of further secessions, based on the national principle defined in the last century as the right of every people to its own state, became inevitable.

The communist restorers of Yugoslavia skillfully exploited the errors and omissions of the Western democracies and the resulting national conflicts, especially the Croatian-Serbian one, to subjugate both peoples. In light of the Serbo-Croatian War, the communists recognized that the formula and practice of Yugoslav unitarianism, tolerated by the victors of the First World War, were no longer tenable. In 1945, they established the "Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia," which, at least in theory, took into account the aspirations of the nationally oppressed peoples of unitarian Yugoslavia—in effect, of an enlarged Serbia. The second Yugoslavia was officially characterized as a multinational state, and the "people's republics" that comprised it were, from the outset, designated as the nation-states of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins.

Such was the theory. In practice, as in monarchical Yugoslavia, the interests of Serbia, one of the six people's republics (recently called socialist), prevailed. This happened because the Soviet strategists of the world revolution—who, between the two world wars, had tried to capitalize on the resistance of the oppressed peoples in Yugoslavia against the Great Serbian governments, supported by France—realized, when war broke out against the Third Reich, which had occupied Serbia in 1941, that only by exploiting the discontent of the Serbian masses, exacerbated by the spectacular political and military collapse of the Yugoslav monarchy in 1941, could they fuel the communist revolution and diversionary actions behind the German-Russian front. In this way, the interests of a single people prevailed even in communist Yugoslavia, giving it the character of an expanded Serbia, just as in the first.

This is manifested not only in the levers of power that are in the hands of the Serbian communists, but also in the territorial division, at least partially, so that internal and external problems remain pending that determine not only the governments of force and the permanent internal political crisis, but also permanent tensions and periodic crises in the relations with neighboring peoples.

One of the explicitly internal problems is the question of Bosnia. Of the six socialist republics that make up the Yugoslav federation, only Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks national status. Other internal and external anomalies include the incorporation of Kosmet (Kosovo-Metohija) into the Socialist Republic of Serbia as an "autonomous territory," where almost half of the Albanian population lives, giving the region a distinctly Albanian character.

Something similar occurred with Vojvodina. This region, with a large Hungarian minority, where Serbs do not hold a majority even after the massacre and expulsion of 500,000 Germans, was also incorporated into Serbia as an "autonomous province." The problem of Macedonia also remains unresolved. The official position is that Macedonia has the status of a nation-state. As such, it would have rights over Aegean Macedonia, which is part of Greece, and Pirin Macedonia, which is part of Bulgaria. Hence the constant threat of international conflicts, primarily with the Bulgarians, who maintain that Macedonia is a regional, not a national, concept and that Macedonians are part of the Bulgarian people. The truth is that Macedonians feel more affinity with Bulgarians than with Serbs. Moreover, on this issue, Bulgaria has the traditional support of Russia.

Thus, even in communist Yugoslavia, the acute problem of national resistance to Serbian supremacy persists among Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and the Albanian and Hungarian minorities. This same phenomenon, as before the war, creates international tensions, since Bulgaria, Albania, and Hungary have concerns for their citizens in Yugoslavia. Nor were Greece's misgivings eliminated, despite the suppression of the uprisings in Aegean Macedonia, which were obviously instigated by the Yugoslav communists.

Due to the adventurous and demagogic policies of the Yugoslav communist leaders, relations with Italy were not satisfactorily resolved. In the euphoria of the victors after the last war, the leaders of the communist regime were not content with the provisions of the 1946 peace treaty with Italy, according to which Trieste was to become a free city, a kind of buffer state, whose governor would be appointed jointly by Italy and Yugoslavia. However, by resolution of the Western Allies, Trieste came under Italian control. This opened the door to possible relapses of Italian irredentism, fueled by the constant threat posed by the presence of a militaristic communist state on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, a real and potential manifestation of Russian-Soviet imperialism.

Political analysts fail to adequately consider the fact that the unresolved national question, inherited from monarchical Yugoslavia, played a significant role in the Moscow-Belgrade dispute of 1945, and that the Soviets are exploiting these conflicts to pressure the Serbian communist leaders to return to the Moscow fold. It is well established that Rankovic, in his attempt to "Sukarnize" Tito, enjoyed the Kremlin's support. At the time the Stalin-Tito conflict erupted, the traditional rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria, as well as Serbian expansionism at the expense of Albania, were of great importance. After Stalin's death, this problem became even more complex, as the Albanians, fearing joint action by Moscow and Belgrade, sought support from Beijing. Thus, thanks to Greater Serbian ambitions, communist China gained a foothold in the Balkans, facing Italy.

All of this indicates that in Yugoslavia, the interests of foreign powers continue to clash and conflict—interests so entangled that the abnormal relations between the peoples of this multinational state provide even distant China with an opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of a country heterogeneous both nationally and culturally, forcibly re-established in 1945 within the framework of the world communist revolution's strategy. The Kremlin, however, precisely because of the unresolved national question that it skillfully exploited during the war, also suffered setbacks and disappointments.

The foregoing indicates that Yugoslavia, acting in the name of an aggrandized Serbia, cannot remain permanently united. It can only survive as Greater Serbia and under a dictatorial system. But Serbia represents barely a quarter of Yugoslavia's territory and population, so it will not always be possible to keep the opposition of the oppressed peoples, partly backed by foreign powers, at bay, nor to stifle the aspiration of all its peoples to a free life, including the Serbian people, who cannot always play the thankless and degrading role of jailer to the other peoples of Yugoslavia.

Belgrade, dependent on the aid of Western democracies after the Tito-Stalin conflict of 1948, had to make certain concessions to the oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia. However, it remains a great unknown whether the communist leadership will be able to channel the unstoppable movement of national and political emancipation through a more or less peaceful evolution, or whether conflicts will arise with direct or indirect interventions by foreign powers, with the implications of the danger of international conflicts. It should not be forgotten that this is the explosive terrain of the Balkans and the issues that were the immediate causes of the First World War.

It is high time, indeed, that international circles, interested in the prevailing conditions in Yugoslavia, firstly in view of the changing relations between Moscow and Belgrade and their repercussions on the alleged disintegration of the empire of the European Soviet satellites, take into consideration the outstanding national problems as the main factor in the development of the situation in a large and sensitive sector of southeastern Europe.

It is also essential to consider that Croatian resistance to Serbian supremacy constitutes the crux of this complex problem. Croatia, given its strength and its cultural and economic development, can offer sustained resistance to Serbia. This opposition could not be broken by the Serbian dynasty, nor will it be by the Serbian communist leaders, even though they have all the means of a dictatorship with the experience of international communism. Croatia is not inferior to Serbia in the political sphere either. It forms the backbone of the resistance of all the nationally oppressed peoples of Yugoslavia and, at the same time, the main force in the struggle for democratic freedoms for all the peoples and minorities of Yugoslavia. During the monarchical dictatorship, the Croatian national movement spearheaded the fight for democratic rights, and Croatian leadership was even accepted by the traditional Serbian parties during the period 1935-1938.

In light of attempts to deny Croatia's political and national identity—attempts stemming from the misguided solution at the end of the First World War, accepted and supported by Western democracies, even though such a solution contradicted their own principles—it is essential to properly assess the fact that Croatia, due to its cultural, national, and economic traditions, possesses all the necessary conditions to become a subject of the right to national self-determination, and that nothing and no one can prevent the Croatian people from exercising that right under favorable circumstances.

In support of this view, it is worth citing some facts that political commentators should always bear in mind.

Croatia figures in European history as a national monarchy, one of the first in Europe; between the 7th and 6th centuries, it was a powerful country, ruled by princes and kings of the Croatian national dynasty. With the extinction of the national dynasty, from the 12th to the 16th centuries, Croatia existed as an associated and equal state in union with Hungary, ruled by a joint king from various dynasties (the Árpád, Angevin, Luxembourg, Corvinus, Jagiellon, and Habsburg). From 1527 to 1918, the Kingdom of Croatia, along with Austria and the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, formed part of the Danubian Monarchy, ruled by the kings of the House of Austria. Even within the dualist system of Austria-Hungary (1867–1918), Croatia retained the status of a kingdom with sovereign rights in internal administration, the judiciary, education, religion, and agriculture.

After the defeat and disintegration of Austria-Hungary, Croatia was forcibly incorporated, against the will of its people, into the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, governed centrally from Serbia by its dynasty, and controlled by a predominantly Serbian army, diplomacy, and administrative apparatus. At the same time, it was economically exploited for the benefit of Serbia, one of the victorious countries in the First World War. Officially, it was called the liberation of Croatia and Yugoslav national unity.

When the Croats successfully reacted by organizing their overwhelmingly majority national movement on democratic principles and fighting peacefully for the establishment of the Republic of Croatia through the right to national self-determination—a right emphasized by the victors of the First World War—the Serbs responded with unprecedented political terror, unknown until then in the history of civilized peoples. This terror culminated in the assassination of the Croatian democratic leaders in the Belgrade parliament in 1928 and the subsequent establishment of the Serbian monarch's dictatorship. The purpose of this dictatorial regime, partly and quite rightly described by the communists as militaristic-fascist, was not only to prevent the Croats from realizing their national rights but also to deny Croatia's national identity.

The Greater Serbian dictatorship proclaimed the thesis, which it disseminated through all means of coercion, that Croats are not a people in the ethnic sense, but rather a tribe within the supposed Yugoslav nation. This amounts to denying the incontrovertible fact that Yugoslavia is not a national concept but rather a product of political geography. The Croatian name, national symbols (flag, coat of arms, anthem), political parties, and national, cultural, and even sporting institutions were outlawed. In contrast, Serbian nationalism was favored, since Yugoslavia, in the minds of its rulers, was synonymous with Greater Serbia.

Over time, the Croats would be forced to become Serbianized as not only their state identity but also their national identity disappeared. This genocide, meticulously planned, was being carried out ruthlessly. The first victims, as is always the case in similar situations, were intellectuals. Albert Einstein and Heinrich Mann appealed to the League for the Protection of Human Rights to prevent the massacre of Croatian intellectuals in the streets of Zagreb by police officers. There were also religious persecutions against Catholics and Muslims, accompanied by proselytizing efforts in favor of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Such treatment of Croats and other non-Serb peoples and minorities in Yugoslavia led Belgrade to attempt, by abandoning its French protectors and its allies in the Little Entente, to align itself with the Third Reich and Fascist Italy in order to gain their support against the oppressed peoples. This shift, however, could not prevent the sudden political and military collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941. The State of Croatia was established at the same time with the diplomatic title of Independent State of Croatia. There were territorial changes in favor of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania; measures were taken to restore Montenegro to Italian protection.

As mentioned, all these events, for the reasons outlined, have not yet been studied or considered with due impartiality in international political literature. The same can be said regarding the Croatian people's resistance to the communist guerrillas during the last war, when, on orders and with the assistance of Moscow, the communists sought the restoration of Yugoslavia so that the border of the Russian-Soviet empire and its European satellites would reach the Adriatic through the conquest of Croatia.

The propagandistic way in which these events, provoked by Greater Serbian policy, were presented to the detriment of their victims was also influenced by the fact that, in the second phase of the war, the Western Allies, under increasing Soviet pressure and against their own interests, agreed to support communist interference in Southeast Europe, providing the communist guerrillas with abundant military aid and political collaboration. In the interest of truth, it must be said that the Western Allies initially aided the Serbian nationalist guerrillas who sought the restoration of monarchical Yugoslavia, but given the complete indifference of the Serbian politicians in the government-in-exile to national problems, they refused to support the implementation of Greater Serbian plans. Thus, because of their initial errors of 1918-1919, the Western democracies found themselves powerless during the war to prevent the annexation of Yugoslavia and, more broadly, the Soviet invasion of Central and Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, the entire wartime propaganda apparatus, both communist and that of the Western democracies, was at the service of the Yugoslav Communist Party, even though it was already known as the most fanatical exponent of communist expansionism. It went so far that even after the war, all forces opposed to communism, without exception, were labeled pernicious and even anti-democratic. In such an atmosphere, no distinction was made between the Croatian nation's efforts to consolidate its hard-won independence and the form of the regime imposed in Croatia under the military and political dominance of the Axis powers.

The fact that nation-states endure while regimes change was disregarded. It is true that President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself, according to Harry Hopkins' notes, in deliberations held in 1943 with Sir Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, repeatedly stated "that the Croats and the Serbs have nothing in common, so it is ridiculous to insist that two such antagonistic peoples should live under a single government" (Robert E. Scherwood: Roosevelt and Hopkins, Barcelona, 1950, p. 242). However, these conversations only contributed to the Allies withdrawing their support for the exiled monarchist government and favoring communist plans, believing in their unfulfilled promises of a just solution to national problems and respect for the right to self-determination.

Afterwards, the communists tried to justify the breach of these promises, maintaining that the Croats' arduous struggle for the restoration of their ancient state was merely an intrigue and maneuver by the Axis powers. The communists claim that the Croatian people's desire to establish their nation-state was not an expression of genuine popular will but rather propaganda launched by the very enemies of the Croatian people. These absurd arguments found some resonance in a segment of the world press, despite the fact that Croatia's millennia-old state tradition is one of the oldest in Europe and that at the beginning of the last century, the Croatian people, like other Central European peoples, developed a vigorous national consciousness. As soon as Yugoslavia was created, the Croatian people organized a magnificent democratic and republican resistance movement, while Mussolini and Hitler were still mere street agitators.

Taking all these facts into account, our editorial team decided to publish, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia, a series of articles related to the Croatian people's struggle for national independence based on the right to self-determination. The only exception to this framework is the study of the defense of Szigeth 400 years ago, led by the Croatian ban (prorex) Nicholas Subic Zrinski, who fell heroically with his entire garrison and was glorified as the Leonidas of Christendom.

This topic is therefore intimately connected to the other contributions, as it illustrates and exemplifies the enduring relevance and dynamism of Croatia's state and national traditions. It also clarifies the Croatian people's willingness to fight and sacrifice themselves for the shared values of the peoples of Western Christendom. Since the current tension between the Western and Soviet blocs is reminiscent of the Ottoman threat, it is essential to recall here the difficult situation and great sacrifices of the Croatian people in this struggle between two worlds of civilization, and their ongoing resistance to communism.

We live in an era in which, for the sake of European, Western, and all human solidarity, which requires new approaches to problems in the interest of peace, the last vestiges of old grudges and prejudices in historical studies are being eliminated, especially among European peoples. We see no reason why Croatia should not also be included in this general process, all the more so given that it had to participate in both world wars when its freedom of choice was quite restricted.

The Croatian state was re-established in April 1941, at an inopportune moment, when the power and influence of the undemocratic Axis governments predominated in Central Europe. For this reason, the communists seek to deny the liberating character of the Croatian national struggle. Although the communist interpretation of democratic and national freedom is well known, it is worth emphasizing that the Croatian national struggle fundamentally follows the traditional line of Western humanism and democracy. This is particularly true regarding the Croatian people's resistance against the imposition of the Yugoslav state and national conception.

The experience of monarchical Yugoslavia between the two world wars and of the current communist Yugoslavia has demonstrated that it is a multinational state, created and maintained for the benefit of a single people, which is usually sustained solely by force and violence against the majority of the population through a dictatorial regime. Consequently, the struggle for the Croatian state is equivalent to the struggle for freedom. It is the struggle for freedom and progress not only of Croats but of all other oppressed peoples and national minorities in Yugoslavia, including the Serbian people, who can only achieve political and individual freedoms and cooperate peacefully with neighbouring peoples within their own nation-state. Therefore, in its essence, the struggle for Croatian national freedom is profoundly humane, democratic, and in harmony with the greater international good.

In our time, when geographical distances are shrinking daily, events in Southeast Europe can have repercussions even in the South American republics. This is all the more true since Croatia, like the Latin American peoples, belongs to the Christian world of the West. We believe, therefore, that in our capacity as political refugees, by fulfilling our duty to Croatia, we will in some measure repay the nations of the New World, which, for thousands upon thousands of Croats, have become their new, noble, and free homeland. At a time when, under the aegis of the Tricontinental Conference, so-called wars of liberation are being fostered and organized in some South American republics, we believe it is appropriate to examine how communists practiced such "liberation" in much of Europe.

In the specific case of Yugoslavia, it is necessary to know the truth so that such events, capable of demoralizing the masses, are not repeated. Thus, the practice of bestowing extraordinary honors, as the democratic government of the Republic of Chile did, upon the Yugoslav communist dictator, who came to power as an agent of Stalin and as the leader of a cruel and ruthless guerrilla force, should not be repeated. Instead, it so happened that this communist dictator, responsible for the massacres of Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Germans, who has deprived several peoples of freedom and independence, including the Croatian people—whose children contributed considerably to the progress of the trans-Andean Republic—was declared an honorary doctor of political and social sciences from the National University in Santiago, Chile, one of the most important teaching and research institutions in America.

We know that we are not in a position to provide a complete account of the events we commemorate, as this will only be possible once all the still-unknown documents are accessible, after Croatia's liberation. However, we can contribute to a better understanding of one of the key problems of Central and Eastern Europe. We believe that our status as political exiles and the fact that Croatia, due to a confluence of circumstances, found itself among the defeated nations at the end of the Second World War, will not prevent our published works from being considered contributions to the specialized literature. We live in an era in which, for the sake of European, Western, and all human solidarity, which requires new approaches to problems in the interest of peace, the last vestiges of old grudges and prejudices in historical studies are being eliminated, especially among European peoples. We see no reason why Croatia should not also be included in this general process, all the more so given that it had to participate in both world wars when its freedom of choice was quite restricted.

The experience of monarchical Yugoslavia between the two world wars and of the current communist Yugoslavia has demonstrated that it is a multinational state, created and maintained for the benefit of a single people, which is usually sustained solely by force and violence against the majority of the population through a dictatorial regime. Consequently, the struggle for the Croatian state is equivalent to the struggle for freedom. It is the struggle for freedom and progress not only of Croats but of all other oppressed peoples and national minorities in Yugoslavia, including the Serbian people, who can only achieve political and individual freedoms and cooperate peacefully with neighboring peoples within their own nation-state. Therefore, in its essence, the struggle for Croatian national freedom is profoundly humane, democratic, and in harmony with the greater international good.

Thus, the practice of bestowing extraordinary honors, as the democratic government of the Republic of Chile did, upon the Yugoslav communist dictator, who came to power as an agent of Stalin and as the leader of a cruel and ruthless guerrilla force, should not be repeated. Instead, it so happened that this communist dictator, responsible for the massacres of Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, and Germans, who has deprived several peoples of freedom and independence, including the Croatian people—whose children contributed considerably to the progress of the trans-Andean Republic—was declared an honorary doctor of political and social sciences from the National University in Santiago, Chile, one of the most important teaching and research institutions in America.

More than the substantive question, for our purposes it will be necessary to shed some light on the problem of the relationship between consciousness and the process of history in its humanizing aspect, its ascent toward an ever-higher civilization, which deserves the "worthy name of civilization."

Rejecting absolute evolutionism and materialist immanentism and accepting "creationist" evolutionism [5], we are not exempt from taking into consideration biophysiological evolution, which forms the natural basis for a creative act of a rational soul. After the work of Teilhard de Chardin, we believe that all opposition to evolutionism, which came with the most tenacious insistence precisely from Catholic circles, has been overcome. "In its deepest being, the world is an organo-dynamic system on the path to psychic internalization..." or "The history of life is nothing but the movement of consciousness morphologically enveloped..." (The Heart of Matter). His compatriot, predecessor but materialist, J. Jaurès, in turn, says: "Humanity is the product of a long physiological evolution, which preceded historical evolution, and when man... emerged from animality... predispositions and tendencies already existed in the first brain of nascent humanity." In his materialist-idealist interpretation, as he himself calls it, Jaurès emphasizes the aesthetic and sympathetic tendencies as two fundamental factors in man's elevation from his animality to the higher horizons of ethical life. The organs of prey—hearing and sight—were from the beginning flooded by images and harmonies "that go beyond the immediate needs of the animal," and at the same time, along with the brute force of feeling, the feeling of sympathy was also formed, "preparing the fraternal reconciliation of all men after centuries of conflict" [6].

In accordance with their general conception of life, the authors invoke the factors that seem most appropriate to them for the development of consciousness toward the state, when Kant felt authorized to say: "Duty is the necessity of acting out of respect for the law." Jaurès substantializes the human brain, granting it almost complete autonomy from the world and history. C. H. Waddington speaks of the transmission and "support of authority," of "biological wisdom," etc., which have elevated us to the ethical character of modern man.[7]

While the Anglo-Saxon author emphasizes that it is not the task of physiological and socio-ethical science "to produce a divine vision of the human condition," entrusted, in fact, to a "rather crude" instrument, forged by "a common blacksmith," referring to the human intellect, Maritain repeats that of Saint Paul: God is yours! To whom should we give our credence? To scientific-positivist hypotheses or to religious beliefs? Is the opposition between them irreconcilable? Is it a real or fictitious opposition?

Leaving aside this series of theoretical questions, the practical interpretation of consciousness has yielded its most positive fruit: the concept of human personality. A large part of our civilization rests upon it, as Maritain states. Modern constitutions, even in communist states, enumerate the rights of the human person.

The path to this point was very arduous and painful, but once overcome, we have reached the state we can simply call a state of civilization. This personalist doctrine was formulated by an Argentinian in a very apt way and with well-condensed content.[8]

In its historical and social journey, humanity has had to overcome many forms of relationships, which, the further back in history we go, were characterized by the absolute power of one person over another. After cannibalism came slavery, serfdom, and the wage labor of the industrial age, with the dream of complete liberation—unfortunately a very disappointing dream—in communism. Law—"the immortal breath of humanity"—universally guarantees the integrity and inviolability of the human person, making it the cornerstone and most precious jewel of our civilization. Only in it could the Declaration of the Rights of Man find its origin. Thus, the epistemological mystery yielded its clear and evident historical fruits. From the rudimentary center of the prey—a center equipped with sight and hearing to satisfy its utilitarian instincts—has developed the pedestal of the most sublime ideals and values of aesthetics, ethics, law, and religion.

But historical evolution has not stopped there. Analogously to the individual human personality, the collective personality of the nation has developed. "It is no accident that the era of modern national thought is immediately preceded by an era of individualistic movements for freedom. The nation drinks, so to speak, the blood of free personalities to make itself a personality" [9].

These collective identities have, in turn, at least in the European sphere, become fundamental values of the legal and political order. The nation-state, national sovereignty and independence—nationalism—are specifically European phenomena. After the French Revolution, which proclaimed the principle of national sovereignty—"la nation assamblée ne peut recevoir d'ordres"—a chain reaction occurred in Europe and Latin America. With the achievement of German and Italian national unity, "it is the century of nationalism, a doctrine that places the nation at the center of interest, the principle of states founded on national sovereignty and independence" [10].

The nation-state, national sovereignty, and nationalism essentially signify the formation of autonomous territorial and personal units, inviolable to others, based on the cultural and ethnic affinity of their members. This kind of autonomy—collective identity—increasingly diminishes the traditional concepts of conquerors, foreigners, and barbarians. The nation-state and sovereignty add a firm criterion, a norm of conduct, to the international legal and political order, leaving conflicts between individuals and factions to the exclusive competence of their leaders, legal representatives: kings, presidents, etc., logically suppressing atrocities, mitigating them with a moderation of punishment, inspired by the friendship of a community that feels identical with itself. Foreign interventions, interference in the internal affairs of others, are reduced to a minimum.[11]

But this specifically European development, upon reaching its culmination, began, according to many and through a strange dialectic, to work against Europe itself in two ways. Internally, it caused Europe to definitively lose its traditional unity as a Christian community, atomizing it into a multitude of sovereign states and nations. These new sovereign political units waged wars that led them from one catastrophe to another. The First World War was followed by the Second, turning the old continent into a heap of ruins. As an immediate consequence, the colonies rose up from the outside against their European metropolises, putting an end to their imperialism.[12]

Political Manichaeism and the Croatian Case

This problem is currently being discussed very passionately. A large number of political, philosophical, and even religious authors refute the value of sovereignty, nationalism, and nation-states, advocating instead for European, Atlantic, and global integration. This would be an inexorable process in the evolution of history. No less numerous are its adversaries. While acknowledging a progressive and universalist unionist development, these individuals mount an almost impassioned opposition to the "precipitous" universalist plans. Nations, races, and civilizations are the true vehicles of historical events. Against the universalist delirium, they defend historical entities—nations, nation-states, civilizations—entrusting them with the preponderant role in the present and for the near future.

Because of the position each side adopts and the means by which they defend their point of view, we also witness exaggerations here. Everything the unionists defend is good, marked as progressive, and everything their adversaries defend is retrograde, reactionary, even fundamentally flawed. A true political "Manichean dualism."[13]

Consequently, one might ask: under what sign will our era enter universal history? Under the sign of unionism or of separation? W. Roepke asked this question twenty years ago, referring to the Weltanschauung of the contemporary world. With all due modesty, we can ask: Where do we place the current Croatian struggle for independence? Isn't it a senseless separatist movement? Aren't our efforts and sacrifices at odds with the course of history? By fighting for a Croatian nation-state, aren't we embarking on a task destined to fail, because our nationalism, our nation-state, our rights to self-determination and sovereignty are outdated values and concepts? Relics of a bygone era? Ideas, concepts, and organizations of the last century?

We will attempt to answer the questions that appear first at the end of this article, giving the floor to recognized authorities, while those that appear last in this series pertain to the author of this article. It is our duty to draw the attention of the powerful to the small, to try to align our concerns and problems with theirs, considering them as an indivisible whole.

Walking wearily along the tortuous paths of exiles in the free world, we encounter the following questions almost daily: Who are the Croats? Where is Croatia? How many Croats are there?, etc. When we explain our situation as succinctly as possible, seeking to satisfy the curiosity of our interlocutors, further questions inevitably arise: What kind of right protects the Croats in their struggle for independence? Is there a subject—the nation, the Croatian people—as the holder of this supposed right?

We frankly confess that it is not always easy for us to answer. Even though there exists in the Americas in general a very strong liberal-democratic sentiment and a persistent zeal for national sovereignty,[14] we find it difficult to convince our friends—say, in Argentina, Brazil, the United States, or Canada—that our struggle for independence has any chance of success when we tell them that Croatia has just over 100,000 square kilometers, while Argentina has 3 million, and Brazil, the United States, or Canada up to 10 million square kilometers. Smallness, weakness, irremediable inconsistency! Where is the subject, where is the space for Croatian sovereignty and for an independent Croatia?

The first observation we must make here is that in the realm of moral values, including law, the concept of quantity, specific to the physical-mechanical world, is not valid. As for the large and small peoples of Europe, however, we respond with the Spanish academic: "European nations have found themselves forming a coherent constellation thanks to powerful centripetal and centrifugal forces, a constellation certainly of the first magnitude, which proudly aspired to be suns and outshine their neighbors, but where each one ultimately had a singular and fundamental mission to fulfill. On one side were the nations belonging to the inner circle of Europe and those to the outer: the western ones, more developed and coherent, with full political autonomy from an early date, and the atomized ones of Central Europe, upon which the consequences of having been pedestals in the Middle Ages for the universalist institutions of the Empire and the Papacy weighed heavily."[15]

Consequently, where is the subject of the right to self-determination in the Croatian case?

While writing this article, a friend sent us an issue of the Belgian journal Justice dans le monde, which features an excellent article by the French Jesuit priest Dr. André Bonnichon, former professor and dean of the law faculty in Shanghai, and currently professor of civil law at the Catholic Institute of Paris. The article, entitled "Le principe des nationalités et les requêtes de la morale" (The Principle of Nationalities and the Requirements of Morality), examines the principle of nationality and the right to self-determination. He laments that jurists, when addressing these two issues, either fail to rigorously define the right to self-determination or leave the subject—the nation—to which this right belongs in the dark.

"A right without a sufficiently defined holder, or a holder of a poorly defined right: such are the lessons learned." Bonnichon quotes Dr. Duverger's text (Le Monde, May 13, 1955), which states: "The right of peoples to self-determination is inseparable from the right of individuals to self-determination." Acknowledging that there is "something profoundly true" in this statement, Father Bonnichon adds that politicians want more. "The assimilation of the individual," for example, requires clarification.

Especially regarding whether the right to self-determination is identical to the right to "form a state." Therefore, and to avoid uncertainty, obscurity, and dilemmas for jurists and politicians, Bonnichon invokes the moralists. C. Coste, whom Father Bonnichon cites among the best contemporary writers on international morality, has formulated the problem as follows: "The special principles of the right of peoples to self-determination belong to natural law, being directly linked to the fundamental rights of the human personality.

One can only hesitate when it comes to their applications." Taking into account this "hesitancy" of Coste, Bonnichon's need for "justification," and his idea that there is no "hesitancy" where there is room for a "national soul"—"la France âme," as Michelet formulated it, or, to add, "une nation, c'est pour nous une âme, un esprit, une famille spirituelle" (Renan)—we wish to point out here the historical presence of the Croatian people for over thirteen centuries, which authorizes us to say: Croatia has a soul, or Croatia is a soul. All the more so, since Father Bonnichon mentions the Croats, alongside with Catalans, Basques, and Flemish, as a marginal case justifying doubt regarding the application of the right to self-determination. This will demonstrate that the subject of the right to self-determination in the Croatian case is well-defined and that there is no doubt about it. Thus, we will obtain one of the two terms—the right and its holder—precisely the holder of the right to self-determination.

Of course, we cannot delve too deeply into Croatian history. We will limit ourselves to what is most essential for our objective.

According to some opinions, we Croatians, in defending sovereignty, accepting the tenets of Croatian nationalism, would be defending "remo fictam et pictam" (a fictitious and imagined thing) and not "rem factam et natam" (a factual and born thing), as Nietzsche formulated it, referring to nationalism in general. Let us see, then, that this is not the case.

The Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, in his famous book, one of the main sources for the history of the early Middle Ages—De Administrando Imperio—specifically in Chapters 29-35, recounts the story of the Croatian people, their present-day homeland on the shores of the Adriatic and between the Drina, Danube, and Sava rivers, extending to the Rascia River in Istria. The emperor notes that the Croats at that time were one of the strongest peoples in Europe and provides us with statistics on their armed forces.

The Roman pontiffs, in turn, an institution not only religious but also an essential element of the politics, culture, and, to a certain extent, the economy of Europe, left in solemn documents testimonies of the active presence of the Croatian people within that constellation of European nations for more than a millennium, as mentioned by the Spanish scholar Del Corral.

Thus, Pope Agatho concluded a pact of mutual respect with the Croats. Not a single century has passed since then without the Croatian people being the subject of papal documents. The Roman pontiffs maintain constant correspondence with the kings and bans as Croatian political leaders, or with their cardinals, bishops, priors of monasteries, and spiritual leaders. Sometimes they call us "beloved sons," other times "bulwark of Christendom"; on one occasion they praise us, on others they admonish us. One of our audacious dukes, who caused difficulties for Venetian trade in the Adriatic, was called "the worst of the Croatians."

It is not our purpose to intrinsically value the relations of the Croatians with the center of European religion and culture, but only to indicate to the interested reader that Croatian history is not mere "romanticism"... The Croatian people are an entity, a political and historical individuality with a long memory. Thomas Archidiaconus, in his 12th-century "Historia Salonitana," and the "Chronicle" of the priest of Duclia (presbyterus diocletatis), both written in Latin, provide extensive information about the life and history of the Croatian people during the first centuries of their existence in the homeland they still inhabit today. "Methodos" and "Kingdom of Croatia," two works in Croatian, several centuries older, are testimonies that essentially coincide with the two aforementioned Latin works.[16]

With the extinction of the Croatian national dynasty in 1102, we formed a Personal Union with the Hungarians until 1527, when we opted for the Habsburg dynasty, thus establishing the Danubian Monarchy. Throughout this period until 1848, the Croatian nobility was the bearer of Croatian political will, embodying the true Croatian nation—"pars pro toto," as Hans Kohn states in his "History of Nationalism." The Sabor, the parliamentary institution of the Croatian people, was actively engaged throughout these long centuries. From it arose the voices of the Croatian people—Regnum regno non praescribit leges—against all Austrian or Hungarian attempts to diminish Croatian autonomy or violate its internal order. The Croatian ban (prorex) was the viceroy in Croatia and the true head of the executive and legislative power of his people.

With this objective in mind, we recall that the Croatian people, still under communist and Serbian rule, celebrated last year the 900th anniversary of one of the oldest monuments in their history: the Benedictine Monastery of the Sisters of the Adriatic, founded by the Croatian national king Peter Krezimir the Great in 1066 and later endowed with real estate by King Zvonimir. The monastery is located in the city of Zadar on the Adriatic coast.

That same year also marked the 900th anniversary of the city of Šibenik, founded by the same King Krezimir. Šibenik boasts many monuments to Croatian history, but the most precious is its cathedral, built in the 15th and 16th centuries and adorned with motifs from the daily life of its people. In Trogir, this year also saw the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the publication of the first scholarly work on Croatian history, written by Ivan Lucić.

This refers to the work: De Regno Croatiae, Slavoniae et Dalmatieae, libri sex, published in Amsterdam in 1677. The year 1968 marked the centenary of the agreement between the Croats and the Hungarians, through which they established their relations with more precise legal stipulations after the complete dissolution of the Croatian-Hungarian alliance in 1848, a alliance that had united us with this neighboring people since 1102.

The Croatian nation, consequently, has been forged over many centuries in the political, cultural, religious, military, and linguistic spheres. A people that has given the world a R. Boskovic, along with a whole host of scholars in the field of exact sciences such as Nikola Tesla, Leopold Ruzicka, Mohorovicic, Professor Prelog, and Professor Bosnjakovic today; A nation that lists among its artists the miniaturist J. Klovic, "maximus in minimus," a miniature Michelangelo, Ivan Mestrovic, and so many other philosophers, writers, and artists, is not a nation that cultivates a romanticized view of its history.

The Croatian people have given the world saints and martyrs, culminating in the figure of Cardinal Stepinac, who embodies the religious character of the Croatian people in our time. In the military sphere, Nicholas Subic Zrinski and the Frankopan family, not to mention Berislavic, Bakac, and others, who for centuries resisted and died, aware that to die for their homeland was to die for the Christian world in general, bear witness to Croatian military valor. These examples serve only as illustrations, far from exhausting the rich tapestry of Croatian history.

If this is the case, the question remains: why is Croatia not independent today? We belong to the inner circle of Europe, as Diez del Corral would say, to the circle of "atomized" nations, where the Empire and the Papacy "weighed heavily" on the tendencies toward full national autonomy and sovereignty. The Western nations, protected against eastern invasions—and the Croatian people formed part of the protective wall against which the waves of the Tatars (1242) and the Ottomans had been breaking—achieved independence by separating from the Empire.

The national dynasties—Spanish, French, and, to some extent, English—were the principal factor in the formation of their respective nation-states. Thus, for example, Renan says: "This great French reign was so highly national that, days after its fall, the nation was able to sustain itself without it." René Johannet, another French writer, analyzing the principle of nationality, finds in its formation both an absolutist and a democratic principle, attributing a rational character to the former and characterizing the latter by its affective nature. Which of the two contributed more to the formation of the French nation? "Civil Laws" or "Social Contract"? "The politician... or the sensitive man?" [17], recognizing the merit of both almost equally.

And what about the Croatian case? As a "fragmented" nation within the Empire, prioritizing universalism over particularism, the Croatians saw the Habsburg kings as the continuators of the Empire. The purpose of the Empire's leaders could not be its disintegration, nor could they foster national separatist movements and the formation of sovereign political entities. When Cardinal Richelieu, consolidating the French state, made a pact with the Ottomans against the Habsburgs, the most prominent Croatian families of that time—the Zrinski and Frankapan families—were beheaded for having attempted to make a pact with the Turks, seeking independence from the Empire and the restoration of the Croatian people's full sovereignty.

We remained within this context until 1918, as part of Metternich's Empire. It was to him, precisely, that the Frenchman KL... Eisenmann, an adversary of the Austrian historian von Serbik, considers the community of Christian states and their historically founded social hierarchy to be "the last and greatest representative of universal thought" [18].

It is therefore almost natural that we Croats lacked this absolutist national element, which substantially contributed to the formation of Western nations and which today constitutes their great advantage. The absolutist factor of our political community acted in the opposite direction. Any attempt at national separation was considered a betrayal of the Empire, of the Habsburgs, a community that was not only political but sacred.

But alongside imperial universalism and the Papacy, we Croats have another, even more decisive element, which weighed heavily on the restoration of the ancient Croatian state and the sovereignty of the Croatian people. This is the Ottoman invasions and the centuries-long struggles that the Croatian people had to endure. For more than four hundred years—from 1463 to 1878—we had to fight, defending every inch of our native land. The biological, cultural, economic, and consequently, political toll was extremely tragic. While the Catholic Monarchs of Spain, the English kings (Henry VII and VIII), and the French (Francis I) distanced themselves from the Empire, forming their well-organized national "autonomies," we died defending its rearguard.[19] While English explorers John Hawkins and Francis Drake were creating the financial base of the British Empire through plunder in the 16th century, we Croatians were flooding our homeland with blood in battles for the Christian community and against the Ottomans: Krbavsko Polje 1493, Dubica 1513, Jajce 1523, Klis 1524 and 1537, Siget 1566, Sisak 1593, Otocac 1663, etc., were bloody battlefields.

While Queen Elizabeth shared the spoils with these pirates,[20] the apostolic nuncio Malaspini, representing Pope Gregory XIII in the Austrian city of Graz, informed the Pope and requested his assistance in recapturing the fortifications on the Una River, where the Ottomans had taken "more than 70,000 peasants" captive. Many refugees from 1566 still lived in Austria and Hungary. According to recent historical research, Croatia lost more than 500,000 men to Ottoman captivity between 1463 and 1603, not counting those killed on the battlefields.[21] With the demographic potential of the people thus considerably diminished, their political influence inevitably also diminished significantly.

However, despite all the difficulties and tragedies, the Croatian people preserved, throughout these long centuries of struggles and administrative, political, and religious divisions, the fundamental elements of their state autonomy and a vibrant awareness of their unity. The "impediments" had inflicted serious wounds and weakened the national organism, but national consciousness was not extinguished. The tension between universalist tendencies and separatism—in the sense of a complete renewal of sovereignty (Starcevic in 1861 [22]) or union with the more ethnically related South Slavs (Strossmayer and later Trumbic [23])—torn at the soul and clouded the conscience, but kept it vigorous.

Thus, for example, while the Sabor (parliament) in 1848 dissolved all ties with Hungary, proclaiming Croatia's independence, Viceroy J. Jelačić, one of the Empire's most distinguished generals, tipped the scales in favour of the universalist conception, fighting loyally for the Empire. In 1918, Field Marshal Boroević, also one of the Empire's most capable military leaders in the First World War, unwaveringly defended the universalist ideal, and when it lost all hope of survival against the general onslaught of the idea of nationalities, he attempted to salvage the Croatian people's right to self-determination and restore a free and independent Croatia, but it was too late. In fact, at the moment of the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, the "democratic" element, "the sensitive man," held the fate of the Croatian people in its hands. But a part of this common man, by painting a romanticized image of union with the Serbs, greatly contributed to depriving his people of the possibility of proclaiming sovereignty and restoring the integrity of their former state independence.

The policy of Trumbic and his henchmen, favoring union with the South Slavs, especially the Serbs, served as a pretext for the latter to occupy Croatia, circumventing all obligations aimed at organizing a truly democratic political union. For over 1,300 years of life in their modern homeland, Croats have not accepted any state as legitimate unless it was accepted and approved by the Sabor, their parliament. Instead of sanctioning the act of "union" with the Serbs, illegally carried out on December 1, 1918, the Serbs dissolved the Sabor. The attempted resistance by the remaining Croatian troops, part of the dissolving army of the defeated monarchy, was brutally suppressed (December 6, 1918), staining the streets of Zagreb, the Croatian capital, with blood. The innocent blood of this people, alongside the Serbian people, had to play a cornerstone role in the new political edifice.

This sincerity requires further clarification. Trumbic and his supporters, embittered by imperial "universalism"—which increasingly adopted Austrian or Hungarian nationalistic garb—and inspired by the ideals of a pioneering ecumenist like Bishop Strossmayer, did not commit national treason. By accepting the Yugoslav conception, they attempted to save Croatia and its territorial integrity against illegitimate Italian claims, supported by a pact (the Pact of London of 1915), conceived not on universalist ideals, but rather aimed at fulfilling the dreams of Machiavellianism and a nationalism defined as "sacred egoism." Victorious alongside the Western Allies, the Serbs evaded all the obligations they had accepted during the war in discussions and negotiations with Trumbic and his henchmen.

Their actions also destroyed the very spirit and idea of a democratic state common to Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and Montenegrins. It was precisely here that things became complicated. From that moment on, a titanic struggle has been waged, albeit on a smaller scale, between the Croatian and Serbian peoples, a struggle that continues to this day. It cost us, especially we Croats, an inestimable price in goods, lives, and, finally, it completely deprived us of freedom and national independence precisely at the moment when the right of self-determination of sovereign peoples triumphed in the European environment and in the sphere of Western civilization in general.

Instead of trying to validate, and if possible, intrinsically strengthen the new political creation, which would henceforth be called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and later Yugoslavia—that is, the country of the South Slavs—by giving it democratic foundations and respecting the will of its people and their traditions, the Serbs introduced oppression, plunder, and terror in a galloping crescendo until they proclaimed the personal dictatorship of their king, Alexander Karageorgevic, the most hated foreign monarch the Croatian people had ever had to endure in their long history. Croatian economic assets were diverted to Belgrade, and from there came terror, persecution, imprisonment, executions, and hangings.[24]

Aware of their rights, the Croatian people rallied around the Croatian Peasant Party and its undisputed leader, Esteban Radic, a political figure of genuine education, training, and democratic sentiments. He still dreamed of being able to transform the new community into a democratic entity, acceptable to the feelings, traditions, and interests of all. The Serbs, on the other hand, especially his Karageorgevic dynasty, saw themselves as radically undemocratic and faced with the growing opposition of the other peoples of the multinational Yugoslav state, who were increasingly joining the struggle with the Croatian leaders, erecting ever thicker and more serious fortifications between themselves and their majority opposition.

With the violent death of Radic and two other Croatian deputies, the conflict entered its decisive phase. The aims of Serbian policy—to Serbize Macedonia and most of the Croatian provinces—seemed to have reached the point of realization. The time appeared to have come for the old expansionist Serbian policy, planned by I. Garasanin in the middle of the last century.[25] The more the Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, and Hungarians resisted this hegemonic policy, the more logical it seemed to the Serbs to organize institutions and mechanisms of terror. King Alexander's personal regime strengthened the police and the army to such an extent that the Serbs became an armed people, an absolutist militarism opposed to the freedom of others.[26]

In this way, the Serbian hegemonic spirit eradicated all vestiges of democracy in that part of the world. The administrative, military, and police apparatus in Serbian hands devoured the resources created by the labor of others, especially the Croats and Slovenes, thus preparing the conditions—the militarization and enrichment of the Serbian ruling class and the impoverishment and political enslavement of the other peoples—for the civil war of the peoples for whom Strossmayer dreamed of a truly ecumenical-democratic community.

After so much suffering, endured under new circumstances, the Croatian people seized the opportune moment in 1941 to proclaim their independence, legally and formally restoring their former sovereign and independent state. The Hungarians annexed their historical parts of Vojvodina; the Macedonians, feeling themselves an integral part of the Bulgarian nation, united with it; and the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija, still under Italian fascist occupation, expressed great satisfaction at having joined their motherland, Albania. The Serbian dreams—unjust and absurd—were thus completely shattered in twelve days. Their administrative, police, and militaristic apparatus served no purpose. Its only visible and real result was the total discontent of its subjects, which became a shared tragedy for the just and the guilty alike.

The story of what followed is well known. The Second World War, or rather, its conclusion, brought the Serbs their second victory. Two decisive factors contributed to this. The Allies did not recognize the dismemberment of monarchical Yugoslavia, unjustly considering it a consequence of the Axis powers' actions. This non-recognition had significant practical and formal political-legal consequences. According to this view, which certainly contrasted with the will of the people, who opposed Great Serbian imperialism, any resistance movement under the Yugoslav flag, aimed at the restoration of Yugoslavia, was considered legitimate, allied, and friendly.

On the other hand, the Serbian bourgeoisie, having completely lost the confidence of its own people during its twenty-year rule, seized the initiative, supported by both the Western Allies and Soviet Russia, albeit for different reasons. Thus, the PKJ (Yugoslav Communist Party), disguised under the banner of the "war of national liberation," protected by the political-legal formula of legitimate resistance, and abundantly supplied with weapons, ammunition, and food, seized power. Given the "legitimacy" of the Yugoslav state, which was in reality a Serbian hegemonic "miniature empire," the vast majority of Serbs enlisted with the new protagonist of Yugoslavia's restoration: the PKJ.

Offended by the "betrayal" of the Croats and other peoples, especially the Macedonians, Albanians, and the German minority, the Serbs, through the PKJ, unleashed their hatred against everyone, particularly the Croats, culminating their atrocities in the now-historic Bleiburg Tragedy. The world of the victors turned a deaf ear, or if it admitted "something," it considered it punishment for the "traitors" and "collaborators," an "internal matter" of Yugoslavia. A tremendous affront to justice! Inconceivable political shortsightedness! From that moment on, the Croatian people and the other peoples enslaved there began a new struggle for freedom.

The new conditions imposed new forms of it. In the Stalinist period and the triumphant euphoria of Belgrade, a deathly silence descended upon Croatia. The most brutal persecutions were perpetrated under the guise of "unity and fraternity." Passive resistance was the people's only weapon: but in the post-Stalinist period, the people began to raise their voices of discontent and protest. In accordance with the nature of the new regime, based on the Marxist philosophy of historical materialism, these voices were heard primarily in the economic sphere. Serbian hegemonic centralism had once again established its absolute power over the resources of other republics, especially the more developed Slovenian and Croatian ones. But underlying the economic problems was always the national question. Despite the corruption that Belgrade practiced with Slovenian and Croatian industrial funds, favoring Macedonian and Albanian collaborators, the communist leaders of these two nations increasingly emphasized their traditional sympathies for the Croats, now joining the "economic" opposition of the Slovenes and Croats.

Only this spontaneous solidarity made possible the elimination of A. Rankovic and his most devoted Serbian accomplices, who had established a terrible system of terror and plunder. After a prolonged and increasingly open struggle from 1958, 1964, 1964, 1965 and 1966, the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, held on Brioni Island (1966), eliminated Rankovic, a point from which the general collapse of that unjust, anti-human and anti-democratic political creation is noted.

The events speak for themselves.

We do not wish to indulge in conjecture. We prefer to give voice to the actors themselves in this drama, which inspires both utter repulsion and a very strange kind of admiration. For example, on March 15th, a Declaration on the Name and Function of the Croatian Literary Language was drafted at the plenary session of the Croatian Writers' Society. This declaration was signed by 18 of the most representative institutions of cultural life in Croatia under the communist regime. Complaining against the degradation and reduction of the Croatian language to a provincial status under the pretext of Serbo-Croatian or Croatian-Serbian identity, these eminent Croatian organizations request two things from the Belgrade government: 1) Amendment of Article 131 of the current Constitution, which should be worded as follows: Federal laws and other general acts of federal bodies must be published in their authentic text in the four literary languages of the peoples of Yugoslavia: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. In official communications, federal bodies must adhere to the principle of equality for all the languages of the peoples of Yugoslavia. The Croatian language must be called by its name—Croatian—and not Serbo-Croatian or Croatian-Serbian. 2) Consequently, given the aforementioned requirement—the Declaration states verbatim—it is necessary to ensure the consistent use of the Croatian literary language in schools, the press, public and political life, radio, and television whenever the Croatian population is involved…”

The struggle for one's mother tongue is not specific to Marxism. For centuries, it has been the principal instrument for the emancipation, liberation, and sovereignty of peoples. That is why we are now witnessing a great spectacle, provoked by this Croatian Declaration. Serbs of all stripes and a nearly nonexistent, opportunistic Croatian minority are raising deafening threats. Party tribunals have already intervened, and the first sanctions have been applied. The Croatian communists have their new “martyrs.” V. Bakaric, the first communist in Croatia and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia (PKJ), upon whom the new “rebellion” weighs most heavily, has postponed the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Croatia indefinitely. In explaining his decision, Bakaric says, among other things:

"Nationalism among us, and according to more or less everyone's opinion, increased from 1952 onward, with a more pronounced rise in 1962 and 1963. If we look at the most vocal spokespeople, we notice that they are changing. In 1963 and 1964, it was those from the economic sector, or rather, the administrative, party, or state sector, concerned with the economy. The basic cause of this was centralism, that is, the distribution of funds. We had said that with reform, nationalism would decline, and in these circles, that has indeed happened. Formally, nationalism is now accepted by others, precisely those who, in the current phase of the revolution, have not found their place, with whom we have not found common ground, and who will still clash with our path for some time."

Referring to "the hotbeds, creators of this situation," Bakaric adds: "For example, we first had a conflict with the group of philosophers[27]. Our aim was to defeat them politically. We took no administrative action." Bakaric then addresses the case of the Croatian communist historian Francisco Tudjman, announcing his "arrangement" behind the scenes with the Central Committee. He then continues verbatim: "At the Matica Iseljenicka (Institute for Emigrants), we heard similar things... Comrade Holjevac[28] and his actions in the Council of the Republic last year, when the issue of the Bozidar Adzija awards[29] were being discussed, have been mentioned. Considering the situation as a whole, it would have been logical for him to have submitted his resignation, which we asked of him, but he did not. Blaming him for not accepting criticism and asking him to examine the sources of nationalism, Bakaric emphasized the possibility of another similar issue"[30] and elsewhere.

The aforementioned Croatian communist historian Tudjman, despite having promised in writing to adapt his historical research and conclusions to the guidelines of the Central Committee, wrote the following in the Zagreb newspaper "Telegram" on January 17, 1967:

"Alongside the revival of the unionist-hegemonist tendency and the prolongation of the climate of Rankovic's increasingly broad interpretations of social life, and the fact that they assumed threatening and unrealistic forms, were also reinforced in the field of historiography by analogous trends. These trends further expanded their role as vanguards, thus failing to merely update the theses and concepts of Vuk-Garasanin and the dictatorship of January 6th (Alexander's dictatorship).

It was necessary to justify the new Alexandrian era of statism and hegemony not only with new theories of superior socialist integralism, but also with appropriate assessments of the recent history of the Yugoslav peoples. This was emphasized in the one-sided assessments: the only positive fact was the formation of monarchical Yugoslavia, and the responsibility for its destruction fell on the nationalities (especially the Croats, then the Slovenes, Macedonians, and national minorities). "On the national question, the discussion revolves solely around the competition between two bourgeoisies, etc."

Responding to critics, Tudjman says: "But something more is needed. For a historian, it would be necessary to investigate the extent to which my views agree with those of the Croatian Marxists who were engaged in similar discussions from 1920 onward, and what their influence and fate were. I believe all this could contribute to the understanding of historical development" [31].

Warning of the danger of Italian irredentism, Pavsic calls for radical internal reforms in every respect.

This Slovenian writer's stance is highly characteristic. The Slovenes, the westernmost part—the Central European part of Yugoslavia, exposed to irredentism, especially Italian—had always seen their salvation in Belgrade, in Yugoslavism. Having experienced the slogan of "unity and fraternity," as applied by A. Rankovic, Slovenian spirits have been mobilized, joining those of Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, and others. The most representative figures of Slovenian politics and culture are now speaking openly of the right to secession.

It is evident, then, that the Croatian struggle for independence and sovereignty is no longer isolated. As the most numerous people resisting Yugoslavism, or rather, Greater Serbianism, the Croatian people, through their struggle, facilitate the resistance of the Albanians, Macedonians, Slovenes, and the Hungarian minority. The Croatian struggle for the right to self-determination thus becomes the common instrument for the democratization of that part of the world, a region that is certainly very crucial and dangerous for world peace and the human rights of individuals and peoples. What is the point of four official languages in Yugoslavia, which are being demanded today, if the Albanians of Kosovo-Metohija can and should be incorporated into the motherland of Albania? A region with almost a million Albanians, forming a majority of up to 75% of the population, should unite with an independent Albania.

Tito recognized this right, even when he saw the future of peoples under the Serbian dictatorship as one of revolutionary illegality. And now? The case, after the fall of Rankovic, is quite well known to world opinion. The recent reception of an Albanian delegation by the US Congress has shed sufficient light on the "liberation" and "unity and fraternity" that Tito, along with Rankovic, has prepared for that martyred population of tiny Albania.[32] The Macedonian case is quite similar. The mere existence of a federation of Macedonian societies in the Bulgarian capital, Sofia, clearly indicates Macedonian discontent with Serbian rule over their homeland. Furthermore, the existence of Macedonian emigration throughout the free world is a compelling argument that Macedonians do not want to live in Yugoslavia.[33]

Ekonomska Politika (Economic Policy), a Serbian newspaper from Belgrade, taking into account what we have been saying, in its feature article in the April 1, 1967 issue, points to a constantly growing phenomenon, calling it "federal aversion." Saying anything in favor of Belgrade is "out of fashion, unpopular," and "dangerous." "Anyone who does something like this," E.P. continues, "can be sure of being labeled an advocate of statism or unitarianism."

Knjizevne Novine (The Literary Press), another Serbian newspaper, commenting on the Declaration on Domination and the Role of the Croatian Language, condemns this Croatian attitude, labeling it "chauvinism." Its commentary concludes: "In any case, the specter of chauvinism of all shades has been wandering freely and unhindered through Yugoslavia for some time. There is even a pre-established protocol according to which this specter moves. First, with certain 'Marxist' quotations on the right of self-determination of peoples, 'socialist' access to the problems is ensured; then a phenomenon, whose existence no one denies, is exaggerated; and finally, in the name of national equality, the very foundations on which the community of Yugoslav peoples rests are attacked" [34].

Regarding Yugoslavism and the foundations upon which the community of Yugoslav peoples rests, which the Serbian newspaper nostalgically invokes, we will quote here the words of an American observer, for they captured the essence of the truth:

"As a state, Yugoslavia is above all a republic of peoples today, not a nation-state. The customary designation of 'Yugoslav state,' whether referring to the former Yugoslavia or the current communist one, has the sole purpose of concealing and denying the real existence of the aforementioned nationalities (Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins) that comprise the Yugoslav state. The Serbs use the term 'Yugoslav nationality' with the deliberate intention of denying the Croatian name, its characteristics, and its national rights. It is the Serbs' desire to assimilate all nationalities, especially the Croatian, but the concept of Yugoslav nationality was and remains merely a premeditated idea of transforming all ethnic groups into a single nationality." Serbia... We must also point out that the Serbs remained the most dominant and powerful political force in present-day Yugoslavia. It is common knowledge in well-informed circles that the majority of members of the Yugoslav Communist Party are Serbs and that they, consequently, occupy positions of political importance.

"The American author, alongside the Croatian struggle for independence, finds similar struggles among other peoples: 'It is possible to find serious movements for the independence of Macedonia and Slovenia, and their motivation and desires are not circumstantial.'" The people are determined to achieve their goals, and nothing will impede their bold struggle" [35]. We believe our thesis regarding the existence of the subject of the right to self-determination in the Croatian case has been sufficiently demonstrated, as has the fact that its struggle for independence is not isolated but rather operates within a democratic framework. This would, above all, ensure the free development of the Croatian people. They should not waste their energies fighting for the most basic thing: the defense of their own literary language, the most developed and oldest of all those used in that part of the world, boasting a 1,200-year-old alphabet (Glagoliskan) and nearly 500 years since lasting works were written in it (M. Marulic, Judita, 1545; M. Drzic: Dundo Maroje and others, works that are currently being staged with great success in European artistic centers). With Croatian independence, its people would no longer have to seek their livelihood abroad as they do today, when nearly 170,000 Croatians are working in West Germany alone. Croatians, even though the Republic of Croatia is, after Slovenia, the most economically developed part of Yugoslavia.

As a religious people, they would determine their position on matters of religion and worship according to their beliefs and traditions, and for them, a Serbian communist, who devastated Croatian villages during the last war, would not be "authorized" to discuss the relations between the Croatian Catholic people and their religious center in the Vatican, intentionally introducing denigrating insinuations against the Croatian Catholic clergy, thereby provoking Croatian discontent not always favourable to the Holy See itself... Whether religion, culture, and the economy have anything to do with existence, free development, and the right to self-determination, we leave it to our readers to freely form their own judgment.

Thus, in fighting against unjust Serbian supremacy, the Croatian people also help the Macedonians, the Albanians, the Montenegrins[36] at least because they never accepted a national identity with the Serbs, and finally even the Slovenes, who today clearly claim their right to self-determination, giving preference to Slovenism over Yugoslavism, as their writer Pavsic, president of the Association of Writers of Yugoslavia, would say.

What, then, is this "higher" interest, for example, that requires almost a million Albanians, living in dense communities and without territorial separation from their motherland, to endure the domination of Belgrade, being prevented from uniting with the State of Albania? Especially if the fate of the population is governed from Belgrade as from Tirana by the same Marxist philosophy and policies? Why can't Macedonians unite with Bulgaria, if all evidence of their own free will expresses their identity with, or a greater affinity with, Bulgarians than with Serbs, and Marxist ideology prevails in Sofia, Belgrade, and Skopje? What is this higher right in whose name Slovenian and Croatian industry must subsidize Serbian industry and maintain the Serbian military and police apparatus to the detriment of all the freedoms of the Slovenian and Croatian peoples?

We consider it appropriate to end these questions here. It remains for us to answer whether the Croatian struggle is in conflict with the general process of history, as we promised.

Here, the old principle applies: contra factum non valet argumentum (facts do not contradict arguments). The "separatist" will of the peoples of Yugoslavia against the "unionist" will of Serbia provides conclusive proof that the current historical development is "separatist." But we will be told that Yugoslavia and its peoples are too small a measure to apply to the assessment of world-historical events. What do the theory and practice of the great nations and of other peoples say?

The Clash of Opinions

Leaving aside the case of Rousseau with his extremist nationalism and totalitarian democracy, we will begin with Renan. In his famous lecture on the nation, delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882, he said the following: "Nations are not eternal. They have begun, they will end. The European confederation will probably replace them."

The philosopher Nietzsche, taking an anti-nationalist stance, argues that nationalism has divided Europe into morbid factions, fostered by the nationalist madness of short-sighted politicians who, in their "fatally transient" politics, distort the signs of proof, do not even suspect that Europe "wants to be one" [37].

G. Sorel, for his part, mindful of this European nationalist division, formulates the most pessimistic idea and paints a picture and perspective of Europe's future. His Europe is a basket full of crabs, which are pricking each other every day. Commenting on this pessimism, Denis de Rougemont adds: "Sorel, who marks the transition between Marx and Nietzsche, his 19th-century masters, and between Lenin and Mussolini, his 20th-century disciples, was undoubtedly the most pessimistic observer of the Europe of nations. The year 1914 proved him right." In 1914, the glass was shattered—not of Europe, of course, but of the Europe of nations and its global imperialism… Germany, France, and Italy, immediately after their liberation, inserted into their Constitutions articles that provided for the abandonment of the sacrosanct dogma of total sovereignty.[38]

L. Einaudi, former Italian president, concludes his book, "War and European Unity," with the emphatic question: how can and should we distinguish the friends from the enemies of peace? He answers that all those who defend sovereignty and do not accept a supranational political formation, ceding to it a portion of national sovereignty, are enemies of peace and of the European future.[39] Luis Diez del Corral, who at times appears to be a "unionist" and at other times a "separatist," formulates the following ideas against nationalism:

"There is a bitter irony and a profound historical paradox in the fact that the same nationalist principle, while tearing apart the historical fabric of Europe, became the common and vulgar patrimony of every people on earth. The national idea, transformed into an elemental idée-force, would take extreme forms of explosive particularism within Europe and, at the same time, would wander anonymously, magically, and fabulously with a long comet-like tail across the skies of the planet, inciting the uprising against Europe of the peoples who had previously recognized its leadership" [40].

His compatriot González Fernández de la Mora identifies the idea of sovereignty with the instinct for power, a general phenomenon of the physical-biological world, proclaiming the principle of sovereignties contrary to the very idea of the unity of law. Humanity will one day blush for having invented a legal term to envelop an instinct, just as we blush today when we lament slavery as a legal institution.[41]

This series of authors with a "unionist," anti-nationalist orientation and a stance against national sovereignty could be expanded much further.[42] Due to space constraints, we interrupt this series to give a few words to these "adversaries."

The flip side of this political "Manicheanism" is represented by a series of writers, scholars, and politicians who defend nationalism, the nation-state, and sovereignty. Since the French Revolution, nationalists and federalists have been in conflict. Roberto opposes French "egoism" to pan-European federalism. He does not believe that the French legislator can legislate for future generations, lacking both the power and the knowledge of the necessary conditions. He prefers to leave the matter in the hands of philosophers, demanding that the French dedicate themselves to their nation.[43]

Our contemporary, the academic François Perroux, says the following: "The historian of the future will undoubtedly say that those who have opposed a fused, integrated Europe were the true and only defenders of the European spirit. A Europe subservient to the dominant powers that triumph, if it were ever to be realized, would mean the end of Europe and of the European spirit. The spirit of old Europe will not emerge victorious from the current impasse except on the condition of remaining true to its best qualities, eliminating these defects which are the cult of slogans (including here the pro-European slogan), the folds of fanatical ideas, the reactions of a Manichaeism that, invoking the tones of the Last Judgment, divides good and bad human beings based on the historical accidents of a moment... In the case of a European federation, "it will be nothing more than a simple alliance, useful or necessary, well or poorly arranged, against a particular enemy; Here we will be dealing with the transfer of a number of national sovereignties and their subordination, not to an impossible common sovereignty, but to the will and advantage of a stronger power, which would become its sole queen and master.

What happened to Germany yesterday would happen to Europe. In 1848, the Frankfurt Parliament attempted to create a federation of equals. But it was mistaken: equality was impossible among the members of the Germanic body….” Then came Bismarck's intervention and Prussian domination. “Let us suppose, then, a federal Europe thus forming an artificial whole with naturally distinct homelands. It would be a grave error to believe that a regime of this kind would guarantee peace. History teaches us that war springs directly from a federal constitution, like the fruit of a flower. These wars, small or large, which are a natural part of this regime, are given the technical name of 'punitive expeditions.'”

In most cases, they forcibly lead the federated members into the fold of the federation….” The author immediately mentions punitive expeditions against “Saxon, Bavarian, etc., separatist groups,” also invoking the case of the Swiss rebellions, on which occasion the rebels were exterminated, as well as the case of the American Civil War, “one of the bloodiest in history. The South was reduced to a kind of servitude for a period of almost twenty years” [44]. To avoid the repetition of this experience on a much larger scale, the aforementioned author recommends political prudence and caution. Jakob Burckhardt had already warned about the arrival of the “terrible simplifiers,” who, in the name of democracy, impose the military sword.

Someone might object that, after the punitive expeditions in Switzerland, Germany, and America, powerful nations and states were formed, justifying their consideration as an entirely positive outcome of history. We acknowledge this, but on the condition of the following observation. In the German case, it was a human multitude already imbued with the common consciousness of belonging to the German nation. They lived in a state of nascent awareness, of the need to form a political whole, not merely a cultural-linguistic one. Here, too, "impeding factors" had postponed the completion of the organic national growth of the German people, a phenomenon common to the development of European nations. We did not wish to address the Swiss case here, but rather the North American case. The latter contrasts with those of Europe, both in its past and present. The same holds true regarding the period of its isolation as well as today, in the period of North America's most active participation in European and world affairs. America was formed apart from the European world, and this conferred upon it certain specific characteristics in comparison with Europe in general.

Immigrants, or emigrants, depending on how one views the American population, initially wanted to continue the same life their parents had lived in Europe. The tendency toward separation, isolation, and "national" autonomies inevitably led to the conflicts that culminated in the Civil War. After the bitter experience of war, vital and political energies were channeled in another direction. Federalism prevailed over the dangerous separatism and the formation of autonomous political units, similar to European states. Political "rationalism," the calculations of jurists and politicians, brought about victory over spontaneous growth toward a political community in the sense of a national community, a community with a shared soul. The American success is inspiring, its example spreading. It stimulates American and foreign politicians, some seeking to impose its experience and others to transplant it in their own countries or generalize it and adapt it to European political needs.

To temper enthusiasm for this current of thought, whether theoretical or practical, we feel it is absolutely necessary to highlight its drawbacks, especially in the European context. The Americans were able to achieve this success thanks to the unique conditions under which they formed their state, their community. The light shed on this matter by the British historian Toynbee is unsurpassed, and the issue, in our view, requires no further explanation: "The energies released by the breaking up of the cake of custom crystallize into new activities that are defined in their forms and limited by their purpose... to a certain plan of social life... In the field liberated by the disintegration of the lineage or family group, a political mode of life arises resembling a ship's company, only on a larger scale and with a permanent foundation: a community in which the binding element is not homogeneity of blood, but common obedience to a freely chosen leader and respect for a freely accepted law, which may be called a social contract in the figurative language of modern Western political mythology."

It is evident that all of this is completely lacking for any eventual European federation at present. European nation-states do not have and cannot have the rupture of their "cake of custom". By the integrity of this "cake" they exist, continue to live and fulfill their "special mission" in the concert of other peoples. Moreover, says the Frenchman Massis, "the force that attracted them (the different ethnic groups that immigrated to America. N. op.) creating from them a nation, was not the force of their past ("cake" of custom," Toynbee would say. N. op.) but of their future. Space has played the role of time here, the future the role of the past" [45].

In Europe, in the case of European peoples, it is the past that has shaped them. Forcing them into federalism would mean a horrific oversimplification, imposing punitive measures with no prospect of success. On the contrary, it would lead to permanent political terror and political and cultural impoverishment, which would simultaneously mean turning one's back on historical progress. A federation imposed hastily would be deprived of the indispensable element of a solid, democratic, and free community. In the case of national liberty, unlike federal liberty, it is a liberty compatible with social cohesion. The free cohesion of its members engenders the internal solidity that distinguishes the European nation-state from all the ancient ones, in which union was produced and maintained by external pressure of the state on disparate groups, whereas here the state's vigor arises from the spontaneous and profound cohesion among its subjects" [46].

To avoid any kind of misunderstanding, we consider it appropriate to dedicate a few lines here to nationalism. Among the concepts currently opposed by many—the nation-state, sovereignty, self-determination, and nationalism—the latter is somewhat more discredited. From various international circles, attempts are being made to label nationalism as racism and totalitarianism. We consider this approach absolutely unjust. No less unjust and erroneous are the opinions of authors who take a single element of the inherently complex idea of nationalism and give it an absolute character, attempting to define nationalism in this impoverished and distorted way. Thus, for example, Del Corral finds the root of nationalism in German philosophy: "philosophy of identity," Derived from Spinoza.

Hegelianism has become the "historical phenomenon," transforming it into the "representation of an absolute principle. The nation will be presented as such a principle, becoming the political destiny, the theoretical foundation and justification of the entire political structure..." The nation is contrasted with the ideal of Justice, isolation versus collaboration and national integration [47].

In his unionist fervor, Coudenhove-Kalergi exaggerates when speaking of nationalism. "Nationalism has become a second religion; with its ethics that compel us to kill or die for the nation, with its cult, its saints and demigods, with its festivals, its symbols, and its dogmas." Because of the enormous importance of the national idea, it is impossible to define it without doing it an offense, because every attempt at definition runs up against different contradictions, whether one tries to define it as a linguistic or state link, as a historical or geographical bond, as an affinity of blood or culture" [48].

According to Kalergi, nationalism is of bourgeois origin and stems from a lack of education. The semi-educated must be nationalists, because from their childhood they know and love only their own history, literature, and culture, their great men... Of the history... of neighboring peoples, they have not even the faintest idea. They study universal history falsified for national use and consumption, thus necessarily arriving at the conclusion that their nation is the greatest in the world, that it has always been right in all political conflicts, that it, in short, is the chosen people of Providence" [49].

Kalergi is not only an amateur historian and politician. He is also a passionate propagandist for his pan-European ideal. To this end, he finds it necessary to starkly contrast the ideas he believes must be overcome with the ideas he longs to realize. His descriptive definition of nationalism is the absolutization of one of the aberrations of the national idea, a secondary concomitant, external to the concept of nationalism.

Also well known is the negative opinion of the great British historian A. Toynbee regarding nationalism. He defines it, as Ortega y Gasset says, as "the spirit or tendency that leads people to feel, act, and think about what is part of a given society as if it were the whole of that society." Furthermore: "The dominant note in the collective consciousness of (Western) communities until recently was the aspiration to be a universe unto itself."

In criticizing the British historian rather virulently, Ortega y Gasset says that "no Western nation, not even Victorian England, not even, to top it all off, Hitler's Germany, has felt itself to be a universe... England... and Germany have each felt themselves to be a part that had the character of a nation, in relation to other parts that are the other nations, together forming a universe that was the Western world. Precisely because each felt itself to be a part, it could feel itself to be the most important part of that universe and, consequently, sought to exercise the corresponding hegemony. But this belief in oneself to be superior, this 'superiority complex,' is evidently something different, it is evidently the opposite of feeling oneself to be a universe and is also heterogeneous to the question of 'nationalism.' Not every nation, much less in order to be a nation and feel itself as such, needed to believe in its superiority" [50].

To do Toynbee justice, it must be said that on his last trip to South America, in 1966, and precisely in Montevideo, he declared that nationalism is currently the most powerful force.[51] Moreover, it seems to us that the British historian, in the first instance, formulated an axiological judgment and, in the second, merely recorded the facts. Similarly, the renowned American publicist W. Lippmann stated: "It cannot be denied that national forces are on the rise. Patriotism, when directed against foreign powers, unites men otherwise divided by religion, politics, social class, or profession. Deeply rooted in the human spirit, nationalism is far stronger than any ideology forged by a party congress and supported by propaganda." Suggesting to America and Europe how they should proceed to strengthen their will to survive, Lippmann continues: "This will must be fueled by the conviction that we are defending our homeland, our civilization, and nothing else" [52].

Such is the dispute over the problem among "the great powers." A dispute that has found no end in either theory or practical politics. In the latter, De Gaulle is against Hallstein, R. Schumann, Jean Monnet, and others. The opinions seem irreconcilable, especially if we consider each in its ultimate aspect. The authors or politicians exaggerate the arguments according to their purpose, painting in bright and luminous shades what might be useful for their objective, leaving the opposing possibility in the dark or painting it in a sad and repulsive light.

Among these many conflicting opinions, R. Aron's seems to us more moderate, more realistic, and fully in keeping with the course of history. He had previously stated that there was not even a "seed of Atlantic patriotism" and that the "European idea is empty" [53]. However, later, in his major subsequent work, he reveals a spirit of moderation and a willingness to be more cautious and objective. By expressly addressing the problem of sovereignty and its eventual restriction and transfer, he lays bare his universalist and unionist sentiments, but always adhering firmly to the facts. Humanity is going through a period of crisis, when conditions are being created for an Imperium. "Each of the empires that have been considered universal unified a zone of civilization and put an end to conflicts between universal sovereignties. Reasoning by analogy seems to suggest that the universal empire, in the second half of the twentieth century, should encompass all of humanity."

The French professor, addressing this problem, reduces the opposing views to the following terms: "...the theorists of peace through law consider a plurality of states and ask how to subject these states to the rule of law. The theorists of peace through empire observe that the plurality of states implies a risk of war and ask how to overcome the obstacle of sovereignty." Trying to maintain his impartiality on this matter, Aron makes a practical observation, stating: "National sentiment is so strong that no empire openly declares itself as such. As soon as the Russian and American armies withdraw, each of the European states will try to regain its autonomy. What is true for Europe is even more true outside of Europe. States that have just been born or have recently regained their independence jealously guard this precious asset" [54].

Analyzing recent European creations such as the Common Market, Euratom, and the European Coal and Steel Union, Aron speaks of a "clandestine federalism," a "painless federalism," stating verbatim: "Legitimate authority, de facto power, awareness of a superior nationality—all of this can gradually emerge from the economic community, but only on the condition that the people desire it and that governments act in accordance with this will, or, in other words, on the condition that governments act with a view to federation and that the people consent to it."

Aron ends his chapter on sovereignty with a certain nostalgic pessimism, saying: “The expansion of the functions of the State, the rule of international law that prohibits direct interference in the internal affairs of independent States, the nationalization of culture—these three characteristic facts of our century preserve national independence and, despite technical and economic interdependence, and also supranational blocs and transnational ideologies, have a meaning that can be deplored, but not ignored. Is it necessary to deplore it?” [55]. To deplore or not to deplore, therein lies the spirit of R. Aron’s objectivity. With Socratic skepticism, he ends his work: “We know that we do not know the answer to these questions…” This modest and wise voice evokes the echo of that much older one—oida me meden eidenai—which also reminds us of the distant years of our youth when our teachers tried to instill classical wisdom in us.

The Great and the Small

While the debate among the great continues, what should we, the small, do? If we were permitted to speak of sympathies, we should lean toward those who defend—axiologically and historically—the nation-state, national autonomy and sovereignty, nationalism. For us, the opinion that nationalism is, in its essence, a depraved ideology lacks any valid foundation. Pope Pius XII, according to Cardinal Feltin, made a perfectly legitimate distinction between "a healthy nationalism," which means devotion to one's own country, "this greater family that God has given us," and perverted nationalism [56].

Accepting this moral assessment of nationalism as absolutely true, we also accept without hesitation the opinion of Professor Victor L. Tapie of the Sorbonne University, who says: "The word nationalism speaks clearly to our generation: it passionately invokes the demands of young nations that are claiming their independence." Furthermore, Znaniecki states, according to L. Diez del Corral: "In fact, more books and articles on the problem of nationalism have been published in Polish than in any other language. In contrast, in England, perhaps the country where national consciousness first encompassed the entire population, nationalism permeated its mentality to such an extent that it ceased to be problematic. This explains why there are so few reflections on nationalism in 19th-century English thought" [57].

What holds true for the Poles also holds true for us Croats. Those who lack national freedom demand it with all the more intensity the more awakened their national-human consciousness is. A people like the Croatians, who maintain a vivid awareness of their state-national independence, conscious of the enormous sacrifices made for it, yet always frustrated for one reason or another, tirelessly insist on their right to self-determination, cultivating their sympathies more with "separatists" than with "unionists," always firmly convinced that between the two there exists a contradiction more apparent than substantive.[58]

The brief reference to Croatian history we have made has clearly indicated the subject of the right to self-determination in the Croatian case. What is this right that supports the Croatians, if there are authors who deny this right the character of a positive obligation under international law?[59]

Irreconcilable with a negative opinion on this matter, A. Bonnichon turns to the moralists. If all the positive norms of international law have fallen silent—datum sed non concessum—Bonnichon deduces the right of peoples to self-determination from the right of humankind to self-determination. The will to live freely, to choose the state and community we prefer—which the Declaration of the Rights of Man guarantees to the individual—must logically and legally apply also to nations, analogous collective entities. All those who wish to live together, he says, "what is accepted as proven in a nation," are entitled to demand respect from a constituted state that has hitherto encompassed them within its sphere of dependence. But the right of a constituted state belongs to the realm of the "constructed," our author says, and the subject of self-determination resides in "what is given" and not in "what is constructed," recalling F. Gény's ideas on this matter. Leaning towards the positivist conception, according to Bonnichon, in similar cases, the right to self-determination, an unconstructed right—it would be a phenomenon "outside the category of Law"—"dehors des catégories du Droit." According to this view, the essential point of gravity of law would be in what is "constructed," in what is positive.

While we acknowledge the legitimacy of the attempt to scientifically delimit (Kelsen) the legal phenomenon from other normative phenomena, a "natural law" conception is irreconcilable with relegating everything that is not positive within it to other fields, especially that of morality. If only positive law were jus—law—how could we legitimately and reasonably speak of jus conditum and jus condendum? These are merely two moments, two phases in the life of the same phenomenon.

According to the modern, democratic conception of law, its essence resides in the will of the people. Hence, it is essential to clearly distinguish between jus conditum and jus condendum. The positive law of a constituted state, within which there exists another will of the people contrary to it—a group of people who feel themselves to be a nation—ceases to be law with respect to this will. All the more so when violence is applied against it in the name of what has been "constructed." Its existence is a legally fictitious reality, while the real will that desires and strives for a new and real possibility is the true right—jus condendum.

Prof. Gonella, commenting on a message from Pope Pius XII, says: “Force is the instrument of justice and, as such, cannot be understood merely as the means of defending an established legality. If this legality is unjust and maintained by violence, the force of law will lose all conservative character, assuming an innovative and legitimately revolutionary character, opposing unjust positive law in the name of a (just) natural law.”[60]

We believe it is impossible to better characterize the Croatian position vis-à-vis the Yugoslav state. Its positive law was never freely accepted by the Croatian people as the law in accordance with their interests and their will. The positivism of its law, the Yugoslav state owes not to force “ab intus,” to the authentic force of law, but solely to force “ab extra,” to physical force, to violence.[61]

An objective researcher, interested only in the truth, will categorically agree with what we have just said. Against positivism The legally fictitious Yugoslav state, maintained by violence, is and must be the right to self-determination of the Croatian people, very clearly guaranteed by the UN Charter in Chapter IX, Articles 55 and 56, in conjunction with Article 103. Within these frameworks, the struggle of the Croatian people has unfolded and continues to unfold throughout their extraordinarily difficult life under the regime imposed in 1918 from Belgrade. After the death of Esteban Radić, a genuinely democratic Croatian leader, killed by a Serbian bullet—violence being the worst possible substitute for law—the Croatian right to self-determination took on "an innovative and legitimately revolutionary character," as Gonella would say, proclaiming the restoration of their independence in 1941.

This act of the Croatian people has still not been objectively addressed. Driven by undisclosed interests and a highly partisan morality, attempts have been made, and continue to be made, to conflate certain circumstantial events with the right to self-determination itself, while simultaneously denying it. in condemning these phenomena. Certain ideological tendencies or practical aberrations—an almost inevitable consequence in the turbulent era in which they occurred—attributable to that Croatian government, do not alter the situation. Therefore, we do not believe the attitude of certain newspapers in the free world to be disinterested, as they currently dedicate their columns extensively to the propaganda of the Yugoslav state apparatus, attempting "elegantly" to overlook the very painful reality in which the Croatian people currently live. We do not believe that profit should continue to be the primary motivation of a company, even when it operates within the sphere of free enterprise. Freedom of enterprise is intimately linked to political freedom, and the political freedom of one to that of others—the indivisibility of freedom.

This was and remains the Croatian motto. Behind our struggle lie six million human beings, human consciences, Maritain's "metaphysical mystery" or "historical miracle," as we have come to call it, him being the factor in the elevation of humankind and the humanization of history. Fighting for self-determination, we Croatians currently in exile, like the people in our homeland, have before our eyes what Churchill said at the end of the last great war, referring to the idea of European integration: "The movement which aims at European unity must be a powerful force of democratic will, which is nourished by our common sense of spiritual values.

We yearn for the eventual participation of all the peoples of the continent (without limitation to Western Europe, N. op.) whose ways of life are not in contradiction with a Magna Carta of human rights and free democracy. We welcome every country whose people are masters of their government." The Croatian people are not the "masters" of the government, installed and maintained by force in Belgrade, especially after the spectacular and tragic extermination of the Croatian army in 1945—known as the Bleiburg Tragedy.

Therefore, in the name of "spiritual values" and "our common sentiment," we demand the extension of the right to self-determination to Croatia, in accordance with that great charter of human rights mentioned by the British statesman in his powerful eloquence. Millions of mutilated individuals in Croatia cannot contribute to either peace or the progress of humanity. It logically follows from this that the Croatian struggle for independence is fundamentally democratic.

On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the restoration of Croatia's independence, we humbly dedicate these lines to the memory of all those who fell for the freedom of their people, especially the martyrs of Bleiburg, reaffirming at the same time our devotion to the principles and ideals of free democracy and the self-determination of peoples, considering them indispensable conditions for the genuine progress of humanity toward its equally genuine integration.

AMALGAMATION, NOT COEXISTENCE

Ángel Belic, Buenos Aires

In this work, I will refer to familiar things, for what is familiar must be repeated ceaselessly so that we assimilate it until it becomes an integral part of our being. One of these familiar things is that without democracy, that is, without individual, national, and state self-determination, there is no freedom. And where there is no freedom, the basic element of the human condition is lacking.

Philosophy defines freedom as the absence of all violence, that is, self-determination, which must be the premise of all ethics. The history of humankind abounds with sacrifices made by those who fought for freedom. Why have people always fought for freedom? Because there has always been a segment of humanity deprived of it.

In this article, we propose to address certain aspects related to the self-determination of peoples, that is, the determination of peoples by themselves. We consider it useful to draw by analogy some well-known phases in the history of the evolution of individual self-determination.

The much-lauded democracy of the city-states of ancient Greece encompassed, in fact, a limited number of citizens, qualified by birth or wealth. Universal Rome, with its extraordinary sense of legal thought, did not recognize the universal equality of all people. Only Roman citizens (civis romanus) benefited from the fruits of that philosophy, while slaves lacked all rights. Only Christianity awakened the consciousness of the masses regarding equality and freedom, which, like a wildfire, swept through individuals and nations. "There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus." But humanity practices only a part of Christian doctrine. True equality will only appear in our times, although this equality and liberty are subject to much criticism.

Through medieval documents such as the Magna Carta, the Golden Bull, and similar texts, certain classes, cities, and guilds obtained a degree of freedom and privileges from their sovereigns. The rest, the non-privileged, lived solely on the benevolence of feudal lords, so there was no question of liberty or equality.

Individual Self-Determination

In the Modern Age, Rousseau, reacting to the abuses of the privileged classes, asserted that every man is born free and developed his political theory concerning the origin and purpose of the State. Forty years later, the French National Constituent Assembly proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which was essentially identical to the American Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen a few years earlier. Its principles formed the foundation of the European liberal order of the last century. "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights... These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression." Such, it would seem, be a perfect definition of individual self-determination.

Political liberalism and technological advancement determined the fabulous progress of humanity, which in a few decades advanced more than in several centuries. However, despite being, in theory, all equal and free and possessing the right to private property, the expected results did not materialize. The free citizen seeking employment in the company of another free citizen faced a terrible dilemma: either freely accept a meager wage for an extremely long workday or freely die of hunger. In the minutes drawn up by the English parliamentary commission that investigated working conditions in the Ashley mines in 1842, we read:

"My name is Sara Gooder. I am eight years old. I haul coal at the Gawber mine. It doesn't tire me out, but I have to push the wheelbarrow in the dark, and I'm scared. I go to work at four o'clock, and sometimes at three-thirty in the morning, and I leave at five-thirty in the afternoon. Sometimes I sing when it's light, but not when it's dark. Then I'm afraid to sing. I don't like being in the coal mine. I'm very sleepy when I go to work in the morning. On Sundays, I go to school and learn to read. They teach me to pray there. I've often heard about Jesus. I don't know why he came to earth, or why he died, but I know that when he rested, there were stones under his head."

"I don't know why he came to earth, or why he died, but I know that when he rested, there were stones under his head." "My name is Mary Barrett; I'm fourteen years old. I've been working in the mine for five years. My father works in an adjoining compartment. I have twelve brothers and sisters, all but one live at home. Only one of them can read. I haul coal and go down to the mine at seven in the morning. I leave at six, sometimes at seven in the evening. I don't like working in the mine, but I have to do it to earn a living. I always work without stockings, shoes, or trousers. I only wear my undergarments. I have to go to the mine with the men. They work naked; now I'm used to it and I don't mind anymore. At first, I was afraid and I didn't like it."

" "I'm Patience Kershaw. I'm 17 years old. My father died a year ago. My mother is still alive, and we are ten children; the oldest is 30 and the youngest is 4. All my sisters used to haul coal. Alicia went to work in the factory because her legs swelled up from carrying coal in the cold water. I never went to school. I go into the mine at five in the morning and come out at five in the afternoon. I take my lunch with me, a piece of bread that I eat at work. I never stop working or rest for lunch. I don't eat anything else until I get home. Part of my head is bald from pushing the wheelbarrow full of coal. I push it a mile underground and back; they weigh about 150 kilos. I do 11 laps a day. If I'm not fast enough, the men beat me."

"I'm not fast enough." Such were the working conditions, created by the beautiful and well-intentioned declaration on the self-determination of man and of the citizen, whose purpose was to create a better society.

Interference with Individual Self-Determination

Strong governments often feel the need to interfere with individual self-determination. To silence government critics, censorship is imposed, political associations are banned, the inviolability of the home is abolished, arrests and imprisonments are carried out, and so on. These interventions are not democratic. But some are.

Democratic intervention was necessary in the cases of Sara Gooder, Mary Barrett, and Patience Kershaw. They had the right to be free, yet they were denied it. When workers' associations demanded maximum working hours and a minimum wage, they were requesting state intervention in a civic liberty, the freedom guaranteed by constitutional law—that is, the freedom to enter into agreements. State intervention in individual self-determination occurs when a conscript is required to wear a uniform or when press laws punish journalists for abuse.

Such interventions relate to the problem of the relationship between the desire for greater individual freedom and the need for an organized social order. Political and legal philosophy created a harmony between individual self-determination and state intervention in its sphere and, to paraphrase Rousseau, forged a modern social contract culminating in a new declaration of Human Rights. This declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris in 1948. There are inalienable civil, personal, economic, social, and cultural rights, examples of which include the right to social security, the right to work, the right to education, the right to participate in the government of one's own country and to hold public office, the right to seek and enjoy asylum, and the right to property.

The obligation to contribute to pension funds clearly constitutes state interference in the realm of individual self-determination, but it was imposed in accordance with the human right to social security.

Self-determination of peoples

The principle of self-determination of peoples was analogous to that of individual self-determination. For centuries, peoples were not the holders of their rights but rather the objects of the political actions of ruling houses, who transferred their power over them through marriage alliances, inheritances, pacts, and wars. The people had never been consulted about their own destiny. Only a few nations, such as the French, English, and Spanish, were organized into nation-states even during the absolutist era, while other states, such as Austria and Turkey, dominated various peoples whose political and legal status varied, but which were far removed from the democratic concept of self-determination. Even France, England, and Spain, although nation-states in their metropolitan territories, held sway over lands and colonies with heterogeneous populations.

The colonies with white populations rebelled in both the Americas, some shortly before the French Revolution, and others during the Napoleonic Wars, and organized their own states. Their primary and foremost task was to secure the newly realized right to self-determination, that is, to protect their sovereignty against foreign interference. It is interesting to note that the principle of self-determination of peoples began to be applied in Europe much later than in the New World and that it is still not fully realized.

Self-determination of States

States self-determination implies the right to exercise their own sovereignty. International law defines sovereignty as the right of every state to act freely in its internal and external relations, including the right to prevent interference by other states in its affairs.

One of the instruments for protecting the sovereignty of the American states was the Monroe Doctrine. However, this doctrine only addressed potential interventions by European states, without providing for the defense of sovereignty against the intervention of one American state in the affairs of another. This posed a significant problem for the South American republics, as several of them considered themselves vulnerable to intervention by the United States.

Numerous conferences were held over several decades until, after multiple drafts, the Charter of Bogotá, or the Charter of the Organization of American States, was signed in 1948, three years after the signing of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 15 of the Charter of Bogotá states: “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The aforementioned principle excludes not only armed force, but also any other form of interference or any tendency that threatens the personality of the State, or the political, economic, and cultural elements that constitute it.”

The United Nations is also based on respect for the absolute sovereignty of its member states. By committing themselves to respect the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations, member states did so voluntarily, in the free exercise of their sovereign will. And to emphasize this sovereignty, the Charter also includes this principle: “The United Nations shall not intervene in matters which are specifically within the domestic jurisdiction of States. This principle shall not preclude the application of enforcement measures in respect of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.”

Modification of the Self-Determination of States

International law arises from international agreements. The greater the number of states that sign a single agreement, the more general that international law becomes. The Charter of the United Nations is an international agreement, signed to date by 133 states—that is, almost the entire world—and its content constitutes general international law. Never in the history of humankind have legal norms been recognized with such unanimity and universality as those contained in the UN Charter. Member states committed themselves to fulfilling all their obligations. Without going into detail, we will simply list, arbitrarily classified, four broad categories of these obligations.

1) The obligations assumed by Member States towards the UN: a) all Member States must give the Organization their full support in any action it undertakes within the framework of the Charter; b) to facilitate prompt and effective action by the UN, Member States transfer to the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace; c) they undertake to abide by the decisions of the Security Council; d) they undertake, under certain conditions, to make their armed forces available to the Security Council and guarantee the UN certain privileges and the necessary immunity within their territory.

2) The obligations of Member States towards other States: a) they undertake to refrain in international relations from the use of force against the independence of other States; b) they undertake to assist one another in the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council; c) each State undertakes to seek to resolve its international disputes first through direct contact with the other State and then to submit the matter to arbitration by the UN. 3) The obligations of Member States towards peoples who have not yet achieved state independence: a) to respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, meaning that any people living in community with another people and in a relationship of dependence has the right to separate from that community and establish their own State; b) certain States, specifically named, committed themselves to bringing independence to peoples who until recently had a colonial or similar status.

4) The Charter establishes that the United Nations will promote respect for the fundamental rights of all without distinction of any kind, such as race, sex, language, or religion. This means that a State would be in violation of international law if it implemented racial laws, denied national minorities the use of their language, or, for example, if a Catholic majority State denied the right to freedom of worship to the Protestant minority, or prevented women from holding public office or employment.

The Charter stipulates that all members must abide by the obligations assumed in accordance with its spirit and letter. Therefore, all member states of the United Nations are bound by international law to comply with all the obligations contained in the Charter, thereby modifying their sovereignty in the interest of international order. If the United Nations adopts any resolution in the prescribed manner, all states must abide by it, even if they voted against it.

Democratic Intervention

All the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations are the result of our democratic conception of the world. Political science defines its objectives as working in two basic directions: a) to preserve world peace and b) to preserve democratic institutions in the domestic and international order. It turns out that the Charter of the United Nations defends democratic principles and, at the same time, the absolute sovereignty of states, which constitutes a clear contradiction.

In the hierarchy of political categories, democratic principles take precedence over the absolute sovereignty of states. Therefore, when a conflict arises between the two, priority must be given to upholding the democratic principle. Human society and human thought are in constant evolution, and just as the original interpretation of liberalism and individual self-determination in the last century proved to be incorrect, or at least too broad, so too is our current interpretation of state sovereignty and state self-determination excessively broad.

In international relations, we must advocate for the freedom and independence of each state, just as in the rule of law we defend the principle of the inviolability of the home; however, we cannot allow the abuse of this same principle. The inviolability of the home does not mean that a lawbreaker can take refuge in their house and thus evade justice. The same applies to the application of an international legal norm with respect to the absolute sovereignty of the state. All the obligations enumerated in the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions it adopts cannot be circumvented by merely applying the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

If a country were to enact anti-Semitic laws, the United Nations cannot doubt for a second that this would affect only the state in question. The implementation of racial laws is in clear conflict with the principles of the Charter, and the United Nations must implement all available measures, including economic blockades, the disruption of land, sea, and air traffic, the severing of diplomatic relations, and, if necessary, military intervention.

The principle of self-determination of peoples (referring to peoples who still lack their own state and live in community with other peoples) and the question of national minorities separated from their homeland belong to the same group of problems. When the text of the Charter of the United Nations states that international relations will be governed by the principle of self-determination of peoples, this is not a Platonic declaration. Rather, by duly signing it, as is the procedure for international agreements, with subsequent ratifications, the member states created a right that can only be interpreted as General International Law. If a people is harmed in the application of its right emanating from the principle of self-determination, established in the Charter, and if the request to freely apply that principle is brought before the United Nations, then that organization, as the competent legal authority, must discuss that matter, take the appropriate resolution and make it effective.

There are few states today where the need to apply the principle of self-determination of peoples, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, might arise. One such state is Yugoslavia, a state entity composed of five officially recognized peoples, all of whom, except for the Serbian people who hold power, are discontented and demand the application of the right to self-determination. The problem is most acutely evident in the relationship between Croats and Serbs, who, although neighbors and linguistically very similar, did not live together in their millennia-long history until 1918. The brief period since then has unequivocally demonstrated that these two peoples are incompatible with a common life. This problem has been addressed repeatedly in this journal, which has offered objective and scholarly analyses of various aspects of the issue. Serbian-Croatian relations are currently experiencing a serious crisis, and it is possible that the United Nations will have to address this issue in the not-too-distant future.

Should this occur, Yugoslavia would likely request that the issue not be discussed at the United Nations, arguing that it is an internal matter, its sole responsibility. In such a case, Yugoslavia would find itself in a clear contradiction, since, as a communist country, it theoretically holds the same view as Soviet legal scholarship on this matter. It is worth noting here that current Soviet legal scholarship, in principle, maintains that all problems related to the principle of self-determination fall squarely within the purview of the United Nations and that member states cannot invoke the paragraph concerning non-intervention in internal affairs in these matters. Moreover, in its view, the United Nations should actively participate to ensure that the principle of self-determination is implemented as soon as possible.[62] The Soviet view is obviously based on the teachings of Lenin, who advocated for the self-determination of peoples and even upheld this view in the event of the eventual secession of the Soviet republics themselves.

In the Decree on Peace, written by Lenin, we read these thoughts:

"If any nation is forcibly confined within the borders of a state, if, despite its expressed wishes—in the press, in popular assemblies, in party agreements, or in movements of rebellion or insurrection against national oppression—it is not granted the right to decide the question of its political existence by free vote, then, after the complete withdrawal of the troops of the conquering or, in general, more powerful nation, the incorporation of that nation into the state constitutes annexation, that is to say, a violent conquest."

Such was the case of Croatia, forcibly incorporated into Yugoslavia, torn apart by the Croatian-Serbian conflict, or rather by Serbian oppression and the resistance of the Croats and other national peoples and minorities subjected to the interests of the dominant nation. Between the two world wars, the Croats expressed their will through democratic means and later also through insurrection, demanding the right to self-determination and national freedom. The Serbs, however, denied and continue to deny these rights and freedoms, resorting to violence and police and military force. Should the United Nations become involved in the Croatian-Serbian conflict, this would not amount to interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, but rather a genuine democratic intervention in full compliance with international law. The United Nations must show courage in strengthening and affirming democratic practices and even intervene in the internal sovereignty of a state when required by the principles of its Charter.

It is necessary to mention here an interesting case of the United States, where they voluntarily limited their internal sovereignty in order not to violate the principles of the United Nations. In 1949, the California Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law that sought to restrict the right of Asian residents in the United States to own land; the decision was based on the finding that the law was contrary to the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, to which the United States was a signatory.

The Legal and Political Character of the United Nations

The United Nations is a product of our time. It is neither better nor worse than humanity according to its way of thinking and seeing. Our generation, at least in the West, prides itself on applying the concept of the rule of law to internal political organization, adding to it the concept of the Welfare State. Our generation, for the most part, places individual self-determination at the forefront of political categories. To defend the individual, who is not isolated, since the same rights belong to everyone, or rather to the social community in its various forms, the Rights of Man were defined and promulgated, constituting the dogmatic part of our constitutions. To prevent the abuse of authority, the principle of the separation of powers is applied.

In foreign policy relations, we have not yet gone so far. Our international community is based on force, currently balanced; a precarious balance, but a balance nonetheless. This is a terrifying fact for our technologically advanced age. It is tragic that political science does not keep pace with the exact sciences. The Charter of the United Nations is the result of the joint work of humanity's most distinguished and wise representatives. Even in its doctrinal conception, it emphasizes above all the value of the human person and their self-determination, from which derives the self-determination of the group or, by extension, the self-determination of peoples.

The consequences of the political conception of the balance of power are felt and weigh heavily within the United Nations. Hence the exaggerated and extraordinary importance attributed to state sovereignty, while on the other hand, the creation of an international power that acts in the same way as certain bodies in a state governed by the rule of law, in accordance with the constitution and current laws, is prevented. The United Nations has its principles, which all member states have committed to respect, but if divergent opinions and opposing interpretations arise, there is no authority capable of resolving the dispute, and everything will depend on the powers that possess the material force to accept or oppose a criterion or resolution.

It is undeniable that scholars in legal and political disciplines, as well as statesmen and politicians who operate in this field today, are more flexible and less exclusivist, trying to adjust or approximate their criteria and actions to those of smaller nations; which, although they may not have great power, exert considerable moral pressure. The United Nations is the world's free forum, which in time must transform into the body capable of enacting laws and adopting viable resolutions, regardless of whether one or another state opposes it due to its own particular interests. Or, as Paul VI expressed it in his 1965 speech before the United Nations in New York, "The United Nations is the obligatory path of our modern civilization."

Amalgamation, Not Coexistence

To analyze the concepts of amalgamation and coexistence, we must begin with the premise that our society has forever rejected war as a means of resolving international problems. War, whether conventional or atomic, would resolve the problem in its own specific way. Whoever survives will resolve what remains unresolved, if indeed anyone survives.

The United Nations is the institution that should resolve all international problems without resorting to war. We have seen that all problems can be resolved if all the forces involved in the United Nations adopt the same point of view. This occurs when the interests of the Western and Eastern worlds, "capitalist" and "socialist," coincide. Such convergences result from a constant evolution to which both the free and communist worlds are subject. It is evident that the democratic world is much more flexible and liberal, more susceptible to change than the dogmatic socialist bloc. In the democratic world, absolute notions and cognitions do not carry the same weight as in the Marxist world, since its philosophical foundation is agnosticism. Freedom of thought is its main characteristic, unlike the communist world. The majority decides, until new generations devise a better formula. In the communist world, only the Party can express opinions and make decisions. However, it is noticeable that this orthodox world is also undergoing a strange evolution. Human rights are enshrined in its constitutions, and its theory suggests that it considers direct, not representative, democracy to be the best system of social organization. Yet, in practice, it allows neither human rights nor a democratic social organization.

When we speak of the Eastern world, we are referring to countries whose philosophy is based on Marxism. Today, we analyze Marxism not only in its theoretical aspects but also in the realm of its political outcomes, as the long period of its application allows us ample opportunity to do so. Capitalism and socialism date from approximately the same era, as they are products of the same industrial revolution. Marx was young when the first terrible consequences of liberal economics appeared, and his doctrine is conceived as equal opportunity for all, that is, overcoming the supremacy of the strongest over the weakest. Marx's theories became the guiding ideas of political movements and parties. But it turns out that practices differ diametrically from theory. Thus, the leader of the German Marxists, Ferdinand Lassalle, said that the worker has no homeland and belongs only to the universal proletariat. In contrast, the First World War demonstrated that "bourgeois" concepts such as patriotism and nationalism are more deeply rooted in people than Marxists had "scientifically" conceived, for the French worker fought with courage and selflessness against the German worker and vice versa, with the workers completely forgetting the supposed proletarian solidarity.

The Second World War confirmed the very strength of national ties, for the astute Stalin observed that Russian peasants and workers would fight more resolutely against the German invaders if they were allowed to fight for their beloved Russia and the glorious tradition of Peter the Great, rather than for the NKVD, international socialism, and their meager wages. Incidentally, Stalin and his successors do not pay their workers good wages not because they don't want to, but because they cannot, since socialist per capita production is lower than capitalist production.

When all socialist countries celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the first socialist state in the world, it will be clear and verifiable with figures that the total concentration of capital prophesied by Marx was realized only in socialist countries, where the 10,000 members of the communist hierarchy, or the new class, as Milovan Djilas called it, maintain absolute control. The total impoverishment of the workers reached its peak there, while the Western worker "exploited under the capitalist system" enjoys a much higher standard of living, better working conditions, and social security. A worker in socialist countries lives slightly better than a prisoner in a labor camp, who receives only the bare minimum of food, clothing, and entertainment to maintain their productivity. In Western European countries, especially in Germany, there are currently around 150,000 workers from Yugoslavia employed. After the capitalists extract the surplus value from their labor, these workers buy Volkswagens, help their families, and deposit the remainder in German banks that yield them profits, since they have no confidence in Yugoslav banks.

I know that all these assertions can be refuted with brilliant dialectics. We are in a period of transition; the future will be different. Fidel Castro said that the day is approaching when the Cuban peasant will go to the city without money—money will be eliminated—and that with a basket of his tomatoes he will be able to acquire everything he needs: clothes, shoes, utensils, a television, etc. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis. But dialectical skill is one thing, and concrete, empirical facts are another.

It was precisely these palpable facts that gave rise to new currents of opinion in the still entirely Marxist environment of Yugoslavia, or, more precisely, among Croatian Marxist philosophers. This new current is infected with the worst disease in the philosophy of dogmatic notions: doubt. Doubt about the results of socialist society, doubt about the executive class of that society, about the leadership that makes political decisions, and about Marxist doctrine itself. They argue that there must be errors in the application of Marx, since we socialists are the victims of alienation, while the growing freedom and well-being of workers in capitalist systems is striking.

Communist supporters in Western countries, under the guise of freedom, refine and debate the theories of Mao Zedong and Castro. Intellectuals in countries behind the Iron Curtain who still believe in socialism and its compatibility with individual self-determination are undergoing an intense evolutionary process. These intellectuals reject the narcissistic, conceited, and unhealthy element in Marxism, in the sense that science is only what Marxism affirms, and everything else is mere utopia. Mussolini always gets it! These are young researchers born and raised in the Marxist environment and saturated with its teachings.

They did not know, like Dr. Zhivago, the old society, nor did they have romantic ties to the past. However, their inquiries reveal that there are truths outside of Marxism as well. It is necessary to seek contact with this type of person behind the Iron Curtain and persuade them that they are not betraying themselves if they stop thinking that the West constitutes prehistory, something worthy of being burned, and that history only begins with the October Revolution. Natural evolution did not stop because Marx was born.

The West, for its part, assimilated some positive aspects of socialism and considerably improved the social standard of the masses. At the same time, it implemented the system of "popular capitalism." The purpose of the early socialists was to create an ideal social order. The West has not yet created it, but it has been relentlessly pursuing it. There is no doubt that Western society, given the experience, is much better and more just than Eastern society. But the West is still constantly evolving. What is good in the East is also good in the West.

Coexistence is the Great Wall of China that divides two worlds and that must be torn down, but not suddenly, rather through a slow and patient process of rapprochement, of seeking common ground, of gradual and reciprocal amalgamation. We must adopt the practical philosophy of the English utilitarians. Coexistence is the truce between two opposing sides in a war, but without open warfare, since no one knows how it would end. Amalgamation strives to create one world from two. Both East and West profess identical basic principles, formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is only one humanity, not two. It is unnecessary to constantly emphasize the application of human rights. It is the constant ethic of our being; one could even say that individual liberty, national liberty, and the right to private property are categories of physiological order. There is no unity if we disregard any of these principles.

One of the first proponents of unity emerged in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. This was Professor Mihajlo Mihajlov, a man of great moral strength, who had the courage in totalitarian Yugoslavia to demand the application of human rights, which, incidentally, are enshrined in the constitution. His demand was considered, however, a betrayal of socialism and of Yugoslav "unity and fraternity." Mihajlov is imprisoned, but it is certain that he shook many communist consciences and called into question the autocratic infallibility of the Central Committee.

The United Nations and the Self-Determination of Peoples in Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia, a multinational country, failed to resolve its national problems. The Serbs control power and practice the exploitation of other peoples in the classic, ultra-nationalist, and chauvinistic sense, despite Yugoslavia being a communist country. The Yugoslav constitution provides for the self-determination of all the peoples that comprise it and even the right to secession. However, no other people, except the Serbs, have been able to exercise their right to self-determination. The peoples of Yugoslavia resemble the three girls from the English mines of the last century. In theory, they are free, but they suffer the most brutal exploitation. Yugoslavia, therefore, seriously violates the obligations assumed upon signing the Charter of the United Nations.

Yugoslavia is caught between social and national problems. Its internal order is the target of the harshest criticism in Croatia and Slovenia, criticism presented in the form of scientific analyses of Marx. Power remains firmly in the hands of a tiny minority, but that minority feels it can no longer govern as it has for the past twenty years, cutting down heads like wheat. Nevertheless, that minority threatens to unleash a new wave of terror.

The situation could worsen very soon. Yugoslavia, from its inception, should have been the subject of study by the United Nations. In its case, the highest international organization can demonstrate that its primary mission is the maintenance of peace and the upholding of democratic principles.

THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA FROM 1941 TO 1945

Milan Blazekovic, Buenos Aires

On the eve of and during the Second World War, there were significant changes in the system of states created in Europe after the First World War and as a consequence of it. These changes occurred through the secession of a new state from an existing one, or through the disappearance of an existing state upon its annexation by another, without another subject of international public law emerging in its territory, or new subjects of international law emerged in the territory of a dismembered state.

Thus, Ireland was proclaimed a sovereign state (December 29, 1937), and Austria, annexed to the Third Reich (Anschluss), ceased to exist (April 14, 1938). Slovakia was proclaimed an independent state (March 14, 1939), and Czechoslovakia, with the creation of the Bohemian-Moravian protectorate, ceased to exist as a state (March 16, 1939). During the war, Poland was dissolved when it was partitioned between Germany and the Soviet Union (September/October 1939), while the Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union (July/August 1940).

Through the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (April 10, 1941), the occupation of Serbia and Montenegro by Germany and Italy, and the incorporation of the remaining parts of Yugoslavia into Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ceased to exist as a state. Finally, following the peaceful occupation first by British and then American troops (July 1941), Iceland separated from Denmark and proclaimed itself a republic (June 17, 1944).

There is no consensus in the legal literature regarding the legal classification of the state-law changes that occurred in the territory of the former Yugoslavia during the period of the existence of the State of Croatia, created on April 10, 1941, and which ceased to exist on May 8, 1945. This lack of consensus is primarily due to numerous gaps in international practice, one of the main sources of international public law. This divergence is all the greater because the case of monarchical Yugoslavia is particularly aggravated by the constitution of Croatia as a new subject of international law during the war and it is for this reason that, with respect to the legal classification of Yugoslavia and Croatia in that period, problems and concepts are faced, such as debellatio, occupatio bellica, dismembratio and incorporatio and on the other hand secessio and successio linked to the problem of a local or general de facto government, the exiled government and the continuity of the State.

Thus, some authors judge the legal and state changes in the territory of Yugoslavia from the perspective of the total occupation by the Yugoslav state, arguing that the occupier could not alter the legal status of the occupied state. Other authors, however, maintain that with the creation of the State of Croatia and subsequent changes, Yugoslavia disintegrated into its constituent parts, each of which de facto or de jure followed its own path, requiring individual consideration and separate legal assessment.

Given that the birth and disappearance of a state is an event to which the international community responds by either recognizing or not recognizing the change, and considering that this response depends on the conflicting interests of existing states—as in the case of war—it seems that the most appropriate way to legally characterize the new state is to define its international status.

By the term "international status" in its broadest sense, we understand the legal position of a state within the international community of states. If a state belongs to the community of states indirectly, that is, through another state community, then it would be more accurate to speak of its legal status within the state community to which it belongs or which it forms part of with one or more other states. In contrast, if a state belongs directly to the international community of states, we speak of its international status.

This applies if its particular relationship with some or all of the member states of the international community differs in some way from that of all or most of the states that comprise the international community. If this differentiation consists of certain restrictions on some fundamental rights and duties with respect to some or all members of the international community, then we speak of status stricto sensu. Since the concept of international status in the strict sense of the term implies certain limitations on the fundamental rights and duties of the state, we never speak of the international status of great powers, but rather of small states in their relationship with powerful states.

I. The 1941 Act in Light of Historical Background

If, within these criteria regarding legal and international status, respectively—the former falling under the purview of constitutional law (the legal position within a given state community) and the latter belonging to public international law (the legal position within the international community of states)—we attempt to systematize Croatia's legal and state history up to 1945, we must note, in general terms, three periods. The first period, that of the Croatian principality and national monarchy from the 7th to the 12th centuries, extends to 1102; the second to 1941; and the third from 1941 to 1945. Leaving aside the first period of Croatian independence, since it does not present difficulties in determining its international status, we will turn to the second period, which, given its constitutional characteristics, can be divided into two main parts.

The first part covers the period from 1102 to 1918, that is, the period of the Croatian-Hungarian state community, that is, the legal-state ties that linked Croatia with Hungary - notwithstanding the dynastic and constitutional changes produced when the Kingdom of Croatia was integrated into the Habsburg monarchy after Ferdinand I was elected King of Croatia in 1527 and despite the periodic breaking of those ties - "through the person of the monarch with the lands subordinated to the crown of Saint Stephen" [63]; This is the period in which Croatian constitutional law developed: the jura municipalia or jura regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae, which consisted of laws and/or resolutions of the Croatian Diet, the Croatian-Hungarian Diet, decrees of the monarch, and other legal provisions governing the state organization and the functions of its executive bodies, as well as regulating its legal-state relations with the Habsburg monarchy, and especially with Hungary.[64] In the final phase of this legal-state process, within the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary formed in 1867, this was involved in the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868.

In the first part of this period, through the organs of state power—the Diet (sabor), ban (prorex), and zupania (comitatus)—Croatia managed to preserve its state identity, if not in the international sense, then certainly in the sense of constitutional law.

The second part of this period extends from 1918 to 1941, when Croatia, upon joining the common state with Serbs and Slovenes in a unitary state, gradually lost the attributes of its statehood, which it had possessed almost uninterruptedly throughout 800 years of union with Hungary. It recovered some of these attributes on the eve of the Second World War with the formation of Banovina Hrvatska in August 1939.

In the third period of Croatia's constitutional past (1941-1945), the subject of this study, Croatia as a nation-state belonged directly to the international community of states. Even within this brief period, three phases can be distinguished regarding its peculiar relations with other states. These phases, by imposing certain restrictions on state sovereignty, particularly in one phase, give rise to the discussion about Croatia's international status during the period 1941-1945.

From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the Croatian statehood is as old as its history and that the third period of its legal and state past (1941–1945) is the logical continuation of the affirmation of the statehood as it developed from the first Kingdom of Croatia in 925 until 1918, following the resounding failure of the attempt to amalgamate and conflate the Croatian and Serbian statehoods during the period 1918–1941, which plunged the Yugoslav monarchy into a constant state crisis[65] that culminated in its disintegration during the Second World War.

World legal literature, both during and after the war, treats this third period of Croatian history differently and draws divergent conclusions regarding the international status of the Independent State of Croatia. Similarly, constitutional scholars approached the legal status of Croatia differently following the reorganization of the Habsburg monarchy in 1867 and the signing of the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868. The question of Croatia's legal status was then raised for the first time in European scholarly literature and remained a topic of discussion until 1918, that is, until the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, crystallizing two opposing criteria: one held that Croatia, by virtue of the Compromise of 1868, was a "province" within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the other maintained that Croatia had retained its sovereignty and state personality.[66]

Although the problem of the legal status of Croatia, whose diplomatic name was the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, in the period 1868–1918 only has legal-historical value, even today it is addressed by jurists and historians from legal-historical and legal-theoretical perspectives, supporting conflicting criteria. Thus, for example, the Soviet historian N. Ratner states that Croatia, by virtue of the Compromise, was a Hungarian province, that at the time of negotiating the Compromise, Croatia was not an independent state from Hungary, that the Compromise was imposed upon it, and that subsequently Croatia's status had nothing in common with independence and was far from federalism.[67] Refuting N. Ratner's thesis, Professor Ferdo Culinovic states: "Certain claims by N. Ratner cannot be denied, such as that the Compromise was indeed imposed on Croatia and that it manifested the triumph of the Hungarian rulers over Croatia. However, with this, N. Ratner contributed nothing new.

Ante Starcevic and the entire opposition in the Croatian parliament (Sabor) from 1868 until October 1918 held the same thesis. Ratner referred to some, but not all, of the fundamental facts related to the Compromise. For example, he did not connect it to what he had previously said superficially on the subject. He overlooked the fact that, for example, according to Article XVII of the 1861 Act, Croatia was independent from Hungary.

Therefore, his assessment of this issue is far removed from scientific criteria and methods and is completely contrary to historical facts.[68] On the other hand, Professor Culinovic proves that by virtue of the The Compromise of 1868 established that Croatia possessed its own territory, constitutionally separate from Hungary, and that Croatia held its own element of sovereignty, since—despite the common "Hungarian" citizenship—the Compromise recognized that the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia was a nation in the political sense and that Croatia had its own organization of power.

Culinovic concludes his considerations by stating: 1) that Croatia, de jure and de facto, since its Compromise with Hungary (1868), had retained its sovereignty; 2) that this sovereignty, given Hungarian supremacy, was indeed restricted; and 3) that, nevertheless, this sovereignty was not thereby annulled. "Croatia, therefore, according to the Compromise, from 1868 to 1918, was a state and not a Hungarian province" [69]. The question of Croatia's international status in the period 1941–1945 has its practical legal value in contrast to the same problem during the period The period from 1868 to 1918, following the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the creation of new states, including the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later known as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), presents itself as a purely legal and historical problem.

The resolution of various legal issues, both international (compensation for foreign citizens) and within Yugoslav domestic law (the question of citizenship rights and the validity of the laws of the Independent State of Croatia as legal norms), depends on the answer given to the question of Croatia's legal status and international standing during the period 1941–1945.

However, legal treaties lack unanimity regarding the international status of the Independent State of Croatia, resulting in divergent answers to the aforementioned legal problems.

It is therefore necessary to examine the legal and state changes that took place in the territory of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia from April 6, 1941, to May 8, 1945, in light of the relevant legal events and in connection with the theoretical principles of constitutional law and the norms of international public law.

II. Emergence of the Croatian Nation-State

During the last war and continuing to this day, April 10, 1941, was considered the day of the re-establishment of the Croatian state, as on that day the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed in Zagreb, its capital. This act was preceded by a long series of events and actions in domestic and foreign policy, which cannot be fully recounted here. We will limit ourselves to the facts and events essential for a better understanding of subsequent legal and state changes in the territory of Yugoslavia and the extent to which they influenced Croatia's later international status.

1. First, it must be noted that within Yugoslavia, "Serbian-Croatian relations were extremely unfriendly" [70]. As the Second World War approached, the Croatian-Serbian conflict intensified. Thus, the bloc of Croatian deputies, elected in the elections of December 11, 1938, with an overwhelming majority, adopted a resolution on January 15, 1939, stating that the basic condition for the solution of the Croatian question consisted of the recognition of the right to self-determination and of the historical Croatian constitutional right; that, given twenty years of experience, common life between Serbs and Croats was impractical; that all acts of the Belgrade government are considered null and void and not binding on Croatia, especially concerning agreements with foreign countries, and finally, an appeal is made to the great powers to take the necessary steps to implement the right of self-determination of the Croatian people, because otherwise the Croats will be forced to resort to the right of self-defense, which could jeopardize peace.[71]

Dr. Vlado Macek, leader of the Croatian opposition in the country, who, like his predecessor Esteban Radic, "tried to win over the Allies of 1914-1918 to the Croatian cause"[72], considered it appropriate to issue the declaration to the Associated Press with the following warning, published in the Zagreb newspapers but not in those of Belgrade: "The Croatian question must be resolved quickly, and it must be understood that the Croats will be more or less indifferent to whether this question is put on the agenda by Roosevelt or Hitler."[73]

At the same time, Macek negotiated with the Prime Minister of the Belgrade government, D. Cvetkovic, and maintained unofficial contacts through his intermediary with Count Ciano, regarding a possible uprising in Croatia.[74] The negotiations concluded with the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement of August 26, 1939, and the establishment of Banovina Hrvatska as an autonomous unit within Yugoslavia. This temporarily resolved the state crisis, despite the war in Europe, which had broken out just two days after the Croatian National Deputies, with only one exception, approved the aforementioned Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement on August 29, 1939. Strict neutrality in the European conflict was the only possibility for the eventual consolidation of Yugoslavia after the signing of the Croatian-Serbian Agreement.

2. Externally, the policy of strict neutrality could not be sustained after all neighboring countries joined the Tripartite Pact and thus found themselves within the sphere of political and economic influence of the Axis powers, and even less so when Italy found itself in dire straits during its war against Greece. Despite Italy's hostile policy and territorial claims regarding Yugoslavia, Germany managed to get Belgrade to join the Tripartite Pact on very favorable terms for Yugoslavia.

However, with the Belgrade coup of March 27, 1941, against Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact—a coup driven by Great Serbian resentment over Croatian autonomy, signed two days earlier in Vienna—the country once again faced a serious crisis, both internally and externally. Internally, the Croats—despite the autonomy they had achieved, which constituted a provisional solution for both Croats and Serbs, albeit with different aims for each—were unwilling to defend Yugoslavia, even though it was defensible, and certainly not under a government that, driven by predominantly Serbian interests, exposed the Croatian people to the upheavals of war. Externally, the putsch aroused the distrust of the Axis powers, without securing any material aid from the Western democracies. The consequence of this shift in foreign policy was the blitzkrieg launched by Germany and other signatory states of the Tripartite Pact against Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941 [75].

3. Since January 1929, the Croats had a political team aligned with the revisionist nations, dissatisfied with the Treaty of Versailles, to prepare for this emerging war crisis. The Croatian Ustasha Liberation Movement already existed, and under the leadership of Dr. Ante Pavelić, a lawyer and national deputy for the Croatian capital, Zagreb, at the time of the assassination of Esteban Radić by a Serbian deputy in the Belgrade parliament in 1928, it sought to achieve the liberation of Croatia and its separation from Yugoslavia through revolutionary methods.[76]

When Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941, all possibilities for implementing the liberation program were thwarted, but two days later, following the Belgrade putsch, it regained relevance. When the German air force bombed Belgrade on April 6, 1941, as a prelude to the invasion of Yugoslavia, this program began to gradually materialize. On April 7, 1941, the invasion of Yugoslavia began when the German army crossed the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border. On April 8, 1941, Pavelic, speaking from his exile in Italy via radio, called on the Croatian people to separate from Serbia and support Germany and Italy [77].

The first proclamation of Croatian independence had already taken place on April 7, 1941, in Cakovac, and the second in Bjelovar on April 8, 1941 [78]. It wasn't until April 10, 1941, shortly after 4:00 PM, that Colonel Slavko Kvaternik, head of the Home Front of the Liberation Movement, proclaimed the reestablishment of the Independent State of Croatia over the radio from Zagreb. Immediately afterward, the radio announcer read a statement by Dr. Macek, who had broken away from the rest of the Yugoslav government and returned to Zagreb. Macek called on all Croats to obey the new authorities and urged his supporters to cooperate with the new rulers [79].

Shortly after the proclamation of independence, German troops entered Zagreb, and that same afternoon Colonel Kvaternik sent a telegram to Hitler requesting recognition of the Independent State of Croatia by the Third Reich [80]. On the night of April 10–11, 1941, the Regent of Hungary, Horthy, issued a military order to the Honvéd (Hungarian army) to liberate the regions of former southern Hungary, which, under the Treaty of Trianon, had belonged to Yugoslavia, since with the proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia, Yugoslavia ceased to exist. On April 11, 1941, Kvaternik, as lieutenant to the head of state, decreed that until the formation of the Croatian government, administrative affairs would be handled by the existing departments of Banovina Hrvatska (Croatian Government). By decree of 16/4/41 Pavelic, in his capacity as head of state, appointed the first Croatian government[81], which took effect one day after Germany and Italy recognized the State of Croatia, so that its birth dates back to 10/4/41 when it was proclaimed.

For the purposes of this paper, data concerning the organization of the administration, the army, the judiciary, finances, etc., are irrelevant, as they do not contribute to international relations as the basis of Croatia's international status, except in exceptional cases, which we will discuss later.

III. Diplomatic Recognitions, Delimitation, Treaties, and Other International Legal Acts

Following the proclamation of independence on April 10, 1941, and the establishment of the first organs of power, a series of acts directly or indirectly influenced the international relations of the new state and, consequently, its international status. These acts included recognition by other states, delimitation, the signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements, accession to international conventions, and so on.

1. Recognitions

a) Hungary

Although several authors claim that Hungary recognized the N.D.H. (abbreviation for Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska, Independent State of Croatia, which we will use hereafter) after Germany and Italy[82], it can be reasonably argued that Hungary was the first to recognize Croatia's independence[83]. As stated above, on the night of April 10-11, 1941, Admiral Horthy addressed the proclamation to the Hungarian people and issued the order to the army. In this proclamation, among other things, he said: "The leaders of the Croatian people have proclaimed the independence and sovereignty of Croatia.

We greet this decision with genuine joy and will respect it"[84]. However, the Croatian head of state did not consider this paragraph of Horthy's proclamation as formal recognition of the State of Croatia and on April 16, 1941, notified the Hungarian Regent of the proclamation of the N.D.H. and its recognition by Germany and Italy. On April 22, 1941, Horthy responded by telegram, reaffirming his recognition of the State of Croatia "already stated in my proclamation of April 10" [85].

b) Germany, c) Italy

Although formal recognition by Germany and Italy was simultaneous, occurring on April 15, 1941, chronologically Germany was the first, since the Germans, before recognizing the Croatian State de jure, had de facto recognized the provisional state leadership of Kvaternik and were negotiating on definitive de jure recognition [86].

The recognition of the State of Croatia by Berlin and Rome was not a simple matter, given the conflicting interests of Germany and Italy in the Adriatic and Balkan regions and the existing military situation there. Following the telegram that Kvaternik sent to Hitler on April 10, 1941, on behalf of the Provisional Government (State Council), requesting German recognition of Croatia's newly proclaimed independence, Ante Pavelić also sent a telegram from Rome to Hitler on April 11, 1941, promising to link Croatia's future to the new European order.[87]

From then on, especially after April 13, 1941, when von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, through the German Consulate General in Zagreb, informed Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer, Berlin's special envoy in Zagreb, that Germany intended to recognize the NDH that very day. Under Pavelic's leadership, with the assumption that Kvaternik was Pavelic's lieutenant, his request for recognition was also processed[88], and until April 15, 1941, the arduous German-Italian-Croatian negotiations to coordinate a formula for simultaneous recognition of the NDH by Germany and Italy continued. Although, for example, Pavelic had already sent a message to Mussolini on April 7, 1941, in which he said, without making any promises, "that all of Croatia eagerly awaits your glorious soldiers and all our fighting organizations will fight alongside them for the freedom of our people and for the Independent State of Croatia for which we wage long and bloody battles"[89], Mussolini demanded that Pavelic send him a telegram with the clause concerning the future borders.

He also demanded that the German proposal for the recognition formula contain an identical clause[90]. The definitive and identical telegrams of Hitler and Mussolini of 4/15/1941, by which they recognized the N.D.H., contained the following clauses: "Die deutsche Regierung wird erfreut sein, sich über die Grenzen des neuen Staates mit der national-kroatischen Regierung in freiem. Meinungsaustausch zu verständigen" the German and the Italian: "My e gradito esprimervi il riconoscimento dello Stato Indipendente della Croazia da parte del Goberno fascista, que será liete di intendersi freely con Governo Nazionale Croato per ladeterminazione dei confini del nuovo Stato, a cui il popolo Italiano augura ogni fortune" [91]. The application of this clause will impose further obligations on Croatia with respect to Italy and will give rise to discussions about the international status of the NDH while those obligations were in force.

(d) Slovakia

The President of Slovakia, Dr. J. Tiso, expressed by telegram on April 15, 1941, his recognition of the NDH without prior notification of the proclamation of independence and without a request for recognition. He used telegraphic communication via Berlin, which, through the German Consulate General in Zagreb, delivered the telegram to the Croatian government on April 17, 1941.[92]

(e) Bulgaria

In response to the notification regarding the establishment of the NDH and the request for its recognition, the Bulgarian Emperor Boris III replied with a telegram, dated April 21, 1941, from Sofia, stating that "the Royal Bulgarian Government resolved to recognize the Independent State of Croatia."[93] f) Romania

Through the exchange of notifications and telegrams of recognition between Pavelic and General Antonescu, the royal Romanian government formulated its recognition of the N.D.H. on May 6, 1941 [94].

g) Japan

Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka telegraphed the Croatian Head of State that the Imperial Government recognized Croatia as an independent state on June 7.

h) Spain

On June 14, 1941, the Croatian government notified the Spanish government of the reestablishment of the NDH, following the report from the Spanish consul in Susak dated June 12, 1941, indicating that the Madrid government was prepared to recognize the NDH. By note dated June 27, 1941, Serrano Suñer, Spanish Foreign Minister, informed Dr. Mladen Lorkovic, Croatian Foreign Minister, that the Spanish government had agreed to de jure recognition of the Croatian government.

i) Finland

Through the Finnish envoy in Rome, the Croatian government notified the Finnish government on June 21, 1941, of the creation of the NDH. The Italian Legation in Zagreb informed the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, by note dated July 9, 1941, of the telegraphic communication stating that the Finnish Ministerial Council, at its meeting of July 3, 1941, had recognized the National Democratic Republic of Denmark (NDH) de jure, effective July 2, 1941. The corresponding note from the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rolf Witting, dated July 31, 1941, was delivered to the Croatian government through the Italian Legation in Zagreb on September 24, 1941.

j) Denmark

Through the German Legation in Zagreb, the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Royal Danish Government of the constitution of the State of Croatia on June 17, 1941. Erih Scavenius, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs by note dated July 31, 1941, that the Danish government had granted de jure recognition to Croatia and its government on July 10, 1941.

k) Manchukuo

The Prime Minister of Manchukuo, Chang Chi Hui, communicated by telegram on August 2, 1941, the recognition of the NDH without prior notification.

l) Thailand

On April 27, 1943, Prasasna Joudhin, the Royal Envoy of Thailand, delivered to the Croatian Envoy in Berlin, Dr. Mile Budak, the telegram from his Foreign Minister, Wichit Wathakan, addressed to the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, by which Thailand recognized the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). M. Budak, who was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the interim, expressed his gratitude for the recognition on April 30, 1943.

This overview of Croatia's international relations also includes the recognitions granted by Croatia to other states and/or governments. Thus, on July 1, 1941, the Croatian government recognized the Chinese National Government in Nanjing, headed by Wang Ching Wei, who, in his telegram of July 5, 1941, acknowledged Lorkovic's telegram regarding the recognition. The exchange of telegrams was conducted through the German and Italian legations in Nanjing and their respective governments.

On August 7, 1943, the government of the People's Republic of Croatia recognized the government of Dr. Ma Maw in Burma, which had declared its independence on August 1, 1943, ceasing to be a British colony. On September 30, 1943, the Croatian government notified the Foreign Ministry of the Third Reich, by note VT 155/43, of its recognition of Mussolini's fascist republican government and, simultaneously, by note VT 154/43, notified it of the severing of diplomatic relations with the Italian royal government. On October 16, 1943, the Croatian government recognized the Republic of the Philippines, and on November 20, 1943, the Indian provisional government of Suchas Chandra Bose (Azad Hind).

Croatia maintained de facto relations with the Vatican through the Apostolic Delegate in Zagreb and the Croatian representative to the Holy See. It also maintained trade relations with the Vichy French government and the Swiss government through their consulates in Zagreb and through agreements on trade and payments (Accord sur les échanges et les paiments commerciaux franco-croates of 16/3/1942 and Abkommen über den Waren- und Zahlungsverkehr zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und dem Unabhängigen Staate Kroatien of 10/9/1941, extended on 19/3/1943).

Although Croatia was recognized de jure by nine European and three Asian countries, and had itself agreed to recognize four states and/or governments, it exercised the active and passive rights of legation only with eight European and one Asian country, namely: Germany, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, Finland, and Japan (only the Japanese envoy in Zagreb)[95].

With the changes in international relations in 1944, caused by the war, the new governments of Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland formally broke off diplomatic relations with Croatia. According to a Reuters report of September 3, 1944, the Romanian press office released a statement by Foreign Minister Grigore Nicolescu Buzesti, in which the Romanian government did not recognize the governments of Slovakia, Croatia, and Fascist Italy, and expressed hope that it would soon be able to replace its diplomatic representatives to the Allies.

On September 7, 1944, the Croatian chargé d'affaires in Sofia telegraphed the contents of the note he had received that same day from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which reads: "The Royal Bulgarian Government, in view of the new political situation in which it finds itself due to the recent events in the Balkans and as a consequence of the rupture of Bulgarian-German diplomatic relations, was forced, much against its will, to break diplomatic relations with the Government of the Independent State of Croatia. The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship considers it necessary to emphasize that this break comes into effect from the moment of the delivery of this note." On September 21, 1944, the Finnish chargé d'affaires addressed Dr. Mehmed Alajbegovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia, the following note: "J'ai l'honneur de porter a votre connaissance que le Gouvernement de la Republique de Finlande a decide de breakingre les relations diplomatiques et consulaires avec le Gouvernement de l'Etat Independant de Croatie" [96].

2. Delimitation

a) Delimitation with Germany

At the initiative of Dr. Ante Pavelić, Germany was the first to address the issue of delimitation in accordance with the territorial clause contained in the telegram of recognition of the North African Declaration of Human Rights.[97] The German-Croatian border was established, in general terms, by the Croatian-German agreement signed in Zagreb on May 13, 1941, and ratified on June 2, 1941, in Berlin, leaving the final determination of the border to a Croatian-German commission that was to take into account, in particular, economic factors (Art. 2, para. 1). This border generally coincided with the former administrative border that had existed for centuries until 1918 between the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia on one side and the Austrian provinces of Carniola and Styria on the other (Art. 1)[98]. On June 17, 1941, the border was rectified in the Bregana Valley in favor of Croatia.[99]

b) Demarcation with Italy

The Italian-Croatian borders were first debated by the Axis powers at the Ciano-Ribbentrop Conference on April 21-22, 1941, in Vienna, when they were discussing the partition and reorganization of the former territory of Yugoslavia. On that occasion, Germany reiterated in principle its political disinterest in the Croatian question, deferring to Mussolini any political decision that would have to be agreed upon with the Croats. To Ciano's question "regarding the procedure that should be adopted for negotiations with the Croats," Ribbentrop replied that Pavelić should first travel to Rome. To the question "by what act should the Dalmatian border be established," Ribbentrop replied that it should be done by law "in the same way that Germany fixed its border with Croatia" [100].

At the meeting held in Ljubljana on April 25, 1941, the Italians proposed two solutions to the Croats, abandoning the idea of personal union that the Germans had initially agreed to: the maximum claim comprising the entire coast from Rijeka (Fiume) to Boka Kotorska, or the limited annexation to Italy of the Dalmatian islands and significant portions of the coast, on the condition that the Croats accept the prepared draft of a pact on close political, military, and economic cooperation with Italy.[101]

Talks continued in Zagreb with the Italian envoy and were concluded at the meeting between Mussolini and Pavelić in Monfalcone on May 7, 1941. It was agreed that the delimitation issue was linked to the consolidation of Croatia's political relationship with Italy. To this end, Croatia enacted on May 15, 1941, the Law on the Proclamation of the Monarchy by virtue of the restoration of the crown of King Zvonimir as a symbol of the sovereignty of the Independent State of Croatia.[102]

Thus, the border with Italy was established by the agreement signed in Rome on May 18, 1941, together with the treaties "on the guarantee and cooperation" and "on questions of a military nature relating to the Adriatic coastal zone," known as the "Rome Agreements." At the same time, at the formal request of the Croatian delegation, the head of the House of Savoy designated Amadeo, Duke of Spoleto, a member of the House of Savoy, as the future King of Croatia.

Under the agreement on the demarcation of the border between the Kingdom of Croatia and the Kingdom of Italy of May 18, 1941, Croatia ceded to Italy the portions of its Adriatic coast that the Allies had promised to Italy in the 1915 Pact of London as compensation for Italy's declaration of war against the Central Powers. Thus, Croatia lost almost all of its major islands, except for Pag, Brač, and Hvar, the entire coastline between Zadar and Split, the territory of Boka Kotorska, and the coast from Rijeka to Kraljevica.[103] Although these islands and the ceded coastal territory covered an area of approximately 5,400 square kilometers with 380,000 inhabitants, of whom only 5,000 were Italian, they were extremely important from a strategic and economic point of view.[104]

While the Rome Agreements of May 18, 1941, established the Croatian-Italian border on the Adriatic coast, in Slovenia, occupied by the Italians as it was not Croatian territory, the Italian-Croatian border was delineated by Royal Decree-Law No. 291 of May 3, 1941, concerning the establishment of the Province of Ljubljana. This decree was sent by the Italian envoy in Zagreb with a note dated July 3, 1941, to the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting that, on behalf of the Croatian government, it be informed of the decree and reported on it.

The Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a note dated July 15, 1941, No. Pov. 50/41 acknowledges receipt of the Italian note of July 3, 1941, and proposes the rectification of the border in favor of Croatia with regard to the municipality of Radatovici and the cadastral district of Marindol, which, due to erroneous demarcations in the "banovine" of the former Yugoslavia, belonged to Dravska Banovina, i.e., Slovenia.[105] Italy never fulfilled this request.

c) Demarcation with Hungary

With the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the restoration of the State of Croatia, the old Croatian-Hungarian border was reestablished as it existed until 1918. However, the question of Medjimurje, an ethnically almost entirely Croatian region between the Mura and Drava rivers, remained unresolved. The Croatian-Hungarian border was never formally established in this area. Croatia never agreed with Hitler's provisions concerning the Medjimurje region, either before or after the proclamation of national independence.[106]

When the Hungarian army occupied Cakovec, the main town of Medjimurje, at 4:30 p.m. on April 16, 1941, and the Hungarians established military administration on July 9, 1941, the Croatian government protested to the Hungarian government in note No. Pov. 61/41, dated July 10, 1941. When the Hungarian government enacted the annexation of Medjimurje to Hungary in parliament on December 17, 1941, the Croatian government protested again in a note dated January 28, 1942.[107] The Croatians always emphasized their non-recognition of such a state in all negotiations and discussions with Hungary.

d) Demarcation with Serbia. The Eastern Border

The demarcation with Serbia was linked to the German military occupation of eastern Srijem, which occurred at the request of the German occupation authorities in Serbia, mainly due to important military installations in Zemun and the supply of Belgrade from that region. During the German-Italian negotiations on the reorganization of the former Yugoslav territory, held in Vienna, it was established that Croatian wishes in Srijem had to be satisfied and that Croatia's eastern border should coincide with the old eastern border of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[108]

In the course of preliminary negotiations on this matter, the German envoy accredited in Zagreb informed Dr. Ante Pavelić, on behalf of his government, that he could, without further ado, establish the eastern border of the Independent State of Croatia. Pavelić then informed the German envoy by note 1089/41 of May 28, 1941, "that from today the eastern border, according to the attached map, will be occupied by Croatian troops and border authorities." Regarding the Srijem, the note states: "In the territory of Zemun, where the German military administration will remain temporarily, I propose that the demarcation line be stipulated in the German-Croatian negotiations, until that area also belongs to the State of Croatia" [109].

By Decree-Law "On the Eastern Border of the Independent State of Croatia" of June 7, 1941, Pavelić established the border between Croatia and Serbia, notifying Germany and Italy by providing the corresponding translation of said Decree-Law [110]. The German legation in Zagreb, in note Pol 2 No. 3-1275 of July 5, 1941, acknowledged receipt of the decree-law and, on behalf of the German government, recognized the eastern border of Croatia [111].

The territory of eastern Srijem gradually passed into Croatian hands, and on October 10, 1941, it came under the complete control of Croatian authorities by virtue of the agreement "On the final transfer of Zemun and its surroundings to the exclusive administration of the Independent State of Croatia," signed on October 4, 1941, in Zemun by Croatian and German delegates.[112] It is worth noting that this agreement refers twice to the "German-Croatian Treaty on the stay of the German Army in Croatia" (Deutsche-kroatisches Abkommen über den Aufenthalt deutscher Wehrmacht in Kroatien).[113]

e) Delimitation with Montenegro

Since Montenegro was under Italian occupation and, according to the Decree-Law of 7/6/41, the eastern border of Croatia in its southern part coincided with that of Bosnia and Serbia (Turkey) as it had been drawn until 1908, leaving the Sandyacato of Novi Pazar to Turkey, it was necessary to draw the border following, in large part, the old boundary of Bosnia-Montenegro-Serbia to the northern border, established by virtue of the Agreements agreed between Italy and Croatia in Zagreb on 27/10/41, "The Rome Agreement of 18/5/41, i.e., from the area of Dogricevo. On that Croatian-Italian border on the fixation of the borders between the Independent State of Croatia and Montenegro." The border, according to art. Article 1 of the agreement, "it largely follows the old 1914 border between Austria-Hungary and Montenegro and Serbia up to Mount Kljunacka glava (peak 1082) which constitutes the dividing boundary between Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia" [114].

With this final agreement on demarcation, the borders of the State of Croatia were established, except in the north along Medjimurje, and remained so until the Croatian government revoked the Rome Agreements on September 9, 1943, following the capitulation of the Kingdom of Italy. Within these borders ran the German-Italian demarcation line from Samobor west of Petrinja, through Prijedor, Banja Luka, Jajce, and Travnik, and south of Sarajevo to Rudo on the Montenegrin border, established by Hitler to secure lines of communication with Serbia during the occupation of that country.[115]

In the Italian military area, due to the wartime circumstances and the successive limitations of the Croatian civil and military authorities, three zones were formed: I, II and III, which ran parallel to the Adriatic coast and the German-Italian demarcation line, respectively, with the civil-military powers of the Italian and Croatian authorities intersecting within them. To regulate these relations and delineate responsibilities, especially after the Italian Second Army, in agreement with the Croatian government, provisionally assumed civil administration in Zone II, an agreement was signed in Zagreb on June 19, 1942, between the Croatian government and the Supreme Command of the Italian Forces "Slovenia-Dalmatia" (Supersloda)[116].

3 - Treaties and Conventions, Agreements and International Notifications

By Decree-Law No. XXXVII-53-X.P. 1941 of April 28, 1941, published in Narodne Novine (Official Gazette) No. 15 of April 30, 1941, the State Coat of Arms (Art. 1), the State Flag, the naval ensign (Art. 2), the Poglavnik ensign (Art. 3), and the Great State Seal (Art. 4)[117] were established. Note No. 4474/1941 of August 8, 1941, Croatia notified the foreign ministries of Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Finland, and the Chinese government in Nanjing of the markings for identifying Croatian civilian aircraft ("HR")[118].

In addition to its recognition and delimitation with neighboring countries, Croatia joined the international community, particularly through its accession to various international conventions and the signing of numerous international agreements, which can be broadly classified into groups.

a) Accession to general international conventions.

By Note No. 31/41 of May 21, 1941, the Croatian government notified the government of the Swiss Confederation in Bern of Croatia's accession to the Universal Postal Convention, thereby becoming a member of the Universal Postal Federation. Through the Italian legation in Zagreb and the Italian government, the Croatian government notified the Spanish government on the same day, with Note No. 80/41, of the accession of the Independent State of Croatia to the Universal Postal Federation. The International Convention on Telecommunications, based in Madrid. In accordance with the clauses of these conventions, the Croatian government informed the foreign ministries of Switzerland and Spain of the stipulations and agreements signed with other countries regarding the regulation of postal and telecommunications exchange.[119] On October 19, 1942, the Croatian government signed in Vienna the Agreement on the European Postal Federation and its Regulations (Uebereinkommen über den europäischen Post und Fernmeldeverein; Vollzugsordnung für den europäischen Postdienst).

By means of notification No. Pr. 696/1943 of 20/1/1943 the Croatian government informed the Swiss Confederal Council in Bern of Croatia's accession to "the Geneva Convention of 27/7/1929 for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in the armies on the battlefield" and to the "Geneva Convention of 27/7/1929 relating to the treatment of prisoners of war", stating in its notification that by decree law of 5/7/1941 the Croatian Red Cross was constituted. The Swiss Consulate in Zagreb, by note 277 Ad.-S 1999-1943 of March 26, 1943, informed the President of the Croatian Red Cross that the competent Swiss authorities, by circular of March 13, 1943, had notified all member countries of Croatia's accession to the aforementioned conventions and that its accession took immediate effect from the moment of notification.[120]

b) Accession to existing multilateral political treaties.

On June 15, 1941, Croatia acceded to the Tripartite Pact, stipulated between Italy, Japan, and Germany on September 27, 1940, in Berlin. The text of this accession, which took effect in Venice, was drafted in Croatian and had the same legal force as the texts drafted in the languages of the founding countries. At the ceremony held on November 25, 1941, in Berlin, marking the five-year extension of the Treaty against the Communist International of November 25, 1936, Croatia also acceded to this treaty, along with Bulgaria, Denmark, Romania, Finland, and Slovakia, while Hungary, Spain, and Manchuria had already acceded in 1939 [121].

c) Multilateral legal and patrimonial conventions and agreements.

When Germany and Italy declared the dissolution of Yugoslavia on July 8, 1941 [122]. The Croatian, German, Italian, Bulgarian and Hungarian governments signed an agreement in Berlin on 22/7/1942 "On the legal and patrimonial dissolution of the former Yugoslav State and on some other pertinent financial problems" (Abkommen über die vermögensrechtliche Auseinandersetzung des ehemaligen jugoslawischen Staates und einige andere damit zusammenhängende finanzielle Fragen). With this agreement and the stipulations and conventions signed in Vienna on June 2, 1943, "regarding the dissolution of the former State Mortgage Bank of Yugoslavia, the Privileged Agricultural Bank, the Handicraft Bank, and the Savings Bank," "regarding the settlement of deposits," "regarding the former Yugoslav administration of the monopoly," "regarding the reciprocal transfer of archives," and "regarding the liquidation within the framework of the social security system of the former Yugoslavia," the States acquiring the rights and obligations of the former State of Yugoslavia were established, with Italy representing Albania and Montenegro, and Germany representing Serbia.[123] According to the agreement in question, Croatia became a co-successor of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia, assuming a portion of its rights and obligations.

On August 10, 1942, Croatia signed in Brioni with Germany, Italy, and Hungary the "Treaty on the New Systematization of the Danube-Sava-Adriatic Railway Company, formerly the Southern Railway Company" (Trattato fra lo Stato Indipendente di Croazia, il Reich Germanico, il Regno d'Italia ed il Regno d'Ungheria per la nuova sistemazione della Compagnia delle Ferrovie Danubio-Sava-Adriatico/giá Compagnia delle Ferrovie Meridionali).

On October 31, 1942, Croatia acceded in Zagreb to the "Agreement on the Formation of the Danish-German-Finnish-Swedish Commission for the Common Procedure in the Provision of Timber in the Countries in the North and East Sea Basin."

d) Various bilateral agreements

Apart from the aforementioned border agreements, Croatia, during the period 1941–1943, signed agreements, treaties, and conventions with neighboring countries and other non-neighboring countries that had recognized it or maintained de facto relations with it (France and Switzerland). These agreements covered the exchange of payments, postal services, telecommunications, and small-scale border traffic, as well as legal assistance, social security, extradition, trade, and cultural cooperation—in short, various political, economic, legal, social, and cultural agreements based on complete equality and reciprocity.[124]

Two agreements signed on May 18, 1941, in Rome with Italy are an exception. These, together with the agreement on the delimitation between the Kingdom of Croatia and the Kingdom of Italy, constitute the so-called Rome Agreements. These are:

"Agreement on Military Matters Concerning the Adriatic Coastal Zone" and "Treaty of Guarantee and Cooperation between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Croatia," with its final protocol and the letters from the Italian Prime Minister to the Croatian Prime Minister and vice versa. All these documents bear the same date.[125]

The agreement concerning military matters is a direct consequence of the Treaty on the Fixation of the Borders between Croatia and Italy, as can be inferred from its preamble. According to that treaty, without any time limit, Croatia undertook the obligation not to construct on the islands and their coastal zone any fortifications or land, sea, or air installations, nor any military bases or implements "that could be used for the purposes of war" (Art. 1). Furthermore, the Croatian government "declares its intention not to maintain a navy" except for a few units to ensure police and customs services (Art. 2). Finally, Art. Article 3 stipulates that "both governments, through a supplementary agreement, will establish the modalities under which the Italian government will have the possibility of moving its armed forces through Croatian territory via the Rijeka-Zadar coastal route and the Rijeka-Ogulin-Split railway line and its eventual extension to Kotor."

In contrast to this agreement without a fixed term, the Treaty of Guarantee and Cooperation, although its starting point is the agreement on borders that "created a solid basis for close mutual cooperation between Italy and Croatia," was signed for 25 years without provision for extension. Its preamble states that the Italian and Croatian governments have agreed—"in the desire to establish relations of close friendship and cooperation and to promote the well-being of both peoples"—that Italy assumes the guarantee of the political independence and territorial integrity of Croatia within the borders to be determined in agreement with the States concerned (Art. 1); and that the Croatian government will not undertake obligations incompatible with this guarantee and the spirit of the agreements (Art. 2). that the Croatian government will seek the assistance of the Italian armed forces in the organization and technical training of its armed forces when it deems it necessary for the purposes of lasting cooperation (Art. 3); the Croatian and Italian governments undertake, as soon as Croatia's economy is consolidated, to enter into broader and closer customs and monetary relations, and for this purpose a permanent commission is established for the study and implementation of the foregoing (Art. 4); and, finally, both governments undertake to stipulate, as soon as possible, new agreements on rail and maritime transport and on the treatment of citizens of one country in the other, on the cultural and legal relations of both countries, and on other matters of common interest (Art. 5).

In the final protocol on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Guarantee and Cooperation, and invoking its Art. 5, both contracting parties declare that until the signing of new agreements, agreements, conventions and treaties signed between Italy and Yugoslavia will remain in force between Italy and Croatia, insofar as they are applicable.

As the border treaty stipulated a special convention regarding the administration of the city of Split and its suburbs, and the island of Korcula, the exchange of letters between Mussolini and Pavelić on May 18, 1941, emphasized that "the Italian government will prepare, as soon as possible, the draft convention regarding the administrative arrangement for the municipality of Split and the island of Korcula," thus formalizing the joint administration of the aforementioned city and island.

Once all the basic agreements between Croatia and Italy were signed, Mussolini issued the following order to the commander of the Italian 2nd Army, General Ambrosio, on May 19, 1941: "The Italian armed forces located in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia, as of tomorrow, the 20th of this month, cease to be considered occupying forces and acquire the status of troops located in the territory of the friendly and allied Independent State of Croatia" [126].

However, the special circumstances arising from the war in Southeast Europe, namely Zones II and III, and the presence of Italian troops in those zones due to the guerrilla actions of the Chetniks (Serbian nationalists) and the communist partisans on the one hand, and on the other hand, the German-Italian rivalry regarding Croatia and the Croatian government's reluctance to actively cooperate with the permanent commission for the study and implementation of the clauses of the guarantee and cooperation treaty that provided for close customs and monetary ties between Italy and Croatia, practically prevented the implementation of the Rome Agreements, except for the one concerning the new borders.[127]

Formally, however, these agreements established a special contractual relationship between Croatia and Italy and thus significantly influenced the international status of the Independent State of Croatia while these agreements were in force.[128] Nor did the Duke of Spoleto ever ascend the throne of Croatia, evidently due to delaying tactics employed by the Croatian authorities.

e) Unilateral legal acts.

The upheaval in Italy, the fall of Mussolini, and the capitulation of Marshal Badoglio's government led Croatia to revoke the Rome Agreements. On September 10, 1943, Dr. Ante Pavelić, as a co-signatory of those agreements, "issued a legal-state declaration on the annulment of the Rome Agreements," and the day before, he informed the Croatian people that Hitler had recognized the State of Croatia "with borders encompassing the separate Croatian regions on the Adriatic." At its meeting of 20/9/1943, the Croatian government resolved to break its relations with the Italian royal government and recognize Mussolini's national republican Italian government, which it notified to the governments of Germany, Japan, Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Spain, and the Kingdom of Italy.[129] Consequently, on 10/9/1943, the Rome Agreements, even formally, ceased to have any bearing on Croatia's international status.

E The nature of relations with the Axis powers, and especially with Italy

The relevant legal events, legal acts, and agreements grouped by subject matter, which we have recorded in Chapter III, chronologically define three legal periods for Croatia in its relations with the States that, during its existence from April 10, 1941, to May 8, 1945, constituted an international community motivated by common interests.

1. - Period from April 10, 1941, to May 18, 1941

Although during this period Croatia had its stable national government and the organization of power based on the principles of the Ustasha liberation movement of June 1, 1933, modified on April 16, 1941, which, until the proclamation of the constitution, served as the fundamental law of the State; even though Croatia was already recognized by Hungary, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. And with Germany, Croatia exercised the active and passive right of legation (the German envoy plenipotentiary presented his credentials in Zagreb on April 21, 1941, and the Croatian envoy in Berlin on May 8, 1941). With the signing of the border treaty, the international status of the State of Croatia until May 18, 1941, was uncertain and imprecise because Italy's recognition of Croatia implied an agreement on borders that, given Italian claims, would not coincide with the former Italo-Yugoslavian border in Croatian territory. Only with the signing of the Rome Agreements was the reciprocal relationship between Italy and Croatia established, and both states exercised the active and passive right of legation (the Croatian envoy presented his credentials in Rome on June 3, 1941, and the Italian envoy, until then chargé d'affaires, on July 2, 1941, in Zagreb).

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that from the date of the proclamation of its independence (April 10, 1941), when the age-old Croatian state idea was reaffirmed, until the first international recognitions and the formation of the first national government, the State of Croatia was nasciturus, a state in statu nascendi ("werdender Staat," according to Georg Jellinek's terminology), a state that was constituted in a revolutionary manner, from the point of view of the existing international order, antilegal, extra legem.[130] Only with the designation of the national government and the adoption of the aforementioned principles, as the fundamental state law on the one hand, and with recognition by several major powers and other states on the other, did Croatia become a state in the full sense of the term and acquire its international legal personality, although it lacked completely precise relations with a part of the divided international community, a matter on which its definitive international status would depend.

2. - Period from May 18, 1941 to September 10, 1943

When considering and judging Croatia's relations with Italy from a legal perspective, based on the Treaty of Guarantee and Cooperation and the Agreement on Military Matters, it is not easy to find an appropriate classification if we proceed from a purely legal-formal standpoint, that is, taking into account only the agreements without considering their implementation. This is all the more difficult given that these agreements envisioned closer customs and monetary ties that were never applied in practice nor legally formalized. The most appropriate classification of Croatian-Italian relations under these legal instruments would be that of a political alliance in which one partner is entrusted with the dominant role in the political, economic, and military spheres, while the other is subjected to certain limitations, whether these limitations are ostensibly to its advantage or detriment.

From this prima facie relationship arises the question of Croatia's right to equality with Italy, since Italy assumes "the guarantee of Croatia's political independence and territorial integrity," while Croatia undertakes not to enter into international obligations incompatible with this guarantee and the spirit of the treaty. From this stems the dispute concerning independence as another fundamental right of every state, since for 25 years Croatia was committed not to exchange its independence for dependence on any other state except Italy, if such a change was in the interests of the Croatian people, and that during the agreed period it was to collaborate with Italy, potentially disregarding its own interests. The inequality is also manifested in Croatia's obligation not to fortify its coast and not to maintain a naval fleet, which Italy can do in the parts of the Adriatic coast allocated to it by the border agreement. Even so, one cannot see in the relationship between Croatia and Italy, and vice versa, "an international union," which Angelo Piero Sereni takes as his starting point in the analysis of this relationship.[131]

Any union must have a legal mechanism of an institutional nature for the purpose of general and permanent coordination of the activities, both internal and external, of the two countries. In the case of Croatian-Italian relations, no such mechanism exists. In contrast, such a mechanism existed in the pre-war Italian-Albanian relationship. In the Croatian-Italian relationship, firstly, there is no shared identity of head of state, as in the case of Albania, where the head of state must always be the King of Italy, by virtue of Italian law. Pursuant to the Italian law of April 16, 1939, and following the offer made by the assembly of deputies from all the Albanian provinces on April 12, 1939, the King of Italy assumed the title: King of Italy, Albania, and Emperor of Ethiopia, in his own name and that of his successors.

Therefore, strictly speaking, one cannot speak of a "personal union," as Italy sought to present its relationship with Albania to the world, because it lacks the element of chance that aligns with the classical conception of a personal union. Rather, one could speak of a real union, in which the monarch's identity derives from a legal norm.[132] Subsequently, Albania was compulsorily represented internationally by Italian diplomatic missions. Unity in foreign policy and the integration of the Albanian army into the Italian army were imposed upon it. The institution of the governor-general, an Italian who is also an Albanian state official, was also imposed upon it; this individual directs the entire political, administrative, and legislative apparatus of the Albanian state.[133]

Unlike the Italian-Albanian relationship, Sereni presents the Italian-Croatian relationship in the following terms:

"The designation of the Croatian king by Vittorio Emanuele, however significant it may be from a political point of view as a sign of the new kingdom's subordination to Italy, is irrelevant to international law. In fact, it can hardly be considered an act of the Italian state, since, more precisely, it was an act exercised by Vittorio Emanuele in his personal capacity, an act that produces consequences for Croatian, not Italian, public law. There appears to be no legal obligation on the part of the Croatian state to place at its head, now or in the future, a person designated by Italy or by its king.[134] Croatia conducts its international relations through its own organs (agencies), without any previously established and permanent control by Italy. The treaty of guarantee and cooperation with Italy does not impose any limitation on Croatia in the exercise of its international relations, except for the clause prohibiting it from entering into any obligation incompatible with the Italian guarantee and the spirit of the treaty." treaty"[135].

Nevertheless, Sereni argues that Croatia could not be a member of the League of Nations without Italy's consent, which is not so clear-cut, since membership in the League of Nations, like today's membership in the United Nations, does not limit the political independence of a member state. Therefore, in this respect, the limitation provided for in the guarantee treaty could not be applied.

Regarding Croatian-Italian military relations, Sereni states: "While Italy is obligated to defend Croatia and practically exercises military control over the country[136], there is no military alliance, and it appears that Croatia did not commit to cooperating in Italy's military actions." Sereni establishes the fact that Croatia was not at war with Russia, while Italy was,[137] and continues: "The internal organization of both states is entirely separate: Italy has no right to interfere in Croatia's internal affairs, except to the extent required by military provisions; nor is there any obligation on the part of Croatia to conform its constitutional organization to that of Fascist Italy."

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that, despite the aforementioned treaties, no relationship of subordination existed between Italy and Croatia, derived from legal stipulations.[138] Except for those parts of Croatian state territory where, in accordance with the Croatian government, Italian troops were stationed for the purposes of the war and especially to combat communist partisans, Italy exercised virtually no control, either directly or indirectly, over Croatia's internal affairs, despite the differing opinions of some wartime authors. The same applies to Croatia's foreign relations, which were determined by the alliance of the countries adhering to the Tripartite Pact. Sereni, for example, sees the influence of Italy in the closure of the American consulate general in Zagreb, which took effect on June 22, 1941.

In reality, the consulate was closed at the request of the German government after the Washington government requested, on June 16, 1941, the closure of German consulates in the United States until July 10, 1941 [139]. Nor did Italy play a special role in Croatia's declaration of war against England and the United States. In fact, it was a collective measure by the member countries of the Tripartite Pact, at the request of Japan, following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Regarding the declaration of war against the United States, Croatia was in the same position as Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, countries to which Germany, invoking Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact, suggested "a formal declaration of being in a state of war" with the United States [140]. Thus Croatia found itself in a state of war with the United States, after Germany and Italy had done so on 11/12/1941, and Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia on 12/12/1941.[141]

Therefore, during the period from May 18, 1941, to September 10, 1943, when Croatia revoked the Rome Agreements, it was neither legally nor de facto subordinate to Italy, and the opinion that "the relationship between Italy and Croatia can be defined as a de facto protectorate very similar to the de jure protectorate that existed between Germany and Slovakia, both in terms of the powers granted to the State and its practical results" cannot be maintained [142].

3. - Period from September 10, 1943 to May 8, 1945

With the surrender of Italy (September 3, 1943) and the revocation of the Rome Agreements by the Croatian government (September 10, 1943), all formal relations between Italy and Croatia stipulated in those agreements were invalidated. These agreements, at least formally, provided a basis for debate regarding the international status of the State of Croatia while they were in force. Thus, Croatia legally regained its independence and equality within the international community to which it belonged, as there was no agreement with Germany or any other state capable of legally limiting Croatia's right to independence and equality.

Precisely because Germany had to assume the political and especially military role of its Italian ally not only in Italy but throughout southeastern Europe, and because the communist partisans seized almost all the Italian weaponry on the Adriatic coast, which was then reincorporated into Croatia, significantly strengthening its military activity, Croatia was militarily dependent on Germany both for arms supplies and for coordinating its strategy with German strategy in southeastern Europe.

Croatia's military situation worsened after Italy's capitulation because the Germans themselves intensified their collaboration with the Serbian nationalist partisans (Chetniks) to Croatia's detriment, a role previously played by the Italians.[143] This political course, with all its consequences, manifested itself in its full scope at the end of August 1943 when Hermann Neubacher was appointed "Special Envoy Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry for the Southeast," based in Belgrade. Its mission was to coordinate foreign policy matters in the area of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Greece.[144]

During this period in the life of the Croatian state, certain areas, especially the coastal zone, were declared "operational zones" with corresponding limitations on Croatian civil administration. This was all a consequence of the restructuring of the German military command in the Balkans, which had already begun in late 1942.[145]

Consequently, in the absence of legal acts that could affect Croatia's equality and independence vis-à-vis Germany, the Croatian state appeared throughout this period as an international subject equal to Germany. However, considering the actual military situation and the role of German military forces on Croatian territory in the final phase of the war, the position of the German armed forces could be defined as the presence of an Allied army in a friendly state for the purpose of defending common interests.

This situation is similar to the American-Icelandic relationship and the position of the American army when Iceland was proclaimed a republic on 6/17/1944. On 5/7/1945, General Alexander Loehr, German commander of the Southeast, restored to the head of state of Croatia and at the same time supreme commander of the Croatian armed forces, the provisional command over the Croatian army.

International Status of Croatia and Yugoslavia During the Last War and Its Consequences

If Croatia, in whatever way, had survived as an independent state at the end of the Second World War—and there were certain possibilities for this—before the Yalta Conference[146], the question of the international status of the Independent State of Croatia during the period 1941–1945 would require no further comment. However, given that Croatia ceased to exist as an international subject at the end of the war as a result of the total conquest (debellatio), which its wartime adversaries and victors describe as "liberation from the occupier," and given that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was established in place of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the question arises of the legal classification of the international status of the State of Croatia during its existence in light of these facts.

First, it is necessary to consider that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, created in 1918, according to the theory of state law and in accordance with the plans of its founders, had to constitute a multinational community with equal rights for Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs. Therefore, the legal basis for the initial origin of the first Yugoslavia was unio aequali jure [147].

Since the State of Croatia emerged in 1941 through the secession of the multinational state it had previously been part of, the legal basis for the origin of the Independent State of Croatia is secessio, as Charles Rousseau described it when referring to the different ways in which a state is constituted [148]. In the part that remained of Yugoslavia after the annexation of Slovenia by Italy and Germany, Baranja and Bachka by Hungary, Vardar Macedonia by Bulgaria, and Kosovo-Metohija by Albania, two state formations were constituted—except for Banat, which was subject to direct German military administration: Serbia; Serbia ceased to exist when the government, overseen by the German occupation authorities, was handed over to General Milan Nedic on August 29, 1941.

Montenegro ceased to exist when, on July 12, 1941, the people's assembly proclaimed its independence under the Italian High Commissioner. While Serbia was not a state in the sense of international law and therefore not an international subject, Montenegro never progressed beyond the stage of a state "in statu nascendi" [149]. Thus, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ceased to exist due to its dismemberment, as proclaimed by its military victors on July 8, 1941. Not the slightest trace of the former state power remained in the territory of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia; the state organization was completely dismantled, and the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London (or Cairo, respectively) never exercised any power whatsoever in any part of the former territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

However, from a legal standpoint, the situation is different with regard to the rest of Yugoslavia's territory after Croatia's secession. That is to say, since dismembratio implies the disappearance of the old state and the creation of new international subjects in its territory, and since Serbia and Montenegro did not possess the attributes of a state according to international law, these remnants of Yugoslavian territory, including the annexed territories, can be considered occupied territory, despite the real and total dismemberment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This would thus be a case of occupatio bellica, a state of de facto possession which, according to the principle of the non-transferability of state sovereignty during military occupation, legally remains the Yugoslav state territory; that is, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia would continue to exist in that territory after 1941 [150].

International Status of Croatia and Yugoslavia During the Last War and Its Consequences

While Serbia was not a state in the sense of international law and therefore not an international subject, Montenegro never progressed beyond the stage of a state "in statu nascendi" [149]. Thus, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ceased to exist due to its dismemberment, as proclaimed by its military victors on July 8, 1941. Not the slightest trace of the former state power remained in the territory of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia; the state organization was completely dismantled, and the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London (or Cairo, respectively) never exercised any power whatsoever in any part of the former territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

On the contrary, Jellinek argues that this criterion regarding the existence of Yugoslavia and the non-recognition of the existence of Croatia is untenable, "since the State of Croatia existed de facto during the period 1941-1945, recognized by several States, and disappeared again after the liberation of Yugoslavia."[154]

Addressing the specific issue of citizenship and in accordance with the principle of not questioning the legal basis for the formation of a State, Jellinek concludes that there is no doubt that the inhabitants of Croatia acquired the citizenship of the newly created State, while the inhabitants of "the amputated Yugoslavia" retained their old Yugoslav citizenship during the occupation.

Therefore, Charles Rousseau, speaking of the recognition of States, includes Croatia, as well as Slovakia, among the cases of premature recognition (la reconnaissance prématurée) by the Axis powers during the second world war, just as the recognition of Panama by the United States (13/11/1903) and of Manchukuo by Japan (15/9/1932) was premature.[155]

In light of the foregoing, and considering how the State of Croatia emerged in 1941 and its recognition by a number of States, it can be argued that during the period 1941-1945 the State of Croatia existed de facto and legally within its territory, while the Yugoslav State existed in the remainder of its pre-war territory and only legally. This view is all the easier to accept given that current doctrine holds that the emergence of a State is an extra-legal phenomenon, not refutable by legal criteria.[156]

Furthermore, international law does not stipulate how many member states of the international community must recognize a newly created state, since states exist if they have acquired all the necessary elements without requiring recognition from others. Recognition is, on the one hand, a legal formula that serves as an instrument to translate the accomplished fact of a state's emergence into the legal sphere—that is, to ratify that a community is a state in the sense of public international law—and on the other hand, it is a political phenomenon, as it expresses the will of existing states to determine and define their relations with the new state.[157]

Nor are there any established rules in international law regarding when existing states can justifiably recognize a new state, except in cases of recognition by the rebel faction of a state, when recognition is premature while genuine struggle is still underway.[158] It is worth recalling that Croatia declared itself free and independent within the context of the Second World War, at a time when other powers were waging war against Yugoslavia. At the time of its initial recognition, Croatia was not engaged in combat against Yugoslavia, which had capitulated on April 17, 1941—two days after Croatia's initial recognition.

However, the characterization of Croatia's recognition as premature does not refer to the duration of the Axis powers' military operations against the Yugoslav army—which, moreover, offered very little resistance, as neither the Croats nor other subjugated peoples and minorities were willing to defend Yugoslavia—but rather to the fact that the Axis war against Yugoslavia, while causing its dissolution, was not an isolated conflict. It was part of the broader war that Yugoslavia's allies continued to wage, and the ultimate outcome of this broader war would determine the existence or dissolution of Yugoslavia as a state. This refers to the theory of the indivisibility of war, which generated the principles concerning governments in exile, and therein lies its legal and political justification.[159]

However, this somewhat shaky thesis regarding international relations pertains to the problem of the future effective establishment of Yugoslavia and does not affect the real and legal existence of Croatia at that time. Finally, international law does not impose an obligation to recognize a community as a state, nor does the new state have the right to demand its recognition from existing states. The interests of the respective pre-existing states decide here, provided, of course, that the new entity possesses all the attributes of a state (Statehood). It is therefore pointless to speak of the right to recognition, as some authors do, when they demand absolute independence as a condition for the "right" to recognition, since classical international law recognizes independent and dependent states, and the degree of their dependence or independence from the latter determines the form of their legal or international status.[160]

But since the State of Croatia existed de jure in its territory and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in its reduced and occupied territory existed simultaneously and in parallel, Croatia became, in part, the successor to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with respect to the rights and obligations relating to its portion of the territory of pre-war Yugoslavia. This matter, as noted, was settled through agreements. Moreover, some argue that even Serbia and Montenegro were successors to pre-war Yugoslavia, although they did not possess all the attributes of statehood.[161]

The logical consequence of this succession would be that the new Yugoslavia, regardless of the highly debatable thesis of continuity and identity between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, has become the successor to the Independent State of Croatia, at least with regard to certain rights and obligations of the defunct state. Yugoslav legal literature, of course, completely excludes the problem of succession, since it upholds the thesis of the total occupation of Yugoslavia, and since occupation does not abolish but only suspends state sovereignty, it concludes that the Independent State of Croatia was not a sovereign state, just like Milan Nedic's Serbia.

"This is proven by the fact that they did not possess a single element of statehood; neither state territory, nor a 'political' people in the legal-state sense, nor their own state authorities with the attributes of a state" [162]. Regarding the question of citizenship, Professor Culinovic states: "The inhabitants of the Independent State of Croatia and those of Serbia during the government of M. Nedic did not cease to be Yugoslav citizens... they were not citizens of the NDH (or of Serbia during the government of Nedic and others), but of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and citizens of the Federal Democratic Yugoslavia, respectively, after the second meeting of AVNOJ" [163]. Professor Culinovic's criterion is logical when referring to Serbia and other occupied parts of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, it ceases to be logical when, in the occupied territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the second meeting of AVNOJ on November 29, 1943, the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia emerged, which no one recognized either as a de facto government or as a state, and which existed only in the small "liberated territory," which was very flexible, so that the inhabitants of the occupied parts of Yugoslavia would be Yugoslav citizens and those of the "liberated" parts, citizens of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning here the formula that would eliminate such a de facto contradiction with respect to the occupied parts of Yugoslavia.

Culinovic says: "...the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia remained intact, although suspended in that part even after it had been occupied. But as regards that part (sovereignty) was not suspended during the entire Second World War but only while the old state existed and until the founding of the new Yugoslav state, that is, until the second meeting of AVNOJ. From then on, sovereignty, even over the then-occupied part of Yugoslavia, belonged to the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia" [164]. But this whole problem exceeds the scope of our study, but it characterizes the development of legal-state relations in the territory of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 10/4/1941, when it ceased to exist in its previous form and extent due to the creation of the State of Croatia, until the promulgation of the new constitution of 31/1/1946, when the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was legally established [165].

From the criteria upheld by Yugoslav jurists regarding the origin of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia as a new state, one might conclude that it is the legal successor of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia insofar as the latter legally existed in the occupied territory, and of the Independent State of Croatia as a separate international subject. This concept of state succession was not accepted in practice, as can be inferred from two cases in American jurisprudence.

Indeed, although the Yugoslav law of February 3, 1945, concerning the invalidity of decisions regarding legal relations between citizens made during the "occupation," made an exception only for decisions on property disputes, which remained in force under certain conditions,[166] the question of state continuity was settled for the American courts on April 16, 1946, the date on which Washington resolved to establish normal diplomatic relations with the government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, after the latter gave assurances that it would respect the international obligations of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, albeit only "in accordance with the resolutions of the Second Meeting of AVNOJ in Jajce in November 1943."

Regarding international agreements, AVNOJ resolved that all treaties and obligations of the Yugoslav government-in-exile would be re-examined to decide whether they should be annulled, renewed, or confirmed, and as for the future, AVNOJ does not recognize the international obligations and agreements of the government-in-exile in London.

The two cases in US legal practice that appear in the legal literature and that refer to state continuity and/or succession between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRP) are the case of "Ivancevic v. Artukovic" [167], an extradition request, and the case of the Socony Vacuum Oil Company claim for damages filed with the United States International Claims Commission.

In the "Ivancevic v. Artukovic" extradition case, the question of continuity between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the FRP was raised twice. The first instance occurred when U.S. District Court Judge Peirson M. Hall rejected the extradition request on July 14, 1952, arguing that no extradition treaty existed between the U.S. and Yugoslavia; that is, the agreement signed in 1902 by the U.S. and the Kingdom of Serbia was no longer in effect. Judge Hall based his decision on the following reasoning: the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, established in 1918, was a new state, and after its formation, the U.S. Senate never ratified the agreement, it was never implemented, and therefore it was not law.

Judge Hall further maintained that the court had the authority to determine whether an agreement was still in force or not. On appeal, the plaintiff was found to be in force by the United States Court of Appeals in San Francisco on February 19, 1954, and the 1902 treaty was in effect and valid for relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Court of Appeals therefore overturned Judge Hall's acquittal and ordered that the extradition proceedings must adhere to the treaty. In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the opinion of the State Department as amicus curiae.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals resolved two issues: first, the question of who is authorized to determine whether an agreement is in force, and second, whether the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is a new state and whether the 1902 agreement was still in force.[168] That Court, adopting the State Department's view, held that Yugoslavia is "enlarged Serbia" because some of its international treaties remained in force.[169] For although the validity of the Kingdom of Serbia's international treaties was based on the express declaration of the Yugoslav government, in scholarly literature this decision is taken as proof that Yugoslavia is indeed enlarged Serbia.[170]

When Judge Hall (3/4/1956) dismissed the extradition request for the second time, finding the alleged acts to be political in nature and therefore inadmissible under the 1901 treaty—a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals—the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. Consequently, the case, with the Court of Appeals' ruling overturned, was remanded to the district court in Los Angeles with instructions to proceed according to Chapter 18, Section 3184 of the United States Code.

The district court assigned the case to the United States Commissioner, Theodore Hocke. The defendant, for the second time, attempted to deny the continued existence of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and proposed "that all the evidence be rejected because the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a government authorized to request extradition, since the crimes, even admitting that they occurred, were not committed within its judicial jurisdiction. The claim alleges that the punishable acts were perpetrated between April 16, 1941, and October 10, 1942.

At that time, the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not exist." In his final ruling of January 15, 1959, rejecting the extradition request, Commissioner Theodore Hocke rejected the defendant's proposal, stating "that he did not believe it necessary to establish whether the claimant government is indeed authorized, since it is the only one that now exists and that could file the claim." Judge Hocke thus ruled on the plaintiff's claim that "during 1941 and 1942 Yugoslavia was occupied by German and Italian troops," and that there were several cases "in which the criterion was adopted that for punishable acts committed during the period of occupation, one is responsible to the occupying armies and not to another country or state."

Since the occupying armies ceased to exist long ago, and these cases refer to refugees who were members of the armed forces when the acts were committed, the proposal had to be resolved on its merits and rejected.[171] Apart from the problem thus resolved regarding the continuity between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Judge Hocke, in his verdict, established two facts of interest to our topic. Regarding the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918, he said: "Without the right to vote or elect representatives after the First World War, Croatia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The government was controlled by the Serbs, who imposed tremendous burdens on the Croats. The Croats desired an independent government or at least independent representation in the Sabor, or Parliament."

Regarding the establishment of the State of Croatia, Hocke said: "The Croats never forgot their ideal of an independent state, and when the Germans and Italians invaded Yugoslavia during the Second World War, they were presented with their first opportunity to establish their own government. On April 10, 1941, the Croatian leaders declared their independence and began to establish their government. The Serbs and others opposed this, and civil strife erupted."

But this is not about occupied foreign territory or the occupier. The territory is Croatian, it is not occupied, and since April 15, 1941, from the standpoint of international law, it has been indisputably under the sovereignty of the Independent State of Croatia. The legal entity that benefited from the change of sovereignty in that territory was not the German Reich but the Independent State of Croatia.[176] It is wrong to confuse or equate the concepts of "belligerent occupation" and "de facto government," as we have just pointed out. Professor Sauser-Hall says: "A de facto government is an internal state phenomenon; belligerent occupation is an external phenomenon with respect to the occupied state."[177] The belligerent occupiers could only have been the Axis powers and not the State of Croatia. There is no case in history of a nation with the characteristics of a nation-state being the belligerent occupier of its own territory.

That is inconceivable. It is conceivable, however, that a state might become the belligerent occupier of a disputed area that it considers its own territory. Such cases are frequent, but this is not the case with Croatia. Nor can the State of Croatia be described as a de facto government, since Croatia was an international subject, recognized by a part of the international community. Only from the perspective of the occupation of Yugoslavia as a whole could such a designation be granted. But since Croatia was not occupied, the thesis regarding the occupation of Yugoslavia is untenable.

The characterization of the State of Croatia as "failed revolutionaries" is inherently invalid after April 15, 1941, that is to say, after the first recognitions of the Independent State of Croatia. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Commission could have rejected the claim of the Socony Vacuum Oil Company—perhaps not in its entirety—even if it were to adopt the criterion that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the successor to Croatia.

The issue of succession would have been framed differently had it not been a matter of compensation for damages but rather of the assets of the State of Croatia, which were not previously the assets of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. For example, if Croatia had acquired its legation building in Berlin by purchasing it from a private individual and not in exchange for the building ceded to the German legation in Zagreb, on what grounds would the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRG) claim ownership of the assets of the defunct State of Croatia?

Only on the basis of the right of succession of the defunct State of Croatia, which was incorporated into the FRG. Such was the case with the right of succession of the current Philippine government to the assets of the former Philippine Republic, founded in 1943 during the Japanese occupation. This concerned the Philippine legation building in Japan, purchased by the Philippine government from a private individual in 1944. The current Philippine government claimed ownership as successor to the former Philippine Republic. On this matter, a memorandum dated June 29, 1951, was prepared by the Assistant Legal Advisor of the Bureau of Northeast Asian Affairs of the State Department, concluding that "it appears clear that equity is on the side of the present Philippine government" [178]. Explaining the legal aspect of the problem, the aforementioned advisor to the U.S. State Department stated: "It is difficult to establish any general rule regarding the succession of States to rights and obligations in international law because of the great variety of circumstances [see L. Oppenheim, "International Law" (6th ed., 1947), pp. 150-178]. The precise circumstances described in the Philippine case may never have occurred before. However, it is well established in international law that the de jure government acquires title to the property of the de facto government of which it is the successor."

If this is the case with the succession of rights and obligations between de jure and de facto governments, then the same rule should certainly apply between two states in the case of the incorporation of one into the other. Of course, it is necessary to distinguish between the duty to fulfill the obligation as a successor in principle and the right to demand fulfillment of the obligation in a specific case.

It is necessary to distinguish between the types of obligations and the persons who demand their fulfillment. With respect to Croatia's obligations arising from arms acquisition agreements, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not be compelled to fulfill them as a successor state, nor could the arms seller, whoever it may be, have standing to appear as a creditor. However, with regard to civil obligations, it does not seem fair to summarily dismiss claims for compensation on the grounds that the state in whose territory the damage was caused is not a state or the predecessor government of the state from which compensation is sought, especially when the damages were inflicted during the "civil" war that the state or the general government effectively unleashed and which caused the majority of the economic losses.

VI. De Facto and De Jure Nation-State

The fact that the State of Croatia emerged and existed only during the war influenced not only its international status but also its regime, state organization, its entire social and cultural life, and, as we saw in the previous chapter, even its approaches from the perspective of public international law. However, the fact that a state was formed during war does not negate its status as an international subject, even if it was recognized by only some members of the divided international community. It is precisely during war that changes in the international community, comprised of a specific number of member states and which, in a given period, constitutes the system of states or the international order, occur most frequently. Any change in the international order that lacks unanimous consent, or at least the consent of the most influential members of the international community, provokes dissension and division within it.

War and the eventual legal and state changes that occur during wartime ipso facto lead to a crisis in the international community and necessarily divide it into two sides with opposing interests. The consequence of this division of the international community is that one side does not recognize the legal and state changes that have taken place in the other's sphere; that is, the new state, recognized by one side, does not enjoy international personality in the opposing side. Therefore, the victor in wars of global dimensions, such as the First and Second World Wars, always establishes its international order, either by restoring the previous status quo or by implementing a new one, depending on which side emerged victorious.

Post-war legal literature from the victorious side characterizes all legal and state changes implemented by the opposing side—that is, the new states—as puppet states and/or governments, implying that they were short-lived, arose through coercion, and were not entirely independent of the main protagonists of their respective sides. In this way, the aim is to disqualify such state formations as states or as international actors, disregarding the fundamental human element in every association: the will of the people.

It is natural that the international community must guard against coercive changes and resort to all available means in peace and war (at least on a local level), and one such means is the strategy of non-recognition. However, this measure should only affect those who resorted to coercion and expanded their territory at the expense of others, and should not affect those who took advantage of external force—general war—to establish their own sovereignty within their territory, thereby exercising the right to self-determination, one of the fundamental rights upon which the international community has been founded since at least the end of the First World War. In this respect, the example of the Philippines and its path to independence amidst American and Japanese rivals is eloquent and very similar to the Croatian case.

What conceptual difference is there between the Republic of the Philippines, established in 1943 by the Japanese, and the one constituted under the auspices of Washington when, after the American occupation, Manuel A. Roxas was elected the republic's first president on July 4, 1946—the same individual "who held a leading position during the Japanese occupation?"[179] Why is one called "the puppet Republic of the Philippines,"[180] and the other simply "the Republic of the Philippines"? Why is the character of a state denied to a state formation if it arose and exists within the sphere of interests of a particular power?

Seeler summarizes the case of Croatia from both a factual and legal perspective as follows: "There existed a state territory whose borders were established by treaties between the German Reich and Italy. There existed a Croatian state people (Staatsvolk), and there existed—at least in the early years of that state's existence—a relatively independent state power in Croatia. It is true that the Croatian government was under strong influence from the German Reich and Italy, but that is not enough to deny the existence of its own state power. Otherwise, today we would have to deny the status of a state to all nations within the sphere of influence of the great powers."

"From 1941," the same author continues, "therefore, the State of Croatia existed, which, it is true, later disappeared at the end of the war. From this, it follows that Croatian citizenship existed."

"Furthermore, due to the wartime circumstances, the State of Croatia was recognized only by a portion of the international community, while for other states the State of Yugoslavia continued to exist de jure, represented by its government-in-exile and with the borders of April 6, 1941."

"Yugoslavia itself, as soon as Croatia was created, through its government-in-exile, expressly protested against the creation of this state. Even today, Yugoslavia does not recognize the existence of the Independent State of Croatia. This is evident, among other things, from Article 1 of the Constitution of January 15, 1946."

"From the foregoing," Seeler concludes, "it follows that, for the States that recognized Croatia, the inhabitants of Croatia were Croatian citizens. For the other States, and especially for the former Western powers and their allies, the inhabitants of Croatia remained Yugoslav citizens."[181]

This faithful description of the legal and state changes that took place in the territory of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1945, and its assessment from the perspective of the general rules of law and international relations in a divided international community, constitutes a compromise between two opposing positions. According to some, the State of Croatia existed as an international subject in its own right, while Yugoslavia ceased to exist or existed only in the occupied territory. According to others, Yugoslavia as an entity existed de jure as an occupied state, which is why Croatia could not exist as a de jure state. This latter criterion is based on Stimson's doctrine on the non-recognition of territorial changes effected by force, considering it a positive norm of international law and therefore valid in the specific case at hand.[182]

However, whether or not this doctrine and subsequent resolutions of international organizations are considered positive international law,[183] they cannot be applied to Croatia, since the origin of the State of Croatia is not due to the occupation or annexation of Croatia,[184] but to the national struggle for emancipation, initially waged through legal means within the framework of the international order upheld by the League of Nations, which culminated in the revolutionary act of October 14, 1941. At that time, this international order no longer existed, and the war between third parties—to whom perhaps only some violation of the existing positive norms of international law could be attributed—provided the only concrete opportunity for Croatia to realize its right to national self-determination.

THE ARMY OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA 1941-1945

Rudolf Kiszling, Vienna, Austria

The Independent State of Croatia, a long-held aspiration of Croatian patriots, was established in the spring of 1941 as a circumstantial creation of the Second World War. When Yugoslav Brigadier Dusan Simovic attempted to nullify Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact two days after its signing in Vienna on March 25, 1941, through a coup d'état, Hitler dismantled the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in early April in a military campaign that lasted only twelve days. Italian and Hungarian troops barely had the opportunity to participate in the fighting.

The weak resistance of the Yugoslav units sufficiently demonstrated that the South Slavic kingdom lacked a spirit of unity, so that regiments recruited in Croatia hardly took part in the fighting. Most of the Croatian soldiers in the Yugoslav army simply went home.

The interests that Germany and Italy demonstrated regarding the new state, born from the political emergency, were entirely different. Hitler, deeply preoccupied with the planned war against the Soviet Union, considered the campaign against Yugoslavia a cumbersome delay from the start of the offensive against the Russians and therefore thought only of how to deploy the troops engaged in the Balkan campaign as quickly and completely as possible. Initially, he was not interested in gaining new territories. Only the Zagreb-Belgrade railway line had to be brought under the control of German forces.

Mussolini, on the other hand, saw in the war against Yugoslavia a highly favorable opportunity to carry out his plans for the creation of an Italian empire, seizing most of the eastern Adriatic coast. Given German acquiescence, Italy was able to annex, in addition to the southern part of Slovenia with Ljubljana and Fiume, all of northern and central Dalmatia, including Split and Boka Kotorska. Italy, on the other hand, secured political, economic, and military dominance on this side of the demarcation line that ran west from Zagreb, Banjaluka, and Sarajevo to Visegrad.

Within this area, which extended to the coast and was occupied by the Italian Second Army, composed of seven divisions and several battalions of Alpine and Bersagliero troops, Croatia was unable to maintain or recruit any troops. Furthermore, the young Croatian state was forbidden from maintaining a fleet, compelled to align itself with the reigning Italian dynasty and then governed by Dr. Ante Pavelić.

Poglavnik, the official title of the head of government, consequently ruled over barely three-fifths of the territory designated for Croatia, which extended north to the Drava River and the Danube as far as Zemun and the lower reaches of the Sava River; to the east, it reached the Drina River. However, even in this territory, Germany and Italy interfered in almost all matters of government. At the same time, the state lacked what it most urgently needed from its very inception: an army, a gendarmerie, and a state police force. Furthermore, Croatia had no factories for the production of weapons and ammunition. The German and Italian military authorities quickly seized almost all the weapons taken from captured Yugoslav soldiers.

Shortly after Croatia declared its independence, Serbian peasants, under the command of General Staff Colonel Draza Mihailovic, loyal to the monarchy, began a guerrilla war in Herzegovina against the occupying powers.[185] The only existing armed forces, some battalions of the Croatian Peasant Guard (Seljacka Zastita), organized as a militia, were employed against these "Chetniks." Since these peasant battalions did not belong to the Poglavnik's Ustasha movement,[186] they were soon disbanded.

During his exile, Pavelic lived in Italy, which constantly forced him to make concessions to Mussolini. From the Croatians who accompanied him in exile, he brought a guard battalion (Poglavnikova Tjelesna Bojna), which formed the core of the hastily organized Ustaše military. This battalion would later occupy a position in the nascent Croatian army similar to that of the German SS. The first Ustaše units were employed against the communist guerrillas (partisans) of Josip Broz, later known as Marshal Tito, who began their operations in Croatia as soon as the German army attacked Russia on June 22, 1941. With their treacherous and brutal attacks, they also sought to turn their fellow Croatians, the gendarmes and their officers, against each other on Croatian territory.

Meanwhile, Slavko Kvaternik, a former lieutenant colonel in the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, whom Poglavnik appointed marshal upon his arrival on Croatian soil, organized the Croatian Ministry of Defense (Ministarstvo Hrvatskog Domobranstva). The ministry comprised several departments: personnel affairs, general staff, reserves section, quartermaster corps, medical corps, legal affairs, and artillery inspection. It also included commands for the air force, navy, and gendarmerie.

Initially, Chief of Staff was Eugene von Marić, a former member of the Austro-Hungarian Army General Staff and later commander of the Yugoslav division based in Zagreb. He was replaced in the autumn of 1941 by Vladimir Laxa,[187] a former Austro-Hungarian major general who was soon promoted to lieutenant field marshal. Marshal Kvaternik was also the commander-in-chief of the Ustaše military units. All matters concerning these units were under the command of the Ustaša militia (Glavni Stozer Ustaske Vojnice). The Ustaša, favored by Poglavnik over the regular army (domobrani), followed their own course in every respect. This was the case from the very beginning with the disadvantageous division of the Croatian army.

The regular army (domobranstvo) was initially formed from reservists of the disbanded Yugoslav army, consisting of 15 infantry regiments of two to three battalions each, one cavalry regiment, 10 artillery groups of two batteries each, 4 pioneer battalions, and a small armored unit. These troops were grouped into five divisions (I in Sisak, II in Banjaluka, III in Sarajevo, IV in Mostar, and V in Doboj), but the IV division also had to withdraw to the Sarajevo district following the Italian prohibition.[188] As the executive authority for this organizational work, territorial military commands were formed, headquartered in Zagreb, Slavonski Brod, and Sarajevo. These commands later became known in the conduct of military operations as Corps I, II, and III.

This initial defense army was provisional until a new military corps of 43,000 recruits was formed in 1941. Besides the five battalions already formed in the spring of 1941, the Ustaše organized ten more battalions during the year, bringing their total to 15 operational battalions by the end of that year, plus two communications battalions. The total number of combat-fit men, excluding conscripts, amounted to 32,000 Domobrani and 10,000 Ustaše at the end of 1941, totaling 42,000 men.

To arm the army, Germany and Italy had each pledged to deliver 100,000 rifles, a specified number of machine guns, and grenade launchers. Deliveries were to be made in stages, but Italy fell far short of its commitment. Germany supplied 45 10.5 cm cannons, as well as 18 tanks captured from the Poles.

In an effort to curry favor with Germany, which had begun its war against Russia on June 22, the Croatian government, advised by the commander-in-chief of the German 2nd Army, Colonel General Freiherr von Weichs, and by the German representative in Zagreb, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, issued an appeal on July 2, 1941, for the formation of a contingent of volunteers to fight against communism. Five thousand men responded to this appeal. They concentrated in Döllersheim, a troop training center in northern Lower Austria.

The 369th Legionary Regiment, comprising 3,000 men, was formed into the German army; it was deployed to the Eastern Front and distinguished itself at the Battle of Stalingrad, where it also suffered heavy casualties. Several hundred volunteers were assigned to the air force and formed two squadrons. A thousand trained sailors joined the German navy and served on light warships in the Black Sea. This circumvented the Italian veto that prohibited the Croatians from forming their own navy. The remaining 2,000 volunteers stayed in Döllersheim and formed the core of the Legionary divisions, which we will discuss later.

For reasons of parity, a Croatian legion was also formed in Italy, but due to its small size, it had no real impact.

Meanwhile, the war against the communist partisans intensified. They were gradually increasing their numbers and, at the same time, escalating their atrocities. Of the numerous battles fought in Croatia, we will only mention the most important. In November and December 1941, the communist partisans besieged Doboj, headquarters of the Croatian 5th Division. The fighting lasted until December 10, when that sector and the railway line to Maglaj were cleared of the partisans, who were not decisively defeated.

Nor did the commander of the German army in Belgrade, Infantry General Paul Bader, whose area of operations had extended into Croatia, fare any better. The pincer movement he led in January 1942 against the partisans on Javor Mountain (the German 18th Division from Sarajevo to the northwest and the 342nd Division from Zvornik to the southwest) ended with only partial success. The final purge in Bosnia was entrusted to the Black Legion.[189] Likewise, during the operation undertaken in March 1942 to dislodge Tito's supporters from Petrova Gora, southeast of Karlovac, in which even some battalions of Domobrani, Ustaše, and the Croatian Gendarmerie took part, the communist forces managed to avoid a decisive battle.

The main reasons that prevented a decisive victory were the insufficient armament of the Croatian units and the small number of German troops. The Italians, for their part, displayed a striking passivity in the battles fought along the border, which the rebels exploited as much as the occasional assistance provided by the population, whether out of solidarity or fear of reprisals.[190]

Changes in the Organization

Meanwhile, in the Ministry of Defense in Zagreb, plans for the definitive organization of the Croatian army were taking shape. It was projected that by the end of 1943, 10 mountain brigades (Gorski Zdrugovi), each composed of four battalions and four batteries, would be established. Five of these brigades were to be ready by 1942. Furthermore, by discharging older officers and transferring younger ones to the mountain brigades, four reserve divisions were to remain from the provisional army as permanent army units.

Two regiments of the Domobran infantry (regular army) were formed from the Ustaše contingents. By the end of 1942, the Ustaše army already had 35 battalions and a security brigade. Since the 5th Mountain Brigade could not be formed due to a lack of weapons, four gendarmerie battalions were established, such as the "Petrinja Brigade" (Petrinjski Zdrug), equipped with firearms of various types and calibers.

During 1941/1942, the German national minority in Croatia raised separate troops, namely: four battalions assigned to Ustaše combat units, two German fighter battalions, and three railway security battalions assigned to the domobrani (Croatian regular army). In the German villages, in addition to the older classes, "local guards" were formed for defense against the numerous attacks by rebel bands.

For reasons of parity, a Croatian legion was also formed in Italy, but due to its small size, it had no real impact.

Changes in the Organization

In the second half of 1943, this division experienced its baptism of fire, as it was committed, along with the 369th Legionary Division, the 714th and 717th Fighter Divisions, the 2nd and 3rd Croatian Mountain Brigades, and two Ustaše Brigades, to a broad encirclement operation, designated "Operation Weiss," in western Bosnia. This German-Croatian military force, under the command of General Luethers, was tasked with penetrating from the Banjaluka-Prijedor-Petrinja-Karlovac line from north to south and repelling Tito's partisans, who numbered 150,000 men, as far as the Neretva River. There, their retreat was to be cut off by the German 718th Division, the Italian armed forces, and the Chetniks (Serbian nationalists), Italian allies. The advance south was successful, and the guerrillas suffered heavy casualties. The remainder managed to break through the Italian-Serbian encirclement and escape to Montenegro.

Also in January 1943, General von Glaise led an offensive in the Croatian region between the Drava and Sava rivers, involving the German 187th Reserve Division, the Croatian 1st Mountain Brigade, and the Croatian II Army Corps. This action culminated in a victory on January 20 near Okucani (12 km west of Nova Gradiska).

Recruitment for the Croatian regular army in the spring of 1943 yielded only 22,000 men.

This decrease in the number of new recruits was due to civilian casualties, the increased contribution of legionnaires to the divisions, and the impossibility of mobilizing troops in regions occupied by communist partisans. Furthermore, the predominance of Ustaše influence over the regular army (the domobrani) was already clearly evident. Thus, by the end of 1943, the Ustaše possessed the powerful Guards Division, with 15 autonomous brigades, a security brigade, a motorized brigade, and a transport brigade, totaling 64,000 combatants. Within the regular army, four new hunting brigades (Lovacki Zdrugovi) were formed, and the remnants of the previous 15 infantry regiments were reorganized into eight brigades called "stable." Due to heavy losses, the number of mountain troops was reduced from four to three brigades; the 311th had to be disbanded.

The regular army (domobrani) numbered 40,000 combatants; therefore, the Croatian armed forces comprised 104,000 men. Furthermore, the two Legionary Divisions, Nos. 369 and 373, with 28,000 combatants, should be added here. In Slavonia, a gendarmerie division belonging to the SS units was formed, its 10,000 men being equally divided between Croats and members of the German minority. Finally, at Himmler's express wish, the 13th SS Mountain Division "Handzar" (Yatagan) was formed from Muslims in eastern Bosnia, arriving in Croatia at the end of 1943 after training in southern France and Silesia.

Following "Operation Weiss" in January 1943, military actions continued in June. To encircle the communist partisans, who were regrouping in the border region of southern Bosnia and northern Montenegro, General Luethers committed the 1st The German mountain division stationed in Serbia, the 718th Infantry Division, the 369th Legionary Division, the Prinz Eugen Division, the Brandenburg Regiment (designated for special operations), the Croatian 4th Mountain Brigade, as well as three Italian divisions and some Chetnik units, participated in this operation against the communist armed forces. A Bulgarian regiment, stationed in Serbia, also took part. During "Operation Schwarz," as it was known, Tito, after suffering enormous losses, managed to cross the Romanija Mountains to Javor, southwest of Zvornik. However, rebellions then began to break out in the regions abandoned by the Allied troops.

In late summer 1943, several significant personnel changes took place in Croatia. Colonel General Dr. Lothar Rendulic, commander of the 2nd Armored Army (without tanks), replaced General Luethers and assumed command of the German and Croatian troops in Croatia in early August. On September 2, Brigadier General Federico Navratil was appointed Minister of Defense, replacing Quartermaster General Begic. Chief of Staff Prpic was replaced by Major General Fedor Dragojlov, who also came from the General Staff of the former Habsburg Monarchy. On September 1, German General Hans Juppe took up his post as Military Inspector in Zagreb; his primary task was the organization of the Croatian army.

The most significant event of that year was the surrender of Italy on September 8. Five German divisions were ready for this not-so-unexpected scenario and disarmed the much larger Italian troops stationed in the attack position west of the demarcation line. The German troops then advanced to the Adriatic coast, which, incidentally, generated enthusiasm in Croatia, though it was short-lived. In northern Dalmatia and at Karlovac, the Croatians captured the Italian contingents. The Croatian Legion, incorporated into the Italian army, moved to Slovenia to fight against the communist partisans.

Meanwhile, the partisans, in small groups, infiltrated from Mount Javor into western Bosnia. Tito established his headquarters in Jajce, where the "Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia" appointed him Marshal of Yugoslavia, and his armed forces were subsequently integrated into the ranks of the Allied armies. Liaison officers from the Allied powers were also present at Tito's headquarters.

Due to the political intrigues of the exiled Yugoslav government in London, Tito deployed large contingents toward Serbia. Colonel General Dr. L. Rendulic took advantage of this concentration in eastern Bosnia and, in mid-December 1943, launched an attack with five sizable groups with the aim of destroying Tito's forces. The partisans, incidentally, lost more than 15,000 men, including 10,000 prisoners. Tito, who directed his troops by telegraph from Jajce, once again managed to save large pockets of resistance and redeploy them to western Bosnia. Banjaluka and Jajce were captured from the partisans by German and Croatian troops by the end of that year.

Despite the heavy losses suffered, the communists rallied in central Dalmatia, supported from the air by the Western powers. There Tito was left harmless, pursued by Germans and Croats throughout the Western Balkans. On May 25, 1944, German paratroopers stormed his camp near Drvar (70 km southeast of Bihac), and he barely escaped. Later, with British assistance, he landed on the island of Vis, from where he subsequently directed the operations of his forces.

In the spring of 1944, only 17,000 recruits were fit for military service in the regular army in Croatia. Nevertheless, the expansion of the Ustaše armed forces was underway. They already had three divisions, including the Poglavnik Guards Division with 16,000 men and an assault division of 13,000 fighters, in addition to 17 independent brigades, a rapid deployment brigade, and a security brigade, totaling 114,000 combatants. The unaltered units of the regular army (domobrani) numbered 40,000 men. In addition, if the 10,000 gendarmes, 6,000 air force personnel, and 1,000 marines are added, the Croatian armed forces (Hrvatske Oruzane Snage) totaled 170,000 men, not including the 40,000 non-combatants deployed in the rear area and other internal services.

The 469th and 373rd Legionary Divisions, belonging to the German army, joined in 1944 by the 392nd Division, the 13th SS Division "Handzar," and 5,000 gendarmes from the German minority, totaled around 50,000 combatants.

As Supreme Commander of the Croatian Army, Poglavnik took a step forward in the autumn of 1944 regarding the organizational unification of the army. He proposed transforming the regular army (domobrani) into Ustaša units, deliberately relegating them in terms of weaponry and uniforms; this organizational process had already stalled in the autumn of 1943. Subsequently, all Ustaša and domobrani units were integrated, forming 17 combat divisions and one training division. The 1st and 2nd Guards Troops Divisions were thus formed; The 7th Mountain Brigade and the 17th Assault Battalion. The 13th, 14th, and 15th Divisions guarded the Brod-Zemun, Zagreb-Brod, and Brod-Sarajevo railway lines. The 18th Division performed a special security function, such as controlling the infamous Jasenovac concentration camp.

The Ustaše's preponderant influence was evident in the appointment of high-ranking military officers. Thus, on February 2, 1944, Pavelić appointed the Ustaše General Vokčić to replace Navratil as Minister of War, and to maintain a balance, he appointed General Matija Čačić of the regular army as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. At the end of August 1944, the less suitable Admiral Nicolas Steinfl took over as Minister of War from General Vokčić, who in the meantime had fallen out of favor with Pavelić.

Supreme command of the more influential Ustaše units was entrusted to Ustaše Colonel Herenčić, and Dragojlov's post was filled by Ustaše Colonel Tomáš Sertić, a former sergeant in the Austro-Hungarian army and a former major in the Yugoslav army. (Marshal Tito also belonged to the Austro-Hungarian army, to the 259th Honvéd Infantry Regiment of the XIII Corps in Zagreb. According to official documents held in the war archives in Vienna, he was wounded on March 22, 1915, near Okna, eastern Galicia, south of the Dniester River, and was taken prisoner by the Russians.)

As Sertić's incapacity soon became apparent, Pavelić appointed former Austrian General Staff Officer Georgy Gručić as Chief of Staff.[191] Poglavnik himself reassumed supreme command of the Croatian army in place of General Čanić. This staff remained in place until the end of the war. After the catastrophe at Stalingrad, the war situation for the Germans and their allies steadily worsened. The front now shifted westward. On August 23, 1944, Romania defected to the opposing side, thus opening the way for Russian troops to advance into the Balkans. When Bulgaria capitulated, declaring war on Germany on September 8, Soviet army units joined Tito's communist forces in Serbian territory. Tito reorganized his forces—which by then numbered half a million soldiers—into four armies consisting of 51 divisions and 23 independent brigades. Tito now directed his campaign, pursuing the conquest of the entire South Slavic region, employing classic frontal warfare tactics while also maintaining guerrilla warfare in the areas held by German and Croatian troops.

The German commander in the Balkans was Field Marshal Freiherr von Weichs, based in Belgrade. When Belgrade was captured on October 20 by a Russian armored corps, Weichs moved to Zagreb (he was soon reassigned), and when the Russians penetrated Hungary, the command of the 2nd Armored Army, as well as significant German forces, were transferred from the area south of the Sava River to Hungary. Supreme command of all troops in Croatia passed to Colonel General Löhr, who withdrew Army Group E from Greece under extremely difficult conditions. Löhr now had the entire Croatian army under his command, in addition to five German divisions remaining from his army group, three legionary divisions, and the 7th SS Division.

Among his measures aimed at the organizational unification of the army, Poglavnik ordered, as late as March 1945, the formation of five Ustaše corps, each with three to four combat divisions, disregarding the fact that these divisions were not composed solely of Ustaše troops. With this, he hoped to realize his long-held desire for a purely Ustaše army.

The Croatian air force squadrons returned from Russia to their homeland and garrisoned four airfields: Zagreb, Banjaluka, Sarajevo, and Mostar.

The minimum personnel required for each airbase consisted of two to three combat squadrons and one transport squadron. With 250 aircraft of various types and 6,000 men, the proposed objective could not, of course, be achieved.

The Croatian navy, under German command, consisted of the 23rd Flotilla in the Black Sea, with 12 submarine chasers and two coastal batteries. The 1,000 sailors of that legion returned to the Adriatic in the summer of 1944, where they had—once again under German command—eight motor launches, a torpedo boat, and two escort vessels.

Half of the 10,000 Croatian gendarmes were incorporated into the German-Croatian gendarmerie division. The remaining gendarmes, temporarily assigned to army tactical units, frequently participated in local fighting.

The End of the Tragedy

The final phase of the fighting in Croatia unfolded mainly in a broad semicircle around Zagreb. The eastern group of Löhr's army, composed of the Cossack corps that fought alongside the Germans, the I and III Ustaše corps, reinforced by four German divisions and a division of legionnaires, had established the defensive line between the Drava and Sava rivers and along the marshy Ilova stream. The 3rd and 1st Armies of the communist guerrillas, with 19 divisions, attacked his 13.5 divisions. Löhr's southern group, with the 4th and 2nd Ustaše Corps, covered the Jasenovac-Sisak-Karlovac sector.

In the far west was the 5th Ustaše Corps, which sent a Ustaše division and a legionary division to Lika. The southern group also had 13.5 divisions. Its adversaries were the 2nd and 4th Armies of the communist guerrillas, totaling 26 divisions. Löhr's total armed forces comprised 27 infantry divisions and 2 Cossack divisions, while Tito's forces numbered 45 divisions on the front, with a reserve of 7 divisions in the rear.

On April 11, Tito launched his meticulously prepared offensive. In the skillful defense mounted by Löhr's army group, the 1st Guards Corps and the Croatian 17th Assault Division distinguished themselves particularly with their spirited counterattacks. Due to the enemy's superior numbers, a general retreat became inevitable. This retreat was linked to the collapse of the German army in central Germany, which resulted in the unconditional surrender on May 9. In northern Italy, the "commander-in-chief of the South" had already surrendered of his own accord on May 2, thus leaving the British a clear path to Carinthia.

Meanwhile, the Croatian government, also recognizing the futility of further fighting, decided not to wage "the last battle to the death" on its homeland in order to save and preserve for the homeland the Croatian armed forces, which numbered nearly 200,000 soldiers. On May 6, General Löhr learned of Germany's imminent surrender and that no agreement regarding Croatia was to be expected. Immediately afterward, on the night of May 7, Löhr reinstated his command over the Croatian troops and the legionnaires.

Pavelic then ordered his troops to hastily retreat to Carinthia, intending to surrender to the British and under no circumstances to the communist partisans. This marching column, joined by approximately 70,000 civilian refugees, reached the town of Bleiburg in Austria on May 14. There, the column was halted by the British, who had arrived in the Klagenfurt Basin via the Loibl Pass. Since only unconditional surrender was possible, the Croatians were disarmed by the British and then, contrary to expectations, handed over to the communists.

Poglavnik, however, had already abandoned his army. He sought refuge in South America via Italy and finally died in late 1961 in a German hospital in Madrid. Unlike Pavelic, Major Lieutenant Löhr voluntarily surrendered to Yugoslav captivity to share the fate of his soldiers. He was executed after a questionable war criminal trial.

Even before the transfer of the unarmed Croats into captivity began, several thousand men managed to find refuge in the surrounding forests. The mass of those who surrendered began the death march, as some 40,000 men were killed near Bleiburg and along the route to Maribor, especially south of that city. The slaughter continued, even near the town of Vrsac on the Romanian border. In total, between 100,000 and 150,000 Croats were killed. Bleiburg and Maribor constitute the final stations of the Via Crucis, filled with cruelties that characterize all those who participated in the struggle for and against Croatian independence. The fact that the ideal objective could not be achieved, despite the sacrifices of the Croatian soldiers of the Ustaše state under the leadership of Pavelić, makes this four-year period in the history of a brave and freedom-loving people one of the tragedies of poignant proportions that so abounded in the last war.[192]

COLONIZATION OF THE SERBS UNDER THE PRETEXT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Rikard Flögel

Agrarian relations in Croatia proper[193] during the feudal era were eliminated in 1848 with the abolition of serfdom. The land became the property of the peasants, who had previously been tenant farmers. However, the nobles retained ownership of the land they directly exploited. In this way, a number of large estates were maintained, although these were not vast holdings in the Americas. These latifundia, which in exceptional cases reached tens of thousands of cadastral jutro[194], were located mainly in the northwestern part of Croatia, that is, in Slavonia, world-renowned for its excellent oak timber.

Northwestern Croatia, then Istria, parts of the Dalmatian islands[195], and the coast were densely populated, and smallholdings prevailed there. This agricultural overpopulation was a consequence of Turkish pressure, which lasted for nearly 250 years and only ended with the Peace of Karlovac in 1699. Catholic Croats, fleeing the Ottomans, settled in large numbers in the Christian part of Croatia, especially around Zagreb, along the coast, and on the islands. A large number of Croats emigrated to other countries: Hungary, Austria, Italy, and even France. Since the last century, many Croats have emigrated to both Americas, totaling more than a million people, mostly men.

The problem of agricultural overpopulation could have been partially resolved through internal colonization, since in Slavonia there were still lands belonging to private individuals, the Church, agricultural communities, the treasury, and municipalities. Some of these lands were not being used rationally, so a well-planned and implemented agrarian reform could have resulted in economic and social benefits.

The largest and best-known estates belonged to the Counts Normann (Valpovo) with 53,733 jutro; the Counts Pejacevic (Nasice) with 34,158 jutro; the Counts Majlath (Donji Miholjac) with 43,692 jutro; the Diocese of Djakovo with 35,838 jutro; the Barons Guttman (Slatina-Nasice) with 19,232 jutro; the Counts Dreskovic (Slatina) with 27,604 jutro; Count Aladar Jankovic (Cabuna) with 10,838 jutro; Count Joseph Jankovic (Lukac) with 6,125 jutro; and Count Andrew Jankovic (Suhopolje) with 7,886 jutro. to the Orthodox Patriarchate (Karlovci) with 10,639 jutro; to the Turkovic Brothers (Kutievo) with 18,405 jutro; to Wiener Bank Verein (Daruvar) with 22,683 jutro[196]; then some properties without precise data regarding their extent, such as the property of Count Eltz (Vukovar), Count Khuen-Belassy (Nustar), Countess Clara Alldringen (Ruma), etc.

Together with appropriate legal provisions, the division of large estates, agrarian reform, the respective improvements, drainage, and the consolidation of small plots, all of this combined with the essential industrial process could have provided every Croatian peasant family with their own farm and the possibility of a decent life without having to seek bread in overseas countries.

Our purpose is to examine the fate of these possessions after the disintegration of Austria-Hungary and the incorporation of Croatia into the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.[197] At the same time, we will point out how the problems of agrarian reform were dealt with in Croatia when it became an integral part of the new state created from an enlarged Serbia.

II. Through its policy of internal colonization and under the pretext of agrarian reform aimed at improving the living conditions of the peasant population, Yugoslavia in fact promoted Serbian expansion. Through measures lauded as a great social achievement, Croatian peasants were allotted a few plots of land, while Serbs received thousands of hectares of the best Croatian land.

In his memoirs, the sculptor Ivan Mestrovic discusses the intentions of Serbian political circles regarding these lands in Croatia even before the creation of Yugoslavia, while the First World War (1914-1918) was still raging [198]. His testimony gains even more significance when one considers his friendly attitude toward Serbia. Mestrovic recounts that V. Matijevic, president of Privrednik, a Serbian association for the promotion of trade and industry, had provided him during the First World War with a report prepared for the Serbian government concerning the future promotion of agrarian reform. The report contained data on the lands owned in Croatian regions by members of the Serbian minority, Germans (the Swabians), and other nationalities, then by Catholic peasants (Matijevic refers to them as "the Croats"), large landowners, the Catholic Church, and so on. He proposed the expulsion of the German minority[199], the maximum reduction of ecclesiastical properties, and the expropriation of landowners so that all that land could be distributed to Serbian settlers.

Ante Smith Pavelic recounts that his father, Dr. Ante Pavelic[200], in his capacity as vice-president of the National Council of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, had proposed this in the session of October 28, 1918, which lasted until the early hours of the following day. This followed the appointment of the Croatian peasant leader Esteban Radic as Minister of Agriculture in the provisional government of Croatia, which was proclaimed independent the following day, October 29, 1918, and acted as an independent state until December 1, 1918, when it was effectively annexed by Serbia by force. The proposed measure was opposed by the Serbian minority party, headed by Svetozar Pribicevic.

Unfortunately, the author does not present the reasons and arguments put forward by the representatives of the Serbian minority. However, it is easy to infer that the idea of colonizing the large estates in Croatia with Serbs, under the pretext of rewarding the volunteers of the First World War, had taken root in Svetozar Pribicevic and the public opinion he represented. Of course, Esteban Radic, as Minister of Agriculture, would have strongly opposed these plans, given his status as a Croatian patriot, founder and leader of the overwhelmingly dominant Croatian Republican Peasant Party, which won a landed majority in every election held between the two wars.

As early as 1919, shortly after the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, a decree prohibited the sale or mortgage of large estates in order to avoid difficulties in implementing agrarian reform.

In 1920, the agrarian reform law was enacted. Subsequent amendments and additions did not essentially alter its spirit and meaning. According to this law, all arable land exceeding 500 jutro in the Srijem commune; 350 jutro in the Pozega and Virovitica commune; 180 jutro in the Zagreb and Bjelovar-Krizevci commune; and only 70 jutro in the Krizevci commune were expropriated for the purposes of agrarian reform. The other communes did not have large estates.

Among the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, the aforementioned law included local residents, war volunteers, and, by virtue of its subsequent amendments, Serbian settlers.

According to the same law, eligible farmers were peasants from villages located no more than 3 to 5 km from the expropriated areas, provided they owned no more than one jutro of land per family member. Each eligible farmer could receive a maximum of one jutro per family member. If the surrounding appropriated land was insufficient, the land allotted to each family member would be reduced proportionally. Therefore, in densely populated regions, each family was given only a few hundred square meters, entirely insufficient to establish a farm. After this distribution among the local population, the remaining land was to be allocated to war volunteers.

Those considered volunteers were people from the territories of the former Austria-Hungary and Montenegro, as well as prisoners of war on the Russian or Italian fronts who had served in the Serbian army or the so-called "Yugoslav Legions." They were classified as combatants and non-combatants. Combatants were entitled to 8 and 3/4 jutro (a unit of land measurement), and non-combatants to 5 jutro. The corresponding certificates were issued by the Ministry of War in Belgrade. The authorities in charge of land reform were not authorized to question their veracity. The volunteers were almost exclusively of Serbian nationality. "Among them were not ten Croatian families, as was later discovered when attempts were made to review the agrarian reform in the second half of 1925 and throughout 1926. In 1923, the number of volunteers verified in this way was 26,817 [201].

According to subsequent amendments, the settlers were those who settled on the land of the volunteers who did not or who sold their rights. These settlers were generally relatives or neighbors of the Serbian volunteers, that is to say, also Serbs.

The agrarian reform law also resolved the issue of compensation for expropriated land. The Croatian peasants, as agrarian stakeholders, were required to pay compensation to the landowners in installments over ten years. The price was to be established according to the net cadastral value of the land. The volunteers, that is, the Serbs, received the land free of charge. The compensation was paid by the State with bonds to be raffled off in subsequent years, charged to the budget." national.

Under special laws, voluntary settlers (Serbs) were exempt from paying municipal and state taxes for ten years. In contrast, Croatian landowners paid taxes on both the land they previously owned and the land they were granted.

Thus, the Croatian people not only failed to gain possession of land expropriated for the purposes of agrarian reform in their own homeland and distributed fairly in relation to the Serbian minority, but also had to use taxes to compensate the landowners for the Serbs' colonization of their own land.

Dr. Milan Ivsic, in the aforementioned work, attempted to ascertain, based on official data, how land was distributed up to 1923, that is, until the year he completed his study.

In Slavonia, and more specifically within the jurisdiction of the Osijek Agrarian Delegation (under the Zagreb Directorate of Agrarian Reform) and within the jurisdiction of the Delegation The Vukovar Agrarian Office (under the Novi Sad Agrarian Reform Directorate), Ivsic, recorded 7,253 volunteers or settlers with 63,244 jutro out of a total of 162,193 jutro of land expropriated under the agrarian reform plan. He emphasizes, however, that it is impossible to verify the exact figure, as the number of rewarded volunteers increased daily.

The extent to which statistics are unreliable is illustrated by an example from the study by M. Stojadinovic, published in the journal Jugoslavenska Njiva in 1925 [202]. This Serbian politician estimates on page 288 that the number of volunteers did not exceed 7,339, and on page 314, for the same period, states that the number of rewarded volunteers reached 10,112, of whom 7,540 settled; on page 377, it can be read that the number of volunteers reached 21,121, of which 11,009 were locals and 10,112 were foreigners.

Dr. Mladen Lorkovic, a specialist in demography,[203] attempted to determine the extent of Serbian colonization in relation to the 1931 Yugoslav population census. Lorkovic concluded that the growth of the Serbian minority in Croatia was not natural, but rather the result of colonization by volunteers and others. Twenty-five volunteer colonies were established in the jurisdiction of the Osijek Agricultural Delegation, and an equal number in the jurisdiction of the Vukovar Agricultural Delegation. A total of 8,000 families, comprising between 20,000 and 25,000 people, settled there. From 1890 to 1910, the Serbian minority in Croatia increased by 21,600; from 1900 to 1910, by 26,800; and from 1921 to 1931, by 43,000.

If we consider that colonization began before 1921 and continued after 1931, we can certainly arrive at the aforementioned figure for Serbian settlers in Slavonia up to 1931. However, the population census does not allow us to establish the exact number of Serbian volunteers who received government grants. Many were unable to settle because the areas became unsuitable for cultivation due to the neglect of drainage canals; others did not settle because they had not built houses and other outbuildings. The statistics could not include them. Above all, the census cannot establish the number of volunteer grant recipients who were members of the Serbian minority in Croatia, nor the total area of agricultural land allocated to Serbs.

As a result of the review of the agrarian reform in the second half of 1925 and throughout 1926—which we will discuss later—it was established that there were 11,000 Serbian volunteers and settlers in the jurisdiction of Osijek and Vukovar, and this in the most fertile lands of Croatia.

According to Ivsic, 162,193 jutro were expropriated in both jurisdictions up to 1923. There were no further expropriations afterward.

The volunteers' plots were typically 8 and 3/4 jutro, and 5 jutro as an exception. Thus, more than half of the expropriated land was given to the Serbian population, and of the remaining half, more than 50% was again given to the Serbs, since the allocation here was much more liberal and the distance from the villages to the expropriated land was always measured in favor of the Serbian villages.

In Srijem, where there were strong Serbian communities, in many places local peasants were allocated two jutro per person instead of one. Croats with non-Slavic surnames—that is, Croatized Germans and Hungarians—were simply ignored. Where there were Serbian villages, the aim was to allocate the majority of the land to the locals, and in Croatian villages, to reserve the majority of the land for the volunteers, that is, Serbian settlers.

The best lands were given to the volunteers. This went so far as to give land to the volunteers in the most densely populated regions, which, in 1936, was one of the causes of the peasant revolt and the deaths of the Serbian volunteers in Kerestinec near Zagreb.[204] Even in the suburbs of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, Serbian volunteers were given preferential treatment in the distribution of expropriated land.

A farmer from Valpovo described the application of the agrarian reform to the author of these lines in the following terms

"Before the land reform, the peasants in my village worked on the neighboring estate because they didn't have enough land of their own. Working on the estate was their main source of income. As a result of the land reform, the estate disappeared from our municipal registry. But the land wasn't allocated to us. We were told we were too far away, while the volunteers, 500 km away, weren't far at all. Now we're forced to work the volunteers' land as day laborers. The land reform created new landowners. We work the same way we did before. Moreover, the new owners don't pay municipal taxes because they're exempt. We locals have to bear all the municipal taxes. If we don't cultivate the volunteers' land, the irrigation canals will get clogged and our own land will be in danger. What has become of us after being integrated into Yugoslavia? We've become the servants of foreigners in our own homeland."

III

The consequences of such an agrarian reform were disastrous from both a socio-economic and national perspective. Economically, once fertile fields that yielded 12 to 17 quintals of wheat per jutro now produced very low yields. In some cases, they didn't even provide enough for seed.

The beneficiary's technical skills were not taken into account. Nor was it examined whether the beneficiary of the agrarian reform was wasteful, a drunkard, or lazy. Since neither the law nor the regulations considered these factors, negative consequences were inevitable.

The agrarian reform in Croatia, as planned and implemented, deprived the Croatian peasantry of their last chance to secure a better life in their own country through internal settlement. The last available lands were mostly given to Serbs.

The Croatian people received nothing but a bone from the agrarian reform, and that in their own homeland. As a consequence, the flow of emigration to overseas countries intensified, a fact that Milan Ivsic, author of the aforementioned study, expressed in his moving dedication in French and English.[205]

The agrarian reform faithfully reflects the harsh Croatian reality of that time and is the key point of Croatian-Serbian relations: the premeditated and planned relegation of the Croatian people at the most sensitive point: forcing them to abandon their ancestral homes and their homeland.

For example, in the Virovitica district (Slavonia), due to the colonization by volunteers, the percentage of Croats fell from 80% to less than 60%.

Any serious analysis of Croatian-Serbian relations in Yugoslavia cannot omit mentioning these facts. Likewise, any international forum dealing with the Yugoslav issue should take them into account. The artificial colonization of the Croatian national territory by Serbs through agrarian reform reached such a scale that it threatened the Croatian character of some regions of Croatia.

This reason alone would be sufficient for Croatia to secede from the Yugoslav conglomerate and become an independent and sovereign state.[206]

After several governments in which Serbian influence was decisive—Croatian deputies boycotted the Belgrade Assembly—the first Yugoslav government was formed on July 10, 1925, with the participation of the Croatian Peasant Party, which held a large majority in Croatia. This occurred after the Croatian leader Esteban Radic's visit to London, Vienna, and Moscow, and the failure of his efforts to re-establish an independent Croatian republic through foreign pressure on Belgrade. Influential figures in London advised him to acknowledge the existing situation and participate in the government in order to achieve equality between the Croatian people and other nationally oppressed peoples with the Serbian people.

In this cabinet, the portfolio of agrarian reform was entrusted to Paul Radic, Esteban Radic's nephew. He assumed this important position at a time when the agrarian reform was in the phase described above. At the initiative of Pablo Radic, upon the formation of the government, it was resolved that the agrarian reform in Croatian national territory would be reviewed to redress the injustices committed against Croatian peasants, whether local residents or settlers from overpopulated regions. The lands would be allocated proportionally to Croats and members of the Serbian minority, so that neither group would be favored nor disadvantaged.

It was a just position.

It was also resolved that National Deputy Jorge Basaricek would continue the selection of future settlers in overpopulated Croatian regions within the framework of the existing organization, "Gruda." In this way, the overpopulated Croatian regions would benefit from the agrarian reform. The author of this work was entrusted with carrying out the review in Croatia.

Pablo Radic and Jorge Basaricek believed that Croatian participation in the Belgrade government would be superfluous if it did not lead to the redress of the injustices committed during the agrarian reform.

Indeed, upon being appointed minister, Pablo Radic's first action was to order a review of the agrarian reform, with the aim of recovering land from those who, according to existing regulations, could not be considered beneficiaries of the reform. The areas thus obtained should be allocated to those who had been illegally excluded. A team of young Croatian experts participated in this task, including agronomists, surveyors, veterinarians, and lawyers with clear and firm principles, as they came from the very heart of the people who were fighting for their emancipation.

The lands taken from the landowners were gradually allocated to Croatian villages. Two colonies were also founded with people from the overpopulated regions who had not previously participated in the agrarian reform.

However, all Serbian political parties rose up against these procedures of the local agrarian offices, first the opposition parties and then those in government.

A provincial government newspaper attacked the review of the agrarian reform and proposed blowing up the Osijek Agrarian Delegation with dynamite. Its article was reprinted by the Belgrade daily Politika on the front page, where it usually published its feature articles. This leading Belgrade newspaper, with its pretensions of being an impartial observer with broad perspectives, always supported Great Serbian aspirations, hiding behind its veiled objectivity.

For the first seven years of its existence, Yugoslavia carried out the agrarian reform in Croatia, not in Serbia. Fifty Serbian colonies were founded in Croatia, but not a single Croatian one. Politika remained silent on the matter for seven years. However, when two Croatian colonies were founded in Croatia, it sounded the alarm that the Serbs were in danger. Those involved in revising the reform should be blown up with dynamite!

Finally, there was a debate in the Skupstina: lands were taken from the Serbs (without mentioning, of course, that they lacked the legally required qualifications) and given to the Croats, who, as a group, were considered "non-national elements."

On February 1, 1927, the government in which the Croatian Peasant Party participated fell. Its downfall was due to the Serbs' constant opposition to granting equality to Croats regarding agrarian reform and in all aspects of national life.

For this reason, the revision of the agrarian reform, so painstakingly and carefully crafted, could not be fully implemented. Furthermore, the partial revision was largely annulled by subsequent governments.

Nevertheless, the revision of the Serbian agrarian reform left deep marks on the Croatian peasantry and ignited a revolutionary spirit in public opinion.

On June 20, 1928, in the Belgrade parliament, the assassination of Croatian deputies Esteban Radic and others was carried out, orchestrated with the complicity of King Alexander himself. The assassin, Deputy Punisa Racic, was chosen by lot from among the Serbian deputies to commit this atrocity.

It is not difficult, then, to understand why he specifically murdered Georgy Basaricek on that occasion and why he shouted to Paul Radic, as he riddled him with bullets: "I was looking for you!"

DISPOSSESSION OF THE MUSLIMS OF BOSNIA UNDER THE PRETEXT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Ivo Bogdan, Buenos Aires

Agrarian Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The communist regime did not redress the dispossession of the Croats perpetrated by the pan-Serbian monarchical governments.

Agrarian reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires a separate discussion. The author of the preceding work participated directly in the attempt to revise agrarian reform in Slavonia. For this reason, he did not address agrarian relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Different conditions prevailed there than in the other Croatian provinces due to four centuries of Ottoman rule. In those provinces, too, the expropriation of land following the Yugoslav agrarian reform was a severe blow to the Croats.

There, the tenure system was definitively abolished only after the collapse of Austria-Hungary, which delayed reforms in order to gain the political cooperation of the former ruling class under Turkish rule. Therefore, after the occupation of these provinces in 1878, pursuant to the resolution of the Congress of Berlin, the occupying power did not consider it appropriate to expropriate the landowners, agas, and beyes—many of whom were descendants of the Islamized Croatian nobility—through radical agrarian reform.[207] Instead, the land, cultivated mainly by Orthodox Christians and susceptible to Serbian nationalist propaganda, was acquired gradually, even though these Orthodox Christians were not of Serbian origin. The Orthodox population settled in Bosnia after the Turkish invasion and occupied the homes abandoned by Croatian Catholic exiles.[208]

Furthermore, from the perspective of the delicate national question in Bosnia-Herzegovina, simply transferring land ownership to Serbian peasants would have meant handing over the land of the Croatian landowners to members of the Serbian minority. It would also impoverish the ruling class up to that point, since a radical agrarian reform, even one carried out under the best conditions, never guarantees compensation of the true value of the land to its owners. It should be noted here that in Bosnia there were very few large estates and that the predominant landowners were Muslims with a few tenant farmers.

In 1910, there were 110,000 tenant farming families in Bosnia and Herzegovina. More than 70% were Serbs, fewer than 30,000 were Catholic, and only 5% were Muslims, who constituted the vast majority of the urban population. The landowners were almost exclusively Muslim.[209]

The Austro-Hungarian authorities decided to proceed cautiously with the agrarian reform and encouraged peasants to purchase land by granting them favorable loans from official and private banks and cooperatives. This was the course of action mainly taken by Catholics, while the Orthodox demanded the simple expropriation of the land.[210] They achieved this with the establishment of the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" in 1918.

The 130,000 Serbian settlers received the land free of charge. Total compensation to the original Croat Muslim landowners amounted to 250 million dinars (approximately $5 million), payable in long-term government bonds. Much of this sum was taken from the former landowners themselves under the pretext of unpaid taxes during the transition period, when the settlers arbitrarily ceased fulfilling their obligations to the landowners before the laws regarding the transfer of land ownership were enacted.

Even the landowners had their directly cultivated lands expropriated, totaling approximately 400,000 hectares. This process mirrored that in Croatia-Slavonia. Land directly cultivated by the landowners was expropriated and given free of charge to Serbs who had sided with Serbia during the war. Only late, when the hegemonic government formed by the Serbs needed the votes of the Muslim deputies in the Skupstina, were the former landowners granted state bonds in the amount of 50 million dinars (1 million dollars) with 6% interest for 43 years starting in 1930 [211]. Due to the abnormal political conditions in pre-war Yugoslavia and then because of the war and the establishment of the communist regime, practically all the arable land in Bosnia was taken from the Croats and given to the Serbs, without the owners receiving the meager compensation stipulated by the unjust laws.

Here too, as in the case of Croatia-Slavonia, it is worth noting that even the modest compensation agreed upon for the landowners was paid, first and foremost, by the Croats. In Yugoslavia then, as now, the tax system was structured so that the heaviest burden fell on Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina, while taxes in Serbia were far less onerous. Thus, under the agrarian reform, land was allocated to the Orthodox to strengthen the Serbian minority in the Croatian provinces, and the compensation was paid by the Croats in the form of taxes. And all of this occurred in their own country.

We must now briefly address agrarian relations in Dalmatia, which formerly belonged to Venice and then (1815-1918) to Austria. There, for a long time, there had been no serfs but rather tenant farmers. The peasants cultivated the land and gave the owner a quarter, sometimes a third, of their produce. The number of these tenant farmers was relatively small, since after liberation from Turkish rule in the 17th and 18th centuries, the vast majority of peasants became owners of the land they cultivated.

Most of the landowners came from Italy during the Venetian period. The tenant farmers were generally Catholic Croatian peasants, since only a small Orthodox community lived in Dalmatia. But even here, land reform was not carried out without detriment to the Croatians. While Croatian landowners, descendants of the old nobility, received little or no compensation as a result of a haphazard land reform promoted for demagogic purposes, the Italian landowners[212] were favored by the governments in Belgrade. The Serbs tried by all means to maintain good relations with the Kingdom of Italy, without regard for Croatian and Slovenes' interests. Thus, following the Rapallo Convention, ratified in 1828, Italian landowners received substantial compensation or retained the lands they cultivated directly. Of course, this time, too, the compensation was paid by the Croats in the form of taxes.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the "agrarian reform" implemented by the communists upon seizing power in 1945. They attempted to create the impression of having rectified the great injustices through a better and more equitable distribution of land, particularly in Croatian regions. However, after the genuine agrarian reform carried out in Croatia-Slavonia by the glorious Croatian leader, Ban Joseph Count Jelačić, in 1848, and following the unjust Yugoslav agrarian reform implemented after the First World War, there was frankly no need to undertake further reforms in agrarian relations, unless the aim was to redress the injustices committed against the Croatian people in monarchical Yugoslavia.

The communists were not pursuing this goal, as they were acting in the interest of Serbian political forces as restorers of Yugoslavia, once again in its role as an aggrandized Serbia despite its federalist façade, devoid of any democratic content, since all power was exercised by the totalitarian communist party, centrally directed from Serbia. Within this party, the influence of distinctly chauvinistic Serbian communists predominated. Under the pretext of agrarian reform, the communists simply expropriated land.

They not only seized land, for propaganda purposes, from the very few remaining non-peasant landowners, who cannot be considered large landowners, and from ecclesiastical institutions, but they also expropriated land from smallholdings (as well as houses, businesses, etc.), declaring their owners enemies of the people and collaborators. These were hundreds of thousands of people, and the vast majority were good Croatian patriots, supporters of national independence. Those who survived the massacres[213] were accused and condemned as enemies of the people, and their property was confiscated. In this way, the communists achieved their twofold objective. They punished the middle class and carried out the revenge of the Serbian supporters of Yugoslavia, that is, Greater Serbia, against the Croatian patriots, opponents of the forced Serbian-Croatian state union.

Even more radical measures were taken against the German minority, which since the 17th century had owned a large portion of the land in Vojvodina (now an "autonomous province" in the "Socialist Republic of Serbia") and cultivated it in an exemplary manner. The communists expropriated by decree all members of the German minority, which numbered around 500,000. In this way, the Serbs seized vast areas of land in Vojvodina, which is among the most fertile in Europe. Most of the German minority were killed or perished in concentration camps, and the rest fled or were expelled.[214]

The communist "agrarian reform" consisted mainly of irresponsible experiments with peasant labor and land ownership. This policy culminated in the forced incorporation of small peasant farms into collective farms (kolkhozes), with the aim of transforming small rural landowners into proletarians.

In this open conflict with the vast majority of the people, the communists suffered a double setback.

On the one hand, they completely disrupted agricultural production, resulting in severe food shortages that reached famine proportions. They were saved by the copious aid provided by Washington when the Moscow-Belgrade conflict erupted in 1948. Thus, the capitalist West had to save the communist liberators from starvation.

Secondly, the communists had to admit that their system of collective land ownership lacked justification and, even less so, the acceptance of the "liberated" peasant masses. In 1954, they had to dissolve the kolkhozes and allow the land to be returned to its owners, the peasants who worked it.[215] Of course, this did not end communist experiments in agrarian policy, although they always ended in resounding failures and great harm to the peasant majority.

In short, the agrarian reforms of both monarchical and communist Yugoslavia, instead of strengthening the Croatian national economy and improving the living standards of landowning peasants, brought new misfortunes. The communists had to abandon collectivization, but the dispossession of the Croats is a persistent phenomenon that proves Yugoslavia's Great Serbian character. Serbian colonization in Croatia continues, and Serbs have had to assume the role of enforcers tasked with maintaining and protecting the coerced unity of the Yugoslav state conglomerate, created and maintained against the will of the Croatian people and other nationally oppressed peoples.

NICOLÁS ZRINSKI - LEONIDAS OF CHRISTIANIYY

Fourth centenary of the defense of Szigeth by a Croatian prince

J. G. Fratija, Buenos Aires

When Pope Pius V ascended the throne 400 years ago, the Church had an energetic and determined pontiff who boldly began to prepare a new crusade that would be crowned by the glorious victory of Lepanto. The events that took place that same year on the vast front between Western Christendom and the Turkish Islamic empire "contributed—in the opinion of one of the most competent historians—powerfully to creating a climate favorable to this crusade and to strengthening the Pope in his plans" [216]. That year, the immense Turkish army of Suleiman the Magnificent was halted by a former ban of Croatia. Suleiman, with his thirteenth campaign, had set out, with greater forces than ever before, through Croatia and Hungary to conquer Vienna, the residence of Maximilian II, Holy Roman Emperor and first cousin of Philip II.

The Turkish army, numbering over 200,000 soldiers, was held up from August 5 to September 8, 1566, besieging the fortress of Szigeth in southwestern Hungary, not far from the northern borders of Croatia. The fortress was defended by Prince Nicholas Subic Zrinski with some 2,000 soldiers, mainly Croatians. When all further defense became futile, Zrinski preferred to die fighting rather than capitulate and surrender, even though the Turks threatened to behead his son George, whom they had supposedly captured. Suleiman the Magnificent died during the siege, on the night of September 4-5, and it is unknown whether from anger at Zrinski's resistance or from some illness.

"The cause matters little; the fact is that many historians mark this date as the beginning of the 'decline of the Ottoman Empire.' For once, such precision is not without meaning, since the empire, which depended enormously on its leader, then passed from the hands of the Magnificent, the Lawgiver (as the Turks called him), to those of the weak Selim II, the son 'of the Jewish woman,' who preferred fine dining and Cypriot wine to military campaigns" [217].

The withdrawal of the Turkish army, which had attempted to redeem the failed siege of Malta the previous year (1565), was met with great enthusiasm and relief in the Christian West. Nicholas Subic Zrinski, the valiant defender of Szigeth, was glorified as the Leonidas of Christendom.

However, this did not break the power of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the weakness of Sultan Selim II, Mohamed Pasha Sokobi (Sokolovic in Croatian), Grand Vizier to three sultans, originally from Bosnia,[218] would manage the affairs of the powerful empire with a steady hand. Nevertheless, Western Christendom could harbor reasonable hopes that Turkish expansion would be contained.

In this hope, and thanks to the efforts of Pius V, the Second Holy League was formed, culminating in the victory at Lepanto in 1571. Only a century later, in 1673, Kara Mustafa was able to raise a powerful army with the aim of conquering Vienna, which would turn into another great defeat. This time, the victory of the Christian armies would mark the beginning of the Turkish retreat to Asia Minor. The Ottoman Turks, who had managed to impose the Pax Turcica on the divided sphere of Byzantine tradition, ended up expending their forces in futile attacks against Western Christendom.

Although there is no direct link between Lepanto and Szigeth, there are undoubtedly certain analogies between these two momentous historical events. What the victory at Lepanto meant for the defense of the Christian Mediterranean, the defense at Szigeth meant for the continental front, along a long line of the middle and lower Danube. And since Szigeth preceded Lepanto, we must not forget that it was an encouraging experience for those who prepared the ground for the brilliant victory of the Holy League.

In this centuries-long struggle, Croatia was always the bloody frontier. Moreover, the front ran through Croatian territory. On one side, Bosnia under the control of the crescent, and on the other, Christian Croatia, along with Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire, under the rule of the House of Austria. In this ongoing struggle that lasted from the 15th to the 18th centuries, Croatia lost a disproportionately high number of people and property, and a foreign ethnic element and a different religion (Orthodox) settled in the abandoned and destroyed homes.

Furthermore, the religious and cultural unity of the Croats themselves, which had prevailed until then, was shattered, as a considerable number of Bosnian Croats embraced Islam, fighting heroically against Christian Croatia.[219] The Battle of Szigeth symbolizes the Croatian dualism of that era. Two of the main protagonists are Croats: Grand Vizier Mohamed Pasha Sokobi and Nicholas Subic Zrinski, former Viceroy of Croatia and head of one of the most distinguished Croatian noble families.

Nicholas Subic Zrinski, hero of Szigeth, who, as a self-sacrificing Christian knight, chose to confront the superior forces of the enemy rather than surrender, to die rather than capitulate, symbolizes both the resilience of Western Christianity and Croatian national spirit. As such, he entered the realm of Western epic poetry. He inspired poets and composers, among them the German poet and champion of liberty Theodor Körner, who perpetuated his memory in the tragedy Zriny. Based on this tragic drama, the Croatian poet Hugo Badalic wrote the libretto for the opera Nikola Subic Zrinski in the last century, a work by the renowned Croatian composer Ivan Zajc, which remains the most popular opera in Croatia to this day.

Zrinski, as we have seen, fell defending Szigeth, a fortress of the Kingdom of Hungary, and his great-grandson Nicholas Zrinski extolled and described his ancestor's heroism in an epic poem, which constitutes the first poem in Hungarian literature. For this reason, in literature the name Zrinski, although he was Viceroy of Croatia and a descendant of the ancient Croatian noble family of Subic, is often written in the Hungarian version of Zriny and taken to mean Hungarian, as if the former Kingdom of Hungary and Croatia were the modern Magyar nation-state. Such confusions and errors were repeated even on the occasion of the 400th anniversary commemoration of the Siege of Szigeth.

Zrinski, as we have seen, fell defending Szigeth, a fortress of the Kingdom of Hungary, and his great-grandson Nicholas Zrinski extolled and described his ancestor's heroism in an epic poem, which constitutes the first poem in Hungarian literature. For this reason, in literature, the name Zrinski, although he was Viceroy of Croatia and a descendant of the ancient Croatian noble family of Subic, is often written in the Hungarian version of Zriny and is taken to mean Hungarian, as if the former Kingdom of Hungary and Croatia were the modern Magyar nation-state. Such confusions and errors were repeated even on the occasion of the 400th anniversary commemoration of the Siege of Szigeth.

Therefore, in commemorating the feat of Szigeth, we must do what Croatia, subjected to the communist yoke, cannot. Because of their ties with Russia and Serbia, the communist authorities neglect to commemorate important dates in Croatian and Western history with due dignity. Furthermore, they use false nationalist rhetoric to mask their principled aversion to Western Christian universalism, even though it would harmonize general and national interests. Nicholas Subic Zrinski, "Leonidas of Christendom," was also known as "Croatian Leonidas," as he was called in national historiography during the Romantic era, although this diminished the perceived significance of his sacrifice. In this climate, the glory of the hero of Szigeth was surpassed in national historiography by his great-great-grandsons Peter and Nicholas, and especially by the former, who was beheaded in 1671 in Wiener Neustadt as the leader of the nobles who conspired against the centralizing tendencies of the Viennese court.[220] Nevertheless, the hero of Szigeth remains an integral part of Croatian national tradition and a source of national pride.

It symbolizes the victorious national and Western resistance against the Ottoman conqueror. As such, it is one of the rare sons of tiny Croatia who honorably entered universal history, reminding those who may forget that Croatia was also a meritorious defender of the Western world and that Pope Leo X rightly conferred upon Croatia the honorary title of "scudum saldissimum ac antemurale Christianitatis" (most sallied shield and bulwark of Christendom).

The heroic defense of Szigeth by former Croatian ban

The cause, or rather the pretext, of the thirteenth and final military campaign of Suleiman the Magnificent, which ended with his death during the siege of Szigeth, was the death of King and Emperor Ferdinand I, who was succeeded by his son Maximilian I. Ferdinand had stipulated an armistice with Suleiman in 1562. After Ferdinand's death, Suleiman maintained that the peace and its terms should be renewed by the new ruler of Hungary and Croatia.

An incident in Transylvania served the bellicose Turkish emperor as a pretext to break off peace negotiations and launch a new campaign. From the perspective of the encounters and conflicts between the great Islamic empire and Western Christendom, this constitutes one of the most notable episodes in the tenacious and futile efforts of the Turks, heirs of Byzantium, to expand into the Christian West.

These fruitless efforts, in Toynbee's opinion, were the principal cause of the decline of Turkish power. Strictly speaking, this refers to the struggle between the House of Austria and the Ottoman sultans in the 16th and 17th centuries for possession of Hungary and Croatia, obstacles to Ottoman penetration into Austria, Italy, and Germany.

Even before this, the Kingdom of Hungary—so called for brevity, though it should be called the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom—was the main target of Turkish attacks against the Christian West during the 15th century. The armies of Hungary's rebellious feudal lords finally succumbed at the Battle of Mohaez in 1526. In that battle, even the Hungarian-Croatian king Louis II Jagiellon fell without leaving any heirs.

Ferdinand, brother of Charles V, was to succeed him on the throne of Croatia and Hungary by virtue of his marriage to Maria, granddaughter of the Catholic Monarchs and sister of Charles V and Ferdinand I. A family agreement existed regarding the succession. In the event of Louis II's death without issue, Ferdinand, Austrian Archduke and Spanish Infante, brother of Charles and Maria, Queen of Hungary and Croatia, was to ascend the throne of Hungary-Croatia. Ferdinand was already King of Bohemia at the time and later, upon the death of Charles V, also Holy Roman Emperor.

However, for this agreement to take effect, the consent of the Diets of the Estates of Croatia and Hungary was required. According to the old constitution, each had the right to elect its own king. Furthermore, in Hungary, there was a strong nationalist party (even then!) that opposed the election of a foreign monarch. Therefore, a Hungarian nobleman, John Zápolya (Duke of Transylvania), was proclaimed king by a majority of the Hungarian Diet.

In contrast, in Croatia, which, even during the reign of Louis II, received military aid from the Habsburgs due to its location in the southeast of the Austrian hereditary lands, the pro-Ferdinand faction prevailed. On New Year's Day 1527, the Croatian estates, assembled in Cetin, elected Ferdinand as King of Dalmatia and Croatia. However, the nobles of the Province of Slavonia, which forms the southern part of the great Pannonian Plain, sided with Zapolya, who also held possessions in Croatia and was of Croatian descent.

Thus, Croatia and a part of Hungary separately recognized Ferdinand as king, while Transylvania, most of Hungary, and a province of Croatia recognized John Zapolya as king. To oppose Ferdinand, who was backed by the Holy Roman Empire and Spain, Zapolya acknowledged the supreme power of the Turks. All of this gave rise to a long struggle that lasted throughout the reign of Ferdinand I (1527-1564) and served as a pretext for the Turks to invade Hungary, ostensibly defending the interests of their protégé Zapolja.

And indeed, they took advantage of the division among the Hungarian feudal lords. Only towards the end of his reign did Ferdinand gain effective power over Transylvania and the part of Hungary that recognized Zapolja's authority. The famous Friar George Martinuzzi (actually George Utisinovic, a Croatian who appears in texts as Hungarian) played a decisive role in this process. Considered by some to be the greatest Hungarian statesman of all time, he was a cardinal of the Catholic Church on the recommendation of Charles V, who incessantly encouraged his brother Ferdinand to reconcile with Zapolja so that Christian forces could be concentrated in the fight against the Turks.

Nevertheless, a segment of the Magyars, caught between two empires, never completely abandoned the idea of making peace with the Turks in order to reduce their losses. Later, when a significant portion of the Magyars embraced Calvinism, they sought to resist the influence of the Habsburg kings. These kings, moreover, in accordance with the needs and spirit of the times, attempted to curb the power of the feudal nobility by strengthening central authority and forming a standing army capable of combating Turkish troops, especially the formidable Janissary units. These Turkish forces were far superior to the rather improvised armies of the feudal lords.

Maximilian I (1564-1576), Ferdinand's successor, had already been crowned King of Hungary and Croatia during his father's lifetime. At that time, Hungary was divided into three parts: one under Habsburg control, another under Žapolya, and the largest portion, with its capital at Buda, under Turkish rule.

The solemn coronation ceremony was also attended by the Croatian grandees with their retinues (banderii), a total of 3,000 richly equipped horsemen, led by Nicholas Zrinski with his 168 knights, the cream of the crop of that troop. According to a contemporary description, they wore helmets and breastplates, and their weapons were lances and swords, and sometimes broad-bladed axes.

During the coronation, Nicholas Zrinski carried the golden apple with the cross, and his son George carried the banner of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Ladislaus Banic the banner of the Kingdom of Croatia, Stephen Dobo the banner of Slavonia, and Prince Nicholas Frankopan of Trzic the banner of the Kingdom of Bosnia.

On that occasion, Maximilian confirmed Zrinski in the position of Captain-General of all Hungary on the right bank of the Danube, a post to which he had been assigned by King Ferdinand on May 28, 1563.[221] Nadazdi held the position of Captain-General in the remaining part of the territory.

Maximilian married his cousin Maria, daughter of Charles V and sister of Philip II. For three years, he replaced Charles V in Spain, governing with prudence and resolve. As an Infante of Spain, he was eligible to claim the Spanish throne should Philip II die without heirs.

The new king of Hungary and Croatia was concerned about whether he would maintain the peace with the Turks, agreed upon by his father in 1562 with the obligation to pay tribute, which they called a "gift." The Turks, according to their custom, considered that with Ferdinand's death, the stipulated peace lost its validity. Therefore, they demanded that Maximilian pay the overdue tribute and renew the peace agreement. Maximilian convened the council of the nobles in Vienna, among whom was Zrinski, who advocated continuing the war for the liberation of the Hungarian and Croatian regions occupied by the Turks. Nevertheless, the current in favor of peace prevailed, especially since Suleiman the Magnificent made offers to that effect.

Maximilian sent gifts to Constantinople, that is, the overdue tribute. However, the Duke of Transylvania, John Sigismund, son of John Zapolva and a Turkish protégé, attacked the parts of Hungary under Maximilian's control. Their aggression was repelled, and their city of Tokay was captured. Suleiman, who had already approved the new eight-year peace agreement, upon learning of the fall of Tokay, annulled the agreement and ordered the border commanders to invade Croatia and Hungary. On the Croatian front, the Ottomans conquered the fortress of Krupa, a Zrinski possession. Meanwhile, the Ban (prorex) of Croatia, Count Peter Erdödi, defeated the army of the Pasha of Bosnia.

Despite everything, there were prospects for peace. Then, the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha died, and his role was assumed on June 28, 1565, by the bellicose Muhammad Pasha Sokobi, one of the greatest Turkish statesmen and military leaders, related to three sultans, who ruled the Ottoman Empire with an iron fist until his violent death (he was killed by a fanatic on October 11, 1579). Previously, after the death of Hairedin Barbarossa, he had also been commander of the Turkish navy (1546-53). The combative Mohamed Sokobi flatly rejected the idea of peace. Moreover, Sultan Suleiman longed to avenge his failed siege of Malta the previous year. Therefore, on October 21, 1565, he wrote to his vassal John Sigismund that the following summer he would come to his aid with such force "that the favors we have promised you will shine brighter than the sun throughout the world, and this fact will be remembered until the end of the world and until the final judgment."[222]

Maximilian had no choice but to hastily assemble an army and money. The German Diet voted him an extraordinary aid package of twenty-four Römermonaten and eight for each subsequent year. This amounted to 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Philip II contributed significant aid in men and money: some 6,000 tercios and 10,000 escudos monthly, plus an extraordinary contribution of 300,000 escudos.[223]

According to Hungarian-Croatian and Austrian sources, the Hungarian nobles had approved an exceptional tax of two silver florins per family of their subjects and a general conscription at the Diet. The Pope contributed 50,000 ducats. Besides the German and Spanish soldiers, 7,000 knights came from Bohemia. 5,400 from the "hereditary lands" of Austria and 3,500 Hungarian knights. The Duke of Guise brought 100 knights from France, the Duke of Ferrara arrived from Italy with 800 knights, the Duke of Florence with 3,000 infantrymen, and the Duke of Savoy with 400 soldiers. With papal funds, 2,000 infantrymen were raised.

Thus, Maximilian was able to command 40,000 soldiers, half cavalry, half infantry. Furthermore, the main fortresses were provided with reinforced garrisons, and troops were organized in Croatia for diversionary actions. Zrinski, captain of Szigeth, assembled some 2,000 combatants, among them several Croatian nobles.[224]

Although Maximilian had the support of much of Christian Europe, his prospects were far from good against Suleiman the Magnificent's 300,000 soldiers, the most impressive force he had ever commanded in any of his twelve previous campaigns. According to French sources, the sultan set out "with such a quantity of artillery and all kinds of ammunition that it is truly frightening."[225]

Suleiman, aged and weakened to the point that he could no longer ride, left Constantinople at the end of April. He arrived at Zemun, on the border of Hungary and Croatia, in the second half of June. There, he was greeted with lavish gifts by John Sigismund Zapoly. The main challenge was crossing the Danube in Croatia, near Vukovar, and the Drava River near Osijek, and passing through a series of fortresses that lay between the sultan and Maximilian.

Suleiman, aged and weakened to the point that he could no longer ride, left Constantinople at the end of April. Suleiman planned to assault the fortress of Jegar, further north, first, but he received news that Nicholas Zrinski had defeated a Turkish contingent near Siklos in southern Hungary. Therefore, he decided to lay siege to Szigeth. Here, the old resentment and hatred for Zrinski also played a role, as he had repeatedly defied the Turks and killed his protégé Kazianer, former commander of the Austrian auxiliary troops in Croatia, who had deserted, betraying Ferdinand. Due to the flooding of the Drava River, the Turkish army only reached Szigeth on August 1st, and Suleiman on the 6th. There, the bulk of the Turkish army, numbering between 100,000 and 200,000 elite soldiers, along with a large quantity of artillery and other war machines, assembled.

There are numerous accounts of the siege of Szigeth, the most important being that of Fernando Crnko, a relative of Zrinski, who survived after the heroic resistance alongside the Croatian nobleman Gaspar Alapic, later Ban of Croatia. Crnko described the defense of Szigeth in Croatian and Glagolitic script.[226] His manuscript was translated into Latin by the Slovenian Samuel Budia and published in Vienna in 1568 under the title "Historia Sigethi, totius Sclavoniae fortissimi propugnaculi".[227]

Much later, the original Croatian text was found and published,[228] which will serve as our primary source.

At that time, Szigeth was divided into three parts: the new town, the old town, and the citadel. The fortress was located in the marshes of the Almash stream (Szigeth in Hungarian means island). The new and old towns were separated by a short bridge. Their fortifications consisted of wood and earthworks. The marshes provided the main defense. Only the citadel, connected to the old town by a long bridge, had better fortifications and a stone tower.

Zrinski supplied Szigeth with abundant provisions. As the Turks approached, with heavy artillery, led by Suleiman the Magnificent and Grand Vizier Mohammad Pasha Sokolovic, the garrison of some 2,500 men swore to Zrinski to fight to the end. Before them, Zrinski swore the following oath:

"I, Prince Nicholas Zrinski, promise first to Almighty God, then to His Majesty, our most illustrious monarch, and to our unfortunate homeland, and to you, gentlemen, never to abandon you, but to live and die with you, sharing in good times and bad. So help me God."

The siege, which began on August 7, 1566, lasted a full month. The new quarter was not well fortified, so Zrinski abandoned it and set it ablaze two days later. Twelve days later, on August 19, the Turks captured the old part of the fortress, and on this occasion, many defenders fell because they were unable to take refuge in the citadel in time. Several thousand Turks also perished. Days earlier, Zrinski had dispatched a messenger to King and Emperor Maximilian, whose help he had hoped for in vain, informing him that "seeing himself in dire straits, he will abandon the old city and retreat to the citadel to resist there to the last man."

The battle for the citadel was fierce and resulted in heavy Turkish casualties. Grand Vizier Sokolovic tried to win Zrinski over by promising him that the sultan would recognize his authority over all of Croatia. This was not an empty promise, considering the precedent of the Hungarian king and Duke of Erdelj, John Zapolia, and his son Sigismund, who had been recognized and protected by the Turks against Ferdinand I. Zrinski, however, haughtily rejected the Turkish offer.

Another ordeal Zrinski faced was far more painful. The Turks had taken prisoner the young trumpeter from the retinue of George Zrinski, the eldest son of the former ban Nicholas. They sent the trumpet and demanded the surrender of the fortress, threatening to kill his son if he refused. Zrinski, despite having ample reason to ensure his lineage did not die out, withstood this ordeal as well. This example of selflessness ranks among the most glorious episodes in military history and precedes the later, well-known act of the defender of the Alcázar of Toledo in the Spanish Civil War.

The Turks then tried to break the defenders' morale by dropping letters on arrows, urging them not to lose their lives in vain, to surrender, and in that case, they would be richly rewarded by the Grand Vizier. However, the defenders remained true to their duty.

At the same time, the Turks bombarded the redoubt with incessant, heavy fire for several days, breaching its fortifications in several places. On August 26, they launched a powerful assault, which was repelled by the defenders, who captured two Turkish war banners. In that assault, the governor of Egypt, Ali Pasha, and Aliportuk, commander of the Turkish artillery, fell.

Another, even more impetuous assault followed three days later. Sultan Suleiman himself, already dying, reviewed his troops. The fighting lasted from dawn until dusk. The defenders held firm and took the captain of the Janissaries prisoner.

The Turks then began to undermine the strongest bastion, known as "the mountain," and on September 2nd they blew it up. Zrinski once again repelled the Turks, but a fire broke out, forcing him to surrender part of the citadel with the surviving population and retreat to the stone redoubt. Suleiman died on September 4th, but the Grand Vizier Sokolovic concealed his death. Even the following day, during the assault on September 5th, he placed the sultan's body next to the tent window as if he were observing his troops' attack. The prudent and astute Sokolovic informed only his father-in-law, the future Selim II, of the sultan's death, so that he could assume the inheritance without hindrance.

Zrinski was left with only 500 soldiers. When the Turks repeated their attacks on September 7th, attempting to set fire to the rest of the fortress, Zrinski chose to go out and counterattack rather than die burned alive with the citadel. Regarding this feat, his faithful secretary Crnko recounts extremely interesting details that help us understand the personality of this proud and valiant Croatian great.

First, he threw the treasure and valuables from his chambers into the fire. Then he donned his finest attire. On his head, he wore a plume adorned with heron feathers and precious stones. At his waist, he placed his pistol, his sword, and his shield in his hand. He had 100 ducats sewn into the lining of his dolmen as spoils of war for any Turk who might capture his body.

Nor did he forget the keys to the city, which the heroic defender wished to keep until death. In the courtyard, he gathered the defenders. Beside the gate, he placed a loaded cannon. Finally, he rallied the garrison, reminding them that all must die for the holy faith of Christ, the king, and the homeland. When everyone swore to fight to the death, Zrinski ordered the citadel gate opened and the cannon fired at the Turks who were assaulting in dense ranks. Through the resulting breach, Zrinski burst forward at the head of his fighters.

The standard-bearer was the young Croatian nobleman Juranic. Zrinski shot down one of the Turkish commanders with his pistol and beheaded several enemy soldiers with his sword. The Turks shouted at him to surrender and not lose his head in vain. Finally, he fell, wounded by a Turkish bullet to the head. A bloody battle raged around him, in which almost all his soldiers perished. Still alive, he was taken before a Janissary officer, who ordered his head to be cut off over Kazianer's famous cannon. It was a symbolic revenge for the death Zrinski had opportunely inflicted on the traitor and Turkish protégé Kazianer.

When the attackers stormed the bastion en masse to plunder it, the powder magazine in the stone tower exploded, killing several thousand Turks.

A handful of the surviving defenders were taken prisoner and later ransomed, among them Gaspar Alapic, Zrinski's nephew and later Ban of Croatia (1574–1577), and the aforementioned Francisco Crnko, who recounted the siege of Szigeth.

Sokolovic placed Zrinski's head on a pike, which remained for two days in front of the sultan's tent. He then sent the head to his brother Mustafa, Pasha of Buda, who in turn sent it to Count Salmo, commander of the imperial army. George, son of Nicholas Zrinski, later buried his father's head in the family mausoleum at the Pauline Church of Saint Helena in Kakovec, the Zrinski residence.

The Turks lost 18,000 infantry and 7,000 Janissaries at Szigeth. The powerful Ottoman army returned, plundering Croatian lands along the way, and on October 24th joined forces in Belgrade with Selim II, who in the meantime had assumed supreme power unopposed, thanks precisely to the skill of his son-in-law, Grand Vizier Mohammad Pasha Sokolović.

During the siege of Szigeth, the imperial army of more than 40,000 cavalry from the Christian West remained completely inactive. The Hungarian and Croatian elites proposed in vain that Ostrogon, which was held by the Turks, be attacked, thus diverting Suleiman's forces from Szigeth. Contemporary Hungarian sources suggest that the Germans' fear was so great that they refused to even acknowledge such a dangerous action. Antun Vramec, a Croatian chronicler and canon of Zagreb who was at the imperial headquarters, wrote to his brother: "We are wasting our time here in the camp near Komoran waiting for I don't know what opportunity." On October 22, when there was no longer any doubt that the Turkish threat had passed, the Christian army disbanded.

Only in Croatia were diversionary actions carried out, which halted and dispersed significant Turkish contingents marching to join the main army. Near Novigrad on the Una River, in what was then Turkish Croatia, now Bosnia, a major battle was fought between the troops of the commander of Pozega and Hlivno on one side and the forces of the Croatian ban Peter Erdödi and Archduke Charles, uncle of King and Emperor Maximilian, on the other. The Christians achieved a splendid victory and seized a large amount of booty. This good news spread among the Christians as a small consolation in the face of the loss of Szigeth and the death of its valiant defenders.[229]

The Hero of Szigeth in Croatian Literature and Tradition

The heroic feat of the defenders of Szigeth had a great impact not only in their time, but also became a favorite theme in Croatian folk poetry and literature in subsequent centuries. The Hero of Szigeth is one of the main protagonists of the epic Croatian folk poetry of the so-called Heaven of the Bans, in which the exploits of Zrinski and his contemporaries, particularly those of Ban Ivan Karlovic, are extolled and glorified.

In Croatian literature, we have a whole series of Zriniades, that is, works whose main theme is Zrinski, the Hero of Szigeth. The first would be the poem entitled "The Capture of Szigeth" by Bernardo Karnarutic, a nobleman from Zadar and former "duke" of the Croatian cavalry in the service of the Republic of Venice.[230](note 15) This poem was written immediately after the fall of Szigeth, according to the account of Francisco Crnko, and published in 1584.

As a contemporary, Karnarutic also recounts other details of interest. He emphasizes the participation of the Croats in Zrinski's court in Szigeth: "The Croats were the honor of his court." The poet, like his contemporaries, considered the Turkish invasion to be God's punishment for sins committed. In his poem, when Zrinski delivers his last speech before leaving the fortress, he refers to the grave situation prevailing in the Church due to the schism (the Reformation). Only if the state authorities submit to the Church will Turkish power be repelled. He even alludes to the alliance of Catholic France with the Turks and states that because of this there is no happiness or joy in France, but "plague, famine and fighting".

In 1661, Karnarutic's epic poem was edited by Peter Fodroci in Zagreb, using the orthography employed by Croatians of the Kai dialect.

The poet dedicated his work to George Zrinski, son of the hero of Szigeth. This is the first of many dedications in literary and scientific works honoring the descendant of a distinguished noble family who, thanks to the glory of the defenders of Szigeth, became an integral part of the Christian epic in the centuries-long struggle against the Ottomans.

George Zrinski himself was a highly learned man. For example, Ivan Pergosic, notary and judge of the Zagreb comitatus, dedicated to George Zrinski the Croatian version of the renowned legal work Decretum Tripartitum by the Hungarian jurist Verbözy, written in Latin.[231]

Domingo Zlataric (1555–1610) of Dubrovnik, one of the most notable poets of his time, published a collection of translations and his original poems in Venice in 1608 in a lavish edition by Aldo Minuzzi. He dedicated it, and particularly his translation of Electra,[232] to Prince George Zrinski. Regarding Electra, he states that he translated it from Greek "in honor of the Croatian language." He thanks Zrinski for having taken his brother Michael into his service as an officer. Zrinski thanked Zlataric in writing, requesting that he also send him his other works.

The Croatian polymath Paul Ritter Vitezovic, the writer who formulated the national program, published the poetic work Odiljenje Sigetsko in 1684.[233] This book on the tragedy of Szigeth arose under the influence of Opsida Sigetska, a work by Petar Zrinski, great-grandson of the hero of Szigeth, and its manuscript is kept in the library of the Viennese Court.[234] It is Peter's first attempt to translate into Croatian the epic poem Adrianskoga mora sirena (Siren of the Adriatic Sea), published in Hungarian by his older brother Nicholas.[235] Later, Peter Zrinski, introducing certain modifications, published his Croatian translation in Venice, in a sumptuous edition.[236]

The last Zrinskis in Croatian history

The brothers Peter and Nicholas Zrinski inherited from their ancestor, the hero of Szigeth, large holdings in Medjimurje, a region populated by Croats and belonging to the Diocese of Zagreb, but which formed part of the Hungarian comitatus of Zalad. Upon the death of their father, George, the Hungarian Croat nobles were educated by the renowned figure of the Hungarian Counter-Reformation, Archbishop Peter Pazmany. They studied at the Jesuit college in Trnava (now in Slovakia) and, as distinguished students, were received in Rome by Pope Urban VIII.

Nicholas's intellectual formation is reflected in his poem when he states, as Karnarutic had before him, that the Turkish invasion was the consequence of divine wrath against the Hungarians, many of whom converted to Protestantism. God allowed the infernal powers to incite the sultan to war, in which Szigeth fell, but Suleiman also died thanks to the merit of Zrinski, who was taken to heaven by angels. The fact that Nicholas, grandson of the defender of Szigeth, although from Croatia and identifying as Croatian, was the author of the first Hungarian epic poem, was seized upon by Hungarian nationalist historiography to present the hero of Szigeth and his grandchildren exclusively as Hungarian patriots. This same argument was partly maintained during the commemorative events for the fourth centenary of the Siege of Szigeth, organized in Hungary.

It would be pointless to even mention this detail were it not for the widespread practice in European historiography of presenting and treating the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom exclusively as Hungarian, thus completely ignoring Croatia's participation in this union from 1102 to 1527 and later in the community with Austria (1527–1918). Throughout this long period, Croatia and Hungary were two distinct kingdoms, each with its own internal administration, diets, and laws, but collaborating closely in the defense of their common interests. Only later, under the influence of modern nationalist trends in Hungary, did the tendency arise to present "the lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen," including Croatia, as an integral part of the Magyar nation-state, even though it was an ethnically heterogeneous territory where Magyars constituted barely half the population. This nationalist trend provoked the political crisis of 1848, which culminated in 1918 with the disintegration of the Habsburg Danubian Monarchy.

In the modern era of national movements, the brothers Nicholas and Peter Zrinski were glorified by the Croats as national heroes for their staunch defense of the constitutional rights of feudal Croatia against the centralizing tendencies of the Viennese court. The understandable desire of the Habsburg monarchs, in line with the general European trend, to strengthen central power had a negative aspect, since in a typically multinational community, this was achieved through the predominance of the Austrian-German element. For the Croats, Hungarians, Czechs, and other peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy, such attempts felt like a loss of statehood and a step toward Germanization. Thus, we have a paradoxical phenomenon: feudal lords, in defending the interests of their estates against the introduction of reforms, especially those advocated by enlightened absolutism, acted as champions of national opposition, even though, as exponents of the old regime, they were not particularly drawn to the modern idea of nationhood.

Nicholas and Peter Zrinski, great-grandsons of the hero of Szigeth, distinguished themselves in the second half of the 17th century as leaders of the resistance of the Croatian nobility, as well as the Hungarian and, to some extent, the Austrian nobility, against the centralizing tendencies of the dynasty. When Nicholas Zrinski, Viceroy of Croatia, died accidentally while hunting (1664), his brother Peter succeeded him as viceroy and as leader of the resistance. Peter distinguished himself in the wars against the Ottomans, but as a diplomat and politician, he was inferior to his brother.

The conspirators relied on the good intentions of Louis XIV and the Republic of Venice, and they strove to gain the support of Poland. When, due to a series of unfortunate events, all these promises failed, Peter Zrinski initiated negotiations with the Turks, but he was denounced, betrayed, condemned to death, and beheaded along with his brother-in-law, Prince Christoph Frankopan, in 1671 in Wiener Neustadt, despite the intervention of several monarchs and even the Pope. This marked the end of the power of the old Croatian nobility and the beginning of their growing dependence on the Viennese court.

The memory of Peter Zrinski became a national cult in the second half of the last century, when Croatian resistance to Austrian and Hungarian dominance was based on the assertion of the historical rights of the Kingdom of Croatia. This cult was greatly aided by the talented Croatian novelist Eugenio Kumicic, who in 1892 published the Croatian historical novel The Conspiracy, imbued with a strong nationalist tendency and with a dramatic description of the struggle and sufferings of Peter Zrinski and Francis Christopher Frankopan, the latter being the offspring of a noble Croatian family and a poet.

Nor did the cult of the heroes of Szigeth die out. During the era of European Romanticism, the German writer and patriot Theodor Körner composed the tragedy Zriny, which was a great success. This work inspired the Croatian poet Hugo Badalic to write the libretto for the opera "Nicholas Subic Zrinski," a work by the then-leading Croatian composer, Nicholas of Zajc. This opera premiered to resounding success in 1879, remained a staple of the repertoire, and was performed hundreds of times, earning enthusiastic ovations from audiences. During periods of foreign oppression, the glorification of the heroes of Szigeth instilled national pride and faith.

These briefly mentioned facts, which testify to the close connection between the Zrinski family and the Croatian national process, render it pointless to refute the thesis that presents the Zrinskis as Hungarian national heroes. His participation in the joint ventures of Croatia and Hungary, two "sister kingdoms" as they were then called, cannot be interpreted within the framework of Croatian nationalist conceptions, much less Hungarian ones.

Even during Peter Zrinski's lifetime, Vladislav Mincetic, son of one of Dubrovnik's oldest families, published the poem "The Croatian Bugle" in honor of Ban Peter, a renowned hero in the struggles against the Turks.[237]

While John Gundulic (1588-1638), Dubrovnik's greatest poet and predecessor to Mincetic, in his great epic poem Osman links the hopes of liberation of the Christian countries from Turkish rule with the Polish prince Vladislaus, in Mincetic's eyes the protagonist of this struggle is the ban (prorex) of Croatia, Peter Zrinski, who visited Dubrovnik in 1654 on his journey to Boka Kotorska. Mincetic glorifies Peter as a descendant of glorious ancestors, who were "the pinnacle of all the bans" and carry "the blood of high nobility." Peter is the "North Star" who will liberate the Croatian lands. The Turkish crescent will retreat before the sun of Zrinski, and then the glory of this Croatian Apollo will be sung by the voices of the Adriatic sirens. Of Peter, he says that "he is a ban in name, but a king in deed."

Above all the honors of this world

In your work transcends and lives

The spirit of the Croatian people.

Mincetic, like other Croatians of his time, is keenly aware that Croatia is one of the countries that rightfully bears the honorary title of the "bulwark of Christendom." That is why he sings:

In the wave of slavery

Italy would have been submerged

Had the Ottoman sea not crashed

against the heroic shores of Croatia.

We have already alluded to the correspondence exchanged between the Croatian poet Domingo Zlataric and Prince George Zrinski, son of the hero of Szigeth. George, among other things, thanks Zlataric for the services rendered to his relative Peter Subic Peranski, who retained the old family name Zrinski, formerly Subic, since the Subic family only adopted the surname Zrinski in the 14th century, after the fortress of Zrin, then located in northern Croatia and today on the Croatian-Bosnian border. The Subic-Zrinski are descendants of the oldest Croatian nobility, which was formed based on the existing tribal organization.

In the early Middle Ages, the Subic are mentioned among the twelve most notable Croatian tribes. In the transitional phase from the tribal to the feudal system, the Subic received the entire comitatus of Bribir, previously tribal, as a hereditary fief in the 12th century. With this, they became the great rulers of the kingdom, holding the title of princes (knez in Croatian). Their power culminated in the 14th century when Viceroy (ban) Paul Subic (died in 1312) became the hereditary ban of Croatia and Bosnia, on equal footing with any king of that era.

Their role was decisive in the enthronement of the Neapolitan Angevins in Croatia and Hungary, to whom they were related. Mladen II, Paul's son, clashed with the Angevins, who sought to strengthen royal power against the oligarchy of the great feudal lords. In this struggle, he lost his freedom and fortune. His nephew, George, ceded the old family estate, the city of Ostrovica in southern Croatia, to King Louis X, and in return received the city of Zrin, from which the surname Zrinski derives. Thus was the founder of a powerful family that gradually, and especially through the marriage alliances of his descendants with the princes Krbavski, Blagajski, and Frankopan, and royal grants for his merits on the battlefields, amassed a great fortune and acquired enormous prestige. Herein, indirectly, lies the cause of this family's downfall. The fear of the Viennese court, envy, and the greed to seize his assets motivated Peter Zrinski's condemnation to death.

This family gave Croatia a plethora of banes (viceroys) and military commanders. For further detail, we reproduce the Zrinski family tree, compiled primarily according to the Croatian historian Vjekoslav Klaic.[238] (Note 23) The tragic fate of Peter Zrinski, beheaded in Vienna and stripped of his possessions, and of his wife Katharina and son Ivan Antun, imprisoned and killed there, had a profound impact on several generations of Croatians, precisely during the period of the formation of national consciousness.

His daughter Elena, married to Rakoczy, became a Hungarian national heroine, closely linked to the rebellion of the Rakoczys, father and son, and of her second husband, Tölöki.

Historical Projections

The facts about the Leonidas of Christendom and the family glory of the Subic-Zrinski, recounted with scientific rigor based on the findings of Croatian historiography, which is not readily accessible to Western historians, may be useful in assessing the Croatian contribution to the collective effort of the Western world in defending against the Ottoman threat. Furthermore, the synthetic data on one of Croatia's oldest families, which played an important role in the formation of the Croatian national monarchy in the Middle Ages from the 7th to the 12th century, later during the Croatian-Hungarian personal union (1102-1526), and was the protagonist of Croatian state thought, distinguishing itself under the Habsburg scepter until the tragic extinction of the Zrinski, as champions of the defense of European Christendom and at the same time of Croatian political individuality, can serve as proof of Croatia's millennial continuity as one of the oldest European nations.

Nevertheless, Croatia, under the influence of theories of linguistic racism—according to which the peoples of the Slavic language group, despite having different and even opposing state and cultural traditions, constitute a cohesive cultural and ethnic community—and due to the misguided interests of Western democracies in their opposition to German militarism and Russian-Soviet imperialism, was annexed to Serbia after the First World War, thus losing, after 1200 years, the attributes of its sovereignty.

On the other hand, the sacrifice of the hero of Szigeth, former ban of Croatia, in the defense of the important fortress of neighboring Hungary, in order to prevent the most powerful Turkish sultan from reaching the heart of the Holy Roman Empire—which for centuries was the symbol of the unity of the Christian West—can serve as one of the most compelling and dramatic proofs of the selflessness of the Croatians in the defense of the greater international good, in this specific case, the defense of Western society regardless of national borders.

The idea of a supranational community of the peoples of Western Europe in general is far more important than the sterile debates about whether the hero of Szigeth and his great-grandchildren, prominent figures in the opposition of Croatia and Hungary to the centralizing tendencies of the Viennese court, were Croatian or Hungarian, or whether they belong to Croatian or Hungarian history. They are rightly glorified as heroes, as was said then, of both homelands. Their actions serve as proof that it is impossible to write the history of the central Danube basin from a nationalist perspective, since the respective peoples jointly defended the values of our shared Western culture for centuries. Nationalist criteria, in particular, cannot be applied to the eight-century history of the union of the Kingdom of Croatia with the Kingdom of Hungary.

The heroes of Szigeth and Wiener Neustadt, through their ideals and actions, confirm that it is possible to combine a sense of loyalty to their Croatian homeland with a sense of belonging to a broader supranational community, with the corresponding rights and responsibilities. Such an attitude is increasingly relevant to the peoples of Europe in our times.

The hero of Szigeth was a fearless defender of his Croatia, but in defending the land of Hungary, to which Croatia had been united for eight hundred years as an associated kingdom, he was also defending Croatia. He fell in the service of the King of Hungary and Croatia, who was also Holy Roman Emperor and a member of the reigning house of Spain during the era when the sun never set on his empire.

The sacrifice of the descendant of the defender of Szigeth, beheaded in Wiener Neustadt in 1671, serves as an example of loyalty to the homeland in keeping with the spirit of this new period in our society. Petar Zrinski, Croatian hero, ban, statesman, and man of letters, died defending the constitutional rights of Croatia, for he attempted to act in accordance with the ideals of the nationalistic era in our Western society.

For the good of Croatia, he sought help outside the framework of the Habsburg monarchy, not only from the kings of France and Poland, but also from the Turks, against whom he had fought valiantly until then, following in the footsteps of his glorious ancestors. However, the last of the Subic-Zrinski family could not commit himself to this path to the very end. Above all, he was a Christian knight. It was precisely his hesitation due to his loyalty to Christianity that led to his later attempt at reconciliation with Emperor Leopold, who, rigorously applying the principles of state, proved implacable and ruthless.

This rigid policy will lead to the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in our century. Therefore, the new unity of the European peoples cannot be founded on the domination of one or more powers, but must be the expression of the interests, rights, and freedoms of all the nations of the European community, and above all, of the weakest and smallest peoples.

While the hero of Szigeth, Nicholas Zrinski, in his capacity as the Leonidas of Christendom, was so resolute and unwavering that he risked not only his own life but also that of his son, and with it the eventual extinction of his family, his great-grandson, Ban Peter—as mentioned earlier—was a man of the modern age. He understands and venerates the sacrifice of his glorious ancestors, but he does not forget that there were two protagonists in the tragedy: on the Christian side, his illustrious great-grandfather, and on the Turkish side, the Grand Vizier Mohamed Pasha Sokobi Sokolovic, a Croatian by birth. The siege of Szigeth, therefore, according to its protagonists, symbolizes the tragedy of all of Croatia, then divided into Christian and Islamic parts.

It was not only the Turks, who had arrived from Asia and Thrace, who fought against Christian Croatia, but primarily the Islamized Croats of Bosnia, who still constitute the Croatian majority in that province today. In its capital, Sarajevo, the first shot of the First World War was fired in 1914. When Peter Zrinski sent his confidant to negotiate with the Sublime Porte, he knew that he would find high-ranking officials of Croatian descent at the Sultan's court, with a keen awareness of their ethnic origins. Peter's envoy spoke with them in Croatian.

In the heat of the fiercest struggle between the cross and the crescent on the front that ran partly through the heart of Croatian national territory, the Croats experienced this conflict with greater intensity than other Western peoples. Hence, there was never hatred among the Croatian adversaries, but rather a chivalrous emulation in the defense of their respective ideals.

The tragic conflicts among Croats in service of opposing conceptions constitute part of the general drama of humanity, expressed in the encounters and conflicts of different civilizations. Although Croatia's basic tradition is distinctly Western, the large Croatian Muslim minority served as an impetus to overcome, over time, the contrasts between Islam and the Christian West.

Catholic and Muslim Croats, faithful to their ideals, while fighting and sacrificing themselves for their own spiritual identity, knew that they were children of the same homeland, of the same Creator, and members of the same human race. Most of present-day Bosnia appeared on geographical maps during the Zrinski era as "Turkish Croatia," that is to say, as part of the Croatian national monarchy that fell under the control of the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, Croatian Muslims managed to preserve certain forms of political autonomy within the Turkish Empire. The old Croatian landed nobility, who embraced Islam due to a confluence of circumstances, managed to preserve their rights as the only hereditary landed nobility in the Ottoman Empire that did not experience the feudal system in the Western sense. In this respect, the Muslim Croats were the exception.[239]

Consequently, the last Zrinski's attempt to negotiate with his compatriots on the Turkish side was incomprehensible to his implacable Austrian judges, whom not even the memory of the hero of Szigeth could sway to consider the emerging nationalist trends with greater leniency. Later, the Habsburg monarchy itself would knowingly adopt a policy of coexistence with the Ottoman Empire; they would even become allies in the First World War, and after their defeat, both empires would be dismembered.

The last Zrinski, remembered by the Croats as the martyr of Wiener Neustadt, as a champion of Croatian sovereignty and national unity regardless of religious creed, worthy of his great-grandfather, the hero of Szigeth, was, in a broad sense, the precursor of the rapprochement between the Islamic and Christian worlds within contemporary ecumenical thought.

[1] J. Maritain: Principes d´une politique humaniste, Paris, 1945: "L´humaine personnalité est un grand mystère mètaphysique. Nous savons qu´un trait essentiel d´une civilization digne de ce nom, est le sens et le respect de la dignité de la personne humaine", p. 14. Regarding the purely scientific problem and the impossibility of solving it, see: G. A. Wetter: Soviet dialectical materialism, trans. cast. Buenos Aires, 1950, 570, 1, where the philosopher Ralchevichy, from the Soviet perspective, acknowledges the impossibility, or at least the fact that it has not yet been clarified, how consciousness could have developed from lower movements.

[2] See, for example: A. Toynbee: Civilization Put to the Test, Buenos Aires, 1960.

[3] E. Kant: Groundwork for the Metaphysics of the Situation, p. 11, Works in Eight Books, Berlin.

[4] See: Francisco Romero: The Place of Man, Buenos Aires, 1954.

[5] See: Studia Croatica, vol. 20-21, our article, p. 58, 9.

[6] J. Jaurès: Idealism and Materialism in the Conception of History, Buenos Aires, 1960, pp. 24, 25, and 26.

[7] H. C. Waddington: The Ethical Animal, Spanish trans. Buenos Aires 1963.

[8] See: "La Prensa" of April 20, 1967. Ricardo Sáenz Hayes, commemorating the figure of the great German statesman Adenauer, says: "His Catholicism meant that for him 'man was something untouchable and unchangeable by nature, because he is born under the splendor of a divine sign that endows him with conscience, responsible self-determination, faith, hope, and charity.'" Those who attack this origin and these attributes are the most singular enemies of humankind, whatever their racial background, their ethical and aesthetic aspirations, their metaphysics, or religious dogma.

[9] F. Meinecke: Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat, Munich 1917, cited by L.D. Del Corral: Op. cit., p. 254.

[10] V. L. Tapie: In his lecture, published in Concience chrétienne et les Nationalismes, Paris, 1958, p. 20.

[11] P. Fessard: Pax Nostra, an examination of the international conscience, Paris, 1936, p. 422, says: "A nation is a people who, conscious of a certain shared origin, culture, and above all, interests, strive to objectify their unity, that of a personal individuality in the eyes of their members, to present it to themselves and to others, in order to be able to orient themselves in total "Independence toward their destiny." Quoted by R. Aron in: "War and Peace," p. 869. R. Aron, in turn, says on the same page: "It does not seem to me in any way illegitimate to define nations as 'collective personalities.' In each man, personality is the synthesis of a biological fact and a conscious will... He participates at once in nature (in the biological sense) and in reason. By analogy, one can speak of 'collective persons': nations."

[12] L. D. Del Corral: Op. cit. p. 246 and G. Barraclongh: An Introduction to Contemporary History, Spanish translation, p. 189 cf.

[13] The term "Manichean dualism" is from François Perroux according to H. Massis: L'Occident et son Destin, Paris, 1961, p. 348.

[14] See "Clarín" of Buenos Aires, which published a series of articles by the most prominent Argentine jurists and politicians, initiated by the newspaper's director, Dr. Noble, all defending national sovereignty and independence with a favorable echo throughout South America (Clarín, January 1967).

[15] L. D. Del Corral: Op. cit., p. 256.

[16] D. Mandic: Rasprave i prilozi iz stare hrvatske povijesti, Rome 1963, p. 444 onwards.

[17] Cited according to D. Del Corral: Op. cit., p. 248.

[18] V. Tapie: Op. cit., p. 20.

[19] J. Miguel de Azaola: National complexes in the history of Europe, Madrid 1952, pp. 8, 9 and 10.

[20] Andrés Maurois, Histoire d'Anglaterre, pp. 334, 335 and 336.

[21] J. Kocijanic: Pape i Hrvati. "The Popes and the Croats", Zagreb, p. 472, 3.

[22] Dr. Antonio Starcevic, Croatian national deputy, founder of the Party of Law, which from 1861-1895 was the main political figure in the fight for Croatian independence, precisely invoking Croatian historical and public rights. He is considered the founder of modern Croatian nationalism and proclaimed "Father of the Homeland".

[23] Dr. Antonio Trumbic, also a Croatian national deputy, originally from Dalmatia, since 1915 president of the Yugoslav Committee, formed in France, which fought for the organization of a common Yugoslav State of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc. He was the first foreign minister of Yugoslavia and died in 1938 in the Croatian Capital in total opposition to the idea of the Yugoslav State and its Serbian rulers in Belgrade.

[24] See: R. Bicanic: The economic aspect of the Croatian question, Zagreb 1937, with the preface by Dr. V. Macek, in Croatian.

[25] See our Institute's edition: Bosnia and Herzegovina, I. Bogdan: "Question of Bosnia and the First World War, pp. 55 et seq.

[26] Thus, for example, E. Pezet: Stepinac-Tito, Paris, 1959, p. 15. In the military college in Belgrade in 1932 there were 1,300 Serbs, 140 Croats and 50 Slovenes.

[27] Group that publishes the magazine "Praxis".

[28] Croatian communist general, accused of nationalism.

[29] B. Adzija, a Croatian communist intellectual shot during the last war.

[30] "Hrvatska Zora", issue for March-April, 1967, München, Germany.

[31] Tudjman refers to the "Croatian periods" of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the fate of its protagonists, "eliminated" by Belgrade like Stalin.

[32] See: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 10.9.1966.

[33] Ivan Mihajloff: Macedonia: A Switzerland of the Balkans, St. Louis 1950. On pages 79-81, it is said among other things: "Seldom has there been a state so undesirable to the nations living in it, as Yugoslavia... The police state regime, the national oppression, the plundering of the people, the extermination of all national manifestations have not been put to rest. Whatever state policy existed during King Aleksander's regime, the same conditions exist under the Yugoslav Bolsheviks. That is why the idea of Yugoslavism and a general Yugoslav state, for which there has never been any kind of historical and traditional root in Macedonia, has become synonymous with tyranny, injustice, and enslavement. Cited according to G. Cesarich's Croatia and Serbia, Chicago, 1954, p. 18.

[34] "Knjizevne Novine", Belgrade, No. 296, dated 3/4/1967.

[35] Richard D. Goodman: The real truth about communist Yugoslavia, Erio, Pa., 1953, p. 58, according to Cesarich, op. cit. Pp. 16 and 17.

[36] See: Vjesnik u Srijedu, Zagreb, 2/21/1966: Where did the idea come from that there is no Montenegrin national culture? By Kosta Cakic.

[37] Denis de Rougemont: Le nationalisme et l'Europe, in "La table ronde", March 1960, p. 25.

[38] D. de Rougemont: Op. cit., p. 26.

[39] L. Einaudi: Work mentioned in the text, Rome, 1948, p. 141.

[40] L. Diez del Corral: Op. cit., p. 245.

[41] González Fernández de la Mora: The Breakdown of Reason of State, Madrid, 1952, pp. 18 and 19.

[42] Those interested in "unionist" ideas can find them in the aforementioned work by Einaudi, which includes classic and more modern works on the subject.

[43] Denis de Rougemont: Op. cit., p. 26.

[44] H. Massis: Op. cit. 344, 45, expounding on the ideas of the academician F. Perroux in his work: Europe Without Borders.

[45] Bernard Fay: American Civilization, Paris, 1939, p. 26.

[46] Del Corral: Op. cit., p. 254

[47] Del Corral: Op. cit., p. 260

[48] N. Coudenhove-Kalergi: L'Europa si desta, Rome, 1945, p. 205.

[49] Kalergi: Op. cit., p. 214, 15.

[50] Ortega y Gasset: Una interpretación de la historia universal, Madrid 1960, p. 248.

[51] "My impression is that the strongest and most powerful ideology at the moment is nationalism, not communism, not capitalism. I think this became evident quite early on in the history of the Soviet Union." Referring to the Stalin-Trotsky conflict, Toynbee says: "This was a victory of nationalism over communism." Cop. Clarín of 9/13/66, Buenos Aires.

[52] Cited according to Massis, op. cit. p. 349.

[53] R. Aron: Les guerres en chaine, cit. according to Massis, op. cit. p. 349.

[54] R. Aron: op. cit. p. 855, 6.

[55] R. Aron: op. cit. p. 868.

[56] Cardinal Feltin in his preface to La conscience chrétienne et les nationalismes, Paris, 1958.

[57] L. Diez del Corral: Op. cit. p. 247.

[58] "When the objective is achieved (European consciousness, N. Ob.) national sentiment must not disappear; it will merely assume its organic function in human society... Because it is natural for man to love first and foremost his own family, then his homeland... to feel bound to his national land and, finally... to his motherland, Europe... civilization, Western race... humanity," Kalergi also says, op. cit. p. 222. Le grande Nation, 65 thésis sur l'Europe”, Brussels, 1965.

[59] See André Bonnichon: Op. cit. p. 20. Thus, for example, M. Peeters, a contributor to the same journal, Le Justice dans du Monde, after exhaustive research, concludes that the right to self-determination does not exist as a positive norm of international law. However, many others contradict this. See, for example: Jugoslavenska Revija za Medjunarodno Pravo, Dr. A. Magarasevic: A view on the right to self-determination in international law, pp. 27-33. Likewise, the Argentine author César Díaz Cisneros: La Organización de las Naciones Unidas, Buenos Aires, 1943, p. 154.

[60] G. Gonella: Presupposti di un ordine internazionale, Vatican City, 1948, p. 99.

[61] See: "Le Figaro," Paris, April 8, 9, and 13, 1967. Three articles by Max Clos, confirming the violent nature of Yugoslav state power.

[62] Cf. Gleb Starusenko, The Principle of Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations in the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State. Progress Publishers, in Spanish, Moscow, pp. 270, year of printing missing, probably 1963; the Yugoslav view: Dr. Aleksandar Magarasevic, "A View on the Right to Self-Determination in International Law," in Yugoslavenska Revija za Medjunarodno Pravo.

[63] Dr. Antun Dabinovic, Hrvatska drzavna i pravna povijest, Zagreb 1940, p. 11. Professor Dabinovic divides Croatian constitutional history into four periods: the first period (626-1180), from the arrival of the Croats in their present homeland until the end of the subordination of the Dalmatian part of Croatia to Byzantium; the second period (1180-1527) is characterized by Croatia's legal and state ties with Hungary; in the third period (1527-1790), Croatia is linked to the monarchs of the Habsburg dynasty, and its main feature is the joint Croatian-Hungarian struggle against Viennese centralism; in the fourth period (1790-1918), the Croats and Hungarians achieve recognition of their legal and state autonomy, and Austrian centralism is replaced by Magyar claims against Croatian liberties.

[64] Dr. Ferdo Culinovic, Drzavnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja XIX y XX vijeka, Zagreb 1956, p. 66.

[65] For the period 1918-1933, see: Ernest Pezet, La Yougoslavie en péril?, Paris 1933, pp. 281; and for the period 1934-1941, see: J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in crisis 1934-1941, New York and London 1962, pp. 306; and the works cited in these books, which were, moreover, written with great sympathy toward Yugoslavia.

[66] The main proponent of the first criterion was the Viennese professor Georg Jellinek (Die Lehre von den Staatenverbündungen, Vienna 1882), who, in his debate with Professor José Pliveric of the University of Zagreb (Das rechtliche Verhältniss Kroatiens zu Ungarn, Zagreb 1885 and Der Kroatische Staat, Zagreb 1887), changed his mind and, for Croatia and some other states, created a new legal-statist term, Staatsfragmente, "fragmentary state" (Georg Jellinek, Über Staatsfragmente, Heidelberg 1896).

[67] N. Ratner, Postanak Hrvatsko-ugarske nagodbe od 1868, Zagreb 1949, pp. 41 ff.; according to the aforementioned work by F. Culinovic, p. 123.

[68] F. Culinavic, op. cit., p. 123.

[69] Ibid., p. 143.

[70] Rafael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Washington, 1944, p. 241. This work was published by the Division of International Law - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for use by the U.S. armed forces after the war and is still used as a source of information today.

[71] The full text of the resolution was published in the booklet The Truth About Croatia, Buenos Aires (year undated), pp. 16 and 18, published by the Federation of Croatian Societies in South America. In abridged form, it is published in Dokumente zum Konflikt mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Third Reich, 1939/41 No. 7, p. 51.

[72] Lemkin, op. cit., p. 242.

[73] Gabriel Louis-Jaray, "La Yugoslavia devant la guerre" (Revue Politique et Parlamentaire, No. 538, Paris, Sep.-Oct. 1939, p. 73).

[74] Count Galeazzo Ciano: Diary, Ed. J. Jones Americana, Montevideo - Caracas 1952, pp. 91-92, 99-100-101, 111, 136, 140, and 143. The publisher emphasized that it is a "direct translation from the Italian based on photocopies of the original manuscript." This will explain the erroneous transcription of Dr. Macek's surname as Dr. Uncek, which is not the case in the Italian edition, where the Croatian leader's surname appears correctly.

[75] Cf. Vladko Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom, New York 1957, pp. 177-238; J. B. Hoptner, op. cit., pp. 171-300; Rudolf Kiszling, Die Kroaten, Graz-Cologne 1956, pp. 153-165.

[76] Cf. Lemkin, op. cit., p. 242.

[77] Cf. Lemkin, o. c., p. 243; Angelo Piero Sereni, "The Status of Croatia under International Law" (The American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXV, 1941, pp. 1144), says, however, that Pavelic already on 4/7/41 invited the people to secede from Servia.

[78] Jere Jareb, Pola stoljeca hrvatske politike, Buenos Aires, 1960, p. 82.

[79] Idem, p. 85 with details about Macek's statement.

[80] Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP) Series D, Vol.

[81] Lemkin, o.c. pp. 252 and 606 entitled: Croatia-Establishment of the state and its administration

[82] For example, A. P. Sereni, o. c., p. 1144 or Lemkin, c. c., p. 252.

[83] The view on Hungary's primacy in recognizing Croatia was held by Dr. Mladen Lorkovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Tihomil Drezga, Director of the Department of Legal Affairs in the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Drezga addressed this issue in his study Postanak i priznanje Nezavisne Drzave Hrvatske, Spremnost Nos. 163 and 164, Zagreb 1944.

[84] Pester Lloyd, Budapest 11/4/1941, under the title Eine historische Entscheidung, alluded not to the proclamation of the N.D.H., but to Horthy's order for the Hungarian army to return the regions awarded to Yugoslavia after the First World War, "since with the proclamation of the independent and sovereign State of Croatia, (Yugoslavia) ceased to exist and disintegrated into its integral parts." See also DGFP XII, No. 307.

[85] Hrvatski Narod, Zagreb, 4/23/1941, No. 70, p. 10.

[86] Such is the opinion of Minister Lorkovic, later corroborated by DGFP XII, Nos. 324 and 331.

[87] DGFP XII, No. 317.

[88] DGFP XII, No. 331.

[89] DNB information from Rome of 4/7/1941, taken from Stefani, and Giornale D'Italia of 4/8/1941 under the title "Un mesaaggio di Pavelic al Duce - La Croazia attende i soldati italiani".

[90] See DGFU XII (the Memorandum of the German Ambassador to Italy Mackensen of 14/4/1941 on his telephone conversations with Rintelen and Ribbentrop before meeting with Mussolini to discuss the telegram that Hitler intended to send to Pavelic), No. 337 (Rintelen, director of the political division of the foreign ministry of the Third Reich, transmits on 14/4/1941 to the ambassador the text of Hitler's telegram to Pavelic on recognition and Ribbentrop's instructions to Mackensen that, having obtained the Duce's consent, he should immediately forward Mussolini's text to Berlin for simultaneous publication. The text of Hitler's telegram contains no references to future borders); No. 338 (Mackensen's report to Ribbentrop of 14/4/1941, at 10:35 a.m., on his conversation with Mussolini regarding the recognition of Croatia. Mussolini states that with recognition he does not want to tie his hands regarding borders and emphasizes Italy's rights to Dalmatia, and that Pavelic should send him a telegram similar to the one he and Kvaternik sent to Hitler); No. 341 (Veesenmayer's report to Ribbentrop of 14/4/1941, at 2:12 p.m., on his meeting with Pavelic in Karlovac. Pavelic stated that he had no obligation to Mussolini and that, once recognized, he wishes to be received by Hitler); No. 342 (Ribbentrop informs Veesenmayer in Zagreb on April 14, 1941, at 3:50 p.m., that the head of the cabinet of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would arrive there that same day to return with Pavelic's telegram to Mussolini. Pavelic can deliver to Anfuso the original of the telegram that was transmitted to Rome through German channels, so that it is not necessary, for the purposes of recognition, to send another telegram); No. 343 (this document contains the text of the aforementioned telegram from Pavelic by which he informed Mussolini of the proclamation of independence and requests its recognition by the government of His Majesty the King and Emperor of Italy); No. 345 (Mackensen's telegram to Ribbentrop of 14/4/41, at 20:00, relating to his conversation with Mussolini about Pavelic's telegram: Mussolini will not insist on the territorial clause in the telegram if Pavelic leaves written confirmation for Anfuso that the border issue will be resolved afterward); No. 346 (the memorandum on Mackensen's telephone report to Ribbentrop of 14/4/41, at 21:30, relating to the Italian demand that Pavelic's telegram be completed with the declaration "that the borders of the State of Croatia will be fixed by mutual agreement between the Croatian government and the governments of the Axis powers." At the same time, the Italians propose the German and Italian texts of recognition of the N.D.H.); No. 348 (Mackensen's memorandum of April 15, 1941, in which he records that Anfuso, after meeting with Pavelic, brought an addendum on the borders and that the Germans preferred to publish only the telegrams from Mussolini and Hitler to Pavelic, while the Italians also proposed publishing Pavelic's telegrams). Regarding the Karlovac intermezzo, see Filippo Anfuso, "Du Palais de Venise au Lac de Garde," Paris, 1949, pp. 142-153. In light of the cited documents, Anfuso's report is not a reliable source, since he writes: "Avant midi, je remis á Mussolini le télégramme, quiut en reconnaissant les droits italiens, préludait aux accords..." (p. 153). The territorial clause, which was the subject at hand, did not in itself imply any recognition of Italian rights. On the same topic, see: Eugen Kvaternik, "Ustaska emigracija u Italiji i 10 travnja 1941" (Hrvatska Revija, No. 1, 1952), especially Chapter VI "Karlovacki intermezzo" (pp. 233-244); these are memoirs of the author, who is very critical of Pavelić, and which are based on Anfuso's book Roma-Berlino-Salé (1950), which he considers "a document of exceptional value."

[91] For the texts of both recognitions, see Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik, vol. 6, June 1941, pp. 465-466, and DGFP XII, no. 364.

[92] Foreign authors (e.g., P. A. Sereni, Rafael Lemkin, Hans-Joachim Seeler) cite April 16, 1941, as the date of the Slovak recognition, which is inaccurate, since the official Bratislava newspaper Slovák published the news of the recognition on April 15, 1941, under the title "Nemecko, Talijansko a Slovensko uznaly samostatné Chorvátsko" (Recognition of Slovak by the People of Slovakia). Therefore, Dr. T. Drezga's viewpoint, op. cit., is correct. in footnote 20.

[93] The authors cited in footnote 29 cite April 22, 1941, as the date of Bulgarian recognition, perhaps because the Italian Stefani news agency transmitted the news without indicating the date of the Tsar's telegram, and the DNB representative in Rome gave them the date April 22, 1941.

[94] The Bukarester Tageblatt of May 7, 1941, reported on Romania's recognition of the NDH, and for this reason, the aforementioned foreign authors, taking their information from each other or from A. P. Sereni, incorrectly date this act as having occurred on May 7, 1941, rather than May 6.

[95] See further details on the recognition of the NDH and the texts of the respective instruments in: Milan Blazekovic, "Dokumenti o priznanju Nezavisne Drzave Hrvatske". Croatian Publication, vol. 37, pp. 9-36, Buenos Aires 1966.

[96] Copies of the documents referred to are in the author's possession.

[97] DGFP XII, No. 389 (Report from the German Legation in Zagreb dated April 23, 1941, to Ribbentrop regarding the conversation with Pavelić concerning the demarcation) and No. 443 (telegram from the Director of the Political Department, Woermann, to the Legation in Zagreb dated May 3, 1941, concerning the agreement on the German-Croatian border).

[98] Official Gazette, Year CVI, No. 153, Zagreb July 11, 1942; Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik, vol. 6, p. 466. Existing documents concerning the Croatian-German delimitation do not justify Hory-Broszat's assertion that, under the Croatian-German agreement, the Pavelić government was compelled to recognize the new Reich border, which ran only 20 kilometers west of Zagreb (Ladislaus Hory-Martin Broszat, Der kroatische-Ustascha Staat 1841-1845, Stuttgart 1964, p. 62). The Third Reich's border moved closer to Zagreb, to almost 20 km, due to Germany's occupation and annexation of most of Slovenia, a fact that the Croatian government could not alter since it was Slovenian, not Croatian, territory. See Note 37.

[99] The protocol between Minister Lorkovic and General Maric on the one hand, and German envoy Kasche and Councilor von Kamphoevener on the other, signed in Zagreb on 17/6/1941, resolved the problems of the delimitation commission, leaving the municipality of Hum to Croatia, while in the Bregana valley the border line deviated from the historical line since the border road belonged to Croatia (Medjunarodni Ugovori 1941, Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ed.).

[100] DGFP XII, Nos. 378 and 385, concerning Ribbentrop's talks with Ciano in Vienna on April 21-22, 1941, regarding the borders or the redistricting of the former Yugoslav territory; No. 363, containing Ribbentrop's instructions to Mackensen regarding Hitler's decision on the German border in Slovenia, which Mackensen had to report to Mussolini. Cf. Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 436-9, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge, London 1948.

[101] Galeazzo Ciano, Tagebücher, Bern, 2nd ed. 1947. The note of April 24, 1941. DGFP XII, No. 396 (Mackensen's report on Ciano's plans for the upcoming negotiations with Pavelić), and No. 428 (Mackensen's report on Ciano's analysis of the negotiations in Ljubljana).

[102] For the text of the law concerning King Zvonimir's crown, see Monatshefte, pp. 467–468.

[103] The text of the agreement is in Monatshefte, pp. 468–469 and in Medjunarodni Ugovori 1941, Croatian Foreign Ministry edition.

[104] Hory-Broszat, op. cit., p. 67.

[105] Medjunarodni Ugovori 1941, pp. 115–122. Border rectification was not achieved. The Italian Nota Verbale of 14/11/1941 - XX contains the Italian point of view, maintaining that the commune of Radatovici belonged to Dravska Banovina (Slovenia).

^[106] DGFP XII, Nº 291 contiene las intenciones generales de Hitler para la organización ulterior del espacio yugoslavo en forma de un memorándum no firmado refrendado por Ritter y Woermann como 2º agregado al documento sumamente secreto OKW/L(IV/Qu) Nº 4434/41 9.Kdos.-Chefs. del 3/4/41, que no fue hallado. Allí, en el punto 2º se dice de Croacia: "Croatia will become an autonomous state, probably under Hungarian influence". En el punto 5º se expresa: "The part (up to the Danube), formerly Hungarian, which borders on Hungary, will fall to Hungary". (Respecto al punto 2º véase DGFP XII, Nº 282 sobre el informe de Erdmannsdorff del 6/4/41, donde se mencionan las promesas territoriales que hizo Hitler a Hungría, "including those regarding Croatia and access to the Adriatic" y el Nº 287 en el que Erdmannsdorff informa el 6/4/41: "Bárdossy remarked further that Hungary did not make any claim to Croatia, since the Croats were unreliable people who had come to terms with Vienna in the past and now with Belgrade. A loose affiliation with Hungary could be considered only if the Croats desired it. On the other hand the Hungarians did desire access to the Adriatic Sea; with respect to that one could come to an agreement also even with an independent Croatian state if there should be one".

En cuanto al punto 5º, es decir, a los territorios que deben pertenecer a Hungría, Hitler dispone en sus "Instrucciones provisorias para la repartición de Yugoslavia" (Vorläufige Richtlinien für die Aufteilung Jugoslawiens, del 12/4/1941 -OKW/W. F. ST./Abt.L. (IV/Qu) Nº 0064/41 g. Kdos) en el punto 2º: "Das Uebermur-Gebiet (Prekomurje) fällt geschlossen an Ungarn im Zuge des historischen Grenze. Eine Aussiedlung der in Nordwestteil des Gebietes lebenden Deutschen für einen späteren Zeitpunkt ist in Betracht gezogen worden. Uebergabe des Gebietes an die Ungarn regelt das Oberkommando des Heeres". (Respecto a Croacia el punto 6º reza: "Kroatien wird innerhalb der Volkstumsgrenzen ein selbständiger Staat. Von deutscher Seite erfolgt keine Einmischung in die innerpolitischen Verhältnisse". En lo concerniente a Bosnia y Montenegro, el punto 7º dice: "Die politische Gestaltlung dieser Gebiete bleibt Italien überlassen". El 14/4/41 Ribbentrop informó telegráficamente a Erdmannsdorff en Budapest que Hungría solicitó "...occupation of the upper Mur region south of the Mur, north of the Drava, the general area east of Maribor", y lo instruyó para que respondiera: "The Führer agrees to the Hungarian occupation of the Prekomurje and region between the Mur and the Drava, in so far as it belonged to Hungary before the World War (I), as soon as the rear comunications of the Second Army permit. The ultimate territorial disposition of these areas shall -independent of the military occupation- be subject to later settlement". Informando del cumplimiento de las instrucciones recibidas, Erdmannsdorff telegrafía el mismo día: "The Regent and the Hungarian Government also laid claim in principle... Mur region and the region between the Mur and the Drava, since it had formerly been undisputed Hungarian territory and had belonged to Hungary but not to Croatia. The Hungarian-Croatian border bad run along the Drava.

To be sure, the Hungarian Government was prepared to negotiate with the Croatians in a friendly spirit later on about the possible return of individual portions of territory between the Mur and the Drava". Sobre el fondo histórico y étnico de Medjimurje, consultar: Dr. Milan Blazekovic, "Poviestna pripadnost Medjimurja", Hrvatska Misao, tomo 14-15, pp. 5-50, Buenos Aires 1955.

[107] DGFP XII, No. 366 contains the report of Weizsäcker, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerning the memorandum of the Hungarian envoy in Berlin, Sztójay, dated April 17, 1941, related to the occupation and postponement of the reintegration of the former Hungarian regions at Hitler's request. The last paragraph states: "Between April 11 and 13, Hungary took possession of the Mur area, the Danube-Drava triangle (Baranya), and the Backa. Through the Regent's proclamation on April 11, Hungary recognized autonomous Croatia." Regarding Medjimurje, it should be noted that, according to the report of the commander of the Croatian cavalry regiment, Ivan Zagar, dated April 16, 1941, the Hungarian army entered Cakovec, the headquarters of Medjimurje, at 4:30 p.m. on April 16, 1941. (See: Dr. Milan Blazekovie, Medjimurje u hrvatsko-madjarskim odnosima, "Godisnjak Hrvatskog Domobrana", pp. 163-174, Buenos Aires 1954).

[108] DGFP XII, No. 396 (the memorandum of 24/4/41 on the results of the German-Italian talks concerning the reorganization of the former Yugoslav territory) and No. 534 (the circular addressed to all German diplomatic missions of 17/5/41, stating that the negotiations and the demarcation of the border were not yet complete, but that the Croatian state encompassed the provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Srijem, Dalmatia (in part), and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

[109] The author has a copy of note No. 1089/41 of May 28, 1941.

[110] The text of the Decree-Law of June 7, 1941, is in "Medjunarodni ugovori," Zagreb 1941; Marko Sinovcic, NDH u svietIu dokumenata, Buenos Aires 1950, p. 251; English text: Lemkin, op. cit., p. 607.

[111] Sinovcic, op. cit., p. 252.

[112] The minutes of June 4, 1941, concerning "the outcome of negotiations on the Croatian-Serbian border territory." The communes comprising the territory of eastern Srijem, which were of particular interest to the German military authorities, were established, and education and the judiciary were immediately placed under Croatian control. In accordance with the aforementioned treaty and by order of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 3522 of July 5, 1941, the Croatian authorities assumed, until July 15, 1941, control of education, the judiciary, internal affairs, forestry, agriculture, and healthcare. The corresponding act was drawn up on July 15, 1941, "regarding the assumption of state administration in the jurisdiction of the city of Zemun and its surroundings by the Independent State of Croatia." This act was signed by the representatives of the Croatian government and the plenipotentiaries of the German military commander in Serbia. On September 25, the act "regarding the negotiations concerning the transfer of Zemun and eastern Srijem to the exclusive administration of the Croatian State" was drawn up.

The minutes indicate that a joint commission was formed to "ensure the supply of the occupying troops and the inhabitants of Belgrade from the territory of Zemun and eastern Srijem"; another commission was also formed to address "customs, monetary, foreign exchange, settlement, and transit issues (especially the passport problem and small-scale border traffic)." The final negotiations then continued in Zemun on October 3, 1941, and were formalized on October 4, 1941, with October 10, 1941, set as the date for the transfer of this territory to the exclusive administration of the State of Croatia. On October 16, 1941, Pavelić thanked Hitler for the return of eastern Srijem, and Chancellor Lorković simultaneously thanked Ribbentrop, who in his reply expressed his satisfaction that "with this new massacre, the final resolution of the border of the new Croatia has been established." (Copies of the documents cited in this note are in the author's possession.) DGFP XII, No. 589 (the telegraphic report of the German envoy to Berlin dated June 4, 1941, concerning the negotiations held in Zagreb) mentions in footnote 4 the treaty of October 4, 1941, and Pavelić's letter to Hitler of October 16, 1941.

[113] The text of this agreement, valuable for assessing the rights and duties of the German army in Croatia, has not been found. A. P. Sereni (op. cit., p. 1149, note 14) probably alludes to this agreement when he writes: "By agreement with the Croatian government, German troops will be stationed in the city of Zemun, on the southern bank of the Danube, for the duration of the war." The Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Koblenz, and even the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt in Freiburg im Breisgau were unable to locate this document.

[114] For the text of this agreement, see: Medjunarodni Ugovori, Zagreb 1941. The border with Montenegro did not entirely satisfy the Croatian government's wishes because of a portion of Sandzak with a Croat Muslim majority. Pavelić discussed this matter with Mussolini on May 18, 1941, in Rome, as the inhabitants of some districts had established Croatian authorities and requested their incorporation into the State of Croatia. In note No. 1089 of May 18, 1941, to the German envoy (see note 46), by which Pavelić established the border line with Serbia that would be occupied by Croatian troops, he stated: "East of the indicated border line lives the Croatian Muslim population, primarily in the districts of Sjenica and Bijelopolje. This population, through numerous demonstrations, delegations, and written requests, expressed a fervent desire to join the independent State of Croatia.

Therefore, I request that the occupation of this border line not be considered a renunciation by the Croatian government of this region." In his letter to Mussolini dated June 13, 1941, Pavelic raised the issue of the borders with Montenegro and, recalling his conversation with the Duce in Rome, proposed "the historical border of that country and Herzegovina as it existed until 1918," and in Sandzak, "the line that connects with the line already established with the German military command in Belgrade in the spirit of the Führer's decision, meaning that the border between Croatia and Serbia will be established by the Croatian government. The delimitation I propose in the Sandzak of Novi Pazar corresponds in general terms to the ethnic composition of that region." This topic was also discussed in Venice on the occasion of Croatia's accession to the Tripartite Pact on June 15, 1941, but the final response was negative.

[115] DGFP XII, No. 388 (telegram to the German envoy in Zagreb, April 23, 1941) and No. 398 (the memorandum of April 24, 1941, on the results of the German-Italian negotiations regarding the restructuring of the former Yugoslav territory) - Cf. Hory-Broszat, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

[116] Cf. Rudolf Kiszling, Die Kroaten, Graz-Cologne 1956, pp. 175-176. The instructions for the implementation of the Zagreb Agreement of June 19, 1942, issued by the Croatian government to its executive bodies in Zones II and III, reveal the establishment of these zones, their borders, and their respective powers. On the pernicious consequences of the Italian reoccupation, namely the creation of Zones II and III, and the non-compliance with the Zagreb Agreement by the Italian military authorities, see Spomenica Ministarstva Vanjskih Poslova o reokupaciji obalnog pojasa i cetnickom pitanju de 1943 (Sinovcic, op. cit., pp. 260-266).

[117] By note verbale No. 1088141 of May 31, 1941, the Italian legation was notified of the Croatian state flag and naval ensign. By note verbale of June 4, 1941, the Italian legation informed the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs that this notification had been forwarded to the Italian government. On the same day, and with an identical note, the Croatian legation in Berlin notified the German government.

[117] [118] According to the text of the notification, most of those States tacitly took note of the indicated signals, while Bulgaria (note No. 397 from its legation in Zagreb, dated September 24, 1941) and Slovakia (note No. 1362 from its legation in Zagreb, dated October 10, 1941) expressly replied that they had no objections to the signals referred to.

[119] For example, with Hungary (verbal notes No. 2019/41, dated July 30, 1941, from the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the foreign ministries of Switzerland and Spain).

[120] See the corresponding texts in Medjunarodni Ugovori 1943, pp. 1-96. The Croatian government delivered the note, dated 1/31/1944 to the International Commission of the Red Cross in which it declared "that the dispositions of the Geneve Convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of war prisoners were, autant que faire se peut, appliquées par analogie aux internés civils, resortissants des pays ennemis, qui se trouveraient en état de "war with the Independent State of Croatia". (Text in Spanish, Studia Croatica, "The Bleiburg Tragedy" Nos. 10-13, pp. 213-285). Croatia, therefore, acted in accordance with the usual practice in international relations when the Tokyo project was adopted at the 15th International Conference of the Red Cross in 1934. A similar obligation was assumed by Germany, Japan, France, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and others. Croatia strictly observed the provisions of the Conventions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war of the United States and Great Britain, countries with which it had been at war since December 14, 1941, after Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia (a debatable declaration of war!), and Hungary had declared war on those countries the day before, while Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States of America on December 11, 1941. While Croatia treated Allied airmen prisoners of war properly, the manner in which the Allied military authorities treated Croatian military and civilian prisoners at the end of the war, in most cases, constituted a violation of said international convention. (See: The Tragedy of Bleiburg, special edition of Studia Croatica, Buenos Aires 1963, pp. 30-33).

[121] Cf. Medjunarodni ugovori 1941.

[122] Ploetz: Auszug aus der Geschichte, ed. 26, Würzburg 1960, p. 1242.

[123] Medjunarodni Ugovori 1941, 1942 and 1943. Cf. Dr. Franjo Zilic, Koje je obaveze bivse jugslavenske drzave preuzela Nezavisna Drzava Hrvastka. "Mjesecnik - glasilo Hrvatskog pravnickog drustva, No. 10, Zagreb 1943, pp. 465-469.

[124] Medjunarodni Ugovori 1941, 1942 and 1943. The special status of the German ethnic group in Croatia (die deutsche Volksgruppe in Kroatien) was not arranged by an international agreement between Croatia and Germany, but by Croatian laws of June 21, 1941 and October 30, 1941, respectively.

[125] Regarding the Croatian and Italian texts of the Rome Agreements of May 18, 1941, see: Medjunarodni ugovori 1941, and regarding the Italian and German texts of the same, see: Monatshefte, op. cit., pp. 468-474.

[126] Sinovcic, op. cit., p. 101; Sereni, op. cit., p. 1149. After the signing of the Rome Agreements and Mussolini's order, the attitude of the Italian army changed. Numerous reports from the Italian occupation zone attest to the excesses of the Italian troops during the first few days.

[127] The permanent commission met several times at Italy's initiative in Rome, Venice, Fiume, and Zagreb, without being able to prepare any agreement, as stipulated by the Rome Agreements. Consequently, Croatia did not sign any treaty with Italy different from those it signed with other neighboring countries. Moreover, Croatia did not observe its obligation not to maintain a naval fleet, as it sent its naval units to the Black Sea. It is therefore correct to conclude that despite German political disinterest and the preponderant military and economic role in Croatia conferred upon Italy by the Agreements of May 18, 1941, "neither the Croats nor the Germans derived from this the consequences" (Hory-Broszat, op. cit., p. 69).

[128] In this study, we have limited ourselves to agreements, treaties, and unilateral legal acts as elements for assessing Croatia's international status, thus omitting the political moments and factual circumstances that motivated them and which are mentioned, where necessary, in the footnotes.

[129] Medjunarodni Ugovori 1943, pp. 317-320. However, the agrément was not granted to Antonio Tamburini, Mussolini's designated envoy, because the national republican government refused to recognize Pavelić's declaration on the dissolution of the Rome Accords. According to the text of Anfuso's note No. 14776 of November 17, 1943, in which he, as Italian ambassador in Berlin, returns as unacceptable the note delivered to him by the Croatian legation in Berlin on orders from his government, Anfuso's account of the refutation of the Croatian note in his work Da Palazzo Venezia al Lago di Garda is not true. There, he spitefully states that he requested another copy, as he could not "part from it because of its numerous seals, which made it a peculiar example of Croatian folk art." See the text of the Italian note in J. Jareb, o. c., p. 110

[130] According to Reinhold Horneffer (Die Entstehung des Staates, Tübingen 1933), the United States of North America was constituted in a revolutionary and therefore illegal manner in 1776 (p. 206), Belgium in 1830 (p. 182), Czechoslovakia in 1918 (p. 235), the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 (pp. 226-229) and Poland in 1919 (p. 246). All these states, until their definitive formation, went through the period of nasciturus, a state in statu nascendi, a state in the making, since in all the cases mentioned, the birth of the state was through secessions, carried out not on the basis of a law from the parent country but as a result of revolutionary acts by the state in statu nascendi, which dictates to itself the norm, the fundamental law, the constitution, and thereby becomes a state in the strict sense of the term. Of course, in the case of Croatia, which emerged during the world war and from there came the occupation of the disappearing state, there is not a total similarity with the origin of the states cited above; there is a similarity only with the states that emerged after the first world war, with the difference that the origin of those states was sanctioned by peace treaties.

[131] Sereni, op. cit., p. 1147.

[132] The view that Albania was in personal union with Italy at that time is also supported by Dr. Bodo Dennewitz in his book Volk und Staat in Lehre, Geschichte und Gegenwart (Staatslehre), Vienna 1943, p. 318.

[133] A. P. Sereni, "The Legal Status of Albania," "The American Political Science Review," Vol. XXXV, pp. 311 ff.

[134] Indeed, the king designated by the head of the House of Savoy did not become the effective king of Croatia, and Italy did nothing to impose him.

[135] Sereni, op. cit., p. 1149

[136] The inaccuracy of this assertion is also demonstrated in the work of General Rudolf Kiszling, "Die Wehrmacht des Unabhängigen Staates Kroatien 1941-1945," published in Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 1965, No. 4, which we reproduce in the Spanish version elsewhere in this volume.

[137] Croatia sent units to the Eastern Front under the supreme command of the German army. Some of these units were taken prisoner at Stalingrad. Milovan Djilas writes about their subsequent fate in Conversations with Stalin, New York, 1962, pp. 39-40. The Croatian volunteers on the Eastern Front, integrated into the Italian army, were few in number and did not distinguish themselves.

[138] Sereni states verbatim: "Thus the subordination of Croatia is not accomplished through legal measures..." (op. cit., p. 1159). However, he believes that a de facto subordination existed, derived indirectly from separate treaties on special matters "and even more through de facto situations which practically give Italy the almost complete control of the whole internal and international life of the Croat state" (ibid.). That this judgment is untenable is proven by the fact of the dividing line between the Allied, German, and Italian troops in Croatia and Germany's predominant political and military position in Europe, since—despite Berlin's formal disinterest in Croatia—its preponderant influence was felt in Croatia.

[139] DGFP XII, No. 634. In the note informing Consul John James Meilly of the Croatian government's decision to close the American consulate, Minister Lorkovic expressly emphasized the obligations undertaken by Croatia upon joining the Tripartite Pact.

[140] DGFP XII, No. 576. In the appendix to this telegram, Berlin suggests that Zagreb, Sofia, and Bratislava declare that they are also at war with England.

[141] Slovakia's declaration of war against the United States is doubtful, as can be inferred from Professor Ferdinand Durcansky's book, Biela Kníha-Právo Slovákov na Samostatnost vo Svetle Dokumentov, Part One, Buenos Aires 1954, pp. 227-234. According to the Slovak constitution, the president of the republic declares war with the prior approval of parliament. In the proceedings brought against President Dr. José Tiso, the prosecution was unable to prove that the president had signed the declaration of war alone or with the participation of parliament. Furthermore, Jack McFall, Assistant Secretary of State, in his letter to Senator James H. Duff, dated October 2, 1951, explained the U.S. State Department's position as follows: "Since the United States never recognized the former Slovak Republic, it did not receive the formal declaration of war through normal diplomatic channels. Therefore, the U.S. government did not take note of the information from the German news agency (DNB), dispatched from Bratislava on December 13, 1941, and published in the 'New York Times,' that the former Slovak government had resorted to this step. The evidence of such a declaration of war found among the State Department's papers is thus only indirect" (op. cit., p. 228).

By analogy, the same criterion should apply to Croatia's declaration of war against the United States, since the circumstances are identical from the American perspective. In the Croatian government's opinion, such a criterion by Washington would be unfavorable to Croatia if the war ended with a compromise, as it would then be excluded from the negotiations. However, the American occupation authorities in Europe treated the diplomatic representatives of Slovakia and Croatia as representatives of countries at war with the United States. Thus, W. M. Dennis (Sp. Agt. C.I.C, -SAIC) addressed a communiqué on July 28, 1945, to the representatives of the former governments of Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Romania, and Italy, their families, and staff, who were then interned in Bad Gastein, Austria, regarding their internment status, expressly stating: "As representatives of a country formerly at war with the United States and/or other Allied countries, you have been interned pending further dispositions." (A copy of this communiqué is in the possession of the author, who was one of the directly concerned parties.) Likewise, the State Department confirmed in 1943 to Mr. Maclintock, the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Helsinki, that it was true that Croatia was at war with the United States of America and that he should sever all contact and conversations with the Croatian plenipotentiary envoy, Dr. Ferdo Bosnjakovic.

[142] Sereni, op. cit., p. 1150.

[143] Hory-Broszat, op. cit., p. 125 (the non-aggression pact between the Serbian Chetnik guerrillas and the Italian General Ambrosio in Dalmatia, dated August 11, 1941).

[144] Cf. Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-1945, Berlin-Frankfurt, ed. 1957, p. 14.

[145] The Croatian government protested vehemently against violations of Croatian sovereignty and other excesses committed by the German military authorities, as in the case of the dismissal of the Prefect of Sarajevo for being hesitant and without consulting the Croatian government (Hory-Broszat, op. cit., p. 141). Hory-Broszat also refers to another case: "When, in April 1944, more than 400 Croatian men and women were killed in Otok, Gruda, and other locations in Dalmatia by members of the SS Division 'Prinz Eugen,' even the German envoy Kasche was outraged and described these excesses as 'unjustified' and 'senseless,' since they were reprisals in most cases against innocent people" (Id., p. 169). In the same passage, mention is made of a report, dated April 12, 1944, by Otto von Erdmannsdorff, advisor and head of the political division of the Third Reich's Foreign Ministry, regarding a protest note delivered by the Croatian chargé d'affaires in Berlin, but without further comment. However, the circumstances surrounding this protest note are interesting and indicative of German-Croatian relations during that period.

Following Italy's surrender in Zagreb, the Ministry for the Liberated Regions was established, headed by Dr. Edo Bulat, who immediately departed with his entourage for Split to assume power on behalf of the Croatian government. Near Klis, they were surrounded by strong communist units. A German armored force rescued them. In recognition of the valor of a battalion of the SS Division 'Prinz Eugen', which had been besieged alongside the Croatians, a street in Split was named after the division. When, later, some units of this same division perpetrated the aforementioned massacre of Croatians in the Cetina region, Minister Bulat renamed the street "Cetinskih zrtava" (Cetina Victims) and sent telegraphic reports to Dr. Stijepo Peric, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who forwarded them to the Croatian legation in Berlin with instructions to lodge the strongest possible protest. Indeed, the protest note demanded the most severe punishment for the responsible German command and threatened "further measures" if this demand was not met. Mr. Sambunjak, in his capacity as chargé d'affaires of the Croatian legation in Berlin, was invited by Councilor Erdmannsdorff. Erdmannsdorff read him the German government's reply without giving it to him and asked him to explain whether Croatia's threat "further measures" meant a declaration of war. The dispute was finally resolved with the resignation of Minister Peric.

[146] This possibility opened up the attempted coup d'état in 1944 by the Ministers of the Army and the Interior (A. Vokic and M. Lorkovic), together with the national deputies of the Croatian Peasant Party (Tomasic and Farolfi). This putsch "should have brought Croatia to the side of the Allies" (Encyclopedia Britannica 1964, "Croatia-Independent State of Croatia"). However, prior to that putsch, and perhaps as its belated impetus, the Croatian state could have survived if the Western Allies had attempted their planned landing on the eastern Adriatic coast, as Churchill had later proposed at the Tehran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943), and which Stalin vehemently rejected, and if in that case they had encountered the opposition of Tito's partisans (Fitzroy Maclean, Tito - the man who defied Hitler and Stalin, Ballantine Books, New York, p. 239), or had they encountered the united communist-German resistance with whom they were allegedly already negotiating for that purpose (Walter Hagen/Wilhelm Hoettl/Die Geheime Front, Zurich 1950, p. 267; Maclean, idem, p. 164; Marcelle Adler-Bresse, "Tito a-t-il négocié avec les allemands?", Revue d'histoire de la 2e guerre mondiale, Paris 1956, No. 22: Jacques de Launav, Secrets Diplomatiques 1949-1945, Brussels 1963, pp. 70/71; Rudolf Kiszling, Die Kroaten, Graz-Köln 1956; pp. 199/200; Hory-Broszat, or. c., pp. 144-146; on these negotiations, at least as far as the suspension of the guerrillas' fight against the Germans and Croatians is concerned, see in extenso: llija Jukic, Pogledi na proslost, sadasnjost i buducnost hrvatskog naroda, London 1965; pp. 148-513). In that case, the plan of the Croatian "White guerrillas," comprised of Ustaše units, might have been realized. They would have joined the Allies on the condition of preserving the Croatian state. This question has remained unexamined until now.

[147] Horneffer, o. c., p. 228.

[148] Charles Rousseau, Droit International Public, Paris 1953, p. 228, (es.: Montenegro, 1878-1918; Géorgie et Arménie, 1918-1921; Etats baltes, 1917-1940; Mandchoukouo, 1932-1945; Croatie, 1941-1945)".

[149] About the development of the state organization and the powers of the occupation authorities in Servia and Montenegro see: Lemkin, o. c., pp. 247-251 and 589-602.

[150] Cf. Hansjörg Jellinek, "Der automatische Erwerb und Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit durch völkerrechtliche Vorgänge, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Staatensukzession", Berlin-Detmold-Köln 1951, p. 193.

[151] Jellinek, idem.

[152] Hans-Joachim Seeler, Das Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht von Jugoslawien, Frankurt am Main - Berlin 1956, p. 30. Furthermore, Melville's opinion is untenable, since, without knowing the reasons for the crisis in Yugoslavia from its constitution in 1918 until 1941, he confuses the causes with their consequences.

[153] Notes Documentaires et Etudes, No. 246, European Series (XLVII) of December 27, 1946, cited according to Jellinek, p. 194. It should be noted here that Article 1 of the approved constitution reads: "The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a people's federal state in republican form, a community of equal peoples who, by virtue of the right of self-determination, including the right of secession, expressed their will to live together in the federal state." This article of the approved constitution does not imply state continuity between the first and second Yugoslavia; on the contrary, it demonstrates that it is a new state. This is demonstrated by all Yugoslav historiography on the scope of the second meeting of AVNOJ (The Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia), as is unequivocally clear from the review of the relevant literature in Jovo Mihaljevic's work "Osvrt na objavljenu gradju i literaturu o Drugom. zasjedanju AVNOJ-a", a review that was published on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of said meeting in Jugoslovenski Istorijski Casopis, organ of the federation of associations of historians of Yugoslavia, No. 14, Belgrade 1963, pp. 2-23.

[154] Jellinek, op. cit., p. 194.

[155] Rousseau, op. cit., p. 298. In light of the documents cited in section III of this study, the characterization of the Axis Powers' recognition of Croatia as co-belligerent is entirely inadequate. (Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, vol. 1, no. 4, London ed. 196, p. 71: "During the First World War, some of the Allied and Associated Powers recognized as co-belligerents both the Czechoslovak and Polish National Committees, and in the Second World War, the Axis Powers granted recognition of a comparable character to the 'Emperor of China,' the State of Croatia, and the Provisional Government of Free India.")

[156] Rousseau, op. cit., p. 349.

[157] Ibid., p. 292.

[158] J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, Oxford 1949, p. 123.

[159] Cf. Jellinek, op. cit., p. 115 and Bohdan Halajczuk, Los Estados conquistados ante el derecho internacional, Buenos Aires 1950, pp. 47-52.

[160] For example, H. Lauterpacht (Recognition in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1947, pp. 27-28) and Chen, T. O. (The International Law of Recognition, London 1951, p. 58) state in almost identical terms that Manchukuo did not have the right to be recognized as a state because, being politically and militarily controlled by Japan, it did not meet the first requirement of statehood, namely, sovereignty exercised by an independent government. Both authors conclude that this also applies to "transient formations like Slovakia and Croatia during the Second World War."

First, it is easy to recognize the transience of a state after the fact; second, Slovakia was not a creation of the Second World War, as it was formed as a state six months before the outbreak of the war and was recognized by all the major powers except the United States; third, the Croatian government was independent in fact and in law in the exercise of state sovereignty, within the sphere of interests to which it belonged. Outside of that community of interests, one could argue about the dependence or independence of the Croatian government only if it had faced an alternative, at which point the degree of its independence could be measured. But, thanks to Anglo-Saxon aid, first to the Serbian nationalist Chetnik guerrillas and then to the communist guerrillas in their struggle against the Croatian state in the first instance and against the Germans in the second, the Croatian government never faced an alternative in the realm of foreign policy. Moreover, political interest is decisive, especially during the war, and is justified in various ways, particularly when it comes to non-recognition. This is clearly reflected in the considerations of A. P. Sereni, who wrote about the legal status of Croatia during its existence, presenting arguments for and against, and concluding: "The refusal of the United States to recognize the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the formation of the Croat state thus appears justified not only on moral and political grounds but on strictly legal grounds as well" (op. cit., p. 1145).

[161] Halajczuk, op. cit. (note 95), p. 46, writes: "Since Serbia was only part of Yugoslavia, we find it preferable to consider that state as one of the successors, as well as Croatia and Montenegro." While Halajczuk considers Serbia and Montenegro to be successors of Yugoslavia, he does not consider the dismembered Yugoslavia a "defeated state," since he believes "that the bordering Yugoslav territories were merely placed under the administration of Hungary and Bulgaria, without being definitively annexed to those states"—which, incidentally, is not accurate—and therefore finds the assumption that it was a total occupation to be well-founded.

[162] Culinovic, op. cit., pp. 353-4.

[163] Ibid., p. 356.

[164] Ibid., p. 369.

[165] It is characteristic of jurists in present-day Yugoslavia that, in justifying the birth of communist Yugoslavia as a new state, they take into account all the legal requirements regarding the origin of a state, namely, that "the state is a fact that is maintained through the exercise of its power and especially through its law," "that it is not fundamental to the origin and existence of a state whether it is recognized by this or that country," etc.

In the case of the independent state of Croatia, however, they deny all these requirements, because that state arose in the territory of the occupied Kingdom of Yugoslavia, whose sovereignty is irreplaceable. Only the communist revolution, with the active assistance of the very allies of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, could have replaced it. However, this political and legal paradox found its solution in the "Tito-Subasic Agreement" of November 1, 1944, and in its implementation at Yalta on February 11, 1945, the final non-compliance of which no one responsible could have doubted. This validated the communist revolution in Yugoslavia, which, as explained, was not an internal problem of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Regarding this matter, and in view of the frequent objections that the sovereignty of the State of Croatia, especially in external affairs, was not complete, we will cite the modern concept of sovereignty as formulated by Dr. Branko Peselj, a non-communist jurist, when he attempted to demonstrate the sovereignty of the ZAVNOH (the Regional Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia) during the period from its formation (June 13, 1943), which later became the government of Croatia on April 14, 1945—that is, while the Independent State of Croatia existed—until the proclamation of the first constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia on January 31, 1946, and subsequently up to the present day. Dr. Peselj states:

"There is little doubt that the modern concept of sovereignty is considerably modified from the concept prevailing a century ago. The classical definition of sovereignty is usually given as "the supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any other earthly authority. The sovereignty, in a strict and narrow sense of the term, implies, therefore, independence all round within and without the borders of the country". (El autor cita como referencias: L. Oppenheim - H. Lauterpacht, H. W. Halleck, W. E. Hall, Fauchille, H. Accioly, Kunz, W. Sauer, Dahn, y luego prosigue).

In the course of the development of international relations, as a consequence of the establishment of many composite states in the nineteenth century and specially with the creation of a great number of new forms of international cooperation in the twentieth century, the concept of sovereignty has undergone considerable modifications. The two most important modifications have been: first, that sovereignty is not necessarily a synonym for a complete international independence (Referencias: Charles C. Hyde, International Law, I, (Boston 1945), p. 126; Green H. Hachworth, Digest of International Law, I, (Washington D. C. 1940), p. 51 y el art. 18 de la constitución soviética de 1936 con su enmienda de 1947); and the second, that the state can remain sovereign even if it agrees that certain sovereign rights, including the conduct of foreign affairs, are to be performed on its behalf by a higher body or another state (Hachworth, o. c., pp. 48-9). In other words, the concept of sovereignty has became in the last few decades much more flexible than originally defined by constitutional and international law, and cannot be appraised today in the strict legal term of absolute values but should be considered in each individual case.

As much as it is clear that the right to enter independently into international relations is still one of the basic requisites of full sovereignty, on the other hand, it cannot be said that the sovereignty of a nation or state is completely destroyed if this single factor is missing. If only three essential elements of sovereignty are present -a distinct group of people, a fixed territory, and an organized government expressive of the sovereign will within the territory- the sovereignty of a nation may be considered as defective but not as entirely lacking. It is from this modern point of view on sovereignty that the constitutional development and the present constitutional status of Croatia are to be evaluated. -Branko Peselj, "Contemporary Croatia in the Yugoslav Federation: Its constitutional status and socio-economic position" en Journal of Croatian Studies, vol. II (1961), pp. 95-96. Nosotros creemos que el Estado de Croacia no necesitaba para su defensa recurrir a este concepto moderno de la soberanía.

^[166] Culinovic, o. c., p. 356.

[167] Cf. the memorandum of Judge Peirson M. Hall, No. 13,467 - PH Civil, published in "The Los Angeles Daily Journal" on July 18, 1952, and July 21, 1952, entitled "Within power of court to determine whether a treaty is in existence." From this memorandum, the interesting fact emerges that the Yugoslav government itself did not invoke the 1902 extradition treaty when, through its ambassador in Washington, it requested the extradition of Andrija Artukovic, former Minister of the Interior of the Independent State of Croatia, from the State Department on March 31, 1951. At that time, the Yugoslav ambassador invoked "the inter-Allied decisions during the last war," the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 "on bestialities," and referred "to the internationally accepted practice in analogous cases." It is significant that the Secretary of State, in his note of May 14, 1951, indicated to the Yugoslav ambassador that the normal judicial process is the only legal avenue for extradition cases and reminded him of the 1901 extradition treaty ("...pursuant to the provisions of the Extradition Treaty of October 3, 1901, in force between the United States and Yugoslavia"). Judge Hall was aware of the State Department's position, quoted it verbatim in footnote 5, and ruled contrary to it, considering the executive branch's viewpoint unconstitutional.

[168] Regarding this issue, the Court of Appeals adopted the State Department's brief, which stated: "...heretofore the Department of State has been looked to for determination of the question whether a specific treaty is still in effect after such changes in government or boundaries. The decision of the District Court, if not reversed, will preclude such a determination..." Regarding the validity of the 1901 treaty, the Court cites the statement of the Yugoslav chargé d'affaires made on September 29, 1921, to the effect that the Yugoslav government considers the treaties and conventions concluded between the Kingdom of Serbia and the United States applicable throughout the territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and states: "...it is conclusive proof that if the combination (i.e., the state community of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Ed.) constituted a new country, it was a successor of Serbia in its international rights and obligations" (Digest of International Law / Marjorie M. Whiteman, vol. 2, Washington 1963, 940/1).

[169] Summarizing its arguments, the Department of State in point II stated that from the documents it is deduced "that the State formerly known as Serbia continued as an international juridical entity upon its enlargement into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, and consequently the treaty rights and obligations of that State continued in force and applied to the whole of its territory." However, in point V the Department of State states: "Opinions of the United States courts have recognized the force and effect of the treaties of commerce and consular relations concluded in 1881 between the United States and Serbia - treaties which rest their validity upon the same legal grounds as the validity of the 1901 extradition treaty (ratified in 1902, N. of A.), namely consideration of Yugoslavia as a true successor State to the Kingdom of Serbia with respect to continuance of its rights and obligations" (Idem, p. 943). Supplementing its arguments with postwar examples, the State Department cites the 1946 exchange of notes between the U.S. and Yugoslavia, which contain the following terms: "...the most-favored-nation provisions of the Treaty for Facilitating and Developing Commercial Relations between the United States and Serbia signed October 2, 1881 shall not be understood to require the extension to Yugoslavia of advantages accorded by the United States to the Philippines" (Ibid.).

[170] Alfred Verdross, Völkerrecht, 5th ed., Vienna 1964, in arguing that courts frequently had to deal with the preliminary question of the effect of a state's origin on international relations (der völkerrechtliche Tatbestand "Staat"), which can arise by way of secession (as in the case of the USA) or the integration of several sovereign states into a new state (as in the case of the German Reich in 1871), in order to decide "at what point the new legal community can be considered a new state," also mentions the case under consideration. On p. 243, note 4, Professor Verdross writes. "Der kalifornische Court of Appeals hat aber im Falle Ivancevic v. Artukovic vom 19. Februar 1954 Jugosllawien als ein vergrössertes Serbien betrachtet. AD 1954, p. 66."

The preposition "but" (aber) undoubtedly indicates the questionable criterion of the Court of Appeal. This dubious ruling by the California Court of Appeals was transcribed from the International Law Report (until 1950, Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases) by Dr. Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern in his book "Practical Cases in Public International Law" (Ediciones Sagitario - 1962, translation of the original Praktische Fälle aus dem Völkerrecht, Vienna 1958).

Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern presents this case in the form of a question (p. 77) and provides the solution (p. 163) as follows: The question: "Under an extradition treaty concluded between the U.S. and Serbia in 1901, Yugoslavia demanded the surrender of a Yugoslav in 1951. Could the individual to be surrendered successfully claim before an American court that he came from Agram, a city that in the "Did the year 1901 not belong to Serbia?" (The court proceeded on the premise that the People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as well as the Kingdom of Serbia, were one and the same state with different names). The solution: "No. Because of the aggrandizement of Serbia at the end of the First World War, the scope of the treaties concluded by the Kingdom of Serbia was automatically extended" (Ivancevie v. Artukovic, 211 F 2d 565 cert. den 348 US 818, I.L.D. 1954, p. 66).

[171] For citations and other details regarding Judge Peirson M. Hall's ruling and the full English text of Judicial Commissioner Theodore Hocke's verdict of January 15, 1959, see the book by Dr. Vjekoslav Vrancic. "Dr. Andrija Artukovic pred sjeveroamerickim sudom," ed. Pequeña Biblioteca Política de "Hrvatska Misao," Buenos Aires, 1959. Its author, a former Croatian minister, was one of the nine defense witnesses at the public hearing that lasted from June 16 to July 8, 1958, followed by the aforementioned judgment of T. Hocke, issued on January 15, 1959.

[172] Cr., International Law Report (London, Butterworth, 1957) IV - Succession with Regard to Obligation for Delinquencies (Torts), pp. 55-63 (abbreviated: I.L.R.) - Digest of International Law, Washington, 1963, vol. 2, p. 767: Croatia "puppet" government not a predecessor.

[173] I.L.R., p. 55 (note). Since, according to that agreement, the determination of compensation must be made by a U.S. agency, the U.S. Senate passed the "International Claims Settlement Act" (Public Law 455) in 1949, establishing the "United States International Claims Commission," which was replaced on July 1, 1954, by the "Foreign Claims Commission of the United States." To better understand this agreement, it should be noted that the total value of the nationalized U.S. assets was estimated at $17 million. This amount was part of the $47 million ($42 million in gold bars) that the Yugoslav destroyer "Beograd" had already transported to London on May 20, 1939, and which were later transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. Tito, as soon as he came to power, demanded the return of those funds, but only after Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform on 28/6/1948, was the agreement of 19/7/1948 concluded, previously delayed because Yugoslavia valued the American assets at 5 million dollars and the United States at 20 million (Cf. Ilija Jukic, "Tito between East and West", London 1961, p. 15; J. B. Hoptner, op. cit., p. 156; Vrleta Krulj, "Povodom izvrsenja Sporazuma izmedju. SAD i Jugoslavije od 19/7/1948 o novcanin potrazivanjima SAD i njezinih drzavljana" - in Jugoslavenska Revija za Medjunarodno Pravo, Belgrade 1963, No. 3, pp. 385-396).

It is characteristic of this agreement that Yugoslavia was able to claim any portion of the $17 million fund that might remain after the payment of the established compensation. The decision regarding the Socony Vacuum Oil Company's claim was made on December 30, 1954 (Digest, p. 767), and according to V. Krulj, the Commission concluded its work at the end of December 1954. A total of 1,556 claims were submitted; the Commission recognized 876 as valid; in 671 cases the claim was rejected, and 3 claims were withdrawn before a decision was issued. The total amount of the approved compensation reached $18,817,904, meaning that the compensation was paid out at 91% of the established sum, excluding interest. By signing the agreement, the United States released $30 million, thus initiating its assistance to Yugoslavia at the most critical moment of the clash between Stalin and Tito. Today, that aid exceeds three billion dollars.

To these figures, we must add those concerning the damage inflicted by communist guerrillas in Yugoslavia, including in Croatia, where Socony's movable and immovable property is located, during the struggle for "national liberation." According to Jovan Marjanovic ("Ekonomska politika nemackih nacistickih okupatora u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945", in Jugoslavenski Istorijski Casopis. No. 4, 1963, p. 92) the guerrillas "had destroyed 157 armored locomotives and 1,123 ordinary ones, 682 armored wagons and 14,310 ordinary ones. In addition, during the same period they made 7,936 km of roads and routes impassable and damaged them, destroying 183 wooden bridges, 720 concrete bridges and 245 iron bridges on the roads." The Argentine Republic resolved the issue of compensation for nationalized Argentine property in the amount of 450,000 dollars through the agreement of March 21, 1964, approved by Law No. 16,923 of 8/16/1966 (Official Gazette of 8/22/1966).

[174] I.L.R., p. 56.

[175] Ibid., p. 61.

[176] Dr. Tihomil Drezga, op. cit., p. 5.

[177] Digest, op. cit., p. 780. Here one can find extensive quotations concerning the differences between "belligerent occupation" and "de facto government" by Professor Sauser-Hall, who points out the danger of equating the two concepts precisely with regard to the question of the identity and continuity of a state. It is significant that Professor Charles Rousseau does not include Croatia among the cases of de facto local government when he cites the cases of de facto general government and de facto local government (Rousseau, op. cit., pp. 308-309).

[178] Digest, op. cit., p. 770.

[179] See also: The Philippines -a Handbook of Information, ed. Republic of Philippines -Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, 1965, pp.

[180] Digest, or. c., p. 769.

[181] Seeler, o. c., pp. 30/31.

[182] For example: Mc Dougal, Myres S. and Florentino P. Feliciano, "Law and Minimum World Public Order -The Legal Regulation of International Coercion" (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1961) on page 313 say: "The changes (the fruits of aggression in Secretary Stimson's phrase) respecting which nonrecognition may be invoked, may include both the cutright annexation of the territory, such as the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936, of Austria and the Sudetenland by Germany in 1938, and of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union in 1940, and the establishment of the "puppet states" such as "Manchukuo" created by Japan, "Slovakia" set up by Germany, and "Croatia" fathered by Italy. The "satellite" government maintained by the effective control of a big power through many various mechanisms presents a more recent type of veiling device.

[183] Cf. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 291 (does not mention Yugoslavia among the cases to which the Stimson doctrine was intended to be applied in Europe during the Second World War); Brierly, op. cit., p. 148; G. Schwarzenberger, op. cit., p. 63; Verdross, op. cit., pp. 170, 222, and 552. By confirming the United Nations Charter in Article 2, paragraph 4, that annexations effected by coercive acts have no legal validity, Verdross consequently considers the prohibition of coercive annexations to be a principle of general international law ("The prohibition of coercive annexations is, therefore, a fundamental principle of general international law"). geworden", p. 228).

[184] DGFP XII, No. 603. The memorandum of June 19, 1941, on the Hitler-Pavelic conversation, in which Hitler declared regarding the origin of the State of Croatia: "The recent events had made him (the Führer) an unintentional instrument of the liberation of Croatia; for actually he had not intended at all to take action against Yugoslavia."

[185] For those who are not sufficiently familiar with internal relations in Yugoslavia, it should be noted here that Draza Mihailovic's movement began in Serbia, where it had its main support and base. In Herzegovina, some members of the Serbian minority joined him. (Editor's note).

[186] A word derived from the Croatian verb ustati (to rise up, to take up arms, to resist). It refers to a resistance movement against the inclusion of Croatia in the Yugoslav state.

[186] [187] Knight of the Military Order of Maria Theresa, which was conferred upon him for his successful defense of Mount Gabriele against the Italians in the First World War.

[188] The Italian troops stationed in Croatia as allied forces, in fact, tried to eliminate the Croatian army by openly supporting the Serbian Chetnik guerrillas, enemies of the Croatian state, and later Tito's partisans (Editor's note).

[189] The Croatian "Black Legion" was commanded by the Ustaša Colonel Jure Francetic, one of Croatia's national heroes, who distinguished himself through his daring and bloody exploits.

[189] The Croatian "Black Legion" was commanded by Ustaša Colonel Jure Francetic, one of Croatia's national heroes, who distinguished himself through his daring and bloody exploits. [190] Until the communist guerrillas became strong enough to carry out forced recruitment, in Croatia they relied almost exclusively on the support of the Serbian minority, discontented with the defeat and disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1941. This minority joined the communist ranks hoping, first and foremost, to restore Yugoslavia to its former role as an enlarged Serbia (Editor's note).

[191] The author did not deem it necessary to mention here the important political reasons that motivated these changes and which he addresses in his book, Die Kroaten. Minister Vokic, along with Interior Minister Lorkovic, was preparing a Badoglio-style coup d'état with the aim of bringing Croatia onto the side of the Allies. The conspirators intended to form a new government under the leadership of Dr. Vlako Macek, president of the Croatian Peasant Party, which, between the two wars, won an overwhelming majority of the vote in every election in Croatia. Vokic and Lorkovic believed that this decisive action would secure Dr. Ante Pavelic's consent. Instead, they were arrested and killed by the end of the war. In the new government, Tomás Sertic was put in charge of the armed forces portfolio. See further details: Rudolf Kiszling, Die Kroaten. Der Schicksalweg eines südslawen volkes, Graz-Cologne, 1956, pp. 210-11; Studia Croatica, Nos. 10-13, pp. 115-17, 1963 (Editor's note).

[192] Reproduction in Spanish authorized by the author and the Austrian magazine Oesterreichische Militär Zeitschrift which published this work in No. 4/1965. (This article is largely based on a study by the Croatian Lieutenant General Fedor Dragojlov, who died on December 8, 1961, in Florida, Argentina. The general framework for this work is provided by my book, "The Croats - The Destiny of a South Slavic People" (Die Kroaten, Der Schicksalsweg eines Südslawenvolkes), published in 1956 by Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, Graz-Cologne. I have also consulted: J. Schwarz: "Croatia Fought Shoulder to Shoulder with Germany" (Kroatien kämpfte Schulter an Schulter mit Deutschland), Deutsche Soldaten- und National-Zeitung, Nos. 1-4 of 1961; P. Wackers: "Die Einsatzstaffel der deutschen Mannschaft und die übrigen bewaffneten) Units of the German People's Group in Croatia 1941-1945" in Feldgrau, No. 2, 1/4/1962).

[193] This refers to northern Croatia, governed by the ban (prorex) and the Diet of Zagreb, which, after the retreat of the Turks, that is, from the 18th to the 20th century, covered an area of 43,822 km². It was divided into the zupanie (comitatus) of Lika-Krbava, Modrus-Rijeka, Zagreb, Varazdin, Pozega, Virovitica, and Srijem. The ban and the Diet, by virtue of their legal and state powers, represented the millennia-old continuity of the Kingdom of Croatia with the attributes of sovereignty. The main aspiration of the Croatian national movement during the Austro-Hungarian period was to unite all Croatian regions under the rule of the ban in Zagreb, namely Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Istria.

[194] Old unit of area: jutro (cadastral yoke) equals 7454 m².

[195] This refers to the territory that, between 1815 and 1918, was one of the provinces of the Austrian Crown (Kronland), populated almost exclusively by Croats. Dalmatia was the cradle of the medieval Croatian national monarchy, which, according to the renowned historian Domingo Mandić, had already achieved full organization with constitutional laws at the Diet held in 753 in the field of Duvno, in present-day western Bosnia.

[194] Old unit of area: jutro (cadastral yoke) equals 7454 m².

[195] This refers to the territory that, between 1815 and 1918, was one of the provinces of the Austrian Crown (Kronland), populated almost exclusively by Croats. [196] Milan Ivsic, Chair of Social Economy at the University and Higher School of Economic and Commercial Sciences in Zagreb, in his book Les problemes agraires en Yugoslavie, with a preface by Victor Boret, Paris, 1926.

[197] The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was internationally recognized under the 1919 peace agreements. In 1929, the dictatorial King Alexander I of the Serbian Karageorgevic dynasty abolished the constitution and decreed that it would henceforth be called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This was intended to erase the Croatian national identity. The Kingdom of Croatia, after 1250 years of continuous existence, was annexed to Serbia as just another territory, divided into small administrative units and governed centrally from Belgrade. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1941 and was restored in 1945 by the communists as the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Since 1964, it has been called the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The communists, therefore, retained the name Yugoslavia, imposed by the dictatorial King Alexander.

[198] Ivan Mestrovic: Uspomene na politicke ljude i dogodjaje, Buenos Aires, 1961.

[199] "Dr. Ante Trumbic - Problem Hrvatsko-srpskih odnosa" - Munich, 1959.

[200] Dr. Ante Pavelic, a dentist and Vice-President of the National Council in 1918, should not be confused with his namesake, a lawyer, who was the head of the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945.

[201] Dr. Milan Ivsic: op. cit.

[202] M. Stojadinovic was an influential official in the Zagreb Land Reform Directorate and a key figure in Serbian colonization in Croatia.

[203] M. Lorkovic: Narod i zemlja Hrvata, Zagreb.

[203] M. Lorkovic: Narod i zemlja Hrvata, Zagreb. [204] In the political trial initiated against the Croatian peasants who took part in the rebellion, the author of this article acted as defense counsel.

[205] "To my Croatian friends and brothers, apostles of a nation that has emigrated to the United States to prepare, by the sweat of their brow, a better future for their homeland."

[206] During the trial brought by the Yugoslav communist authorities in 1959 against Andriy Artukovic, former Minister of the Interior of the Independent State of Croatia, presided over by Judge Theodor Hocke in the Los Angeles courts, the defense regrettably omitted any mention of the agrarian reform carried out in Croatia by the Serbs. This was a very opportune moment to offer the distinguished American judge the chance to clarify this aspect of Serbian-Croatian relations as well, just as he did on the political, economic, and cultural fronts. This judge demonstrated an exceptional ability to grasp reality, to link causes with their effects, and surely in his acquittal he would have emphasized more forcefully that the restoration of Croatian national independence in 1941 was the consequence of a natural evolution. See the article on the trial in Studia Croatica, 1960, No. 1, pp. 94-95.

[207] Milan Blazekovic: Illustrious Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Turkish Empire, "Studia Croatica", 1965, Nos. 16-19, pp. 299-311.

[208] Dominik Mandic: Bosnia and Herzegovina - Croatian Provinces, "Studia Croatica", Nos. 16-19, pp. 53-220; see especially on the origin of the present-day Serbs in Bosnia, Chapter IV, pp. 192-220.

[209] Fuad Slipcevic: Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Berlin Congress to the First World War (in Croatian), Zagreb 1954, p. 42.

[210] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

[211] Dr. Oton Franges: Agrarian Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Hrvatska Enciklopedija" vol. II. - Franges was a minister in the dictatorial government of King Alexander, established in 1929, but as a specialist in agrarian policy, he had to acknowledge that agrarian reform in Bosnia was "disorganized, disorderly, and that a large number of prestigious and traditional Muslim families were proletarianized."

[212] Some 12,000 inhabitants, exclusively from the urban population, in a province of 643,000 souls according to the Austrian census, including the city of Zadar, which belonged to Italy from 1918 to 1943.

[213] Cf. Studia Croatica, special edition "The Tragedy of Bleiburg."

[214] Ibid.

[215] Jure Petricevic, Agrarian Policy in Yugoslavia, "Studia Croatica", 1961, pp. 117-129; Failure of Titoism in Agriculture and in the Countryside in General, "Studia Croatica", 1962, pp. 309-324, Buenos Aires.

[216] Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Mexico City-Buenos Aires, 1953, Vol. II, p. 281.

[217] Ibid., p. 291.

[218] Milan Blazekovic, Illustrious Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Ottoman Empire, "Studia Croatica", 1965, Nos. 1-4, pp. 299-311.

[219] Ibid.

[220] Pedro Vukota, Croatia in Blavian Geography, "Studia Croatica", 1965, No. 1, pp. 48-57.

[221] Vjekoslav Klaic, Poviest Hrvata, vol. 1, p. 240.

[222] "Et tale tibi auxilium praestabimus, ut nostra tibi promissa clementia per totum terrarum orbem solis clarius innotescat et huius rei memoria usque ad ultimum mundi diem et extremum iudiciam permaneat", V. Klaic, op. cit., p. 2.56.

[223] Fernand Braudel, op. cit., p. 289.

[224] Vjekoslav Klaic, op. cit., p. 258.

[225] F. Braudel, op. cit., p. 290. Here, certain historical comparisons are necessary in connection with the current policy of De Gaulle's Fifth Republic toward NATO. While Maximilian was preparing to defend the West against the Turkish threat—which some contemporary authors compare to the current communist threat—the French ambassador Fourquevaux expressed the wish "that the Great Lord of the Turks would be obstinate and persevere in his Hungarian enterprise; for otherwise the plague of Germany will become too fearsome if matters are settled on that front," ibid., p. 290.

[226] On Glagolitza, see: Marko Jupundzic, La Glagolitza croata, "Studia Croatica" 1964, Nos. 1-2, pp. 55-76.

[227] At that time, the term Sclavonia often encompassed all the Croatian provinces. Cf. P. Vukota, op. cit.

[228] Stjepan Ivsic, Podsijedanje i osvojenje Sigeta u glagoljskom prijepisu hrvatskoga opisa iz g. 1566 ili 1567 (The siege and conquest of Siget in the Glagolitic transcription of the Croatian description of the year 1566 or 1567), Starine Jugoslavenske Akedemije Znanosti i Umjetnosti 36, Zagreb 1918.

[229] F. Braudel, op. cit., part II, p. 291.

[230] Vazetje Sigeta grada, slozeno by Barni Charnarutichu Zadraninu, in Venetia MDLXXXIII

[231] "Decretun, kotarega je Verböczy Istvan dijacki popisal... od Ivanusa Pergosica na slovienski jeziktrabajojen"; Nedelisce 1574.

[232] "Elektra tragedija, Ljubmir pripovijest pastirska, Ljubav Pirama i Tizbe. Iz vece tudjih jezika u hrvatski slozeno. K take su pristavljene njekoliko pjesni u smrt od razlicieh. Po Dominku Zlatarichu. V Bnecieb po Aldu. MDCVII." It is worth noting that the collection contains the Croatian translation of Torquato Tasso's Aminta, translated by Zlataric directly from the manuscript, so his Croatian version was published before the Italian original. Zlataric studied in Padua and was elected rector there.

[233] Odiljenje Sigestsk (Siege of Szigeth), Linz 1684. Second edition, Vienna 1685.

[234] Obsidio sigethana. Carmen heroicum Croaticum.

[235] Szigeti veszedelem "Adriai tengernek Syrenaia", Vienna 1651.

[236] "Adrianskoga mora sirena" - Count Peter Zrinski - Stampana v Bneczih pri Zamarij Turrinu, Leta MDCLX.

[237] Frublja stovinska, in praise of His Excellency ban (prorex) Pedro Zrinski, author of the Mermaid of the Adriatic, this poem by VIadislav Iera Mincetic, nobleman of Dubrovnik. In Ancona nella Stamperia Generale, MDCLXV.

[238] Vjekoslav Klaic, Povjest Hrvata (History of the Croats), Volume III, p. 154. Klaic published the genealogy of the Zrinski family back to Nicholas Sigetski. The author of this study completed it using other sources.

[239] Milan Blazekovic, op. cit.